The socio-technical construction of precision bombing : a study of shared control and cognition by humans, machines, and doctrine during World War II by O'Mara, Raymond P. (Raymond Patrick)
The Socio-Technical Construction of Precision Bombing:
A Study of Shared Control and Cognition by Humans, Machines, and Doctrine
During World War H
by
Raymond P. O'Mara
Colonel, United States Air Force
B.S. Electrical Engineering, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1987
Masters Aeronautical Science, Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, 1995
Master of Military Operational Art and Science, Air University, 2001 ARCHNES
Master of Airpower Art and Science, Air University, 2002
Master of Strategic Studies, Air University, 2008
Submitted to the Engineering Systems Division in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Technology, Policy, and Engineering Systems
at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
June 2011
C 2011 Raymond P. O'Mara. All rights reserved.
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly paper and electronic copies of
this thesis document in whole or in part in any medium now known or hereafter created.
Signature of Author
T Engin ing Systems Division
A // 17 May 20/
Certified by
Professor of
David A ldaddUf
Francis and David Dibner Professor of the History of Engineering and Manufacturing
Aeronautics and Astronauit and Director, Program in Science, Technology, and Society
Thesis Supervisor
Certified by
Certified by
- L- I Sheila E. Widnall
Institute Professor and Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Owen R. Cote, Jr.
Principal Research Scientist and Associate Director, MIT Security Studies Program
Accepted by
Stuart Madnick
John Norris Maguire Professor of Information Technology & Professor of Engineering Systems
Chair, ESD Dissertation Defense Committee
A , - =;--r r- X-- - - t7

The Socio-Technical Construction of Precision Bombing:
A Study of Shared Control and Cognition by Humans, Machines, and Doctrine
During World War 11
by
Raymond P. O'Mara
Submitted to the Engineering Systems Division
on May 17, 2011 in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Technology, Policy, and Engineering Systems
Abstract
This dissertation examines the creation and initial use of the precision bombing system
employed by the United States Army Air Forces during World War II in the opening phase of the
Combined Bomber Offensive against Germany. It presents the system as distinctly socio-
technical, constructed of interdependent specially trained humans-the pilot, navigator, and
bombardier-purpose-built automated machines-the Norden bombsight and the Minneapolis-
Honeywell C-1 Autopilot-and the high-altitude, daylight bombing (HADPB) doctrine, all of
which mutually shaped each other's creation and use.
The first part of the study establishes the relationship between the HADPB doctrine, the
humans, and the machines, presenting the bombardment system as a three-level socio-technical
system designed for optimum control at all levels. It describes the elements at each level, their
design for use as a system, how they initially employed the system, and how their actions caused
a revision of the HADPB doctrine, in the process redefining precision from a system perspective
and significantly changing the system's social structure.
The second part of the study examines the actions performed by the three principal socio-
technical members the bomber crew, and determines the specific tasks and roles accomplished
both the humans and machines within the system. It establishes what the crewmembers did,
analyzing their professional construct, the machines that shaped their professional identities, how
the humans and machines, through distinct processes of shared control and cognition,
accomplished the tasks associated with precision bombing-flying, navigating, and bombing-
and how the HADPB doctrine affected their actions. It focuses on how technology, by granting
varying levels of control over the task of flying the aircraft, created conflict over control of the
system itself, and how command, a uniquely military function granted organizationally and
doctrinally to the pilot, served as arbiter of that conflict.
This study establishes a perspective for the future study aerial combat systems, and a
better understanding of the organizational and social impact of the increased use of automation in
those systems, particularly relevant to the discussion surrounding the expanded use of remotely
piloted aircraft by the United States Air Force in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
You lived and died alone, especially infighters. Fighters. Somehow, despite
everything, that word had not become sterile. You slipped into the hollow cockpit
and strapped and plugged yourself into the machine. The canopy ground shut
and sealed you off Your oxygen, your very breath, you carried with you into the
chilled vacuum, in a steel bottle. Ifyou wanted to speak, you used the radio. You
were as isolated as a deep-sea diver, only you went up, into nothing, instead of
down.
James Salter, The Hunters'
Remote warfare has changed the enduring truth of the past 5,000 years of war. A
growing number of soldiers wake up, drive to work, sit in front of computers and
use robotic systems to battle insurgents 11,300 kilometers away. At the end of a
day "at war, " they get back in their cars (and) drive home.... The most
dangerous part of their day is not the dangers of the battlefield but the commute
home.
Peter Singer, War of the Machines2
The two accounts above describe the same thing-air warfare and the relationship
between the humans and machines involved. The first, penned by James Salter, a former U.S.
Air Force (USAF) fighter pilot during the Korean War, reflects a romantic view of aerial
warfare-the notion of the solitary warrior, the pilot the master and the machine the servant
becoming one to form a singular, lonely flying being. It envisions the Knight of the Air
venturing off to fight single, mortal combat. The second, written over five decades later by Peter
Singer of the Brookings Institution, reflects a more contemporary, sterile view of air warfare-
the 'unmanned,' automated aerial killing machine, tenuously tethered through the ether to a
control station thousands of miles away from the scene of the violence, with the faceless pilot
protected safely within. It is the science fiction-inspired battle of the future. Studies in contrast,
each view captures an aspect of modern air warfare, but both mischaracterize the complexity of
the socio-technical systems that employ airpower and the relationship that exists between
humans, machines, and ideas that comprise them.
In Salter's Korean War-era novel, The Hunters, protagonist Cleve Connell typifies the
romantic, literary-influenced portrait of the fighter pilot-the steely-eyed killer with exceptional
James Salter, The Hunters (New York: Vintage Books, 1956), 193.
2 P. W. Singer, "War of the Machines," Scientific American, July 2010, 62.
eyesight and coordination who is the master of a highly complex, deadly machine. An expert at
aerial gunnery, Connell is defined by his skill at jockeying his aircraft through the sky, exploiting
its strengths and accommodating its limitations while seeking victory against his North Korean
opponent in one-versus-one combat. Risking death at every turn, professional recognition comes
through superior individual performance in battle. Connell's pursuit of the ultimate professional
aviator status-that of fighter ace, an aviator with five air-to-air kills-drives and consumes him,
for achieving that rare milestone is the surest confirmation of his flying skill and the route to
professional validation and personal glory.3 In this endeavor, he competes not only with his
North Korean foe, but with his compatriots as well, for they doggedly pursue the same
recognition that he seeks. It is a savage competition, with great rewards for the most skillful,
victorious elite and professional anonymity for those who fail. For James Salter, air combat is a
human-centric activity, with the aircraft serving as an inanimate tool, pressed into service, its
only function to enable the pilot to attain his goal, and the aircraft operator plays the lead role. It
is a perspective reflected in much air combat literature, from fiction to biography to historical
narratives.
Cleve Connell's human-versus-human world stands in stark contrast with Peter Singer's
view of air warfare. In Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 2 1" Century,
Singer describes a very different type of combat, one in which automated machines-those that
enable robotics-replace the human in warfare systems and themselves become "the very agent
of war." 4 Singer describes an air combat that is conducted through "remote split operations,"
where automated machines allow faceless aircraft operators to remain thousands of miles away
from their aircraft, protected from the violence of the battlefield while their machines assume all
of the physical risks of warfare.
In these remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) systems, the humans' role is far more ambiguous
than that of Salter's Korean War fighter pilot. RPA operators observe the battlefield on
television screens while sitting in a metal box, much like a shipping container, connected to a
large communication system through several umbilical cables. These cables are the operators'
3 The elite status of the fighter ace was established in World War I and played a large role in the glorification of
airmen. See Lee B. Kennett, The First Air War 1914-1918 (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1999);
Peter Fritzsche, A Nation of Fliers: German Aviation and the Popular Imagination (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1992).
4 Peter W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century (New York, NY: The
Penguin Press, 2009), 194.
connection to the world, providing all of their sensory input-video captured from a camera on
the RPA, voice communication between and with personnel involved in or supporting the battle,
internet chat rooms with other participants who have no voice communication. They also carry
the operators' commands to RPAs flying over the battlefield-speed up, slow down, turn, point
the camera at a particular threat, employ weapons-and all of it depends upon an elaborate,
complex datalink communication system consisting of cables, antennas, transmitters, and
receivers hosted on a constellation of satellites. For Singer, aerial warfare has become machine-
centric, where the human plays the supporting role.
In Singer's machine-centric force, the humans' role as a combatant is no longer clear, and
as the RPA operators have no opportunity to face their opponent in the traditional sense, the
route to professional distinction even less so.5 In the RPA system, only the machines are actually
at the scene of the battle. Whereas Connell earned accolades and recognition for acts of superior
tactical prowess and bravery, RPA operators are far removed from the battlefront, distant and
detached, unrecognized as anything more than a faceless element in a complex network of
humans and machines. Yet, RPA operators too fight, but it is the machine that plays the lead
role-and increasingly so as RPAs assume a progressively larger role in modern combat.
But is either perspective correct? More importantly, does either perspective accurately
capture the truly complex relationship between humans, machines, and the ideas that guide the
use of these socio-technical systems? Fifty years ago, was the pilot truly the independent master
of aerial system? Have automated machines in current systems replaced humans to the extent
that they have become the new "agents of warfare" and the human is minimized to a mere
system component? Why should we care?
The USAF has dramatically increased its use of RPAs in the past fifteen years as
advances in automation and remote and supervisory control have steadily increased their
5 Greg Jaffe, "Combat Generation: Drone operators climb on winds of change in the Air Force," The Washington
Post (Washington, DC, February 28, 2010), sec. A, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/02/27/AR2010022703754_pf.html (accessed 1 March 2010); Houston R.
Cantwell, "Beyond Butterflies: Predator and the Evolution of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle in Air Force
Culture" (Master's Thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 2007); Mark Thompson, "Air Force
Predator Drone Pilots: A New Kind of 'Top Gun'," time.com, October 5, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1927766,00.html (accessed 6 October 2009); Edward
Helmore, "US Air Force prepares drones to end era of fighter pilots," guardian.co.uk, August 23, 2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/22/us-air-force-drones-pilots-afghanistan (accessed 6 August
2010).
warfighting capabilities. 6 RPA systems have evolved from unarmed surveillance-only systems
to strike-capable platforms able to carry multiple types of ordnance, and demand for their
presence in combat theaters has skyrocketed. From 2008 to 2009, the USAF increased its
number of fielded RPAs by 330 percent, and converted 87.8% of manpower billets freed up
through the retirement of legacy, human-piloted fighter systems to support increased RPA
operations. 7 In fact, the USAF's new emphasis on RPAs is so great that in fiscal year 2009, it
trained more pilots for RPAs than pilots for manned aircraft, and by 2011, the RPA pilot
community will be second in size only to the F-16 pilot community.8 This distinct shift toward
an RPA-centric air force, where the aircraft operator is removed from the aircraft itself, has
caused the pilot-dominated USAF to have to consider some of the issues raised by Peter Singer's
version of air combat, principle among them the role of the pilot in the organization and the role
of airpower as a military instrument.
The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade have created a demand for
persistent airborne surveillance over the battlefield, necessitating long missions that extend
beyond normal human pilot endurance limits. Technological improvements in automation and
remote and supervisory control, however, have enabled the transfer to complex machines many
of the previously human tasks and skills required for flying and employing aircraft. This transfer
has allowed RPA systems to perform missions that were previously unachievable by traditional
human-piloted systems. The automatic pilots that control RPAs for much of the time that they
are airborne, "flying" the aircraft for the human operator on the ground, are not subject to those
same physiological limits, and are thus able to fly these longer missions, making them more
useful and flexible in application.9 In short, the automatic pilot is able to fly these missions
6 In FY97, the total USAF RPA fleet consisted of two MQ-1 Predator RPAs. By FY09, that total had grown to 126
M/RQ-1 Predator/Reapers and RQ-4 Global Hawks. See Col. James C. Ruehrmund, Jr., USAF (Ret.) and
Christopher J. Bowie, Arsenal of Airpower: USAF Aircraft Inventory, 1950-2009, Mitchell Institute Studies
(Arlington, VA: Mitchell Institute Press, 2010), 47.
7 Michael B. Donley and General Norton A. Schwartz, 2010 Air Force Posture Statement: Presentation to the
Committee on Armed Services United States Senate (Washington, DC: United States Air Force, February 9,
2004), 9-10.
8 Lt Col Lawrence Spinetta, "Letters - Air Force Community - Air Force Times--The Coming UAS Revolution",
August 10, 2009, http://www.airforcetimes.com/community/opinion/airforce_opinion-letters_081009/
(accessed 2 September 2009).
9 RPAs can stay airborne much longer than human-piloted aircraft, as they are limited only by the amount of fuel
and ordnance that they can carry. Human-piloted systems are additionally limited by the amount of time
that the pilot can remain alert, how much oxygen the aircraft can carry, and the pilots basic physical
stamina. While physical limitations are largely eliminated, RPAs continue to be the focus of a great deal of
"better" than a human pilot, which creates an uncomfortable situation for some in the USAF, as
flying skill has historically played a strong role in the professional identity, organizational
culture, and leadership structure of the organization. 10
Removing the pilot from the aircraft has also significantly improved the safety of the
human in the system by further removing the aircraft operator from the 'point of execution' on
the battlefield. This increased distance has virtually eliminated concern about operator exposure
to risk from enemy fire, which challenges the traditional concept of the aerial warrior, as typified
by Salter's fighter pilot." The extensive use of automation in RPA systems also raises other
penetrating questions, and appears to openly challenge the traditional view of the pilot and of
flying itself. If we separate the humans from the aircraft and allow machines to fly, do we even
need pilots, who are the traditional warrior class and leaders of the Air Force, to operate them?12
In 2009, the Chief of Staff of the USAF commissioned a study to examine that very issue,
looking at "current (RPA) manning paradigms and their ability to accommodate rapidly evolving
human factors research. See "The Persistence-Plus Cockpit," AirForce-magazine.com, July 24, 2009,
http://www.airforce-
magazine.com/DRArchive/Pages/2009/July%/o202009/July%2024%202009/ThePersistence-
10 PlusCockpit.aspx (accessed 27 July 2009).
Throughout its history, the USAF has cultivated a flying culture, and aviators, specifically pilots, have
traditionally led the organization. See Vance 0. Mitchell, Air Force Officers: Personnel Policy
Development, 1944-1974 (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, United States Air
Force, 1996); Brian J. Collins, Behind the Cyberspace Veil: The Hidden Evolution of the Air Force Officer
Corps (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008).
Distance from the battlefield enemy eliminates battlefield risk to the RPA operator, but exposes them to other
potential threats. Deployed combatants are able to control their exposure to enemy threats to varying
degrees through force protection measures that manage risk. However, the fact that many RPA operators
work from locations in the United States, living at home and commuting to work, reducing the ability to
apply traditional force protection measures. However, to date there have been no reported attacks on U.S.-
based RPA operators. See David Axe, "A man and his drones: on the front line of robotic warfare,"
Wired co.uk, December 2, 2009, http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2009-12/02/a-man-and-his-drones-
on-the-front- line-of-robotic-warfare.aspx (accessed 3 December 2009); David Zucchino, "Drone pilots
have a front-row seat on war, from half a world away," Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles, CA, February 21,
2010), http://www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-fg-drone-crews21-
201 Ofeb21,0,5789185,full.story (accessed 31 March 2010).
Carol Ann Alaimo, "Will drones push fighter pilots out of the cockpit?," Arizona Daily Star (Tucson, AZ, July
26, 2009), http://azstarnet.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/article_877afc9c-a0ce-5f4b-b690-
760b0ce74fa9.html?mode=story (accessed 21 May 2010); Peter Almond, "Manning Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles: Fighter Pilots or Geeks?," RUSI Defence Systems (June 2009): 79-82,
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/UnmannedVehiclesFighter Pilotsor__GeeksRDSSummer_0 9 .p
df; Joshua Gramm and Steven Papp, "An Insatiable Demand: 'Manning' the US Air Force'sUnmanned
Aircraft Systems with Capable Pilots", March 31, 2009; Thompson, "Air Force Predator Drone Pilots: A
New Kind of 'Top Gun'."; Julian E. Barnes, "Training the Top Guns of drone aircraft," latimes.com, June
7, 2009, http://articles. latimes.com/2009/jun/07/nation/na-topgun-drone7 (accessed 6 August 2010).
and emerging missions."13 Conducted by the Air Force Research Institute (AFRI), its principal
finding was that
The RPA is a new paradigm of airpower (that)
A) Disrupts the status quo and requires new thinking, and
B) Redefines the "pilot" role.14
The study went further to conclude that, as a new paradigm of airpower, the RPA demands
"organizational and cultural transformation."' 5 The conclusion that the RPA is a new paradigm
is significant and it portends great potential upheaval and change. The concept of the paradigm,
much abused, originates in Thomas Kuhn's classic book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
Kuhn advanced the paradigm as the foundational belief structure held by a particular social
group that informs its view of the world and how it solves problems, binding together a group of
otherwise "disparate" humans. 16 The RPA as a new paradigm is thus inherently disruptive, as it
implies that the "old" paradigm is no longer valid and that the underlying beliefs of the current
social group require reconstruction in accord with the new worldview.
If the RPA is, indeed, a new paradigm, the USAF must undergo seismic organizational
change in its structure and leadership in order to adapt to the new world. Who becomes the new
"pilot" and leads the organization? What role will pilots play in that new world? The new
foundational belief implied by a new paradigm, however, extends beyond organizational
leadership and personnel issues to the very fundamental ideas, or doctrine, that have guided
airpower's use for the past century. As Singer points out in Wiredfor War, doctrine "shapes
everything that the military does," and if RPAs represent a new paradigm for the USAF, then its
doctrine must change.' 7 Doctrinal change is difficult and expensive for a military force, as it
influences weapon system acquisition and determines the types of people it recruits and trains.
What is more, if you get doctrine wrong, the consequences can be catastrophic, as the military
may be unable to perform its mission.
13 Colonel Tim Schultz, "UAS Manpower" (PowerPoint presentation presented at the Future Operators Symposium,
Maxwell AFB, AL, July 21, 2009), notes, slide 2.
14 Colonel Tim Schultz, "UAS Manpower Strategy" (PowerPoint presentation presented at the Future Operators
Symposium, Maxwell AFB, AL, July 21, 2009), slide 4 (emphasis added).
15 Schultz, "UAS Manpower," slides 2, 4, and 7.
16 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure ofScientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,
1996), x, 10, 294.
17 Singer, Wiredfor War, 208.
Has the RPA truly changed the way that the USAF must organize, train, and equip its
forces to the extent that a century of experience in employing airpower is no longer valid? The
answer to that question is critical, as it means the difference between tearing down the
institutional house, destroying the foundation, and rebuilding at great expense, versus merely
adding a new wing onto the existing structure that accommodates the new, unique capabilities
supplied by RPA systems. However, before we may answer it, we must identify and understand
the phenomena underlying the issue. Essential to Singer's and AFRI's conclusions is the
assumption that the aircraft operator's physical location is a critical factor. For Singer, the RPA
breaks thousands of years of warfare tradition and replaces the operator as the very agent of war.
For AFRI, the RPA actually redefines the pilot's role in the aerial combat system. Is their
assumption correct? Therein lies the central question.
How has the physical dislocation of the operator, enabled by automation
technology, changed what the RPA operator does as compared to what a
manned-aircraft operator does?
Answering that question requires an historical understanding of how humans have used machines
and automation in aerial combat systems, and how the institutional beliefs held by the
organization shaped and were shaped by those same humans and machines.
The Research Project
The research project started as an effort to provide a more complete answer to the above
question by establishing what manned-aircraft operators do and why they do it from a broader
historical perspective, examining how aircraft operators used machines and automation to
accomplish their jobs within several socio-technical aerial combat systems that performed a
specific aerial combat mission-precision bombing-and how USAF doctrine shaped and was
shaped by their actions. The initial project proposal included a detailed examination what
aircraft operators actually did while accomplishing their jobs, tracing their actions and
interactions with the major automated machines during a typical combat mission, across three
major manned precision strike systems that spanned an historical period that included major
doctrinal change, and establishing how their relationship with those machines developed. Upon
completion, the results of the research could then be paired with a similar study of RPA
operations to determine how, or if, automation has changed the role of the aircraft operator.
The weapon systems chosen for inclusion represented both significant doctrinal change
and incorporated major automated machines that affected how the aircraft operators
accomplished their jobs. These included:
1. Period:
Doctrine:
Technology:
2. Period:
Doctrine:
Technology:
3. Period:
Doctrine:
Technology:
World War II
High-altitude, daylight precision bombing (HADPB)
The B- 17 Flying Fortress/four-engined heavy bomber
The Norden bombsight
The Minneapolis-Honeywell (M-H) C-I Autopilot
Vietnam era
Low-altitude, day/night, all-weather precision strike
The F-Ill Aardvark
The Terrain Following Radar
The Integrated Navigation/Weapon System Computer
Post Vietnam
Medium altitude, night, high-threat, surgical strike
The F- 117 Nighthawk
Forward/downward-looking Infrared targeting system
Automatic pilot
Stealth
The results from the analysis of these independent socio-technical systems was then to be
compared to establish whether there was an identifiable relationship between humans, machines,
and doctrine within the precision strike mission that could inform the discussion surrounding the
significance and use of automation in RPA systems.
It soon became apparent that the proposed project suffered from two critical flaws. First,
it was far too broad for completion in a single study. Second, no prior research had established a
conceptual mutual relationship between humans, machines, and doctrine. Nothing had been
done to link them in a systematic fashion that demonstrated how they functioned together as a
socio-technical system, influencing and shaping each other as reflected in how the humans in the
system did their jobs.
The second flaw presented an opportunity-establish a conceptual mutual relationship
between humans, machines, and doctrine from a socio-technical system perspective and, as this
is an historical study, the logical choice to fix the first flaw was to "begin at the beginning." The
scope of the research was thus narrowed to address the first case only: the high-altitude, daylight
precision bombing (HADPB) doctrine, the B- 17 four-engined heavy bomber, the Norden
bombsight, and the M-H C-I Autopilot. This study is thus designed to take the necessary first
step toward understanding what aircraft operators do-how they perform their jobs, how they
accept and use automated machines in those jobs, how those machines influence and shape their
professional identities, and how military doctrine shapes and is shaped by human action within
the system.
Research Scope
This study examines the creation and initial use of the precision bombing system
employed by the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) during World War II in the opening
phase of the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) against Germany. It presents that bombing
system as a distinctly socio-technical entity, constructed of specially trained humans, purpose-
built automated machines, and the HADPB doctrine, all of which mutually shaped each other's
creation and use. The study establishes the relationship between the HADPB doctrine and the
humans and machines chosen to execute it by examining first the structure of the system,
presenting it as a three-level socio-technical system, describing the socio-technical elements at
each level, how the system was designed to be used, including the primary automated machines
involved, and how it was actually used in practice. It then examines the actions and tasks
performed by the three principal socio-technical elements of the heavy bomber crew-the pilot,
the navigator, and the bombardier-describing and analyzing the professional construct and
creation of the individual human crewmembers, the machines that shaped their professional
identities, how those humans and machines accomplished the necessary tasks associated with the
precision bombing mission-flying, navigating, and bombing-and how the HADPB doctrine
affected their creation and use.
The decision to examine this particular case is appropriate beyond the fact that it is the
first chronologically. The HADPB doctrine was the USAF's first clearly developed and
expressed doctrine. Its development and execution served as the basis for the decision to
separate the USAF from the U.S. Army after the war and create a separate air force, and the
doctrine itself is central to the organization's cultural self-identity to this day.' 8 Understanding
how doctrine affects technological choice and human action in the USAF requires an
examination of HADPB doctrine.
The four-engined bomber is appropriate for the study because its crew performed all of
the tasks within the precision bombing mission accomplished in all past and present USAF
precision strike aircraft systems-flying to the target, navigating to the target, and bombing the
target. Additionally, it was in these aircraft that those roles were first performed by separate
human-machine elements. For this study, I have chosen to examine the B- 17 Flying Fortress as
the particular aircraft system. Although the United States built more B-24s during the war, B-
17s saw more action in the early phase of the CBO that is under examination, and it possesses an
iconic status and is perhaps the best-known aircraft flown during the war.19 The B-17 was also
the first aircraft equipped with the Norden bombsight and the M-H C-I Autopilot, the two
principal automated machines addressed in this study. Additionally, there is no evidence that
indicates that the experiences of the B-24 crewmembers were appreciably different from that of
the B-17 crewmembers, thus we can generalize any conclusions drawn across the systems.
The Norden bombsight and the M-H C-I Autopilot were two of the first automated
machines to get wide use in military aviation and tied tightly to the HADPB doctrine. The
Norden bombsight is the forefather of the precision targeting systems presently in use in combat
and was the first fielded bombsight with an automatic bomb release mechanism. Its precision
bombing capacity to put a bomb "in a pickle barrel" from 20,000 feet was the critical capability
at the ideological center of the HADPB doctrine. The M-H C-I Autopilot requires examination,
because it was the key machine that made the Norden bombsight as accurate as it was, and it had
a significant impact on the professional existence of both the bomber pilot and bombardier.
Also, the autopilot is the machine that enables the RPA to perform its mission without an
18 Some argue that the HADPB doctrine was actually the last clearly expressed USAF doctrine, as well. Its long-
term effect on the USAF structure diminished as mission emphasis shifted away from strategic attack, but it
remains a foundational element is the service's identity. See Carl H. Builder, The Icarus Syndrome: The
Role ofAir Power Theory in the Evolution and Fate of the U.S. Air Force (New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction Publishers, 1994); James Mowbray, "Air Force Doctrine Problems: 1926-Present," Airpower
Journal VIV (Winter 1995), no. 4 (1995).
19 The United States built 12,692 B-17s and 18,190 B-24s during the war. I. B. Holley, Jr., Buying Aircraft:
Materiel Procurementfor the Army Air Forces (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History,
Dept. of the Army, 1964), Table 11, p. 550.
operator on board the aircraft, thus understanding its historical context is essential for extending
this study to the present day issue.
The human elements chosen for study include the pilot, the navigator, and the
bombardier. The bombardier and pilot were obvious choices, as they operated the two primary
automated machines mentioned above. The navigator was not initially included, as at the start of
World War II there was no automated machine associated with navigation. However, navigation
is a technology-dependent, critical task accomplished within the bombardment system, and
looking beyond World War II has been the subject of much automation. Additionally, it soon
became apparent that limiting the definition of automation to mechanical or electrical
automation neglected this key part of the bombardment system from a socio-technical
perspective, as the maps, charts, and forms used by the navigator played a key role in
mechanizing both navigation and the navigator, thus making the navigator worthy of inclusion.
Notably absent from this study is consideration of the use of radar in the precision
bombing mission. During the later stages of World War II, radar emerged as an integral part of
the precision bombing system as well as the Allied and German air defense systems, but those
who created the HADPB doctrine during the 1930s were unaware of its existence when they
developed the formation tactics that were integral to the doctrine. They constructed the HADPB
doctrine for visual bombing only, and did not consider the potential effect that early warning
radar or radar-aided anti-aircraft gun systems might have on the German ability to defend against
bomber attacks. 20 The tasks, roles, and machines examined in this study were developed
specifically for visual bombing, and when radar was introduced, it changed significantly the
tasks accomplished by both the bombardier and the navigator. Examination of that change is the
next logical step in the longer-term effort to determine how humans use machines and how
machines shape human actions and professional identity.
When addressing a topic as broad as this, even with the stated limitations, it is important
to include what the study is not. It is not a history of the Combined Bomber Offensive. That
20 Well after the war, Major General Heywood Hansell, one of the principal architects of the HADPB doctrine, was
quoted as saying "If our air theorists had had knowledge of radar in 1935, the American doctrine of
strategic bombing in deep daylight penetrations would surely not have evolved." See Thomas H. Greer,
The Development ofAir Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941 (1985. Reprint, Office of Air Force
History, U.S. Air Force, 1953), 60. For more on the impact of radar on the course of World War II, see
Robert Buderi, The Invention That Changed the World: How a Small Group of Radar Pioneers Won the
Second World War and Launched a Technological Revolution (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
history has been written many times, with the best effort made in 1970 by author Noble
Frankland in his classic book Bomber Offensive.2 1 It is also not an account of all of the
American bombing operations during the war. The opening phase of the CBO, prior to the
introduction of radar, was chosen as it was the clearest expression and execution of the HADPB
doctrine as developed before the war, although the air campaign in the Pacific shared similarities
with the CBO in Europe.
Although it is a sequential examination of the major tasks that the pilot, navigator, and
bombardier accomplished during the mission, as related to the primary machines under
consideration, this study is not an end-to-end narrative of a bombing mission. Nor are the
actions and events examined taken from the same mission. The sequence and actions are
assembled from numerous sources from official directives and histories to personal interviews
and narratives to construct a "typical" picture of what the crew accomplished during a bombing
mission. Each chapter, however, does open with a narrative from a single mission, Mission
#111, flown against targets in and around the city of Bremen on 8 October 1943, told from the
perspective of the subject under examination in that chapter to set the appropriate context for the
discussion.
The study is also not a human-centric tale of the strong social relationship that developed
between the members of the bomber crew during the highly-charged, emotional atmosphere of
the bombing campaign, although that is an essential part of the experience of the men who
fought in the CBO. Again, many authors have provided excellent accounts along these lines,
including Donald Miller's outstanding Master's of the Air: America's Bomber Boys Who Fought
the Air War Against Nazi Germany, and Stephen Ambrose's The Wild Blue: The Men and Boys
Who Flew the B-24s Over Germany, 1944-45.23 While this study in no way minimizes the very
human context of aerial warfare, it instead concentrates on the relationship between the
crewmember, his machine, and the HADPB doctrine.
21 Noble Frankland, Bomber Offensive: The Devastation of Europe (New York: Ballantine Books, 1970).
22 For more on the airpower war in the Pacific Theater, see Alvin D. Coox, "Strategic Bombing in the Pacific, 1942-
1945," in Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment, ed. R. Cargill Hall (Washington, DC: Air Force History
and Museums Program, 1998), 253-382.
23 Donald L. Miller, Masters of the Air: America's Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War Against Nazi Germany
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006); Stephen E. Ambrose, The Wild Blue: The Men and Boys Who Flew
the B-24s Over Germany 1944-45 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002).
Theoretical Foundations
This research and analysis for this project draws upon several bodies of literature,
including the sociology of scientific knowledge, human factors engineering, and science and
technology studies. These bodies of literature provide the theoretical building materials that
enable us to understand the nature of military doctrine as a social construct and establish its
relationship to the humans and machines that physically make up the socio-technical bombing
system. They also provide insight into how humans and machines interact in socio-technical
systems and understand the relationship between them.
Doctrine is to military operations what scientific theory is to academic research. Each
provides the intellectual foundation upon which practitioners pursue and build new capability or
knowledge. Scientific theory is the accepted knowledge, or paradigm, that leads a coherent
group of practitioners through the exploration of 'normal science.' It defines the art of the
possible and acceptable, firmly guiding the research direction and objectives of the adhering
community of practitioners.2 4 Rooted in the sociology of scientific knowledge, this perspective
reveals that theory is a fundamentally social construct, subject to the acceptance and approval of
the dominant scientific group. Similarly, doctrine is a socially constructed body of knowledge,
supported and advanced by the dominant military community of practice that guides the conduct
of military operations. Just as important, it guides how the community of practice considers new
problems and defines the field of acceptable solutions, which consequently affects what methods
and technologies are acceptable to implement those solutions.
The relationship between doctrine and technology is a subject well explored by
historians, with a general focus on the failures associated when the two are not harmonized, or
how one shapes the development of the other.2 5 Political scientists, likewise, have explored the
relationship, but generally within the larger context of organizational behavior, international
24 Ludwik Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press, 1981);
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions; Edward W. Constant, The Origins of the Turbojet Revolution
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).
. B. Holley, Jr., Ideas and Weapons: Exploitation of the Aerial Weapon by the United States During World War
I. A Study in the Relationship of Technological Advance, Military Doctrine, and the Development of
Weapons (1953. Reprint, Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983); Builder, The Icarus
Syndrome; I. B. Holley, Jr., Technology and Military Doctrine: Essays on a Challenging Relationship
(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2004); Stephen L. McFarland, America's Pursuit of
Precision Bombing, 1910-1945 (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995); Martin L. Van
Creveld, Military Lessons of the Yom Kippur War: Historical Perspectives (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage
Publications, 1975).
relations, or innovation.26 What remains unexplored is how doctrine shapes not only the
technologies chosen, but how the humans in the system use them. This human-machine
relationship reveals itself in the way that humans share tasks with machines based upon
expertise-how they work together to accomplish their mission, and central to this is the concept
of humans and machines working together within a socio-technical system.
Human factors engineering, which grew out of scientific management and cybernetics
theory, examines the human-machine relationship through a systems approach, focusing on the
physical and cognitive interface between the humans and machines. However, the strong
tendency toward modeling humans within the system as uniform elements avoids the 'messy'
social inputs, outputs, and artifacts, cloaking the impact that professional identity or
organizational cultures have on the way that operators use or view machines. However, as
modern systems have incorporated more automation, new understandings of how humans and
machines relate have progressed beyond simplistic work models. The concepts of shared and
supervisory control, where humans and machines share tasks based upon their particular
expertise evoke a more cooperative relationship, with all elements working together toward a
common goal.28 In spite of this advance in concept, human factors still generally underplays the
social effect of the increased use of automation to perform tasks and skills that have traditionally
been hallmarks of highly-skilled professionals, such as aviators. There is also a tendency in this
field to "black box" a machine, and neglect its own social structure-the designer's ideas and
beliefs embodied in the final design that influence how and why the machine is used.
Opening up that socio-technical "black box" is central to this study's examination of the
bombardment system. To open the box and examine its contents, we turn to theorists in the
Science, Technology, and Society (STS) field, who examine the creation of knowledge. STS
26 Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1991); Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the
World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Owen Cot6, "The Politics of Innovative Military
Doctrine: The U.S. Navy and Fleet Ballistic Missiles" (Ph.D. Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 1996).
27 Frederick Winslow Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management (New York: Harper & brothers, 1911);
Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics: Or, Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine, 2nd ed.
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965); Thomas B. Sheridan, "The System Perspective," in Human Factors in
Aviation (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1988), 27-50.
28 Thomas B. Sheridan, Telerobotics, Automation, and Human Supervisory Control (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1992); Raja Parasuraman, Thomas B. Sheridan, and Christopher D. Wickens, "A Model for Types and
Levels of Human Interaction with Automation," IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics,
Part A: Systems and Humans 30, no. 3 (May 2000): 286-297.
scholars investigate the social construction of scientific and technological knowledge, exposing
the assumptions, negotiations, trades, compromises, and physical realities and limitations that
distinctly mold the technology's form and make it a social object. 29 They examine the whole of
the socio-technical system, refusing to acknowledge any separation of the social and technical,
emphasizing the influence of context and culture on the development and use of technology.30 It
is a system construct that does not unnecessarily privilege the human over the technical, but one
that enables a clearer understanding of how the elements function as a system, sometimes
working together and other times at odds with each other. It is STS that enables us to construct a
socio-technical system that extends beyond human and machine, incorporating the doctrine that
unifies the bombardment system under examination.
Method and Structure
As an historical study covering the development of a socio-technical system comprised of
several interdependent doctrinal, human, and machine elements, several options present
themselves for organization. One approach is to structure it in the order described and examine
first the doctrine, then the human bomber crewmembers, and then the machines that they used.
This approach, however, serves poorly the very interdependent nature of those elements that is
under examination. A second option, the one chosen, is to organize the study by the tasks
accomplished during a precision bombing mission-flying, navigating, and bombing-but first
address the doctrine that defined the tasks, then the tasks individually by looking at the humans
and machines that together accomplished them. This approach lends itself more readily to a
logical discussion of the bombardment system from its structure through its employment, and as
such the entire project consists of six chapters, including this introduction, broken down as
follows.
Chapter 2 examines the doctrinal creation and structure of the socio-technical
bombardment system built by the U.S. Army Air Corps after World War I and used by the
USAAF in the opening phase of the CBO against the Germans during World War II,
29 Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Construction ofScientific Facts (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1986); Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through
Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988).
30 Latour and Woolgar, Laboratory Life; Donald A. MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: An Historical Sociology of
Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990); Donald A MacKenzie, Mechanizing Proof
Computing, Risk, and Trust (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).
concentrating on the intermediate and highest levels of the system." It presents the
bombardment system as a set of interdependent human, machine, and doctrinal socio-technical
elements that all worked together to accomplish a common purpose, each shaping the function
and structure of the others. First, it opens the bombardment system "black box," and defines it as
a socio-technical system of interdependent humans, machines, and ideas, describing the role that
those ideas serve as military doctrine, the guiding beliefs that shape the humans and machines in
military systems, and how doctrine shapes and integrates them. Second, it describes the
foundations and structure of the doctrine of High-Altitude, Daylight Precision Bombing
(HADPB), exploring how it laid the ideological foundation for the creation of the bombardment
system used during World War II. Third, it describes the structure of the bombardment system
as a three-layer system, comprised at the lowest level of individual human-machine elements, at
the intermediate level of the bomber aircraft, typified by the B- 17, and at the highest level of the
bomber formation. Finally, it examines how the system, initially employed as intended in
accordance with the doctrine, was changed in response to operational realities, and how that
change affected the way in which the system was controlled. These concepts lay the foundation
for the succeeding chapters.
Chapters 3 through 5 cover flying, navigating, and bombing, describing the historical
development of the individual socio-technical elements of the bombardment system-the pilot,
the navigator, the bombardier, and their associated machines-and how certain machines and
their unique ability to use those machines helped form their professional identities. The actions
of each are described and analyzed, focusing on how the human used machines to determine
what he really did during the mission to accomplish his task, and how those actions were shaped
by and shaped the HADPB doctrine. Finally, each chapter draws conclusions about the
relationship between the humans, their machines, and the doctrine. There is overlap in these
chapters, as each individual human was a member of the bomber crew, itself a socio-technical
unit and with extensive interaction between the constituent elements, and it is often not possible
to understand the actions of one crewmember outside of the context of the actions of the other
crewmembers. Additionally, some of the pertinent machines, the M-H C- 1 Autopilot in
31 The U.S. Army Air Corps and the U.S. Army Air Forces are the two immediate predecessors of the current
United States Air Force. The Air Corps existed from 2 July 1926 to 20 June 1941, when it became the
United States Army Air Forces. The USAAF became the USAF on 17 September 1947. This study refers
to the organization to as the Air Corps during the period leading up the initiation of the CBO, and to it as
the USAAF after the initiation of the bombing campaign.
particular, are relevant to more than one crewmember, and understanding their role in the system
requires expanding the discussion beyond the primary crewmember under examination.
Chapter 3 examines the flying and control element of the bombardment system and
focuses on the bomber pilot. It describes system control at the single aircraft and larger
formation levels as a process of shared control between a specially trained human operator, the
pilot, and several humans and machines based upon their unique capabilities. First, it describes
the development of the bomber pilot from initial creation as a technical specialist, valued for his
flying skill, to a generalist and commander, valued for his skill as a system controller and
military commander. Second, it describes the pilot's actions on a bombing mission, exploring
the complex nature of controlling the bombardment system at the aircraft and formation levels,
and how the doctrine of HADPB and the machines he used to execute that doctrine shaped those
actions. Third, it explores how the pilot, as the aircraft commander, shared control with the
copilot, navigator, and bombardier to accomplish the mission. Finally, it examines the
introduction of the autopilot and the pilot's acceptance of it as a machine that enhanced his
command of the aircraft through the ability to share control of the flying task, and how its use
created the need for the pilot to develop a new skill set.
Chapter 4 examines the navigation socio-technical element in the bombardment system
and focuses on the bomber navigator. It describes aerial navigation on a bombardment mission
as a complex, automated process of shared cognition, conducted by a human technical specialist
and the unique computational machines and navigational technologies that defined him
professionally. First, it describes the creation of the bomber navigator as a single-task, technical
specialist, reluctantly accepted as a non-pilot member of the bomber crew only under the
demands of the HADPB doctrine and rapid wartime expansion, whose skills were rooted in the
tradition of maritime navigation and who was defined by his mastery of a complex set of
specialized instruments. Second, it describes aerial navigation as a shared cognitive process,
wherein the navigator used purpose-built calculating tools to translate and integrate several sets
of diverse data in what Bruno Latour called a "centre of calculation" to build idealized textual,
temporal, and spatial models of the bomber mission, which then served as execution-level
instructions for the conduct of the mission. Third, it examines the navigator's flight working
environment as a second "centre of calculation" and the tools that he used to try to recreate those
models in the air to navigate his aircraft to the target of the day. Finally, it examines how the
HADPB doctrine shaped his actions in flight based upon his position in the overall bombing
system, and how unique calculating machines mechanized those actions.
Chapter 5 examines the bombing socio-technical element in the bombardment system. It
describes bombing as a singular, socio-technical task, accomplished by a human-machine system
consisting of a bombsight designed to make up for human shortcomings in real-time integration,
calculation, and precision flying, and the bombardier, a specially trained human, defined
professionally by his ability to operate that bombsight, whose primary function was to act as an
environmental and contextual sensor and interpreter for the bombsight, providing it the data it
required to do its job. It examines how the mastery of the bombsight defined the bombardier and
created him as a professional being, and how the subsequent evolution of the doctrine of high-
altitude, daylight precision bombing (HADPB) dismantled that identity. First, it describes how
bombsights developed to make up for the human inability to solve the bomb dropping problem in
real-time. Second, it presents the Norden bombsight as the solution to that problem, describing
how it developed as a complex mechanical computer that automated as much of the bombing
process as possible, how it solved the bomb release point problem by creating an real-time,
dynamic analog of the aircraft-target physical relationship, and how its integration with the
aircraft autopilot enabled the bombardier to realize that solution. Third, it describes the
engineering of the bombardier as a single-task, technical specialist whose professional identity
was completely defined by his mastery of the bombsight, how his ability to find, identify, and
track the target made him an interdependent part of the socio-technical bombing element, and
how his actions were mechanized to enable that element to function during the most high-stress
portion of the bombing mission. Fourth, it describes the bombardier's role as an essential
cognitive element in the system and how he built visual and mental models that enabled him to
interpret the physical environment and provide the bombsight the necessary data to solve the
bombing problem. Finally, it examines how the HADPB doctrine and drop-on-leader formation
bombing largely dismantled the bombardier as a professional entity by requiring that his unique
professional skill exist only in one small part of the overall bombardment system. Chapter 6
concludes the study, drawing general conclusions from the previous four chapters and
forecasting them forward, laying the groundwork for the next phase of the research.
Sources
This study drew on research from both primary and secondary sources. Archival work
was done at the U.S. Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), the National Museum of
the United States Air Force, the archives of the Mighty Eighth Air Force Museum, the digital
archives of the National Archives and Records Administration, the Rutgers University Oral
History Archives of World War II, the 3 9 0 th Bomb Group Museum, the Office of the Air Combat
Command Historian, and the Office of the Air Force Materiel Command.
Research regarding the development of the HADPB doctrine and the structure of the
bombardment system draws mostly upon primary sources, including the original writings of
early airpower theorists, foundational Army Air Corps doctrine documents, the Bombardment
Aviation instructional texts used at the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) during the two decades
between World Wars I and II, and interviews with and memoirs written by USAAF officers who
developed, evolved, and executed the doctrine. Much has been written about the HADPB
doctrine, assessing both its validity and effectiveness, but quite often, the foundational ideas that
led to its creation are either biased or misrepresented, leading to inaccurate assessments and
32
erroneous conclusions. The early theorists' writings were particularly valuable, as they
provided an undistorted view of how the first airpower visionaries perceived the capabilities of
the newest weapon of warfare, enabling us to see how those ideas were realized in both the
HADPB doctrine as well as the humans and machines designed to execute it.
The foundational doctrine documents and the instructional texts were valuable, as they
captured the state of airpower thought at the time, and also reflected what was taught to airpower
practitioners. They, of course, represent the institutional view of what airpower practice should
be, and are not necessarily a perfect reflection of what those who actually practiced it thought.
However, it was the institution as a whole that went to war, and the ideas captured within these
sources were the dominant influence on how the individuals executed their mission. The oral
histories and personal memoirs rounded out the institutional view, illuminating the process of
doctrinal adaptation to the realities of warfare, providing the depth and color to the debate that
surrounded that process, and how the doctrine changed with experience. These sources,
32 Distortions are frequently found in writings that wish to address the "morality" of the bombing campaigns against
Germany and Japan, portraying them as bombing campaigns against the civilian populations. See A. C
Grayling, Among the Dead Cities: The History and Moral Legacy of the WWII Bombing of Civilians in
Germany and Japan (New York: Walker & Co, 2006).
however, present their own biases and distortions, as they were written and told by men
concerned with their own personal legacies and the perception of their roles and actions in a very
contentious military campaign. Personal rivalries between participants also colored their
perceptions, and great care was taken to verify claims of thought or action with multiple sources.
Research on the pilot, navigator, and bombardier draws on both primary and secondary
resources. Primary sources included official directives, training, and instructional manuals that
described what each crewmember did and was responsible for during a bombing mission. These
official documents provided the structure for the model of the human action, but again, presented
what each crewmember was supposed to do. The actual actions of the humans participating in
the bombing missions were sure to vary, but overall, these documents defined their tasks and
responsibilities most thoroughly, and linked them to the overall mission purpose. Bomber
crewmember memoirs, oral histories, and videotaped interviews provided the personal element
and color lacking in the official manuals and rounded out the official description of their tasks.
These sources provided the personal perspective, illuminating the professional and social
relationships that the bomber crewmembers had with each other as well as with the machines
that they used to accomplish their jobs.
Secondary source research included several Air Force Historical Studies, many written
very soon after the events that they described using primary source data. These studies provided
excellent focused summaries and access to data that otherwise scattered through multiple
locations and archives, and the quality of the research that went into them is generally
outstanding. Also used were several well-researched volumes written by Roger Freeman, the
expert on Eighth Air Force Operations in Europe during World War II.33 His work has proven
beyond reproach and provided an excellent foil against which to compare other works for both
accuracy and content.34
The written memoirs, oral histories, and interviews used for research during this study
deserve a final, separate comment. There is no shortage of published personal memoirs covering
the bombing campaign during World War II, the AFHRA, the Mighty Eighth Air Force
The archives at the Mighty Eighth Air Force Museum in Savannah, Georgia, are named in honor of Roger
Freeman.
34 See Roger A. Freeman, The Mighty Eighth: Units, Men and Machines (A History of the US 8th Army Air Force)
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1970); Roger A. Freeman, The Mighty Eighth War
Manual (London: Jane's Publishing Company, Ltd, 1984); Roger A. Freeman, The Mighty Eighth War
Diary (Motorbooks Intl, 1990); Roger A. Freeman, B-17 Fortress at War (London: Ian Allen Ltd, 1977).
Museum, and the Rutgers University Oral History Archives of World War II all have extensive
collections of oral histories recorded by veterans of the CBO, and in recent years, individual
bomb group associations have flourished and made great efforts to capture the history and
experiences of the men who fought in those units during World War II, recording and
transcribing hundreds of videotaped interviews with these veterans. These sources vary greatly
in quality, but virtually all share one characteristic-they do not describe what the author or
interviewee was actually doing during the mission. It is infrequent that one describes in any
detail the seemingly mundane individual actions necessary for performing the mission that are of
interest for this study. More often, they relate stories that revolve around the bomber crew and
the experiences that they shared-how they fought, killed, and died together. They capture,
better than any other source, the sharp, personal, and visceral nature of aerial combat, and
prevented this study from becoming a sterile, distanced examination of some event in the distant
past, defined only by words printed on dusty pages.
This research study is necessarily incomplete, but provides the intellectual groundwork for
the discussion surrounding the increased use of automation in warfare. It is only the first step,
but contributes to the fuller understanding of how human operators in other highly technical
systems are affected by the adoption of automated machines, particularly those associated with
strong professional identities, dominant organizational culture, or potent guiding doctrine or
theory, such as commercial aviation, manned spaceflight, or undersea exploration.
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Chapter 2
Assembling the Socio-technical-The Birth and Structure of the Bombardment System
8 th Air Force Mission Number ].: Bremen
Friday, 8 October 1943. The beginning of "Black Week." The 8th Air Force launched
399 heavy bombers from the 1", 2nd, and 3 rd Bombardment Wings from over a dozen air bases
scattered around England, destined for targets around the German cities of Bremen and
Vegesack in one of the largest Combined Bomber Offensive missions to date. The B-i 7sfrom the
3 rd Bombardment Wing, each flown by a crew of specially trained aerial warriors, assembled
over the English town of Lowestoft, first into Squadrons, then Groups, and finally into the
massive 3rd Combat Wing, before they departed for the European continent on time, precisely as
planned
Led by the crew of B-1 7 42-3393, Just-A-Snappin', of the 100t Bomb Group's 4 18th
Bomb Squadron out of Thorpe Abbots, England, the 3rd Bombardment Wing flew over the
English Channel in near-perfect formation toward the island of Borkonny, where they would
enter the European continent. The Luftwaffe launched several waves offighters to challenge the
massive bomber force, but most were intercepted by the 274 P-47 Thunderbolt escort fighters
accompanying the formation for defensive protection. As the three Combat Wings turned over
Borkonny toward Bremen, however, the German defensive anti-aircraft flak batteries came to
life, and began to batter them.
Crossing the Initial Point for the bomb run over the city of Emden, the Wings split into
individual Combat Box formations for the bomb run. Ahead, the bomber crews could see black
flak clouds ahead, hovering above the city of Bremen, and the bomber pilots tucked their aircraft
more tightly into the formation, decreasing the distance between aircraft to mere few feet, while
the bombardiers prepared the bomb run. Stricken by the flak, several bombers fell enroute to the
target, many taking their crews with them to the unforgiving ground below. In a span of eight
minutes over Bremen, the 3rd Wing B-1 7s dropped 130 tons of bombs on their targets, many
scoring direct hits. During that time, the anti-aircraft fire intensified and struck several more
bombers, including the lead aircraft, Just-A-Snappin', which could not maintain the pace and
fell out offormation.
Following the attack, the formations turned west for their unescorted return trip to
England, and as the P-47s had already left short offuel, they had to fend for themselves against
successive waves of attacking defensive fighters. Although they shot down several, the fighters
soon shifted their attention to the wounded, straggling bombers that could not keep up, and
destroyed several more as they struggled to get home. When the survivors finally returned to
England, the 8 th A ir Force leadership evaluated the results. The mission was a success, as the
bombers had accurately dropped 544.74 tons of bombs on their targets, and the crews claimed to
have shot down 167 enemy aircraft and damaged 85 more. But that success had come at a
significant cost. Thirty bombers were destroyed, including Just-A-Snappin', and 236 more
suffered signficant damage. Four men were known dead, 56 wounded, and another 301 missing
in action, last seen as their aircraft went down in flames. Nevertheless, the next day, they took to
the skies once again, destined for new targets in their bombing campaign against Germany.I
1 Adapted from Edward Jablonski, Flying Fortresses. The Illustrated Biography of the B-I 7s and the Men Who
Flew Them (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965), 184-195; Frank D. Murphy, Luck of the
Introduction
This chapter examines the doctrinal creation and structure of the socio-technical
bombardment system built by the U.S. Army Air Corps after World War I and used by the U.S.
Army Air Forces (USAAF) in the opening phase of the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO)
against the Germans during World War II, concentrating on the intermediate and highest levels
of the system.2 It presents the bombardment system as a set of interdependent human, machine,
and doctrinal socio-technical elements that all worked together to accomplish a common
purpose, each shaping the function and structure of the others. First, it opens the bombardment
system "black box," and defines it as a socio-technical system of interdependent humans,
machines, and ideas, describing the role that those ideas serve as military doctrine, the guiding
beliefs that shape the humans and machines in military systems, and how doctrine shapes and
integrates them. Second, it describes the foundations and structure of the doctrine of High-
Altitude, Daylight Precision Bombing (HADPB), exploring how it laid the ideological
foundation for the creation of the bombardment system used during World War II. Third, it
describes the structure of the bombardment system as a three-layer system, comprised at the
lowest level of individual human-machine elements, at the intermediate level of the bomber
aircraft, typified by the B-17, and at the highest level of the bomber formation. Finally, it
examines how the system, initially employed as intended in accordance with the doctrine, was
changed in response to operational realities, and how that change affected the way in which the
system was controlled. These concepts lay the foundation for the succeeding chapters.
Draw: Reflections on the Air War in Europe (Trumbull, CT: FNP Military Division, 2001), 141-142; Harry
Crosby, A Wing anda Prayer: The "Bloody 100th" Bomb Group of the U.S. Eighth Air Force in Action
Over Europe in World War II (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), 127-135; "Black Week -
Bremen", n.d., http://www.100thbg.com/mainpages/history/history4/bw-bremen.htm, accessed 26
December 2010; Combat Chronology, 1941-1945 (Washington, DC: Center for Air Force History, 1991),
199; Ian L. Hawkins, B-1 7s over Berlin: Personal Stories from the 95th Bomb Group (H) (Brassey's Inc,
1995), 170-171; Roger A. Freeman, The Mighty Eighth War Diary (Motorbooks Intl, 1990), 123; Arthur B.
Ferguson, "POINTBLAN K," in The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 2-Europe: Torch to
Pointblank, ed. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Washington, DC: 1983. Reprint, Office of Air
Force History. Originally published Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), 695.
The U.S. Army Air Corps and the U.S. Army Air Forces are the two immediate predecessors of the current United
States Air Force. The Air Corps existed from 2 July 1926 to 20 June 1941, when it became the United
States Army Air Forces. The USAAF became the USAF on 17 September 1947. This study refers to the
organization to as the Air Corps during the period leading up the initiation of the CBO, and to it as the
USAAF after the initiation of the bombing campaign.
The Colossal Network of Machines and Objects
The Anglo-American CBO conducted against the Axis powers in Europe during World
War II, one of the largest single military campaigns of the war, was the result of a Herculean
effort in the air and on the ground. Begun in September 1939 by the British Royal Air Force
(RAF) Bomber Command and joined in August 1942 by the USAAF 8 th Bomber Command,
later 8th Air Force, it lasted through the German surrender in May 1945, a total of 973 days.
During that period, American forces employed a revolutionary new bombardment system that
paired the most advanced four-engined bomber aircraft in the world with the most accurate high-
altitude bombsight available, flying more than 410,000 effective sorties and dropping over
1,000,000 tons of bombs on enemy targets in the European Theater of Operations (ETO), the
Mediterranean, and North Africa.3 To field the machines necessary to execute the CBO and the
bombing campaign in the Pacific theater, the United States devoted 40 percent of its war
production to aircraft, building almost 34,000 heavy bombers between 1940 and 1945, almost
13,000 of them Boeing B-17s, as well as an estimated 52,000 precision Norden bombsights.4
The heavy, four-engined bomber, best represented by the Boeing B- 17, and the Norden
bombsight formed the technological centerpiece of the USAAF bombardment system, creating a
dominant view of a distinctly American technological method of warfare. Historian Timothy
Moy described it thus:
Broadly conceived, the bomb delivery system was a colossal network of machines
and objects, including bombs, bomb racks, defensive machine guns, radios,
navigational slide rules, and insulated flight clothing-not to mention the
production engineering needed to manufacture all that hardware. At its simplest
level, the system consisted of a relatively fast, high-altitude, long-range airplane,
and a precise optical bombsight.
Richard G. Davis, Bombing the European Axis Powers: A Historical Digest of the Combined Bomber Offensive,
1939-1945 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2006), 565.
4 I. B. Holley, Jr., Buying Aircraft: Mate'riel Procurementfor the Army Air Forces (Washington, DC: Office of the
Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1964), Table 11, p. 550; Davis, Bombing the European Axis
Powers, 33; Albert L. Pardini, The Legendary Secret Norden Bombsight (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military
History, 1999), 342. The bomber production numbers include B-17, B-24, B-29, and B-32 aircraft. The
bombsight total includes production for both the Army Air Forces and the United States Navy.
Timothy Moy, War Machines: Transforming Technologies in the U.S. Military, 1920-1940 (College Station: Texas
A & M University Press, 2001), 33. Russell Weigley discusses the American use of airpower technology
during World War II as representative of the American way of war. See Russell Frank Weigley, The
American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York: Macmillan,
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This focus on the system as machines, however, limits a true appreciation of its extent.
Certainly, there were dominant machine elements. The B- 17 aircraft and the Norden bombsight
are two of the most well known machines used during the war outside the atomic bomb. But
what of the men who operated those machines? The United States trained over 27,000 crews,
most of which consisted of ten men each, to fly the bombers and operate the bombsights. The
CBO took a large human toll, and during its execution in the ETO alone over 24,000 men were
killed and another 38,000 were wounded or went missing. By way of comparison, 19,733
United States Marines lost their lives during the entire war in both the European and Pacific
theaters of operations.7 Surely, the crews who operated the bombers and bombsights were a part
of the bombardment system. Just as significantly, what of the doctrine, that set of codified
beliefs that encompassed the philosophy and principles of warfighting that brought human and
machine together into this massive system?
Viewing the USAAF bombardment system only as a collection of technological objects
that, given a certain task operate together to complete it, fails to capture the true makeup and
complexity of the system. This "black boxing," drawing a line around the most visible and
identifiable elements of the system, the bomber aircraft and the bombsight, greatly oversimplifies
it, placing at risk any attempt to understand its operation or role in a larger context. To truly
understand the system, we must open the black box and examine how the system was designed,
why it was designed the way that it was, and who designed and operated it.8
Opening the "Black Box"-The Socio-technical and the Bombardment System
The first step toward opening the black box of the bombardment system and examining
its contents is defining what the system should include. Noted systems thinker Russell Ackoff
broadly defined a system as "any entity, conceptual or physical, which consists of interdependent
6 Jerry White, Combat Crew and Unit Training in the AAF: 1939-1945, Army Air Forces Historical Study 61
(Washington, DC: Air Historical Office, Army Air Forces, August 1949), 29.
7 Davis, Bombing the European Axis Powers, Table 4, p. 586; "Marine Corps Casualties," United States Marine
Corps History Division, 2010, http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/HD/FrequentlyRequested/Casualties.htm
(accessed 19 January 2011).
8 The concept of opening the black box of a technology or system to examine the ideas, concepts, beliefs, and
assumptions that shaped its creation comes from French sociologist and anthropologist. He advances that
this is the only way to really understand not only the system, but also the outputs that it produces. See
Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 2-4.
parts."9 Systems exist in many forms, including philosophical systems, mechanical systems,
communication systems, and many more. All share the characteristic that they have
interdependent elements that influence each other in the process of producing an outcome. Of
particular interest for defining the bombardment system used during the CBO is the human-
machine system-a human-controlled collection of interdependent humans and machines that
uses machines in a significant way in order to achieve its objectives.' 0 By inspection, the
collection of aircraft, bombsights, and the human operators who used them to bomb German
targets during World War II certainly qualifies as a human-machine system. However, even that
definition remains incomplete, and by applying the system concept more thoughtfully, we may
construct a more thorough description of that bombardment system.
Ackoff advanced that a human-machine system is a specific type of behavioral system,
one that can display activity and where "the outcome of its behavior is conceptualized as the
product of the interaction of its parts."" As production of an outcome is an integral part of the
definition of the human-machine system above, we may extend the system boundaries to
encompass any part that affects the outcome of the system as the result of intentional or
preconceived interaction. In other words, a human-machine behavioral system includes anything
that, by design or intent, affects the behavior or output of the system as a whole. As such, a
distinct set of ideas or principles that intentionally shapes the purpose, structure, or use of a set of
interdependent parts must itself be included within the boundaries of a system.
The ideas and principles that shape the purpose, structure, or use of a human-machine
system are a distinctly social construct, in that they embody the beliefs and knowledge of the
human group that defined them. To borrow from Walter Vincenti, what a distinct human social
group does depends upon what it collectively knows.12 Those beliefs, however derived, thus
influence the interaction of the parts of the system and the behavior of the system overall.
Similarly, they are open to modification based upon system performance and any learning that
may ensue. The inclusion of these ideas and principles, then, changes the nature of the human-
machine system from merely one within which humans use machines in a significant way to
R. L. Ackoff, "Systems, Organizations, and Interdisciplinary Research," in Systems Thinking: Selected Readings,
ed. F. E. Emery (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), 332.
10 Ibid., 333.
11 Ibid., 332.
12 Walter G. Vincenti, What Engineers Know and How They Know It: Analytical Studies from Aeronautical History
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990).
produce an outcome to a socio-technical system, within which humans and machines work
together in a manner shaped by the beliefs and knowledge of the social group that defined the
system's purpose, structure, and use.
The USAAF bombardment system was a distinctly socio-technical system. Although the
term "weapon system" was decades from use when the Air Corps began building bombers and
bombsights and training humans to use them in the 1920s, the human-machine system
relationship between them is clear. Aerial bombardment was simply not possible without
bombers and bombsights, and the machines themselves were useless without trained humans to
operate them. However well designed, manufactured, and trained, though, this human-machine
system was incomplete without a binding focus and purpose that brought all of the human and
machine elements into a coherent whole. That binding and focus evolved as bombardment
doctrine, the set of guiding precepts and knowledge that shaped not only the purpose and
objective of the bombardment system, but the actual physical and cognitive construction of the
system, as well as how the humans and machines in the bombardment system acted and
interacted both physically and socially.
Military Doctrine and Shaping the Human Mind
Doctrine is a form of purposive knowledge. It provides a set of intellectual and
prescriptive guidelines that address a specific purpose or objective for a particular social or
organizational group, which is itself defined by the acceptance of the correctness and authority of
those guidelines. Codified into laws and precepts derived from the results of the experience of
those in the past, doctrine is "an authoritative rule... (representing) the 'tried and
true'.. .hammered out by trial and error (and) officially recognized as such." 3 As a form of
codified knowledge or beliefs sanctioned by adherents as "what is right," doctrine is taught to
future generations and provides the guidance for how those adherents act and interact. It is
particularly useful where the official codification of sanctioned beliefs or knowledge can provide
guidelines that enable a community to achieve a commonly defined purpose.
Military doctrine is a form of doctrine that deals explicitly with military means.
Developed primarily by the military services, it is the set of codified beliefs that encompass the
13 1. B. Holley, Jr., "The Doctrinal Process: Some Suggested Steps," in Technology and Military Doctrine: Essays
on a Challenging Relationship (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2004), 7.
"philosophy and principles for waging war as held by the military (italics in original)."' 4 A
powerful tool, military doctrine shapes not only how armed forces should conduct warfare, but
also how military professionals should think about warfare. According to Joint Publication (JP)
1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, the capstone doctrine publication of U.S.
joint armed forces, doctrine "promotes a common perspective from which to plan, train, and
conduct military operations. It represents what is taught, believed, and advocated as what is
right (i.e., what works best) (emphasis in original)." 15 In essence, military doctrine provides a
level of intellectual control that enables military forces to focus their thoughts and efforts
constructively toward a commonly defined goal.
A critical element of the JP 1 definition is that doctrine is taught. The members of the
United States' military forces are taught doctrine through a professional education system that
ensures that they understand how the United States intends to employ military power when
necessary. As they exist in an ever-changing geopolitical context, the military services must
certainly adapt their approach toward how to employ military power to that changing context,
but the official doctrine taught at these service schools ensures that individual service members
understand how their service intends to employ military power in general-it is the way that is
understood and accepted as the best at that time.
As it is taught in the service's professional education institutions in a codified form,
service doctrine becomes an integral part of the service's culture. It forms the core of the service
member's beliefs about their mission. Much in the way that Thomas Kuhn presented the
codified scientific facts and laws belonging to a specific scientific tradition of practice as
"received beliefs" that shape how that tradition of practice views and interprets the world,
service doctrine shapes the service member's view of the world and defines the acceptable realm
of ideological and technological solutions available to solve problems.16
14 Dale 0. Smith, U.S. Military Doctrine. A Study and Appraisal (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1955), 4.
15 Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrinefor the Armed Forces of the United States, May 14, 2007, ix.
16 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure ofScientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,
1996), 4-5, 175. Kuhn's concept of received beliefs is frequently used in a negative sense, as representing
a rigid, inflexible credo that dictates and limits creative thought, particularly in reference to the
development of the strategic bombing doctrine developed by the Air Corps before World War II. See
Thomas J. Green, Bright Boys (Natick, MA: A.K. Peters, Ltd., 2010). However, the use in this study is
more in line with Kuhn's vision of received beliefs as an intellectual model that shapes thought, orienting it
in a particular direction, but not imposing strict, unbreakable limitations.
Doctrine, however, cannot remain effective or relevant if it stagnates and does not
respond to experience and change. As it embodies deeply rooted cultural beliefs and ideals,
doctrinal change is inherently difficult.' 7 However, when experience presents results that
demonstrate the ineffectiveness of a particular doctrine and new knowledge is acquired, that
doctrine must evolve and incorporate that new knowledge. Radical doctrinal change, though, is
rare, as it generally requires a reassessment of an organization's very core beliefs. Change, when
recognized as necessary, is more often evolutionary in nature, wherein an organization adapts its
beliefs and ideals to incorporate the new knowledge in a way that is acceptable within their
existing ideological view of the world.
Doctrinal influence is far reaching in the military. It overtly influences how the
individual services prepare for combat, both cognitively and physically. Faced with a given
problem, doctrine presents the intellectual framework that guides the creation of the solution.
Doctrine is, however, not to be confused with strategy. Strategy is concerned with what is to be
done-achieving certain ends. Doctrine involves how those ends are going to be met-the
means used to achieve the ends.18 As purposive knowledge, it extends beyond just an
intellectual framework for how to solve problems. It also guides the creation of the tools used to
achieve strategic ends. In 1968, General Curtis LeMay, former Chief of Staff of the Unites
States Air Force and architect of the bombing doctrine used during World War II, captured the
essence and of military doctrine:
At the heart of warfare lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for waging
war in order to achieve victory. Doctrine is of the mind, a network of faith and
knowledge reinforced by experience which lays the pattern for the utilization of
men, equipment, and tactics. It is the building material for strategy. It is
fundamental to sound judgment.' 9
17 Harold R. Winton, "On Military Change," in The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities,
1918-1941, ed. Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), xii.
18 I. B. Holley, Jr., "The Role of Doctrine," in Technology and Military Doctrine: Essays on a Challenging
Relationship (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2004), 3.
19 James Mowbray, "Air Force Doctrine Problems: 1926-Present," A irpower Journal VIV (Winter 1995), no. 4
(1995): 1.
Doctrine, as the codified body of beliefs that defines military missions and shapes the thought
regarding who and what should execute them, is thus clearly linked to the humans within the
organization that adheres to it.
Military Doctrine and Shaping the Technological Ideal
Technology plays a significant role in the development of doctrine. To a great extent, it
determines what can be done with military force. The clearest example of this is the existence of
separate military services within most developed countries' military forces. Each service has a
separate, distinct mission within the overall context of the mission of the military service as a
whole. They exist largely based upon command of the primary medium in which they operate:
air, land, or sea. Control of that medium, as well as the technologies used to gain and exploit
that control, are prime concerns for each service. Thus, the methods and technologies by which
they gain that control determine how each service views a particular problem, and influence the
range of possible solutions that they may produce, and each service "organizes, trains, equips,
and sustains" its forces in order to best accomplish its individual mission.2 0 Accordingly, each
service develops its own doctrine, based on the capabilities individually possessed, and pursues
technologies that enable them to execute that doctrine.
While doctrine may significantly affect the type of technology developed by each service
and how it should be used, it is not a unipolar relationship. The specific characteristics of a
technology determine largely what it can be used for, and may thus limit doctrinal options. Just
as an M-9 automatic pistol does not lend itself to use in nuclear deterrence doctrine, neither do
intercontinental ballistic missiles lend themselves to close range, urban combat operations. The
type of technology available limits doctrinal options to those achievable within the capabilities of
the technologies themselves.
I. B. Holley's landmark study of the United States Army's aviation efforts during World
War I, Ideas and Weapons, demonstrates that when either doctrinal development outstrips
technological capability, or technological development does not respond to doctrinal advance,
the effectiveness of military forces suffers. Holley clearly expressed the necessity of a coherent
approach to developing both technology and doctrine together.
20 Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 14; Air Force Basic Doctrine, Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD)
1, November 17, 2003, ix.
Superiority in weapons stems not only from a selection of the best ideas from
advancing technology but also from a system which relates the ideas selected with
a doctrine or concept of their tactical or strategic application, which is to say the
accepted concept of the mission to be performed.
Doctrine and technology are thus inextricably linked. Doctrine may adapt to
technological development as new capabilities emerge, or, conversely, technological
development may be focused to fulfill a doctrinal vision, as we shall see was the case for
the Air Corps' development of precision bombing doctrine and technology before World
War II.
The military's codified knowledge and beliefs, doctrine shapes the purpose, structure, and
use of military socio-technical systems. It is linked to the human elements of those systems
because it shapes both the knowledge and beliefs that drive their behavior. It is linked the
technological elements in those systems because it shapes their creation and use. It is thus an
integral part of those socio-technical systems. While doctrine must change in response to
unfavorable system behavior in order to remain effective, it establishes the initial conditions and
requirements for the system's use by defining its purpose as well as the constituent human and
machine elements. Any consideration of the interactions between those constituent elements
must begin with an examination of the doctrine that helped transform them from separate
components into integrated, interdependent parts of a socio-technical system.
High-Altitude, Daylight Precision Bombing-The Construction of Purpose
Doctrine exists at multiple levels. At the highest level, it links theory to practice by
defining a system's purpose, its component parts, and how those parts are to be employed writ
large. Entering World War II, the United States pursued the doctrine of high-altitude, daylight
precision bombing (HADPB) as the primary offensive against Germany while building and
preparing sufficient ground forces for an invasion of Europe. Simply put, HADPB envisioned
large forces of heavily armed bombers, flown by specially trained aircrews employing precision
bombsights attacking vital centers of the German war-making infrastructure in order to destroy
21 I. B. Holley, Jr., Ideas and Weapons: Exploitation of the Aerial Weapon by the United States During World War
I: A Study in the Relationship of Technological Advance, Military Doctrine, and the Development of
Weapons (1953. Reprint, Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 14.
their ability to fight. It defined the system purpose (destroy the enemy's ability to fight), the
system components (bombers, aircrews, and bombsights), and how they were to be used
(attacking vital industrial centers in large force). A controversial doctrine, HADPB evolved at
the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) during the 1930s in contravention with official U.S. Army
doctrine of the period, and was based largely upon theories about the potential effectiveness of
strategic bombing and rested upon a very thin base of British experience gained during World
War I.
The HADPB doctrine developed in the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) during the
1930s. Originally founded on 1 November 1920 as the Air Service Field Officer School at
Langley Field, Virginia, it became the Air Service Tactical School the next year and eventually
the ACTS in 1926, with the establishment of the Air Corps. Chartered to prepare Air Corps
officers for duties and command, the school's curriculum taught the U.S. Army's airpower
doctrine, focusing on "the tactics and techniques both of the Air Service and of the other
branches of the Army and the Navy."22
Ordinarily, doctrine develops as the result of experience and is the embodiment of the
"tried and true." However, as the newest form of military power, airpower had been used only
during World War I, and then only on a relatively small scale. There was no broad base of
experience upon which to build a coherent doctrine, and the ACTS rapidly evolved into a
doctrine development center, where the instructors generated nascent ideas about how to use
airpower and, most significantly, taught them to the students. As such, the ACTS became a de
facto brain trust and the instructors held a unique and powerful position, able to develop new
ideas and convey them directly to the Air Corps' future leaders, often without oversight from,
and in direct contravention with, their parent organization, the U.S. Army.
The history of the development of official Army airpower doctrine after World War I is
extremely complex and is complicated by the very public efforts of many airmen, most notably
Brigadier General William "Billy" Mitchell, to force the United States government to establish a
military air arm separate from the Army or Navy, and is beyond the scope of this study.
However, an examination of the ideas that led to the creation of the bombardment system used
during World War II is instructive, as it explains how that system was constructed, the role of
22 Robert T. Finney, History of the Air Corps Tactical School: 1920-1940 (Washington, DC: Air Force History and
Museums Program, 1998), 8-11.
precision bombing in the system, and how and why the component human and machine elements
were developed.23
HADPB doctrine evolved at the ACTS out of the ideas of Italian airpower theorist Giulio
Douhet and the American and British experience during World War I. Douhet, an Italian
artillery officer born in 1869, was the first airpower theorist. He formed his ideas on airpower
during World War I, and published them in his landmark treatise on airpower, The Command of
the Air, in 1921. Douhet recognized that airplanes had the potential to significantly change the
way that nations would fight wars in the future. He developed and advanced his theories in an
effort to build a case for a national air force, independent of the control of his nation's army,
believing that airpower's true potential could not be realized if it remained under the control of
those concerned primarily with the employment of ground forces. The desire for an independent
air force pushed Douhet's ideas to extremes, and criticism of them is abundant. However, he
remains perhaps the most significant airpower theorist of all, as most of his successors used his
ideas, knowingly or not as the basis of their own theories or as the point of departure for their
own thoughts.24
Douhet realized that the airplane could have a revolutionary effect on warfare, believing
that its inherent speed and ability to reach any point within an enemy's country meant that an
attacking air force could bypass their fielded forces and provide a shortcut to victory.2 ' Rather
than targeting enemy military forces, as had been the primary method of waging war for
centuries, Douhet favored taking the war directly to the enemy nation's civilian populace,
advocating violent, destructive attacks against such targets as
peacetime industrial and commercial establishments; important buildings, private
and public; transportation arteries and centers; and certain designated areas of
civilian population as well. To destroy these targets three kinds of bombs are
23 The most authoritative study done on doctrine development in the Air Corps is Thomas H. Greer, The
Development ofAir Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941 (1985. Reprint, Office of Air Force History,
U.S. Air Force, 1953). Greer focuses on doctrine development, but weaves the story of the drive for an
independent air force into the narrative most effectively. Other sources that address the topic from multiple
perspectives, for example ; Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of
British and American Ideas About Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2002); Moy, War Machines; David B. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the
U.S. Army, 1917-1945 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
24 Phillip S. Meilinger, Airmen and Air Theory: A Review of the Sources (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press,
2001), 103.
25 Ibid., 104.
needed-explosive, incendiary, and poison gas-apportioned as the situation may
require. The explosives will demolish the target, the incendiaries set fire to it, and
the poison-gas bombs prevent fire fighters from extinguishing the fires. 26
These attacks formed the core of a new concept of airpower as strategic instrument of warfare,
able to directly affect the outcome of a conflict, rather than as an adjunct or supporting element
of ground armies. This new warfare, as Douhet envisioned it, would involve masses of heavily
armed, combat-survivable aircraft conducting such strategic attacks against the enemy
population until their will to resist crumbled.
Machines played a starring role in Douhet's theory. He proposed the creation of a new
aerial weapon-the battleplane-a bomber aircraft with an extensive combat radius, speed
sufficient only to enable it to avoid attack from other aircraft, enough armor to protect the crew,
and enough bombs to destroy its targets and complete the mission. Although intended to avoid
aerial combat, he envisioned that this battleplane would include some defensive weaponry for the
sake of the crew's morale.27 Douhet had faith in the battleplane's ability to get to the target
because he believed that the small, slow, lightly armed fighter aircraft of the time could be
avoided, negating their ability defensive capabilities. As an artillery officer, he likewise had
little faith in the effectiveness of anti-aircraft artillery defenses, dismissing their fire as
inaccurate, ultimately believing that it was impossible to defend against an air attack that could
come from any direction at any time.2 8
Douhet paid little attention to the difficulties of precision bombing. His belief in the
battleplane's invincibility permitted low-altitude bombing attacks, and the bombsights then
available performed sufficiently well in that environment. He also advocated the use of weapons
with area-wide, destructive effects, which largely compensated for any potential inaccuracies.
His three-phase attack plan that combined first explosive, then incendiary, and finally poison-gas
bombs was intended to destroy large areas of enemy cities, rather than concentrating on
individual targets. Douhet's choice of weapons was driven by his plan to target specifically the
enemy civilian population's will to fight, rather than a specific industry or vital center, and he
wished to affect maximum destruction, rather than minimum. Douhet's ideas regarding airpower
26
Giulio Douhet, Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (1942; reprint, Washington, DC: Office of Air Force
History, 1983), 20.
27 Ibid., 117.
28 Ibid., 18.
were very controversial at the time of his writing, particularly his agitation for a strong,
independent air force, and the Italian government jailed him in 1915 for expressing his views too
strongly.2 9 Although ridiculed by many, his major theoretical contributions, including the
concepts of airpower as an offensive instrument of war, the battleplane, and attacking vital
centers other than fielded military forces, proved very influential in the development of the
HADPB doctrine developed by the Air Corps.
Douhet's ideas largely paralleled those of the first American airpower advocate, William
"Billy" Mitchell. Like Douhet, Mitchell was consumed with the idea that airpower could be a
decisive military force that offered cheaper, more rapid victories in wartime than could
conventional land or sea forces, but only when employed separately and independently, not
constrained by the need to support those same forces. He cultivated the concept that massed
bombers attacking "an enemy nation's war-making capability and will to fight...would yield a
victory that was quicker and cheaper than one obtained by surface forces." 30
Mitchell's ideas were rooted in the experience he gained as the chief of the Air Service
branch of the American Expeditionary Force during World War I, influenced greatly by the
thinking of Major General Hugh Trenchard, the head of the British Royal Flying Corps, who
believed intensely in the idea of airpower as an offensive force. Trenchard thought it best "to
exploit the moral effect of the airplane on the enemy, but not to let him exploit it on ourselves,"
which could only be done "by attacking and continuing to attack."3 1 During the war, Mitchell
advocated the use of airpower in support of the allied ground forces, but was captured by
Trenchard's ideas about using airpower as an independent force against "strategical" targets and
destroying the enemy's ability and will to fight.32
Following the war, Mitchell began aggressively campaigning for an independent air
service in the United States military and, in the words of airpower historian Mark Clodfelter,
29 Phillip S. Meilinger, "Giulio Douhet and the Origins of Airpower Theory," in The Paths ofHeaven: The
Evolution ofAirpower Theory, ed. Phillip S. Meilinger (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1997), 5-
6.
30 Mark A. Clodfelter, "Molding Airpower Convictions: Development and Legacy of William Mitchell's Strategic
Thought," in The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution ofAirpower Theory, ed. Phillip S. Meilinger (Maxwell
AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1997), 79.
31 Alfred F. Hurley, Billy Mitchell: Crusaderfor Air Power (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006), 26.
32 Clodfelter, "Molding Airpower Convictions: Development and Legacy of William Mitchell's Strategic Thought,"
86-89.
"reform the most violent of man's activities-war." 33 Mitchell proposed a technological solution
to what he believed was a technological problem. Rifled artillery, poison gas, and the machine
gun had made warfare into the horror witnessed on the Western Front, but be believed that the
newest machine, the bomber, had the potential to reverse the horrific trend of increasing human
slaughter. 34
Mitchell saw modern warfare as dependent on industry, and the bomber's ability to attack
virtually anywhere in an enemy's country presented the opportunity to destroy their capacity to
make war, thus shortening the conflict, rather than engaging in bloody contests between
opposing armies. He envisioned a new type of warfare, where fleets of bombers would attack
centers of production of all kinds, means of transportation, agricultural areas,
ports and shipping; not so much the people themselves. They will destroy the
means of making war because now we cannot cut a limb from a tree, pick a stone
from a hill and make it our principal weapon. Today to make war we must have
great metal and chemical factories that have to stay in one place, take months to
build, and, if destroyed, cannot be replaced in the usual length of a modern war.35
This sharper, quicker, and more decisive form of warfare would, in his mind, "result in a
diminished loss of life and treasure and...thus be a distinct benefit to civilization."36 As with
Douhet, however, destroying this target set did not require precision bombing, and it was highly
likely that many civilians would die as Mitchell's fleets of bombers dropped their bombs on the
middle of cities in their efforts to destroy their industrial targets. 37
Mitchell's ideas were supremely unpopular within the traditional U.S. Army, and ran in
direct contravention to the official airpower doctrine laid out in Training Regulation (TR) No.
440-15, Fundamental Principles Jor the Employment of the Air Service, published in 1926. TR
440-15 stated that the mission of the Air Service was to
Ibid., 90.
34 William Mitchell, Skyways: A Book on Modern Aeronautics (Philadelphia, PA: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1930),
261-263.
35 William Mitchell, Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of Modern Air Power, Economic and
Military (New York: 1988. Reprint, Dover Publications, Inc., 1925), 16-17.
36 Ibid., 16.
37 Donald L. Miller, Masters of the Air: America's Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War Against Nazi Germany
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 36.
assist the ground forces to gain strategical and tactical success by destroying
enemy aviation, attacking enemy ground forces and other enemy objectives on
land or sea, and in conjunction with other agencies to protect ground forces from
hostile aerial observation and attack.
Independent strategic action against the enemy's war-making infrastructure was clearly out of
the question, as TR 440-15 succinctly declared that the organization and training of all Air
Service units was
based on the fundamental doctrine that their mission is to aid the ground forces to
gain decisive success (emphasis added).
In spite of the official Army position regarding the use of airpower, Mitchell continued to
ferociously advance his views regarding the need for an independent air force to maintain the
United States' national security.4 4
Although his relentless pursuit of independence was professionally costly, causing the
Army to court-martial him in 1926, Mitchell's campaign for an independent air force was joined
by a core group of Air Corps officers who shared his views, many of whom wound up as
instructors at the ACTS. By the early 1930s, this group of officers, known as "the Bomber
Mafia," had gained control of the intellectual development and the curriculum at the school, and
both Mitchell's and Douhet's ideas about strategic bombing and the offensive potential of
airpower had taken root, as had the concept of the battleplane.41 However, these ideas underwent
one significant modification.
38 Training Regulation (TR) No. 440-15, Fundamental Principles for the Employment of the Air Service (Secretary
of War, January 26, 1926), paragraph 3.
39 Ibid., paragraph 4.
40 Mitchell wrote numerous articles and published several books on the topic of airpower. They are most clearly
expressed in the following William Mitchell, Our Air Force: The Keystone of National Defense (New
York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1921); Mitchell, Winged Defense; William Mitchell, "Airplanes in
National Defense," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 131 (May 1927): 38-
42; Mitchell, Skyways: A Book on Modern Aeronautics. Mitchell's life and crusade was as interesting as it
was polarizing. The most even treatment he receives is in Hurley, Billy Mitchell.
41 The extent of Douhet's influence Mitchell's thinking and on the ACTS was debated for many years after the end
of World War II, however, Raymond Flugel made a very strong case in 1965 demonstrating a clear
connection between Douhet's writings and the HADPB doctrine developed by the ACTS. See Raymond R.
Flugel, "United States Air Power Doctrine: A Study of the Influence of William Mitchell and Giulio
Douhet at the Air Corps Tactical School, 1921-1935" (The University of Oklahoma, 1965).
While the Bomber Mafia, led by Lieutenant Harold George, agreed that the enemy's
industrial production should be the central focus of any strategic bombing campaign, they
rejected the idea that the bombing would have a greater effect on civilian morale than on
42industrial output capacity. Civilian morale was considered as an objective, but in the words of
Major General Haywood Hansell, one of the architects of the CBO,
we carefully considered the validity of... civilian morale as an objective. We
concluded, however, that it was not a proper objective until widespread defeatism
had been engendered by heavy air attacks against the systems which supported the
means to fight and the means to live, coupled with despondency concerning the
prospects of victory. 4 3
Rather, the Bomber Mafia developed a doctrinal construct for the employment of airpower as an
independent decisive force that could force an enemy to acquiesce, based upon four possible uses
for bomber forces.
(1) To destroy the social-economic-industrial systems on which a major enemy
state was dependent for its life as a modern great power-the intricate,
sensitive, interrelated systems which supply power, fuel, transportation,
communications, water, and food; Or,
(2) to destroy the industrial means of providing munitions and supplies which the
enemy armed forces must have in order to fight; Or,
(3) to destroy the means by which finished munitions are delivered to the enemy
troops; Or,
(4) to attack enemy armed forces directly-especially enemy air forces.44
Although at odds with the Army's approved doctrine of airpower as a supporting element for
ground forces, destruction of enemy industrial infrastructure became the central focus, the
purpose, of strategic bombing at the ACTS.
Destruction of the enemy industrial infrastructure was contingent upon the ability to
accomplish three major tasks: flying to the target, finding the target, and dropping bombs
accurately enough and in sufficient numbers to destroy the target. Clearly, accomplishing these
tasks would require a system of humans and machines, employed together in a way to achieve
42 Miller, Masters of the Air, 39.
43 Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler (Atlanta, GA: Higgins-McArthur/Longino & Porter,
Inc., 1972), 85.
44 Ibid., 37.
the overall objective of destroying individual industrial targets. The Bomber Mafia developed
such a socio-technical system through the 1930s, refining the basic ideas supplied by Douhet and
Mitchell, but integrating the concept of precision attack to minimize rather than maximize
attacks on the civilian populace. They shaped and matured their ideas in the Bombardment
Aviation class taught at the ACTS, and the text used during the class, while serving as an
instructional tool captured their thoughts and beliefs about how to design and employ this
bombardment system. However, because these thoughts and beliefs were then taught to the
members of the Air Corps, they actually evolved into Air Corps doctrine. Examining this text,
then, provides the clearest picture of the service's precision bombing doctrine. The doctrine
itself developed through the 1930s, but the 1938 version of the text, the last one produced before
the United States closed the school in preparation for World War II, is the culmination of that
evolution and clearly defines how the Air Corps intended to perform the precision bombardment
mission, and it provides a clear picture of the system the United States took to war in Europe at
the beginning of the CBO.
Bombardment Doctrine and System Definition
Physically and cognitively, the Air Corps' bombardment doctrine structured the
bombardment system as an interdependent network of humans and machines at three levels,
unified by their doctrinal mission of precision bombing. At the system's lowest level, the
component level, individual, specially trained members of the bomber crew worked with
specifically designed machines to perform the tasks necessary to bomb precisely, including
flying, bombing, and navigating. At the intermediate, aircraft level, these humans and machines
formed a coherent individual team, defined by the physical dimensions of the bomber aircraft
that itself, based on its capabilities, then became an integral part of the system. At the highest, or
bomber formation level, groups of these aircraft-level systems worked together to mitigate the
limitations and shortcomings displayed at the lower level and improve system effectiveness.
The Component Level-Humans and Machines
At the bombardment system's component level, it was physically constructed from
interdependent human and machine elements. Each mutually defined the other based upon a
specific task that bound them together, derived from the overall purpose-precision bombing.
The principal human elements were the bomber pilot and the bombardier, who together
comprised the human "bombing team" that delivered and dropped the bombs, and the navigator,
who ensured that the bombing team arrived at the correct target and made it back home. These
three specially trained human crewmen were inseparable from the machines that they used to
perform their part of the bombardment mission, which included the bombardment aircraft, the
bombsight and bomb release mechanism, which made up the "fire control system," and the
specialized navigation and calculation instruments.45
The Human Elements-The Bomber Crew
Although at the component level, the bombardment system consisted of individual
humans and machines, the humans together formed an integral unit-the bomber crew. The
bomber crew formed the core human organizational and social unit of the bombardment system,
consisting of an aircraft commander (pilot), copilot, navigator, bombardier, and other men
including a radio operator and several aerial gunners. Throughout the preparation for the war
and during the war itself, the USAAF assembled these individual crewmembers to specific crews
that, for the most part, remained together as a team. They trained as a crew before they deployed
to any combat theater, working together to perfect their mission and form a "closely knit, well
organized team of highly trained specialists," and then flew together often in combat. 46
The USAAF emphasized building, training, and maintaining the bomber crew as a team,
as experience during World War I demonstrated the positive effect that maintaining crew
integrity during combat operations had on its bombing efficiency. The "increased morale
resulting from the close association of the personnel performing a coordinated and common
mission, particularly under the stress of active operations" greatly increased their effectiveness as
a combat unit.4 7 Pre-World War II bombing doctrine recognized the utility of keeping bomber
crews together as a unit, and directed that commanders should make maximum effort to keep
them intact during combat operations, stating
the maximum degree of efficiency in bombardment operations will be
considerably enhanced if the policy of maintaining intact the combat crews of
45 Bombardment Aviation: 1931 (Langley Field, VA: Air Corps Tactical School, 1931), 33.
46 White, Combat Crew and Unit Training in the AAF: 1939-1945, 25.
47 William C. Sherman, "Tentative Manual for The Employment of Air Service (1919)," in The U.S. Air Service in
World War 1: Volume II, Early Concepts in Military Aviation, ed. Maurer Maurer, vol. 2 (Washington, DC:
The Office of Air Force History, 1978), 397-398.
bombardment airplanes is not violated unless the breaking up of the crew
becomes necessary in the interest of increased efficiency as viewed from other
considerations. 48
Although the bomber crew formed the human core of the bombardment system and crew
integrity improved their effectiveness as a single unit, individual crewmembers who displayed
individual excellence were often assembled from separate crews during combat to improve the
overall effectiveness of the larger bombardment system, as will be seen in subsequent chapters.
Combat crew training was an extensive process comprised of three phases, all oriented
toward teaching the bomber crewmembers how to individually perform their tasks and work
together as a team to accomplish their mission. The first phase focused on individual proficiency
in the bomber aircraft, enabling the crew to gain familiarity with their aircraft and equipment.
The second phase focused on more mission-oriented training, including bombardment, gunnery,
and elementary formation flying, and began developing the crew into a coordinated team. The
final phase, conducted just before the crew deployed to a combat theater, was devoted principally
to simulating combat missions and employing as part of a larger squadron, group, or wing unit.4 9
By the end of training, they had transformed from a group of individuals into what John
Steinbeck described as a team with "each member responsible to the whole and the whole
responsible to its members."50
While they formed a cohesive human team during combat crew training, these human
elements of the bombardment system were at the same time forming an integral relationship with
their necessary machines. As they worked together to hone their performance as a human unit,
they did so with the machines that they needed to perform their jobs, integrating themselves with
them through the performance of their individual tasks. In the process, they ceased to exist as
individual human elements of the bombardment system, transforming instead into individual
socio-technical elements, with each human defined by his mastery of a specific machine that
enabled him to perform his function on the bomber crew.
48 Bombardment: 1933 (Maxwell Field, AL: Air Corps Tactical School, 1933), 20.
49 Leslie F. Smith, Development ofAAF and USAF Training Concepts and Programs: 1941-1952, U.S. Air Force
Historical Study 93 (Washington, DC: USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1953), 321, Call 101-93,
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50 John Steinbeck, Bombs Away: The Story of a Bomber Team, 2nd ed. (New York: 2009. Reprint, Penguin Books.
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Building the Socio-technical-The Human Pilot, Bombardier, and Navigator
The bomber pilot was the leader of the bomber crew, defined by his ability to fly the
bomber aircraft, but was also the crewmember least constrained by the mastery of a specific
machine. The 1938 Bombardment Aviation text defined his primary function as to fly the
bomber aircraft to the target, demonstrating
excellence in blind flying, navigation, formation flying, and the ability to
conduct flights under all types of weather conditions, during daylight and during
darkness... at distances of many hundreds of miles from his base and in the face
of every possible type of defense which an alert major power will utilize in the
air defense of its vital establishments.
Certainly defined by his mastery of a specific machine-the bomber aircraft-the pilot's
responsibilities extended far beyond flying to control of the system at the next, or aircraft level.
The pilot served as the system controller at the lowest level, and he had the broadest
responsibility for the completion of the mission.
The pilot was designated the "aircraft commander," and was charged with ensuring that
the combat crew of his airplane had "reached the highest possible standards of proficiency in the
performance of those duties which are so vitally essential in the carrying out of successful
bombardment operations," which included understanding the role and function of every other
member of the bomber crew.5 When this text was written, as will be discussed in subsequent
chapters, the bomber pilot was actually trained to perform the role of every other member of the
crew, including the bombardier and navigator, and was expected to ensure that each performed
adequately well to accomplish their joint mission.
The pilot also served as the moral leader of the bomber crew. As the one in control of the
aircraft, he was responsible for ensuring that it and the crew made it to the enemy target, in spite
of the expected hazards and danger associated with warfare. The earliest bombardment doctrine,
as expressed in the 1924-1925 Bombardment text, made this role clear when addressing the
pilot's duties:
He must not be overcautious and allow inconsequentials to turn him back when
he could go on. In time of war every pilot who returns to the airdrome should
be held to rigid account for his action; yet he must be given the benefit of the
51 Bombardment Aviation: 1938 (Maxwell Field, AL: Air Corps Tactical School, 1938), 8-9.
52 Ibid., 11.
doubt in passing judgment on his action. It may be necessary to take
disciplinary action in rare cases, but in general the moral pressure of the
disapproval of his comrades will be sufficient. If he is a coward they will know
it.53
Later versions of the text eliminated mention of cowardice, but included a discussion on the
importance of leadership in instilling the "offensive spirit" in the bomber crew, the willingness to
"carry on in spite of opposition." 4 The pilot had physical control of the bomber crew as a socio-
technical unit because he flew the aircraft that contained them, but he also had to maintain moral
control of the human elements of the system. We examine the pilot's role as the system
controller in Chapter 3.
The bombardier had a much more narrowly defined function-dropping the bombs on the
target-and he was tied more closely to the specific machine necessary to do his job than any
other crewmember, the bombsight. The Bombardment Aviation text explained that a bombardier
must be
thoroughly familiar with the operation of our modern intricate bomb sights,
release mechanism, and bomb racks. He must be thoroughly acquainted with
the effectiveness of the several types of bombs and the targets against which
each should be used. Each bombardier must be trained in bombing for precision
with the minimum time interval for the conduct of the sighting operation. The
skill of the bombardier determines the success or failure of his combat crew and
their powerful airplane. If he fails at the critical moment, the entire mission
with the effort, hazard and possible casualties entailed, are of no avail
(emphasis added).55
The bombing machines and the bombardment mission were themselves an integral part of the
definition of the bombardier, as will be explored in Chapter 5, and outside of the context of the
bombing mission and the machines used to drop bombs, he did not exist.
The navigator on the bomber crew had a similarly narrowly defined function based on
technological mastery-knowing where the aircraft was and ensuring that it flew to the correct
target and returned home-but was less closely associated with a single, specific machine than
the bombardier. The Bombardment Aviation text charged him with
Bombardment: 1924-1925 (Langley Field, VA: Air Service Tactical School, 1924), 41.
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all responsibility for air navigation. He is especially provided the latest
equipment for air navigation and must devote constant study and practice to this
science. His precision may assure the success of the mission or his failure may
defeat the efforts of all other members of the crew.56
While air navigation was not a task limited to the bombardment mission alone, it was clearly
critical for mission success. As will be seen in Chapter 4, the navigator and his tools were an
inseparable team, and he spent more time working with the specific tools of his trade than any
other member of the bomber crew did.
Building the Socio-technical-Technology and the Fire Control System
As dropping bombs was the primary function of the bombardment system, at the
component level, the most important machine element was the fire control system. First
identified as such in the 1931 version of the ACTS Bombardment Aviation text, the fire control
system consisted of the set of interrelated machines that enabled the dropping of accurate bombs,
including the bombsight and the bomb release mechanism in the aircraft.57 The bombsight,
which calculated the bomb release point necessary to hit a target, played the central role in the
fire control system, and thus in the overall bombardment system itself, as shown by its
description in the 1938 text.
When one realizes that the most proficient airplanes in the world, the most
powerful bombs obtainable, and the highest specialized personnel are useless
unless the bombs can be so placed as to insure the destruction of the objective, it
must be appreciated that the bomb sight does not constitute mere a "gadget" but
actually is of major importance. It is as essential as the motors of the airplane,
since the success of the bombardment mission might well depend upon the
degree of accuracy and precision possible of attainment by the bomb sight.58
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Certainly critical for mission success, the bombsight required a skilled human, the bombardier, to
operate it. Much as the bombardier himself was nothing without the bombsight, the bombsight
was useless without the bombardier.
The other critical element in the fire control system was the bomb release mechanism.
While the Bombardment Aviation text initially described the bomb release mechanism as a
device designed to "release the bomb from its rack at the will of the bombardier," its real purpose
was to "reduce to an absolute minimum any delay in the release of the bomb after the bomb
release point has been reached." 59 The bomb release point was a specific, unique point in space,
and the bomb had to be released at that point in order to hit the target. Delays caused by human
reaction time in triggering that release signal were a significant source of bombing error, and the
bomb release mechanism was intended to eliminate that source of error. By 1938, electrical
bomb release mechanisms that were operated by electrical contacts in the bombsights themselves
were being installed in all bomber aircraft. Together, the bombsight and the bomb release
mechanism comprised a separate system, controlled by the bombardier as he operated the
bombsight. The relationship between the bombardier and the bombsight and the effect of this
automated bomb release method will be explored in Chapter 5.
The bomber crew and their associated machines came together into a single socio-
technical team, focused on performing the tasks necessary for the precision bombing mission. It
was not, however, a team of equals. The navigator and the bombardier played critical roles in
the bombardment mission, but were limited by their narrowly defined tasks and the specific
machines that they used to perform them. The pilot, on the other hand, was the crewmember
least defined by his mastery of a machine and responsible for the overall performance of the
crew and thus the leader. The bombardment doctrine designated him as the aircraft commander
and leader, thus establishing a distinct social hierarchy within the system.o
Although hierarchical, the bomber crew structure enabled shared control of the mission.
Each of the primary crewmembers had a distinct function, and no single individual could
accomplish them all. The pilot maintained overall control, but relinquished some measure of that
control depending upon the phase of the mission, taking direction from the navigator to and from
the target and giving him control of the flight path, or giving the bombardier control of the
59 Ibid., 41.
60 White, Combat Crew and Unit Training in the AAF: 1939-1945, 332-333.
aircraft during the bombing phase so that he could place the aircraft where the bombsight told
him in order to hit the target. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, these crewmembers shared
their control with "their" machines. Shared control of the system was necessary for mission
success.
The Intermediate Level-The Bomber Aircraft as a Socio-technical Unit
The socio-technical bombardment team came together as a unit defined by the
bombardment aircraft. The bomber had been a central part of precision bombing doctrine from
the days of theoretical infancy, and its fundamental purpose was to unify all of the component
elements of the bombardment system into a single, composite component that could perform the
mission. As stated in the 1938 Bombardment Aviation text,
the basic function of the bombardment airplane and its equipment is to
effectively transport and apply destructive agencies upon materiel objectives.
Upon this task are based all requirements (emphasis added).61
From the beginning, it was envisioned and defined as a socio-technical system that integrated the
mission and the socio-technical components, making clear provisions for both the humans and
machines necessary for precision bombing.
The design roots of the aircraft used by the American forces during the CBO are found in
Douhet's battleplane. Air Corps bombardment doctrine called for a large bomber aircraft with
strong offensive and defensive characteristics that could carry large amounts of bombs long
distances and drop them on enemy targets, while defending from enemy attack during the
mission. Offensively, the first and foremost requirement was to be able to "carry a sufficiently
heavy load of bombs, chemicals, or torpedos (sic), and release them accurately upon objectives
vital to an enemy." 62 From a technical perspective in 1938, a sufficiently heavy load of bombs
was determined to be 2,000 lbs, as
61 Bombardment Aviation: 1938, 33.
62 Ibid.
a 2,000-lb. bomb and probably a 1,100-lb. bomb, properly placed, will create
satisfactory destructive effect on any military establishment so far conceived by
man (emphasis added).63
However, embedded in the above statement is also the need to be able to release those bombs
accurately. To meet this accuracy requirement, the bomber aircraft had to accommodate the
entire bombardier-bombsight element and, as such, the aircraft had to provide a position for the
bombardier that "permits a bomb sight to be installed and conveniently operated and which
permits excellent vision toward the target."64 Similarly, the aircraft had to be easy to fly,
particularly in formation, as will be discussed below, providing the pilot a cockpit that afforded
good forward vision, otherwise it could not be "an effective bombardment airplane." 65
Maintaining crew efficiency so that they could perform their mission was also a primary
design driver for the optimum bomber aircraft. The doctrine developers desired an aircraft
as comfortable as possible to avoid producing any unnecessary fatigue. It is
imperative that oxygen be provided conveniently at high altitudes. The crew
must be kept warm if efficiency is to be maintained over long periods. As range
increases, comfort becomes of greater importance in avoiding unnecessary
fatigue. 66
A comfortable aircraft would also reduce fatigue produced by long flights over enemy
territory under the constant stress of possible or actual enemy attack. Providing stations
for effective bombardment and reducing fatigue, however, met only the primary
offensive requirement for the battleplane.
When the Bomber Mafia at the ACTS developed the HADPB doctrine, they envisioned
attacking targets that were both highly valuable and deep within enemy territory, which forced a
secondary, defensive requirement that the aircraft be able to "overcome determined resistance"
from airborne and ground threats. 67 Defense against airborne attack was provided by two key
capabilities-speed and defensive gunfire. Though through 1930, pursuit aircraft easily
outperformed bombers in flight and, with the proper direction, could provide a measure of
63 Ibid., 36.
64 Ibid., 37.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., 36.
67 Ibid., 33-34.
defense against their attack. However, the arrival of the Boeing B-9 and the Martin B- 10
monoplane bombers changed the offense-defense equation. During the late 1920s and early
1930s, the development of pursuit aircraft technology had stagnated in the United States and
Great Britain, as aircraft manufacturers focused on improving the speed and range of larger
aircraft, partially at the urging of the bombardment supporters in the Air Corps. The B-9 and the
B-10 were both all-metal monoplanes with retractable landing gear and powerful engines, and
were 60 to 80 miles per hour faster than any previous bomber. At its roll out, the B-10 was the
fastest, highest flying bomber in the world, easily able to outrun any existing pursuit aircraft.68
High speed became the bomber's greatest defense against airborne attack, as it made it more
difficult for defensive fighters to attack them and reduced their chances of conducting multiple
attacks, as well. In the event of fighter attack, however, the bomber was also to have defensive
guns for self-protection, covering multiple axes of attack, making any such attempt costly and
dangerous for the defender. 69
While speed was an effective defense against airborne attack, it was also a bomber
aircraft's primary protection against ground defenses, along with high altitude and
maneuverability. Anti-aircraft artillery (orflak) was unguided during World War I, and not
tremendously accurate, and bomber crews found that higher speeds made the bombers more
difficult to hit and further reduced flak accuracy. 70 Altitude also provided a defense against flak,
because aircraft that flew higher were more difficult to hit. However, as the effective range of
anti-aircraft artillery improved during the years following World War I, bombers had to fly
continually higher to decrease their effectiveness. While flying at higher altitudes increased
aircraft survivability, it decreased bombing precision. The higher altitudes introduced greater
variance into the problem that the bombardier and the bombsight had to solve, as will be
explained in Chapter 5, and accurate bombing results were more difficult to attain.
Since flak was unguided, aircraft maneuvers were another effective defense against
getting hit, and ease of maneuvering was identified as another key bomber capability.
Bombardment doctrine called for an aircraft that was "easy to fly," and that the response and
68 Greer, The Development ofAir Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941, 47-48, 58-60; Bernard Boylan,
Development of the Long-Range Escort Fighter, USAF Historical Study 136 (Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF
Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, 1955), 14-18.
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controls should be "quick, positive, and easy in their operation" so that the pilot could quickly
and easily perform defensive maneuvers when under fire from ground defenses." By 1932, the
bomber aircraft's advantage in speed, altitude, and maneuvering capability gave it such a huge
perceived advantage over pursuit and anti-aircraft defenses that many believed that there was no
effective way to defend against a determined bomber attack, and on 11 November 1932, Stanley
Baldwin, the British Prime Minister, said as much in a speech to Parliament when he famously
stated that "the bomber will always get through."72
The ideal bomber defined by the Air Corps bombardment doctrine was conceived as a
socio-technical system, integrating technical elements that enabled the individual socio-technical
elements perform their jobs as effectively as possible. Shaped by the need to fly long distances
at high speeds and drop bombs from high altitudes, the HADPB doctrine developers envisioned
it as a complete system that brought all of the component socio-technical elements into a single,
larger composite component that could perform the precision bombing mission. Its design
provided specifically for both the human and machine elements necessary to perform the
mission, while incorporating the ideas of precision bombing from high altitude. Prior to the
1930s, while Billy Mitchell was still agitating for an independent air force, such a system was
technologically infeasible as the state of aviation technology at the time simply could not support
the design and production of such an aircraft, making the realization of the doctrine seem
unlikely. However, as aviation historian Arthur Price explained, the early 1930s saw the
development of all-metal, stressed-skin aircraft that could fly higher, farther, and faster than any
before.73 That new machine, accompanied by the invention of the Norden bombsight and more
powerful aircraft engines, led to the development of perhaps the most well-known aircraft from
World War II, and the one that moved precision bombing from theoretical musings at the ACTS
to the reality that became the CBO.
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The B-17-The Socio-technical Embodiment of an Idea
At the time that the 1938 Bombardment Aviation text was written, the United States had
only one operational heavy bomber aircraft, the Boeing B- 17 "Flying Fortress" (Figure 2.1). It
was, however, the physical embodiment of the ACTS precision bombing doctrine and would be
the most used bomber during the CBO.74 Designed in 1934, with the first prototype flown that
same year, the B- 17 was the workhorse of the USAAF during the CBO, and went through many
modifications during the war that improved its performance. The final version, the B- 17G, was
powered by four turbo-supercharged engines, had an operational ceiling of 35,000 feet, a
maximum speed of 220 miles per hour (mph), could carry a 6,000-pound bomb load over 1,100
miles, and carried thirteen .50-caliber machine guns for self defense.7 5
Figure 2.1
Boeing B-17C 76
A modern aeronautical marvel, the B- 17 was designed specifically for high-altitude,
long-range bombing missions and, when initially fielded, was the most advanced bomber aircraft
of its time. Structurally, it reflected the current state of the art, offering nothing new or untested,
however, as B- 17 authority and aviation historian Peter Bowers points out, it was the manner in
which the aircraft went together that made it unique. 77 Boeing's designers designed and laid out
74
During the war, more B-24s were built (18,190) than B-17s (12,692), but more B-17s saw service during the
CBO. See Holley, Jr., Buying Aircraft, p. 550, Table 11.
Jane's All the World's Aircraft (London: Jane's Publishing Company, Ltd, 1946), 210.
76 Boeing B-1 7C, Photograph, n.d., AirForceMagazine.com, http://www.airforce-
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the semi-monocoque aluminum fuselage specifically to accommodate the bomber aircrew and
their machines, optimizing it both offensively and defensively for the strategic bombardment
mission (Figure 2.2).
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Figure 2.2
The B-17 crew compartment layout7 8
Offensively, the B -17 enabled the crew to accomplish their jobs with the maximum ease
attainable. The cockpit, fully enclosed and located high atop the aircraft, had room for two
pilots, the aircraft commander and a copilot, and provided excellent forward visibility, making it
easy to see other aircraft in formation. The inclusion of the copilot's position was a clear nod to
the HADPB doctrine, as it implied that the anticipated range of precision bombing missions
would be beyond the physical capability of a single pilot.79 Uniquely, forward and below the
cockpit was a dedicated compartment for both the bombardier and navigator. The bombardier
and the bombsight were located in the very front of the aircraft behind a Plexiglas nose that
provided excellent forward and downward visibility, giving the bombardier the best possible
view of the target. While a separate bombardier's station was common in bomber aircraft, the B-
17 was the first bomber to have a dedicated navigator's compartment.8 0 The navigator's station,
designed specifically to accommodate all of the tools of modern aerial navigation, was located
immediately behind the bombardier, conveniently close the pilots, as well, allowing easy access
to both during flight.
Although Boeing designed the B- 17 to operate at high altitude, out of the reach of enemy
defensive fire, the aircraft was unpressurized. Unlike its successor, the B-29, the interior of the
7 8 B-1 7. Pilot Training Manualfor the Flying Fortress, AAF Manual No. 50-13 (Headquarters AAF, Office of
Flying Safety, 1945), 29.
79 Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper, 1949), 155-156.
80 Norris B. Harbold, The Log ofAir Navigation (San Antonio, TX: The Naylor Company, 1970), 77.
B- 17 was not sealed, and thus exposed to the outside environment. During bombing missions,
temperatures plunged well below zero degrees Fahrenheit, exposing the crew to brutal
conditions. To compensate for this situation, the B- 17 had a limited heating system designed
primarily to enable the crew to perform their primary mission. It pumped hot air into the pilot's
cockpit, as well as onto the Plexiglas nose to prevent it from frosting up during flight and
preventing the bombardier from using his bombsight, but also included a limited number of
heating vents distributed back through the fuselage to the tail section at the crewmembers'
positions. Each crew position also had an electrical outlet, designed for use with the electrically
heated flight suits that many bomber crewmembers wore during high-altitude missions. Each
position also had a connection point so that the crewmembers could plug into the oxygen system,
designed for use up to 40,000 feet. Crewmembers were required to use supplemental oxygen
whenever flying above 10,000 feet above sea level. A full intercom system enabled the
crewmembers to communicate with each other at any time, as long as the aircraft generators
were functioning.8' The B- 17 formed a small human-machine organism, providing life-support
for the human elements while connecting them with each other and with their machines so that
they could perform their jobs in the hostile environment of the high altitude bombing missions.
Defensively, the B- 17 was designed for speed and was very heavily armed. With a top
speed over 200 mph, it was extremely fast and it could outrun the pursuit aircraft of the early
1930s, limiting them to either head-on or stern attacks. The bomber earned its "Flying Fortress"
moniker from the many machine guns placed throughout the fuselage, providing multiple-axis
defense and ready to challenge any such threat. Designers placed the machine guns to provide
the maximum amount of defensive cover, and a dedicated gunner, trained in aerial gunnery,
operated each. Interestingly, although the aircraft's speed enabled the bomber to outrun
attacking fighters and limit them to stern attacks, the first several models of the aircraft did not
have a machine gun installed in the tail section, and even though the Air Corps' own doctrine for
attacking bombers was based on stern attacks, in a distinct case where technology and doctrine
did not come together, this left the bomber defenseless in the very area where it was most likely,
by design, to be attacked. 82 Later versions of the aircraft included a tail gun, and throughout the
81 B-17F Pilot's Flight Operating Instructions, T 0. No. 01-20EF-1 (U.S. War Department, 1942); Pilot Training
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war, Boeing made improvements to the size and location of the machine guns, greatly increasing
the bomber's ability to survive aerial attack.
The B- 17 brought the ACTS strategic bombing doctrine to life, integrating the socio-
technical elements of the bombardment team into a complete whole, effectively encapsulating
them as a single unit. It was, in the words of General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, the man who
would command and lead the USAAF through World War II, "the first positive answer to the
need arising from the United States' modification of the Douhet theories, which we had been
teaching as an abstract science at the Air Corps Tactical School," and the first "real American
airpower...that you could put your hand on."8 3 It placed each crewmember in a position to
enable the system to drop bombs as precisely as was possible, and provided for a great degree of
self-defense.
As a single unit, however, the B- 17 was not able to execute the doctrine of strategic
bombing. As well conceived and implemented as was the design, a single B- 17 could neither
carry enough bombs to ensure the destruction of an enemy's vital targets, nor defend itself from
determined attack by multiple defensive fighters. Since creating a larger aircraft able to carry
more weapons was not feasible with the technology available at the time, doctrine provided the
remedy. The HADPB doctrine not only defined the bombardment system purpose and the socio-
technical elements, but also how the system was to be used at the intermediate level. It did so by
assembling numerous intermediate elements, the aircraft, into a larger whole, creating a higher-
level system more capable of achieving the massive, precision bombing attacks that were at the
heart of the strategic bombing doctrine.
The Formation-Construction, Control, and Execution at the Highest Level
As mentioned previously, the industrial infrastructure target set that the creators of the
HADPB doctrine envisioned attacking was very likely to be well defended, in addition to
potentially being very large. This was particularly the case during the CBO, as the German war-
making industrial base was, indeed, comprised of very large factories and industrial centers that
were extremely well-defended by an extensive air defense network of defensive fighters and
heavy flak batteries. To execute the doctrine, it was necessary not only to be able to drop bombs
precisely, but survive the trip to and from the target and drop enough precise bombs to destroy
83 Arnold, Global Mission, 154-157.
the target. To achieve this, the bombardment doctrine constructed a higher-level system, the
bomber formation, comprised of several of the intermediate-level components, the bomber, itself
comprised of the individual human-machine socio-technical elements in the bomber crew. The
bomber formation combined the precision bombing capability of the individual bombers with the
concept of mutual defense in order to deliver the mass of weapons necessary to destroy their
industrial targets.
Construction and Control
For bombing missions, the bombardment doctrine assembled groups of bomber aircraft
into formations, creating a larger system of interdependent components that operated as a single
entity to accomplish the mission. Formations were designed to provide the bombardment system
either defensive or offensive capability, and varied in size and construct to address the particular
requirements of each individual mission.84 Assembled from progressively larger groups of
aircraft, the formation provided the maximum amount of control over the system at various
levels.
The basic formation unit, which contained "the largest number of airplanes that can be
precisely controlled and commanded by one individual," was the squadron, and varied in size
from three to six aircraft. 85 The squadron commander controlled the squadron as a single unit,
but it was shared control, as the individual pilots were still in command of their own aircraft.
Three to six squadrons assembled into Groups, commanded by a group commander, again
providing layered, shared control for the growing system. Up to three groups, likewise,
assembled into the largest unit, the Wing, again with a single individual commander, the Wing
commander, in control of the overall formation system, which could contain up to fifty four
individual aircraft. Although the size and physical arrangement of the final formation was
dependent on the mission, the configuration was guided by the need to remain flexible so that it
could respond to changing operational conditions during the flight. It needed to be simple, so
that individual pilots could "maintain easily their assigned positions and be susceptible to
efficient control by the commander" at all levels.8 6
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Formation simplicity was a key requirement for the individual pilot, because he could
effectively fly formation only with the one aircraft immediately to his right or left. Maintaining
formation position, which varied from as far away as a few hundred feet to as close as ten feet of
separation between aircraft, could be very physically demanding and required a great deal of
concentration. As such, the aircraft flying and handling qualities had a direct impact on the
effectiveness of the formation. Aircraft that were easier to fly made maintaining position easier,
which enabled the formation leader more flexibility to maneuver in response to changing
conditions, such as weather or enemy defenses. Regardless of the final size of the formation,
individual pilot ability to maintain his aircraft's position was the key to its overall effectiveness.
Defense and Survival
The overall purpose of the formation, whether for defense or offense, drove the physical
arrangement of the aircraft. Defensively, formations could provide protection for the individual
aircraft from either attacking pursuit or fighter aircraft or from defensive flak batteries. Against
fighter attack, doctrine arrayed the bombers so that they provided each other mutually supporting
defensive machine gun fire. In addition to covering more axes of attack, the massed effect of the
multiple guns was far more threatening and deadly than that possible for a single aircraft. In this
type of formation, the aircraft flew as closely together as possible, ensuring maximum overlap
between individual aircraft machine gun coverage. It was the most demanding for the pilots, and
used only when there was a threat of enemy air attack.
When entering areas heavily defended by flak batteries, such as over cities or target areas,
the bombers employed a different formation. The aircraft spread out, increasing the distance
between the individual elements so that a single flak burst could not damage multiple aircraft.
The intent of this formation was to overload the ground defenses with multiple targets, with the
underlying philosophy that at least some of the formation would survive to reach and attack the
target.
Offense, Daylight, and the Mission
Once in the target area, the bombardment system's focus shifted from survival to
destruction, and the aircraft transitioned to a formation more conducive to precision bombing,
based upon the particular target for the mission. The specific target type, precision or area,
determined the method of attack used by each aircraft. Precision targets, "those which, to be
destroyed, require either a direct hit by a bomb of the proper size or a hit within a limited
distance therefrom (sic)," such as naval vessels or bridges, demanded that each aircraft drop its
bombs individually, ensuring the greatest accuracy.87 This necessitated a looser formation that
allowed the individual bombers to maneuver to the correct bomb release point, which transferred
control to the aircraft level in the system, but decreased the defensive protection afforded the
individual aircraft. While the USAAF did attack targets of this type during the CBO, the
majority of the campaign focused more on what were classified as "area" targets.
Area targets were those targets that required "a distribution of bombs of the proper size
throughout the area in which the definite targets lie...including large rail terminals, extensive
industrial plants, and large supply depots."88 Attacking area targets successfully required a more
dispersed bombing pattern, but the method of employment was very similar to that used to attack
precision targets. The bombers generally remained in close formation, continuing to follow the
formation lead to the target, but each individual bomber was still responsible for bombing a
particular part of the area target. Area bombing did not automatically imply the saturation of a
general target area, and doctrine directed that the individual bomber crew treat each target as a
precision target and employ their aircraft in the manner that guaranteed the greatest bombing
accuracy.89 As with precision targets, bombing area targets necessitated a looser, less defensive
formation, which increased the risk of a bomber getting shot down.
Bombing as a single formation with every aircraft dropping at the same moment was, in
fact, envisioned as a rare occurrence, reserved for instances when uniform coverage of an entire
target area was desired, such as during the employment of chemical bombs.90 In this case, each
bomber in the formation would release their bombs upon a signal from the lead aircraft, such as
when the lead bombardier released his bombs. Precision bombing was rarely attainable through
this technique, however, as it was almost impossible to ensure that each aircraft in the formation
dropped their bombs at the same instant. The limits of human reaction time prevented
87 Ibid., 44.
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simultaneous release, and the system as a whole was not equipped to operate in this fashion. For
this reason, pure formation bombing was not considered a primary mode of employment in the
Air Corps' prewar bombardment doctrine.
The desire for precision employment with mass had another significant effect on the
overall concept of the HADPB doctrine-the bombers had to fly during the light of day. The
desire to hit targets precisely meant that the bomber crews needed to be able to see their targets.
While the cover of darkness provided a measure of defense against hostile attack from the air or
the ground, it also made it very difficult to locate the targets, particularly those blacked out or
camouflaged. This made night bombing impractical as a precision bombing doctrine.91 While
flying during the day made precision bombing more practical, it also made bombing itself more
dangerous, as the bombers were plainly visible to enemy defensive forces. As explained later,
this vulnerability caused a significant change in American bomber operations during the CBO.
The bomber formation comprised the top level of the bombardment system designed by
the Bomber Mafia in the 1930s to execute the HADPB. As a purposeful assemblage of
interdependent socio-technical elements, the formation itself was a distinct socio-technical
system, structured in a fashion to provide the human formation commanders layers of shared
control that enabled them to use and alter the system in response to the immediate context, while
still performing the bombing mission. The different formations themselves were designed to
take advantage of the mutual defense capabilities of the individual intermediate elements, the
bomber aircraft, but more importantly the individual precision bombing capabilities of those
aircraft. It was their ability to precisely hit targets, enabled by the successful cooperative efforts
of the socio-technical bombing teams that made up those aircraft, that made the HADPB doctrine
theoretically feasible.
It was this system of doctrine, machines, and humans that the United States brought to
England in 1942 to execute the CBO. However, it was based upon theory, rather than the "tried
91 The American decision to pursue daylight bombardment during the CBO was hotly debated at the time, as the
British, who began bombing the Germans before the USAAF even entered the war, had been markedly
unsuccessful with daylight bombing. They shifted almost immediately to night operations, taking an area
bombing approach in their operations. It was not until the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 that
both sides came to the agreement that the Americans would bomb during the day and the British continue
to bomb at night, attempting to implement "around the clock bombing." The decision to pursue a daylight
campaign has been examined many times since the end of the war. For two of the best, see Noble
Frankland, Bomber Offensive: The Devastation of Europe (New York: Ballantine Books, 1970); Anthony
Verrier, The Bomber Offensive (London: Batsford, 1968).
and true," and when the first attempts to employ the system provided evidence of performance
contrary to that which was expected, the USAAF commanders quickly changed how they used
the system, in turn changing how the elements were organized and employed. These changes, as
will be seen in subsequent chapters, directly affected how each of the individual human-machine
elements in the system performed their jobs, with unanticipated social and technological effects.
When the "Tried and True" Isn't
The USAAF bomber force that arrived in England in August 1942 as the 8t Air Force
(8 th AF) had a system of doctrine, machines, and humans designed to attack and destroy
Germany's industrial infrastructure while defending itself against attack from enemy fighters and
defensive flak that was based almost solely on theory. It had never proven itself in practice.
Experience soon demonstrated that some of the assumptions used to construct the formations
were incorrect. German defensive fighters proved far more deadly than anticipated and caused a
great deal of bomber attrition both on the way to and returning from the target. Bombing
accuracy was far worse than expected, as the heavy flak batteries around the German targets
proved more effective than anticipated, and they disrupted the bomber crew's normal, peacetime-
learned bombing procedures, forcing them to maneuver defensively in such a fashion that the
bombardier had insufficient time to aim the bombs before the aircraft arrived at the target. As a
result, a great number of bombs fell extremely far from their intended impact point.
Shortly after starting the bombing campaign, 8th AF bomber crews discovered that the
German defensive fighters were more effective than they expected. After a short period of
experimentation, the Germans developed tactics that exploited weaknesses in the American
bomber design as well in the bomber formations. The initial version of the B- 17 was only lightly
armed in the in the forward quarter of the aircraft, with a single .30-caliber machine gun operated
by the bombardier providing limited coverage against attack. The Germans exploited this frontal
vulnerability and developed head-on attack tactics that were so effective that they caused, by far,
the majority of bomber losses. In November 1942, bomber losses to fighter attack averaged 3.7
percent of the attacking force, but rose to 8.8 and 8.7 percent in December and January,
respectively, and nearly brought the American daylight offensive to a halt. 92 Efforts to improve
92 Jean H. DuBuque and Robert F. Gleckner, The Development of the Heavy Bomber: 1918-1944, U.S. Air Force
Historical Study 6 (Washington, DC: USAF Historical Division, Air University, August 1951), 119; Arthur
the defensive armament were initiated in the United States, but they could not be implemented
right away and a more immediate solution was necessary.
The initial formations used by the 8 th AF were intended to provide protection against
aerial attack, but were obviously lacking. Although the prewar bombardment doctrine described
specific formations up to the largest, or Wing level, the initial 8th AF bombing operations were
conducted only at the Group level, with a maximum of twenty seven aircraft. These Group
formations were controllable, but did not combine enough firepower to deter enemy air attack.
Additionally, the formation's defensive capability was compromised because most bomber crews
arrived in the ETO poorly trained in formation flying, and they were consistently unable to fly
their aircraft in the tightly packed configuration necessary to provide maximum defensive
support. To remedy these problems, 8th AF commanders immediately established a formation
training program for new bomber crews and reconfigured the formation to provide more
effective defensive support.93
Several different formation configurations were considered and tested before the 8th AF
units settled on a single, standard solution. Called the "Combat Wing" (Figure 2.3), the new
formation consisted of up to 54 aircraft, organized into three "Combat Boxes" of 18 aircraft each
(Figure 2.4). The Combat Box consisted of a "wedge" of three squadrons, each of which had six
aircraft grouped into two elements of three individual aircraft flying in a "V" formation within
about 100 feet of each other. Each successive element in the formation had a designated "lead"
aircraft, with the pilot of that aircraft in charge of that part of the formation. This arrangement,
as constructed in the prewar doctrine, shared control of the formation hierarchically, and
maintained an acceptable workload for those in the lead.
The squadrons echeloned in altitude, as did the groups, which provided excellent
maneuverability for the whole formation, as well as a great degree of defensive coverage for the
sides and rear of the formation. Forward protection was increased, as well. Because of the
placement of the guns in the individual aircraft, the lower squadrons received less coverage from
B. Ferguson, "The War Against the Sub Pens," in The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 2-Europe:
Torch to Pointblank, ed. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Washington, DC: 1983. Reprint,
Office of Air Force History. Originally published Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), 264-265.
The B-24 was more heavily armed in the forward quarter than the B-17, as it had a .50-caliber chin turret
located in the nose. However, its coverage was limited by the fact that it could only engage targets below
the horizon, leaving the bomber vulnerable to attack from above in the front quarter.
93 Curtis E. LeMay, Mission with LeMay: My Story (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), 233-235.
the front and were more vulnerable to attack from that quarter. While the low, rear squadron in
the Combat Wing came to be known as the "Coffin Corner" or the "Purple Heart Corner"
because of this vulnerability, the overall protection afforded the bombardment system as a whole
was increased by the new formation.94
94 Hansell, Jr., The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler, 116; LeMay, Mission with LeMay: My Story, 257.
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Figure 2.4
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Precision?
Offensively, 8th AF leaders had to increase the effectiveness of their bombing. Post-
mission photographs revealed that from August to December of 1942 only 5 percent of their
96 Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P. Harahan, eds., Strategic Air Warfare: An Interview with Generals Curtis E.
LeMay, Leon W. Johnson, David A. Burchinal, and Jack J Catton (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force
History, U.S. Air Force, 1988).
77
bombs fell within 1,000 feet of their intended aimpoint. 97 In fact, an average of only 50 percent
of the bombs dropped on any given mission could even be identified in the photographs,
indicating many extreme misses.98 This caused little intended destruction, and was certainly not
sufficient to execute the plan of destroying enough of the German war-making infrastructure to
cause them to stop fighting. They had to increase the accuracy of their attacks if the CBO was to
work as planned. Part of the problem, though, was determining how to measure bombing
accuracy.
In the early stages of development, the HADPB doctrine had been built on very
optimistic assumptions about bombing accuracy. Through the 1920s, precision bombing was
unachievable, but with the arrival of the Norden bombsight in 1931, bombing results improved
steadily, and some airmen began proclaiming that they could put a bomb "right in a pickle
barrel" from high altitude, implying a level of precision that was really attainable only under
optimum conditions. Bombing results did improve, however, as demonstrated by the
performance of the 1 9 th Bomb Group over a period of forty-one days of training during 1935.
On the first day, operating at 15,000 feet, they managed only to drop their bombs within 520 feet
of the target. Gradually, though, crew performance improved, and by the end of the training
period they were able to place their bombs regularly within 164 feet of the target. Missing the
target from 164 feet is not a direct hit, but to the men in the Air Corps, "a near bull's-eye from
almost three miles up struck us being pretty good."99
Evaluating bombing results was not a simple matter of determining whether or not a
bomb hit its intended target. In fact, most bombs missed their targets. Against many targets,
however, it is not necessary to score a direct hit in order to destroy it, because a close enough
miss with a bomb of sufficient size may produce enough explosive effect to cause destruction.
Bombing accuracy evolved as a concept of determining not only how far a bomb fell from its
target, but also how far a bomb could be expected to fall, probabilistically, from its target. As
explained by historian David McFarland, 15t Lt. Kenneth Walker, while an instructor at the
ACTS in the early 1930s, developed the concept of the circular error probable, or CEP. CEP
was a measure of the radial distance from a target within which a given number of bombs could
97 Stephen L. McFarland, America's Pursuit ofPrecision Bombing, 1910-1945 (Washington, DC: Smithsonian
Institution Press, 1995), 173.
98 Ferguson, "The War Against the Sub Pens," 270.
99 Arnold, Global Mission, 150.
be expected to fall. Using actual bombing data gathered during 329 practice bomb drops from
5,000 feet, Walker determined that the Air Corps could expect that while 25-31 percent of the
bombs would hit the target, 50 percent of them would fall within 147 feet. The 50 percent CEP
became the standard measure for bombing accuracy. 00
During the first five months of the bombing campaign, the 8th AF average CEP was 900
feet, which was twice the prewar average attained during training missions flown at the same
altitudes. One of the principal sources of error was excessive maneuvering in the target area, as
the bomber pilots attempted to avoid the heavier-than-expected defensive fire from flak batteries
stationed around the target. Prewar doctrine did call for the bombers to shift from their defensive
formation to a looser formation in the target area to enable maneuvering, but the doctrine was
adversely affecting bombing accuracy. Conventional wisdom among the first group of bomber
crews to see combat was that any bomber that flew in a straight line for more than 10 seconds
was likely to be hit.' 0 ' However, the bombardier needed a bomb run of at least 50 seconds with
the aircraft flying straight and level to correctly operate the Norden bombsight. Maneuvering
every 10 seconds made precision bombing virtually impossible and accuracy became inversely
proportional with the strength of the resistance at the target.10 2
The solution to the bombing inaccuracy problem came from two sources: changes to the
formation used while bombing and the mandatory use of the autopilot during the bomb run. The
closely-knit Combat Wing formation proved more effective for survival against air attack, but
according to the prewar doctrine, the minimal distance between the individual aircraft made it
less than optimal for bombing targets protected by ground-based anti-aircraft defenses. In
theory, the close spacing made more aircraft in the formation vulnerable to the enemy fire.
Colonel Curtis LeMay, commander of the 3 0 5th Bomb Group, questioned the wisdom of this
assumption, believing that flak batteries were actually less effective than they were being given
credit for. Using the data in a World War I air defense manual, he calculated the probability of
an 88mm artillery shell hitting a B- 17-sized target at 25,000 feet and determined that it should
take 372 rounds to achieve a hit, which made the event seem pretty unlikely.10 3
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Given that, he directed that his bombers remain in the defensive, more closely spaced
Combat Box rather than shifting to the looser formation called for by doctrine during the bomb
run, and mandated that the formation not maneuver until the bombardiers dropped their bombs.
While this gave the bombardiers ample time to operate their bombsights, the dictates of
maintaining the tighter formation meant that the individual bombers would not be able to
maneuver to drop their bombs in the individual precision manner in which they had been trained,
so LeMay implemented the "drop-on-leader" bombing doctrine. During drop-on-leader, only the
bombardier in the group's lead aircraft used his Norden bombsight, and when he released his
bombs, the rest of the bombardiers in the formation did the same.10 4 This new procedure
transformed the bombardment system from a conglomeration of 54 individual bombing elements
into a single bombing element. The drop-on-leader doctrine was soon adopted by all of the 8th
AF bomber groups, and became the standard bombing procedure for the USAAF forces
participating in the CBO. As will be seen in succeeding chapters, LeMay's decision had a
significant impact not only on how the bomber crews accomplished their jobs, but also on the
social and physical structure of the crew as a socio-technical system.
Since the individual bombardiers no longer aimed their bombs, the traditional measure of
accuracy, the CEP, became irrelevant, and the adoption of the drop-on-leader doctrine forced a
redefinition of accuracy. The results of the individual aircraft were not germane, except within
their role as a part of the formation overall. It was no longer a matter of determining how close
bombs fell on fifty-four individual aimpoints, rather, how close the formation's bombs as a
whole fell in relation to a single aimpoint. The new measure of bombing accuracy became the
formation's "mean point of impact," or where the majority of its bombs hit the ground. After a
bombing mission, photo interpreters drew a 1,000-foot circle around the greatest concentration of
bomb hits, and the distance from the center of that circle to the intended aimpoint became the
new measure of the formation's accuracy. Additionally, they measured the percentage of bombs
that fell within that 1,000-foot circle, as a measure of formation bombing effectiveness.
For maximum effectiveness, the drop-on-leader doctrine required that the lead aircraft fly
as precisely as possible while leading the rest of the bombers to the aiming point. As will be
explained in Chapters 4 and 5, the Minneapolis-Honeywell C-1 Autopilot in the B- 17, coupled to
the Norden bombsight and controlled by the bombardier, produced the most accurate bombing
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results. LeMay mandated that each lead aircraft fly the bomb run with the autopilot engaged,
enabling the bombardier to control the aircraft until he released the bombs.
The final major change LeMay implemented was the creation of the "lead crew." He
realized that lack of preparation for the day's mission was making it difficult for bomber crews
to find and identify the target. Most of the time, the first time a bombardier found out which
target he was bombing was at the mission brief the morning of the mission, so there was little
time to get familiar with the particular civil and geographical features that would help him find
it. In LeMay's words, "there's a lot of difference between bombing circles in the desert and
bombing the northeast corner of a factory building in the midst of an industrial buildup with
industrial haze, bad weather, and poor visibility, etc."105 The crews were rushed during the
bomb run, and frequently identified the target too late to conduct an accurate bomb drop.
Although doctrinally each formation had a designated leader before the implementation
of the drop-on-leader doctrine, he was only the lead pilot in the formation, responsible for
orchestrating its airborne maneuvers. There was no formal equivalent lead bombardier or
navigator position in the formation. LeMay created positions for lead bombardiers and lead
navigators and gave them the responsibility for becoming intimately familiar the targets in a
particular geographical area, and when a mission called for an attack on one of those targets, they
would fly in the lead aircraft.106
The lead crews were selected based upon merit, rather than rank. They were the best at
their jobs, and while some crews earned the distinction as an entire crew, others were assembled
from members of different crews. Selection as a lead crew or for membership on a lead crew
was a direct acknowledgment of demonstrated skill and ability, and it separated those individuals
from the "rank and file" of the other bomber crews. It also carried a heavy burden of
responsibility and increased danger. If the navigator missed a checkpoint or the bombardier
misidentified the target, it affected the entire formation, and the whole mission could end in
failure.107 Since they flew in the front of the formation, the lead crews were the most exposed to
the Luftwaffe fighter's head-on attack tactics, and they suffered a disproportionate number of
105 General Curtis E. LeMay, "Interview with General Curtis E. LeMay," interview by Col. Bill Peck, Oral History
Transcript, March 1965, K239.0512-785 C.1, IRIS No. 1000342, US Air Force Historical Research
Agency.
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losses. As such, lead crews were required to fly only 30 missions to complete their tours of
combat duty, rather than the 35 required of non-lead crews. 108
The combined effect of adopting the Combat Wing and Combat Box formations for both
offensive and defensive employment, the decision to enforce longer bomb runs and use of the
autopilot during them, and the creation of the lead crew improved 8 th AF bombing accuracy.
Through the first nine months of 1943, as the new changes were being implemented, the average
formation CEP was 1,130 feet and 24% of the bombs fell within the desired 1,000 foot circle.
Over the next six months, accuracy improved to an 820-foot CEP, and 40 percent of the bombs
fell within the circle. 109 Certainly improved, but far from the "pickle-barrel" bombing
anticipated in the 1930s. During 1943, out of 100 bombers attacking a target, on average only 16
dropped their bombs within 1,000 feet of the target. 10
Entering the war in 1942, the 8th AF employed a bombardment system constructed from
and guided by a prewar bombardment doctrine based upon years of theoretical development and
essentially no operational experience. It was neither tried nor, as experience would show, true.
When initial bombing results proved less than satisfactory, 8* AF leadership could not change
the human or machine elements of the system, so they had to change the way that those elements
were used. They could not immediately improve bomber defensive capability or invent a new,
more accurate bombsight, but by rearranging the elements and altering their use, they sacrificed
individual performance and improved the system's overall performance.
The prewar doctrine imposed insufficient control on the bombardment system given the
realities of the defenses faced during the CBO. Changing the formations employed by the
bombers and implementing the lead crew construct improved that control, as evidenced by the
increase in bombing accuracy, and also fundamentally changed how bombing accuracy was
measured, with overall system accuracy and effectiveness taking precedence over individual
bombing accuracy. In addition to changing the physical structure of the bombardment system, it
also changed the social structure by identifying an elite group, designated as such by their
108 "2d Bombardment Wing Instructions No. 35-13B: Personnel, Military, Relief of Combat Crew Personnel",
January 5, 1945, 1, Microfilm roll B5337, File 526.179, US Air Force Historical Research Agency. In the
early phases of the CBO, a crew completed its combat tour after flying 25 combat missions. As the allies
gained air superiority over the European continent and bomber losses diminished, the required number of
missions was increased. The crew of the Memphis Belle was the first to complete their 25 combat missions
during the CBO.
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demonstrated superiority over their peers, who had different jobs and a larger role in the control
of the system. Bombing accuracy did not improve as much as was desired, but the change in
how the system was employed, the doctrine guiding its use, did have a positive effect on system
precision.
Conclusion
The bombardment system employed by the 8th Air Force during the CBO was a true
socio-technical system, consisting of a set of interdependent parts-ideas, humans, and
machines-all working together to achieve a common purpose. The technologically focused
view of the system at its simplest level as "a relatively fast, high-altitude, long-range airplane,
and a precise optical bombsight" ignores the fundamental relationship between those machines
and the humans that operated them.' It was not machines that that made up the system at the
simplest level, but human-machine systems, teams of humans and machines that were incapable
of performing their mutual task without one another.
John Steinbeck, in Bombs Away, his wartime account of the creation of the human team
that occupied and operated the bomber aircraft and bombing machines, presented a more
inclusive view, acknowledging the link between human and machine.
The long-range bomber is an intricate an marvelous machine capable of
climbing to great altitude, capable of tremendous range, capable of carrying
great bomb loads; but it is still only as good as its bomber crew. It is only a
machine. It can only fly as well as its pilot can fly it an only arrive at the point
toward which its navigator can direct it." 2
However, this view of a human-machine system still excludes a vital element-the beliefs and
ideas that formed these humans and machines into a mutually defined team-the doctrine of
precision bombing that gave them a reason to exist. Opening the black box that defines the
system's physical limits allows us to see how this doctrine is part of the system-how the ideas
and beliefs that it encapsulated led to the creation of the system and how the experience gained
using the system modified those very same ideas and beliefs.
m Moy, War Machines, 33.
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The precision bombing doctrine developed in the 1930s gave shape to the bombardment
system, defining its purpose, its components, and how those components were to be used.
Formed from unproven theories and beliefs, the HADPB doctrine constructed a three-level
system of socio-technical elements and ideas about how to employ them. At the lowest level, it
created individual socio-technical elements, focused on a single task. At the intermediate level,
it combined those elements into a single socio-technical unit, defined by the specially designed
bomber aircraft that encapsulated them. At the highest level, it combined those units into a
single, more powerful socio-technical system whose employment was guided by the ideas that
created it. The HADPB doctrine created a hierarchy of capability, embedding control at each
level to ensure that the system could operate in harmony to achieve its purpose. It also created a
social hierarchy, privileging certain humans over others based upon their role in the system.
While the prewar HADPB doctrine shaped how the system was used in the opening
stages of the CBO, failure to achieve the desired results with the system as constructed forced a
reevaluation of the underlying ideas about how the system should be used. Changing the
offensive formation doctrine decreased the performance of the individual system elements but
increased the overall system performance, in turn redefining the measure of accuracy. It also
redefined the roles of individual elements in the system, in some cases fundamentally changing
how humans and machines interacted at the individual level to accomplish their task within the
system, and changing how the humans did their jobs and how they fit into their professional
social structure. The manner in which the HADPB doctrine shaped this human-machine
relationship is the focus of the next three chapters.
Chapter 3
Command and Shared Control-Flying and the Pilot as the System Controller
Bremen. Friday, 8 October 1943. In the left seat of the cockpit of B-1 7 42-3393, Just-A-
Snappin', pilot ]s' Lt. Everett Blakely took the runway ahead of the entire 3 rd Combat Wing. He
guided the heavy bomber down the runway, eased it into the air, and followed the heading
passed by his navigator, Harry Crosby, that would take them to the formation rejoin point. As
the lead, he had to arrive at the rendezvous first, as all of the bombers in the 1 0 0 th Bomb Group,
and eventually the 3 rd Combat Wing, were to join on his aircraft.
In the right seat, Major John Kidd, the mission command pilot, worked closely with
Crosby and Blakely, orchestrating the aerial ballet that was the formation rejoin. He watched as
the 100th Group's bombers took their positions, giving direction over the radio when necessary
to clear up any confusion. Clear weather facilitated the assembly process, and they finished in a
record eighteen minutes. Shortly thereafter, the 3 9 0th and 9 5 1h Bomb Groups took their positions
in the Combat Box, completing the 3rd Combat Wing.
At the appointed time, Blakely departed east over the English Channel, following the
course set by Crosby. Maintaining a steady 150 mph, he left the formation pilots a power
margin that enabled them to easily keep their aircraft in the safety of the Combat Box.
Approaching the Initial Point, enemy fighters attacked, but Blakely continued toward the target
under Crosby's direction, and he engaged and adjusted the autopilot to maintain level flight.
Once past the Initial Point with the target area in sight, Blakely transferred control of
Just-A-Snappin' to his bombardier, James Douglass, for the bomb run. Thirty seconds before
the bomb dropping point, a burst offlak struck the aircraft and penetrated the Plexiglas nose,
but Douglass remained steady, controlling the aircraft through his Norden bombsight. As the
bombs fell from the aircraft, Blakely retook control, immediately turning away from the target.
At that same instant, another burst offlak destroyed the number four engine and damaged
severalflight control surfaces, forcing the bomber into an aggressive dive.
The stricken aircraft fell 3,000 feet, tossing the crew about the aircraft while Blakely and
Kidd wrestled to control it. As Blakely recovered level flight, Kidd alertly transferred lead of the
formation to the deputy lead aircraft, since they could no longer maintain that position in their
damaged condition. With only three engines, they fell out of the protection of the formation, and
from that point, they were on their own for the 200 miles journey back to England Following
Crosby's direction, Blakely nursed the damaged bomber westward, all the while orchestrating a
running battle against attacking defensive fighters.
Limited 120 mph and continually losing altitude, Blakely considered ditching in the
English Channel, however, several of the crew were severely injured and unlikely to survive such
an event. Unable to reach Thorpe Abbots, he chose to land at an abandoned airfield near
Coltishall. Upon touch down, the brake cables snapped and Blakely could neither steer nor stop
the aircraft. Careening down the runway, Just-A-Snappin' hit a tree, coming to an abrupt,
crunching halt. Although the aircraft was destroyed, Blakely was successful-the formation had
reached the target, bombed it, and everyone in his aircraft had returned safely to England (one
crew member died later from wounds suffered during the mission).1
1 Adapted from Edward Jablonski, Flying Fortresses: The Illustrated Biography of the B-17s and the Men Who
Flew Them (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965), 184-195; Frank D. Murphy, Luck of the
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Introduction
This chapter examines the flying and control element of the bombardment system and
focuses on the bomber pilot. It describes system control at the single aircraft and larger
formation levels as a process of shared control between a specially trained human operator, the
pilot, and several humans and machines based upon their unique capabilities. First, it describes
the development of the bomber pilot from initial creation as a technical specialist, valued for his
flying skill, to a generalist and commander, valued for his skill as a system controller and
military commander. Second, it describes the pilot's actions on a bombing mission, exploring
the complex nature of controlling the bombardment system at the aircraft and formation levels,
and how the doctrine of HADPB and the machines he used to execute that doctrine shaped those
actions. Third, it explores how the pilot, as the aircraft commander, shared control with the
copilot, navigator, and bombardier to accomplish the mission. Finally, it examines the
introduction of the autopilot and the pilot's acceptance of it as a machine that enhanced his
command of the aircraft through the ability to share control of the flying task, and how its use
created the need for the pilot to develop a new skill set.
Getting to the Target-and Back
During the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO), a typical bomber mission began with
the General Briefing, held in a large briefing room in the Group Operations building. There, the
bomber crews gathered after eating breakfast to find out the details of their upcoming mission.
Depending on the size of the mission, up to two or three hundred men might pack themselves
into the room, and for most of them, the General Briefing was the first time that they would be
told the location of the target for the day's mission. At the start of the briefing, much as
portrayed in the movies, the Group Commander or Group Briefing Officer walked to the front of
the room, perhaps up onto a stage, and pulled back a curtain, behind which was hidden a map of
Britain and western Europe. On the map, a red woolen line connected one dot that represented
their home base to another dot, likely hundreds of miles away, that represented their intermediate
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destination-the target (Figure 3. 1).2 Their final destination was, they hoped, the same place that
they started the day. In that moment, the map defined their universe for the next twelve hours or
so.
Figure 3.1
The large-scale mission map for Mission No. 327 to Berlin, 29 April 19443
Every crewmember in the room had a particular interest in that line. The navigators were
concerned with the line's direction, turns, and length. The bombardiers were concerned with the
line's midpoint, its sharp reversal marking the target location. The pilots in the room were
concerned with what the line represented, the mission as a whole, and how they were going tofly
that line, orchestrating and controlling the massive formation of groups, squadrons, elements,
and individual bomber aircraft so that they could achieve their objective-precision bombing of
the target for the day. They were an elite group, both technically skilled specialists and team
leaders, chosen from among the best flight training candidates for their skill and judgment, and
ultimately responsible not only for the achievement of the mission's objectives, but for the safety
of the men on their crews all the way to the target and back, as well.
2 Elmer Bendiner, The Fall of Fortresses: A Personal Account of the Most Daring-and Deadly-American Air Battles
of World War II (New York: Putnam, 1980), 90-92. This scene played out at all of the bases in the ETO,
and is described with minor variations in virtually every memoir covering bombing operations during the
war.
This is a picture of the map revealed to the B-24 crews of the 392d Bomb Group, stationed at Wendling, near
Norwich, England, on the morning of their 29 April 1944 mission to Berlin. "The Berlin Bombing Mission
Flown by The 8th Air Force on April 29, 1944--Map 392 route Berlin.jpg", April 29, 1944,
http://www.b24.net/stories/annette.htm (accessed 4 March 2011).
The Pilot as the Technical Specialist
The age of the military pilot began on 30 July 1909, when the United States Army bought
its first powered, heavier-than-air aircraft from the Wright brothers, a Wright A that became
Army Aeroplane No. 1 (Figure 3.2). On that day, Orville Wright took off from Fort Myer,
Virginia, accompanied by passenger and navigator Lieutenant Benjamin D. Foulois, for a ten-
mile round trip speed trial, with Alexandria, Virginia, marking the halfway point.4 Orville's
purpose was to demonstrate to the U.S. Army Signal Corps that he and his brother, Wilbur, could
produce a controllable aircraft that met the Army's requirements to lift 350 pounds, including
fuel enough for a 125-mile flight, and achieve a top speed of at least thirty-six miles per hour
(mph).5 Foulois, assigned as the Army's official observer for the trial, was one of the few Army
officers who had shown an interest in aviation. Initially believing that he had been selected for
the task because of his intellectual and technical abilities, Foulois later found out that he was
chosen for his "short stature, light weight, and map-reading experience." 6 His diminutive size
and skill with a map boosted the Wrights' chance for success, as extra weight was sure to slow
down the aircraft and getting lost would add time to the trip.
4 Benjamin D. Foulois, From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts: The Memoirs of Benjamin D. Foulois (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 1-2; Alfred F. Hurley and William C. Heimdahl, "The Roots of U.S. Military
Aviation," in Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force (Volume I. 1907-
1950), ed. Bernard C. Nalty, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997),
13-14.
5 Brigadier General James Allen, Chief Signal Officer of the Army, "Signal Corps Specification, No. 486:
Advertisement and Specification for a Heavier-Than-Air Flying Machine (23 December 1907)," in How
Our Army Grew Wings: Airmen and Aircraft Before 1914, by Charles deForest Chandler and Frank P.
Lahm (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1943), 300.
6 John F. Shiner, Foulois and the U.S. Army Air Corps, 1931-1935 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History,
U.S. Air Force, 1983), 2; Foulois, From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts, 63.
Figure 3.2
Orville Wright in Army Aeroplane No. I at Fort Meyer, Virginia
Orville completed the first half of the trial course averaging 37.735 mph, but had trouble
finding the balloon that marked the turn point in Alexandria. It had blown close to the ground
and was very difficult to detect, causing him to fly beyond the prescribed limits of the course.
Regardless, he averaged 47.431 mph during the return leg for an overall average of 42.583 mph,
easily establishing a new world record for a two-man flight. Wright and Foulois set two other
world records on the flight: one for accomplishing a 10-mile cross-country flight, and the other
for attaining the record altitude of 400 feet.8 The success netted the Wright brothers the contract
award of $25,000, as well as an additional $5,000 for exceeding the desired top speed of 40 mph
by a full two miles per hour.9 In return, the U.S. Army received the aircraft and an agreement
that the Wrights would instruct two men in "the handling and operation of (the) flying
machine." 10 Foulois was one of those two men.
Learning to fly the Wright aircraft was a significant physical and cognitive challenge for
Foulois. Handling and operating the flying machine in the way that Orville Wright had during
the trial was no simple task. Although missing the turn point at the middle of the course had
Orville Wright at start offlight, Fort Meyer, Va., Photograph, June 29, 1909, George Grantham Bain Collection
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nearly upset the Wrights' chances of success during the trial flight, neither navigation nor finding
the target had been Orville's principal challenge. In his memoirs, Foulois noted
The air was bumpy, and I had the feeling that there were moments when Orville
didn't have full control of the machine as we dipped groundward. It was as if
someone on the ground had a string attached to us and would pull it
occasionally as they would a kite. But each time Orville would raise the
elevators slightly, and we would gain back the lost altitude."
The Wright A represented the leading edge of aeronautical technology, but it was truly primitive.
Designed for no mission other than powered flight, maintaining basic aircraft control was a huge
task in itself.
Army Aeroplane No. 1 was a very close derivative of the Wright Flyer, and as such its
flight control system was a complex technological array comprised of cables, rods, pulleys, and
levers which required extensive study and practice to master. More "mechanical than
instinctive," it consisted of two levers which governed the aircraft's flight path, one for each of
the pilot's hands.' 2 The left-hand lever, which moved fore and aft along the aircrafts
longitudinal axis, controlled the aircraft pitch by moving the elevator. Intuitively, when the pilot
pushed the lever forward, the nose of the aircraft pointed toward the ground causing it to
descend, while pulling the lever back pulled the nose up, causing the aircraft to climb.
The operation of the right-hand lever was far less intuitive. Used to control the aircraft
roll by warping the wings, it too moved along the aircraft's longitudinal axis, although it induced
motion along the lateral axis. The pilot moved the lever forward to induce left bank and
backward to induce right bank. The top portion of the lever was hinged laterally, providing the
pilot control of the aircraft rudder. Rotating the stick to either side of the aircraft caused the
rudder to move in the same direction, enabling the pilot to perform coordinated turns in flight.
This complex control arrangement meant that in order to turn to the right, the pilot had to pull
back on the right hand lever while twisting his wrist to the right. Left hand turns were performed
11 Foulois, From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts, 64.
12 Juliette A. Hennessy, The United States Army Air Arm, April 1861 to April 1917 (Reprint. Washington, DC,
1985: Office of Air Force History, U.S. Air Force, 1958), 93.
by pushing forward on the lever while twisting the wrist to the left. This "scarcely intuitive"
arrangement caused at least one aircraft accident in the first year of Army aviation.13
Foulois took Army Aeroplane No. 1 to Fort Sam Houston, Texas and established the
Army's first heavier-than-air flying operation, essentially teaching himself to fly, as he had
received less than an hour of flight instruction from the Wright brothers, none of it solo. It was
his eventual mastery of the complex flight control system and his ability to control the aircraft in
flight and make it respond to his will-to fly the aircraft-that changed him from an Army
officer interested in aviation into a pilot. That ability to control the aircraft became, and remains,
the skill that defined the pilot.
As explained by Wolfgang Langewiesche in his classic book on the art of flying, Stick
and Rudder, aircraft operate in opposition to many conventional notions. They are safer when
they are faster rather than slower, when they are higher rather than lower. The pilot must learn to
accept many overtly contrary notions, such as when faced with an emergency such as a stall or a
spin with the aircraft plummeting toward the ground, the only way to recover controlled flight
and keep from crashing is to actually point its nose at the ground. 14 Learning to fly involves the
mastery of a discrete body of knowledge, and flying is a distinct skill-a process of learning and
accepting those notions and translating them into the physical environment of flight.
Early Army flight training focused on the basics of aircraft control-takeoff, turning, and
landing-but accidents and death were common. From 1909 to 1914, twelve airmen out of a
total flying corps of fifty-five were killed in aircraft accidents.1 5 Army leadership recognized the
dangerous nature of flying, and restricted flight training to young volunteers, "ideally captains of
not more than five years of service in that grade, or unmarried lieutenants, of medium weight." 6
Neither prior experience nor knowledge of aviation was a prerequisite for selection, although
courage, dexterity, and enthusiasm were desired attributes. Additionally, an exceptional sense of
Crouch, The Bishop's Boys; Hennessy, The United States Army Air Arm, April 1861 to April 1917; Henry H.
Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper, 1949), 18-19.
14 Wolfgang Langewiesche, Stick and Rudder: An Explanation of the Art ofFlying (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., 1944), 3.
15 Hennessy, The United States Army A ir Arm, April 1861 to April 1917, 101-102, Appendix 14, 236-23 8. To this
day, the initial phase of pilot training focuses on takeoff, landing, and the basics of aircraft control.
16 Rebecca Hancock Cameron, Training to Fly: Military Flight Training, 1907-1945 (Washington, DC: Air Force
History and Museums Program, 1999), 30.
equilibrium was valued, as detecting and quickly correcting the rapid, minute changes in attitude
and balance helped pilots maintain aircraft control. 7
Thomas DeWitt Milling, one of the Army's premier polo players and a 1909 graduate of
West Point, fit the developing profile of the military pilot-"the independent young man who
embraced excitement and the element of risk." 8 Milling quickly distinguished himself as one of
the Army's best pilots, exhibiting skill in all phases of flight. Grover Loening, an aeronautical
engineer employed by the Wright Company, remembered him as "one of the first real natural-
born flyers. He had a cool daring, a fine hand, and a very keen set of senses.. .he soon had
become the leading and most skillful pilot at that time in the government service."1 9 Milling
became the first Army pilot to fly at night, and was the only pilot in the early group of aviators
who became comfortable flying airplanes with completely different control mechanisms.20
Although Foulois spent nearly all of his time in Texas learning to fly Army Aeroplane No.
1, he also gained a great deal of experience fixing it. Since he had little instruction, most of his
landings were actually controlled crashes, and the Army had no trained aircraft mechanics to
repair the resultant heavy damage.2 Since he alone was responsible for keeping the aircraft in
safe flying condition, understanding how it was built and how its systems operated enabled him
to make the frequent repairs, and became as important to his survival as learning how to fly. In
this respect, Foulois' experience mirrored that of all of the Army's early aviators.
Early pilot training was both a physical and technical education, and the acquisition of
flying skill and technical knowledge became intertwined, essentially merging into a single skill
set. Trainees spent long hours learning how to assemble, disassemble, and repair aircraft, while
at the same time learning how to control them in the air. Knowledge of engine and flight
control operation was necessary not only to fix the aircraft on the ground, but also a critical part
of understanding how the aircraft as a system worked in the air. Pilots were trained to recognize
any slight change in oil or water pressure or the flicker of an ammeter needle and interpret its
17 Vance 0. Mitchell, Air Force Officers: Personnel Policy Development, 1944-1974 (Washington, DC: Air Force
History and Museums Program, United States Air Force, 1996), 351.
18 Cameron, Training to Fly, 30; "Biographies: Brigadier General Thomas D. Milling", n.d.,
http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio.asp?bioID=6480 (accessed 30 September 2010).
19 Grover Loening, Our Wings Grow Faster (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc., 1935), 19-20.
20 Foulois, From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts, 96; Cameron, Training to Fly, 33.
21 Foulois, From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts, 70-78.
22 Arnold, Global Mission, 17; . For a comprehensive account of early flying training, see Cameron, Training to
Fly.
meaning. While such a change might mean nothing, it could presage disaster, and the pilot had
to learn which and "govern his actions accordingly."2 3 The emphasis on technical knowledge
became a central part of flight training as it could save the pilot's life, but thorough aircraft
knowledge was also seen as necessary for mission success.24
Army leadership recognized the importance of aircraft technical knowledge as an integral
part of the pilot's skill set, but also its importance to the success of the Army's aviation mission,
as well, and formally established him as a technical expert in Air Corps doctrine by making him
alone responsible for ensuring that his aircraft could perform the assigned mission. The 1924-
1925 Bombardment text used at the Air Corps Tactical School explained that, as the
bombardment pilot "habitually takes his plane deep into hostile territory," it was necessary that
he prepare for such flights by "making sure that every part of his motor and his plane is
functioning properly" so that he did not lose such a valuable piece of equipment or fail at his
mission.2 5 The doctrine made the pilot personally responsible for testing the aircraft and seeing
to it that it was "full of gas, oil and water and all ready to take off."26 This emphasis on thorough
technical knowledge remained a consistent theme in bombardment doctrine through the 1920s,
but as will be seen, subtly shifted as the necessary number of tasks grew and the bombardment
system grew in complexity.
Skill and Professional Distinction
Soon after it began aviation operations, the Army recognized that pilots developed
specific skills that separated them from their peers, just as skill with horses separated cavalry
officers from infantry or artillery officers. On 23 February 1912, War Department Bulletin No. 2
established the rating of "Military Aviator," a distinction limited to those commissioned officers
of the Regular Army or Organized Militia who could, in a powered aircraft,
attain an altitude of at least 2,500 feet, fly in a 15-mile-per-hour wind, carry a
passenger to a height of at least 500 feet and immediately make a dead-stick
23 Bombardment: 1924-1925 (Langley Field, VA: Air Service Tactical School, 1924), 41.
24 The emphasis on technical and aircraft systems knowledge persists to this day in USAF pilot training. Pilots learn
basic aerodynamics as well as how the individual systems are constructed and operate. Although pilots no
longer fix their own aircraft, thorough knowledge of system operation is necessary in flight, particularly
when handling a system malfunction or emergency.
Bombardment: 1924-1925, 41.
26 Ibid.
landing within 150 feet of a previously designated point, and make a military
reconnaissance cross-country flight of at least 20 miles at an average altitude of
1,500 feet.2 7
This new rating firmly established the aviator, by definition a pilot at that time, as a technical
specialist possessing measurable skills and associated with a specific machine-the aircraft. It
also formally established pilots as a separate social group within the Army, with membership
limited to those who possessed those skills. That skill and distinction, however, was not
regarded universally well within the service. Many in the Army perceived these early pilots as
"irresponsible, irrepressible playboys" who preferred to operate as loners, and viewed them with
a certain measure of professional disdain.28
On 18 July 1914, Congress passed a law that further distinguished the pilot as a separate,
technical specialist and in the process further alienated aviators from much of the mainstream
Army. House Resolution (H.R.) 5304, enacted as Public Law Number 143, An Act to Increase
the Efficiency of the Aviation Service of the Army, and for Other Purposes, established the
Aviation Section of the Signal Corps, giving aviators a small measure of organizational
autonomy by charging it with
the duty of operating or supervising the operation of all military aircraft,
including balloons and aeroplanes, all appliances pertaining to said craft, and
signaling apparatus of any kind when installed on said craft; also with the duty
of training officers and enlisted men in matters pertaining to military aviation.29
The law limited the selection of aviation officers to those below the rank of Captain and limited
the selection of new trainees to "unmarried lieutenants of the line of the Army not over thirty
years of age." It also established a one-year time limit for flying trainees to demonstrate "their
fitness or unfitness for the detail as aviation officers." 30 If a trainee could not develop the
necessary skills and learn to fly within one year, he returned to his former duty.
27 Hennessy, The United States Army Air Arm, April 1861 to April 1917, 5 8-59.
28 Major General James E. Fechet, Flying (Baltimore, MD: The Williams & Wilkins Company, 1933), 69.
29 An Act To Increase the Efficiency of the Aviation Service of the Army, and for Other Purposes (H.R. 5304)
(Public Law Number 143, 18 July 1914 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1914), quoted in Chase C. Mooney and
Martha B. Layman, Organization of Military Aeronautics: 1907-1935 (Congressional & War Department
Action), Army Air Forces Historical Study 25 (Washington, DC: Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence,
Historical Division, December 1944), Appendix 1, p. 110, hereafter H.R. 5304.30 H.R. 5304, Sec. 2.
In recognition of the inherent dangers associated with aviation duty, H.R. 5304 mandated
that "no person, except in time of war, shall be assigned or detailed against his will to duty as an
aviation student or an aviation officer."3 1 In order to keep the Aviation Section manned at the
required level, it also enacted a measure to attract officers to aviation duty in spite of the danger.
The law authorized aviators extra pay for aviation duty, over and above their regular Army
salaries. Aviation trainees received a twenty five percent pay raise and, when they became fully
qualified, were awarded a promotion of one grade in rank, provided they were not currently
above the rank of first lieutenant. Qualified aviators received a fifty percent raise when their
duties required them "to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flight."3 2 This special
treatment generated a great deal of ill will among Regular Army officers, as the new promotion
policy moved younger officers ahead of many senior to them, affecting their chances of
advancement and promotion. They also strongly resented the additional pay, a sentiment that
remains to this day among many non-aviators in the military. Technical specialty, promotion,
and extra pay, however, had a price. Pilots bristled at the age limitations imposed upon them by
H.R. 5304, as well as the marriage restriction. 34
These two events, the creation of the of the Military Aviator rating and the Congressional
recognition of aviators as a distinct group within the Army, served to solidify the pilot's early
identity as a technical specialist. Pilots became valued for their ability to fly aircraft and, as
such, became identified with aircraft. However, "flying" had evolved into more than a physical
skill to include the necessary understanding of the machine itself and its component parts. The
creation of the Aviation Section within the Signal Corps to handle all Army aviation matters
gave credence to that knowledge, establishing flying as a technical specialty rather than just a
physical skill.
The Emerging Role of Command
While H.R. 5304 formally recognized the pilot as a technical specialist, it did not restrict
non-pilots from commanding flying units. The Army recognized flying as a technical skill, but
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
3 Hurley and Heimdahl, "The Roots of U.S. Military Aviation," 26.
34 Thomas H. Greer, The Development ofAir Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941 (1985. Reprint, Office of
Air Force History, U.S. Air Force, 1953), 2.
had not yet determined that flying, as a part of the larger mission of military aviation, constituted
a fundamentally different form of military power than already existed. Army leadership did not
believe that either flying experience or qualification as a pilot was necessary to command a
flying unit, leaving the opportunity open to all Signal Corps officers. However, the extensive use
of airpower during World War I and the rapid development of tactics and doctrine soon made it
apparent that the effective use of airpower did require flying experience, just as the effective use
of seapower required naval experience. Of particular importance was the development of large
formation tactics for both bombardment and pursuit missions, which required leading large
groups of men and machines into combat in a coordinated manner to accomplish a specific
mission.
Following the war, Congress enacted the National Defense Act of 1920 that, in addition
to establishing the Army Air Service as an officially recognized combatant arm of the Army,
mandated that at least 90 percent of the officers in the Air Service hold an aeronautical rating.
Recognizing that the successful employment of airpower required specialized knowledge, the
Act also established that only such rated officers could command flying units. At that time, this
included pilots as well as aircraft observers. 36 The law addressed the issue of flyers commanding
flying units at the lower levels in the Air Service, but did not mandate that the Chief of the Air
Service hold an aeronautical rating. While not surprising, as this was a very senior command
position and none of the early aviators were old enough or senior enough in rank to warrant
consideration, it left the senior command position in the Army's aviation organization open to
any Army officer of sufficient rank and seniority, regardless of his professional qualifications
regarding aviation.
Neither of the first two leaders of the Air Service, Major General Charles Menoher and
Major General Mason Patrick, were pilots when they assumed command of the Air Service.
Menoher was largely unsuccessful for two reasons, both related. First, while he was a very well
regarded and experienced infantry officer, he had no experience with airpower. He did not
For an account of the American air experience in World War I and the tactics and doctrine that grew out of that
experience, particularly in relation to formation employment, see William C. Sherman, "Tentative Manual
for The Employment of Air Service (1919)," in The U.S. Air Service in World War I: Volume II, Early
Concepts in Military Aviation, ed. Maurer Maurer, vol. 2, 4 vols. (Washington, DC: The Office of Air
Force History, 1978), 313-410.
36 R. Earl McClendon, Autonomy of the Air Arm (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program,
1996), 10; Mitchell, Air Force Officers, 353. Aircraft observers were non-pilot aviation officers.
understand the particular supply, personnel, and doctrinal challenges facing the Air Service,
which made him an ineffective leader. Second, this ineffectiveness led to his inability to control
Billy Mitchell, his deputy, whose public agitation for an independent air force was causing the
Army a good deal of embarrassment. Mitchell had no regard for Menoher because he was not a
pilot.37
Mason Patrick replaced Menoher on 5 October 1921, and fared much better because he
already had some experience leading an aviation organization. He had served as the Chief of the
Air Service of the American Expeditionary Force under General John J. "Black Jack" Pershing
during World War I, and in that role, gained a great deal of experience with both the organization
and employment of airpower. Patrick remained as Chief of the Air Service until 2 July 1926,
and although not a pilot when he took command, actually learned to fly and qualified as a pilot
while in the position. As he explained in his memoirs, Patrick understood the important role that
flying played in the psyche and culture of the Air Service.
I have never known any men who so persistently, insistently, "talk shop" as do
air pilots, and they have a language of their own which none but the initiated
can understand. This had been borne on me during my service in France and
impressed me anew when I took charge of the Air Service of the United States.
At that time the Air Service was filled with cliques and it was necessary to gain
the confidence of this personnel. None but a flying man could hope to succeed
in such a task.38
Upon taking command, Patrick attended flight training, achieving the rating of "Junior Aviator"
at the age of fifty-nine.39 While in command, he took every opportunity to fly, which had a very
positive impact on his effectiveness as a leader. He related
Nothing did more than this continual flying to win the confidence of the men,
much younger, with whom I was in contact, trying to direct and guide them in
an effort to make of the Air Service united body of men all working toward one
end (emphasis added).4 4
37 Robert P. White, Mason Patrick and the Fightfor Air Service Independence (Washington, DC: Smithsonian
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Significantly, qualification as a pilot also gave Patrick some moral authority over Mitchell, and
he was able to exert some control, albeit limited, over the petulant officer. Patrick's experience
illustrates why flying and command came together in the Air Service. More specifically, it
shows why the role of the commander and the pilot came together as a necessary combination for
effective leadership of the Air Service.
On 2 July 1926, the United States Congress formally fused the role of commander and
pilot by passing the Air Corps Act. While not establishing a separate air service, the Act
established the Air Corps as an organization capable of military action both as an auxiliary force
and as "an independent force operating alone on a separate mission," further defining airpower
as a separate form of power.41 Recognizing that independent mission, it mandated that the Chief
of the Air Corps, a major general, at least two of his assistants, brigadier generals, and at least 90
percent of the officers in the grades below be "flying officers." 42 Additionally, the Act
reaffirmed that only flyers could command flying units, but added a restriction that during
peacetime, only pilots could command. This was significant, because during peacetime the
military force was much smaller than it would be during war, making command opportunities
much more rare. The Act ensured that pilots would get those rare opportunities. Non-pilot
opportunity to command flying units completely disappeared in 1940 during the build up to
World War II, when Congress extended the restriction to include command during wartime as
well as peacetime.43 These moves reflected a trend following World War I where pilots
performed more of the airborne duties necessary in the relatively simple aircraft of the era,
gradually reducing the role of the non-pilot rated flying officer, the observer, as will be discussed
below.
The Aircraft Commander and the Generalist
As flying became associated with higher-level leadership in the organization, a similar
trend occurred at the basic level, fundamentally changing the role of the pilot, particularly in the
41 Mooney and Layman, Organization of Military Aeronautics, 78.
42 An Act to provide more effectively for the national defense by increasing the efficiency of the Air Corps of the
Army of the United States, andfor other purposes (Public Law Number 446 69th Cong., 1st sess., 1926),
Section 13a.
43 Mitchell, Air Force Officers, 353.
bombardment mission. Writing between the World Wars, Major General James Fechet, former
commander of the Air Corps, summed up it up thus:
Originally the flyer was a lone actor. He lived or died by his own initiative.
There was no one aloft to counsel or advise him. He survived or perished by his
own initiative. This led to a criticism of the pilot, particularly in warfare. It was
said that he did not cooperate, that it was difficult to induce him to join in the
general scheme, participate for a common purpose. Changes in air tactics and
new inventions have completely altered all this. Airplanes no longer roam the
skies alone. They fly and fight in huge formations, the single pilot maneuvering
his plane coincident with many others and subject to the signal or radio voice
command of a common leader.44
Just as commanding air forces was changing, flying itself was changing, becoming a more
complex task influenced by the growth of an increasingly complex system of multiple humans
and machines.
World War I witnessed the birth of bombardment on a large scale, with large aircraft,
manned by multiple members of a bomber crew, participating in large formations that required a
great deal of cooperation and coordination to be effective. This placed new demands on the
aircraft pilot. He now had to coordinate the efforts of the men on these crews while ensuring
that, as a team, they fulfilled their role in the larger formation, whether that role was to lead or
participate as a follower (wingman). Achieving technical proficiency in flying was no longer
sufficient to become a "good" pilot. The good pilot had to evolve and become a leader, and to
do so, had to become a generalist who understood all aspects of his crew's mission. Evolve, in
effect, as the controlling element of a growing, complex system.
During World War I, bomber aircraft design progressed rapidly from small,
single-seat, single-engine aircraft to multi-seat, multi-engine behemoths with several
crewmembers, each performing a particular task (Figure 3.3). These crewmembers had to
function together, along with their associated bombsights and navigational instruments, to form a
single team focused on accomplishing the mission. The 1933 ACTS Bombardment text made
the pilot's role as the leader of that team, designating him "the commander of that highly skilled
group of individuals" with responsibility for their training. 45 As the aircraft commander, the
44 Fechet, Flying, 68-69.
45 Bombardment: 1933 (Maxwell Field, AL: Air Corps Tactical School, 1933), 20.
pilot had two responsibilities: flying the aircraft and commanding the crew to ensure that they
could accomplish their mission.
Figure 3.3
The Glenn Martin GMB bomber, the first U.S.-designed bomber procured in quantity by the U.S. Army
during World War I46
Through the 1920s, bomber aircraft were simple enough that the pilot could readily
understand the roles played by each of the other members of the bomber crew. In fact, pilots
generally filled both the pilot and bombardier positions, and by 1930, the Congressionally
mandated limitations on manpower and the policy that 90 percent of officers be rated meant that
most of the Air Corps officers were pilots, and in bombardment units, all of the officers were
pilots, filling all of the flying officer positions on the aircraft. In these units, every officer was
required to qualify as both bomber pilot and bombardier, making it such that the aircraft
commander could readily coordinate the crew's actions because each member was very familiar
with the others' responsibilities.47
In 1939, however, that situation had changed, as will be explored in greater depth in
Chapters 4 and 5. The advent of the four-engined bomber earlier in the decade, the need for a
ten-man crew to operate it, and the personnel pressures associated with the rapid build up for
46 Martin GMB Bomber, Photograph, n.d., http://www.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/040315-F-9999G-
013.jpg (accessed 11 February 2011).
47 Bombardment Aviation: 1931--Draft (Langley Field, VA: Air Corps Tactical School, 1930), 21-22.
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World War II found the Air Corps facing a severe shortage of qualified pilots on the eve of the
war. It could no longer use pilots as bombardiers and navigators, opting instead to use non-pilot
specialists in those positions. With the arrival of these non-pilot specialists, bomber pilots were
no longer required to qualify as bombardiers or navigators and, consequently, were less qualified
to perform all of the crew duties on the bomber, but were still responsible for their satisfactory
completion. 48 Aircraft command meant command, and the B-1 7 Pilot Training Manual
described the aircraft commander's duties thus:
Your assignment to the B- 17 airplane means that you are no longer
just a pilot. You are now an airplane commander, charged with all the duties
and responsibilities of a command post.
You are now flying a 10-man weapon. It is your airplane, and your
crew. You are responsible for the safety and efficiency of the crew at all
times-not just when you are flying and fighting, but for the full 24 hours of
every day while you are in command.49
The emphasis on command over flying and the growing difference between them carried over to
the B-24, as well. Its Training Manual clearly pointed that a pilot could "be one of the best B-24
pilots ever trained and still fail as an airplane commander."5 0
The aircraft commander was, however, still the pilot. He was still responsible for the safe
operation of the aircraft, including takeoff, landing, instrument flying, and navigation in both
normal and emergency situations. He still had to maintain in depth knowledge of all of the
aircraft systems, including the flight controls, hydraulics, fuel system, engines, and
communication systems. He was the commander on the aircraft, but flying skill was still a
central defining characteristic and critical for success in that role. A steady, skillful pilot
imparted confidence in his crew, making them a more effective team. Harry Crosby, a navigator
in the 1 0 0 h Bomb Group, stated that he would follow his aircraft commander, Everett Blakely
anywhere because he was a good pilot, one who "could keep the (instrument) needles steady,"
and thus be counted on to make the right decision for the crew.5 '
48 As will be explained further in Chapter 4, pilots learned navigation as a part of their normal training, but did not
specialize in the task.
B-1 7: Pilot Training Manualfor the Flying Fortress, AAF Manual No. 50-13 (Headquarters AAF, Office of
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Since formations were a central part of the HADPB doctrine, one of the aircraft
commander's responsibilities as a bomber pilot was maintaining proficiency in flying formation
with other aircraft. By regulation, he was required to be able to hold his aircraft in formation at
all altitudes, maintaining a position within one wingspan, or just over 100 feet, of the aircraft in
front, and "be able to take evasive action without getting more than 300-400 feet from the
(formation) leader."52 This type of flying was demanding both physically and mentally, calling
for instant reaction to any change in attitude, altitude, course, or speed, requiring constant
adjustment of the throttles and wrestling with the flight controls. The demands of formation
flying, combined with the anticipated long missions associated with the HADPB doctrine and the
added pressure of being responsible for the completion of tasks that he was no longer as well
equipped to accomplish, prompted bomber aircraft designers to make provisions for the aircraft
commander to be able to share some of his burden with another pilot during the bombing
mission-the copilot.
The Copilot
The heavy bombers designed during the 1930s and flown in the CBO had two pilot
positions in the cockpit. The aircraft commander sat in the left seat and the copilot in the right
seat. 3 Initially designed for use by a "relief pilot," the right seat was installed because aircraft
designers believed that the demands of flying formation during long-duration bombing missions
would likely be beyond the physical endurance of a single pilot.54 However, the relief pilot's job
soon evolved from that of a substitute "set of muscles," to that of an active co-participant in who
aided the aircraft commander in controlling the aircraft as he both flew and led the crew. The
copilot served as the aircraft commander's executive officer, his "chief assistant, understudy, and
strong right arm."55 Although he was officially the assistant pilot, the copilot was an aircraft
commander-in-training, gaining the experience necessary to take command of a crew of his own
52Leslie F. Smith, Development ofAAF and USAF Training Concepts and Programs: 1941-1952, U.S. Air Force
Historical Study 93 (Washington, DC: USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1953), 332-335, Call
101-93, IRIS No. 01004508, US Air Force Historical Research Agency; Pilot Training Manualfor the B-
17, 113.
This convention is still used today. The aircraft commander is often referred to as "the left-seater," connoting the
position of authority.
54 Arnold, Global Mission, 155-156.
Pilot Training Manual for the B-17, 14.
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in the future, and one of the aircraft commander's primary responsibilities was ensuring that the
copilot had the chance to develop the necessary skills so that he could assume that position.56
Generally less experienced than the aircraft commander, the copilot was still responsible
for being able to fly the aircraft in all phases of flight and had to be prepared to take over the
control of the aircraft if the aircraft commander became unable to do so. While his primary duty
was to share the flying responsibilities, he had to be extremely proficient in engine operation, as
he maintained control of the throttles during formation flying while the aircraft commander
controlled the flight controls, both pilots working together to keep the aircraft in the correct
position.
Close, effective cooperation between the two pilots was crucial, as they had to coordinate
their actions and work as if they were a single control element. A good aircraft commander
learned to share his flying responsibility and trust his copilot, and a good copilot learned to
anticipate his aircraft commander's actions and shape his own actions to complement them
accordingly. When this intimate relationship developed fruitfully, they could keep their aircraft
tucked into position almost effortlessly. When it did not, formation flying could become a
severe strain on the aircraft commander as he struggled to both control the aircraft and command
the other members of the crew as they performed their jobs.57 As will be seen, sharing of control
during a task-intensive portion of the mission became a hallmark of how the aircraft commander
performed his job.
The Formation Commander
Since the bomber formation was the USAAF's primary striking element during the CBO,
operating and controlling that formation was, perhaps, the most important task during a bombing
mission. The Air Corps learned from its experience during World War I that the person leading
the formation had to have certain characteristics to be successful.58 Early post-war bombardment
doctrine stated that leadership, aggressiveness, coolness under fire, good judgment, initiative,
and "accurate knowledge of the capabilities and limitations" of the formation were essential
traits, ideally found in the bombardment unit's commander. Successful bombardment unit
56 Ibid., 15.
57 Bert Stiles, Serenade to the Big Bird (New York: W.W. Norton, 1952), 83.
58 Sherman, "Tentative Manual for The Employment of Air Service (1919)," 395-396.
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commanders made good formation leaders, and good formation leaders made good unit
commanders.59 Holding the command position, however, was not sufficient to qualify as a
formation leader.
Bombardment doctrine imposed one overriding requirement on a formation leader-that
he be a pilot. The 1924-1925 ACTS Bombardment text clearly stated
There is one qualification of the formation leader to which there must be no
exception: HE MUST BE A PILOT. If possible, it is more important that a
formation leader be a pilot than that a commander be one, for unless he be a
pilot he cannot intelligently direct the maneuvers of the formation nor can he
gain the confidence of its personnel (emphasis in original). 0
The text went on further to explain that, as formation flying was essentially "a game of follow
the leader," the pilot in the lead aircraft was the defacto leader. If the formation leader was not
that pilot, he would have to communicate his direction and leadership through the pilot in the
lead aircraft, in all likelihood causing delays and inefficiencies that could jeopardize the success
of the bombing mission.61
Successfully leading formations took a particular type of flying skill that included an
awareness of the environment that extended far beyond the physical limits of a single aircraft.
The formation leader had to consider all of the aircraft in the formation when he maneuvered, not
just his own. He had to ensure that he did not operate at full throttle, as this made it difficult, or
impossible, for his wingmen to maintain their position, and left them to power margin to catch up
if they did fall behind. Formations of aircraft were also less maneuverable than single aircraft.
As can be seen in Figure 3.4 below, aircraft on the "outside" of the turn, the side of the formation
away from the direction of turn, have to travel a farther distance than aircraft on the "inside" of
the turn. The formation leader could not turn too aggressively, or those on the outside might fall
behind, unable to fly fast enough to maintain position, while those on the inside might be forced
to slow down excessively, and fall below their aircraft stall speed. Flying effectively as the
formation leader required thinking beyond a single aircraft, seeing the formation as a fluid,
integrated whole made up of interdependent parts.
104
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A typical bomber formation used during World War 16
In addition to flying the lead aircraft, doctrinally, the formation leader was the mission
commander, responsible for knowing and understanding the purpose of the mission and making
the necessary plans for its execution. He had to communicate the plan of attack to the sub-
elements of the formation, ensuring that each individual aircraft commander understood the
mission intent and their role in achieving it, and provide them the details necessary for the
assembly and employment of the bomber formation. Most significantly, as the mission
commander he was responsible for the successful execution of the attack. Just as the mantle of
command expanded the role of the bomber pilot beyond just flying the aircraft to controlling it as
a socio-technical system to accomplish its mission as a team, so too did it expand the role of the
formation leader beyond that of lead pilot to formation system controller, responsible for all
elements in the larger socio-technical system and for their success as a whole, and doctrine
changed accordingly.
During the 1930s, the doctrinal requirement for designation as a formation commander
changed from pilot to that of "flying officer," but as explained earlier, in a bombardment
62 Sherman, "Tentative Manual for The Employment of Air Service (1919)," 396.
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squadron all of the flying officers were pilots. However, there was a significant change in the
definition of the formation commander's duties-no longer was he to pilot the leading aircraft.
The 1931 version of the ACTS Bombardment Aviation text explained
To control the formation and to supervise its navigation, defense, and method of
attack (the formation commander) should be relieved of the duties of piloting.
He should be in position to observe the conduct of the formation, the action of
the hostile pursuit, and the manner in which the bombardment attack is made.
He is responsible for the tactics employed and the air discipline of his
command, and to fulfill this responsibility, he must actually observe the conduct
of the mission. He must have first-hand knowledge gained by close
observation, before he may improve the tactics or take corrective measures to
insure compliance with the adopted methods. The commander must be a flying
officer. Only by piloting proficiency, by experience in flying all positions of a
formation, may a commander have that background which will insure proper air
leadership (emphasis in original).63
Once again, the technical ability to fly was central to the formation commander's role, but his
position as the controller for the entire bombardment system transcended that single skill.
During World War II, mission commanders, or command pilots, generally did not fly in
the lead aircraft as the aircraft commander. They either flew in the right seat in the copilot
position or went along as an extra crewmember. 64 In all cases, the command pilot monitored the
formation assembly, configuration, and employment to and from the target. Good command
pilots worked with the lead aircraft commander, much the same way that the aircraft commander
worked with the copilot, allowing him to do his job as the lead pilot to ensure that they made it
as easy as possible on the rest of the pilots in the formation by flying intelligently. When they
were successful as a team, the effort was greatly appreciated, as Harry Crosby relates
Jack Kidd let his lead crew fly a steady course, and the wing crews could stack
in tight, no whipping around, no burnt out engines. He let the bombardier do
his job from the IP to the target. He was the 1 0 0 ths best command pilot.65
Although a pilot, and a highly qualified one, the command pilot had to forego control of the
aircraft to perform his job, and just as the aircraft commander shared the flying duties with the
63 Bombardment Aviation: 1931 (Langley Field, VA: Air Corps Tactical School, 1931), 91.
64 Philip Ardery, Bomber Pilot: A Memoir of World War II (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1978), 83.
65 Crosby, A Wing and a Prayer, 68.
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copilot, the command pilot shared the command responsibilities associated with "flying" the
formation with the lead aircraft commander.
Entering World War II, the bomber pilot's task was a complex one. He had to possess
the technical skill and expertise to fly his aircraft, but the demands of command fundamentally
changed his role in the bombardment system. At the aircraft command level, he was responsible
for the conduct of his entire crew, many of whom performed tasks for which he was either not
qualified or too busy to accomplish on his own. This required him to share control of the aircraft
with the crew. He shared flying duties with the copilot, and, as we will see below, other aspects
of control such as taking direction from both the navigator and the bombardier depending on the
phase of the mission.
As the command pilot and formation commander, the bomber pilot had to share control
of the aircraft with the aircraft commander and, as explained in Chapter 2, share control of the
formation with the leaders of the smaller group or squadron elements that comprised and
subdivided his command. To be effective, the bomber pilot had to be both a good pilot and a
good commander at all levels of the bombardment system, and these requirements shaped how
pilots were selected on the eve of the war and how they were trained.
Pilot Selection
World War I established the Army pilot as something of a cultural icon. The notable
accomplishments of men such as Eddie Rickenbacker, fighter pilot and ace, cemented the
romantic vision of the independent, rough-and-tumble "Knight of the Air," and the Army had no
problems finding applicants interested in flight training.66 With more volunteers than
opportunities to train them, the real difficulty lay in determining which of the applicants was
most likely to successfully complete flight training, and trainee selection focused mostly on
physical coordination. Men who could ride horses or motorcycles, sail a fast boat, or who were
football players were considered good candidates, particularly if they demonstrated intelligence,
66 For more on Rickenbacker's rise and struggles with his iconic status, see Hans Christian Adamson, Eddie
Rickenbacker (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946); W. David Lewis, Eddie Rickenbacker: An
American Hero in the Twentieth Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005); Eddie
Rickenbacker, Rickenbacker (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967). The rise of the pilot as a cultural
icon was not limited only to the United States. For an excellent account of the German experience with the
issue, see Peter Fritzsche, A Nation of Fliers: German Aviation and the Popular Imagination (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).
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self-confidence, alertness, and maturity, and demonstrated good equilibrium when spun in a
"spin chair." 67
Following the war, when the Army returned to its pre-war reduced manning levels, there
was an even greater shortage of flying training opportunities, and the Army added an applicant's
education level as a discriminator when selecting flying cadet candidates. 68 The initial post-war
standards for admittance as a flying cadet were quite high, and over time, the emphasis on
education grew. In 1920, applicants were required to be unmarried male citizens of the United
States between the ages of twenty and twenty-seven at the time of entry into training, and have
completed high school or its equivalent. As the popularity of aviation grew through the decade,
particularly after Charles Lindbergh's transatlantic flight in 1927, the number of applicants for
flying training continued to grow, and in 1928, the Air Corps raised its educational standards in
an effort to limit the number of qualified candidates, requiring proof of at least two years of
college education before accepting any cadet into flight training.69 Those without proof of
formal education could still be admitted to training if they passed a comprehensive examination
that tested their knowledge of United States and general history, English grammar and
composition, geography, arithmetic and higher algebra, plane and solid geometry, plane and
spherical trigonometry, and elementary physics. The test was very difficult and, as it focused on
education rather than flying aptitude, few candidates without some college education were able
to pass it.70
By 1928, the excess number of qualified applicants required that the Air Corps establish a
formal priority list for admission into training as follows:
a. (1) Graduates of the United States Military Academy, the United States Naval
Academy, and the United States Coast Guard Academy who apply for
appointment as flying cadets within 1 year from date of graduation, who
67 Mitchell, Air Force Officers, 351. After the war, the emphasis on athletic recruits decreased, although physical
fitness was still a requirement. See Brigadier General Henry H. Arnold and Major Ira Eaker, This Flying
Game (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1936), 108-109.
68 Natalie Grow, Procurement ofAircrew Trainees, Army Air Forces Historical Study 15 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Army Air Forces Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Historical Division, August 1944), 1-2.
69 Robert L. Thompson, Initial Selection of Candidates for Pilot, Bombardier and Navigator Training, Army Air
Forces Historical Study 2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Air Forces Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Historical Division, November 1943), 7-8. In 1926, the maximum age was briefly raised to twenty eight
years old, but was lowered back to twenty seven the following year. See Ibid. p. 11 note 14.
70 Grow, Procurement ofAircrew Trainees, 3.
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fail to receive commissions because of lack of vacancies and are
recommended for appointment as flying cadets by the respective
superintendents of those academies.
(2) Enlisted men of the Air Corps of the Regular Army who at time of
appointment have served at least 11 months.
b. Other enlisted men of the Regular Army who at time of appointment have
served at least 11 months.
c. Officers and enlisted men of the National Guard who at time of appointment
have been assigned to Air Corps units for at least 11 months and who are
favorably recommended by their commanding officers.
d. College graduates who are graduates of the Air Corps Reserve Officers'
Training Corps units.
e. College graduates who are graduates of Reserve Officers' Training Corps units
of other arms or services.
f. Graduates of recognized colleges and universities.
g. Other officers and enlisted men of the National Guard who at time of
appointment have had at least 11 months' service.
h. Students in Air Corps Reserve Officers' Training Corps units who have
completed their junior year.
i. Reserve officers and members of the Enlisted Reserve Corps who at time of
appointment have served at least 11 months.j. Students in good standing of recognized universities who have completed their
sophomore year.
k. Others.
This priority list remained in use until the Air Corps expansion programs before World War II
were implemented, and the average formal education level for flying cadets remained high. Over
fifty per cent of the candidates admitted into training over the next decade came from categories
(e) and (f), both of which required a college degree.72
In 1939, on the eve of World War II, the Air Corps had an available pool of over 800
academically and physically qualified applicants available to fill 549 flying cadet positions.73
Ordinarily, this would pose no problem, however, the Air Corps expansion programs leading up
to the U.S. involvement in the war established an unprecedented demand for pilot trainees. The
execution of the initial American air war plan against Germany, AWPD/1, required a total of
Flying Cadets of the Army Air Corps (Washington, DC: Adjutant-General's Office, U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1927), 10-11 cited in Grow, Procurement ofAircrew Trainees, 4.
72 Grow, Procurement ofAircrew Trainees, 4.
7 Thompson, Initial Selection of Candidates for Pilot, Bombardier and Navigator Training, 18.
109
103,482 pilots. 74 With the launch of the first expansion program on 1 July 1939, the list of
eligible candidates was exhausted, and for the first time, the Air Corps had to relax its entry
standards in order to produce the required number of aviators.
After determining that neither lowering the physical standards nor raising the maximum
age limit was an acceptable way to increase the number of qualified candidates, the decision was
made to lower the education requirements for admittance into the flying cadet program. The Air
Corps reduced the difficulty level of the entrance examination, and men with less than two years
of college were encouraged to take the test. While the examination was altered slightly, it
remained focused on measuring the applicant's level of education and training rather than his
aptitude for flying. Physically qualified applicants who passed the test entered into flight
training.
As the war progressed, the USAAF developed a new test to try to better assess a
candidate's potential to complete flying training. The improved test, the Aviation Cadet
Qualifying Examination (ACQE), evaluated a recruit's aptitude for all flying training, including
the pilot, navigator, and bombardier crew positions. Developed through the USAAF Aviation
Psychology Program, the ACQE evolved throughout the war and proved to be an accurate
predictor of trainee success for all flying training, and measured the following characteristics:
comprehension and judgment, mathematical ability, mechanical comprehension, alertness, and
leadership qualities.76 Performance on the judgment section proved the best indicator of
potential success in pilot training, and almost as effective was performance on the mechanical
comprehension section. Both reading comprehension and knowledge of recent events correlated
with success, as well, but not as strongly, but performance on the vocabulary and mathematics
sections showed little correlation with the successful completion of pilot training.
The ACQE results paint an interesting portrait of the successful pilot trainee. Judgment
and comprehension of complex subjects were important capabilities for a pilot to possess, but
technical knowledge, such as mathematics, less so. While the overall ACQE scores for those
74 Arthur R. Kooker, "Broadening the Basis of Procurement," in The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 6-Men
and Planes, ed. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Washington, DC: 1983. Reprint, Office of Air
Force History. Originally published Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), 433.
75 Grow, Procurement ofAircrew Trainees, 6-7; Thompson, Initial Selection of Candidates for Pilot, Bombardier
and Navigator Training, 19-22.
76 See A. Jack Jernigan, Selecting the Best: World War II Army Air Forces Aviation Psychology (Bloomington, IN:
1st Books, 2003).
77 Thompson, Initial Selection of Candidates for Pilot, Bombardier and Navigator Training, 39-44.
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sent to pilot training were, on average, lower than those sent to navigator training, the sections
were the pilots scored more highly indicated the ability to make decisions and handle
complexity. In his memoir, Ad Lib. Flying the B-24 Liberator in World War II, B-24 pilot
William Carigan quipped that "pilots were chosen from those who gave quick and correct
answers; bombardiers were chosen from those who gave quick and erroneous answers;
navigators were those that gave slow and correct answers." 78 While Carigan's comment is
perhaps glib, the test results do seem to reflect that the pilot had, in fact, evolved from his earlier
role as a technical specialist, where technical knowledge was prized, to that of a commander and
leader, where decisiveness and the ability to handle complex systems were more valuable.
Bomber Pilot Training
Those selected as pilot candidates attended three phases of training: primary, basic, and
advanced. All candidates completed the same primary and basic programs, which focused on
developing basic flying skills and learning "the technique and judgment required of military
pilots." 79 Following completion of the basic program, students were assigned to specialized
advanced training programs based upon the assignment that they were likely to receive upon
completion of that phase. Assignment allocation was based upon student preference and
performance during the basic program, and the instructors made the final recommendation.8 0
Those students selected for four-engine, heavy bomber training first attended an
advanced twin-engine training program that focused on providing them "combat proficiency as
pilot of a twin-engine military aircraft."81 In that program, students worked on instrument,
navigation, and formation flying during both day and night. Although the syllabus was directed
at individual proficiency, it also prepared the pilot trainee to work with a multi-man crew,
instilling the understanding that he would have to be able to communicate with the other
members of the crew while performing his own tasks, and that he would have to rely on their
ability to perform their tasks in order to accomplish the collective mission as an aircraft crew.82
The advanced twin-engine training program certainly trained pilots, but by conscious design
78 William Carigan, Ad Lib: Flying the B-24 Liberator in World War II (Manhattan, KA: Sunflower University
Press, 1988), 74.
Smith, Development of AAF and USAF Training Concepts and Programs: 1941-1952, 52.
80 Ibid., 64.
81 Ibid., 83.
82 Cameron, Training to Fly, 405.
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began training pilots to become aircraft commanders.
Following advanced twin-engine training, heavy bomber students proceeded to a
transition school, where they learned to fly their assigned aircraft, whether the B- 17, the B-24,
or, later in the war, the B-29. They spent four weeks learning about the aircraft and how to fly it,
and more about how to act as the aircraft commander. The training covered topics such as the
importance of air discipline, the code of military law, and the duties, obligations, and
responsibilities to crewmembers. Early in the war, all pilots completed the full training, but later
in the war, the USAAF developed a shorter course that focused on engineering issues for those
trainees who would start out as copilots. 83 Following this phase, pilots were matched with their
crews, and together they completed their final training as a single combat unit until they
deployed overseas.
Later in the war, this crew training included all anticipated phases of a combat mission:
formation, day and night instrument flying, navigation, and combat bombing, and crews were
better prepared for combat. Early in the war, however, there was precious little training
opportunity, as the USAAF desperately needed even minimally qualified bomber crews in the
combat theater to replace combat losses. Many crews deployed with little or no combat training,
but were still expected to be able to immediately fly through the defensive fighters and flak in
the large bomber formations attacking the German industrial infrastructure. This inexperience,
particularly with formation flying, led to many of the operational difficulties faced by the
commanders in the ETO as they tried to determine the most effective bombing doctrine.84
The bomber pilot who arrived in the ETO in late 1942 was a distant cousin of Lieutenant
Benjamin Foulois. He was still a technical specialist, proficient in flying, the skill that provided
a significant portion of his identity, but his required skill set had grown far beyond aircraft
control. The responsibility of commanding the increasingly complex bomber aircraft system
demanded that he evolve into a generalist, able to understand the various tasks accomplished by
his crewmembers and control their collective actions so that they could accomplish their
collective doctrinal mission. The demands of controlling that increasingly complex
Jerry White, Combat Crew and Unit Training in the AAF: 1939-1945, Army Air Forces Historical Study 61
(Washington, DC: Air Historical Office, Army Air Forces, August 1949), 24-29; Smith, Development of
AAF and USAF Training Concepts and Programs: 1941-1952, 116.
84 Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P. Harahan, eds., Strategic Air Warfare: An Interview with Generals Curtis E.
LeMay, Leon W. Johnson, David A. Burchinal, and Jack J. Catton (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force
History, U.S. Air Force, 1988), 26.
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bombardment system at the aircraft level demanded that he share some of the control of the
system, trusting each crewmember to do their respective jobs, but still responsible for their
successful performance. Significantly, the demands of command and control also required that
he share his fundamental task-flying-with a copilot. At the formation level, the demands of
command and control altered the bomber pilot's role even further, and while flying remained a
core required skill, the command pilot had to effectively relinquish his role as a pilot in order to
command the entire formation and mission. While still an aircraft pilot, and the most capable
and qualified one either in the aircraft or in the formation, he had grown into the central control
element for a much more complex system, and that role distinctly shaped how he completed his
task during a bombing mission.
Bombing in the European Theater of Operations
The Mission Brief
On the morning of a CBO mission, the pilots listened as intently as any of the other
crewmembers present during the General Briefing, concentrating on the larger picture so that
they understood the overall plan and purpose for the mission, but each one also gathered the
specific details of its orchestration, as well. They noted details such as the rejoin point, rejoin
plan, and push time, and paid particular attention to the specifics of the formation plan, as it was
the primary determinant of what they would do for the day. The pilots received a number of data
sheets, or "flimsies," with information about the mission, including one that showed the group
formation and the position that each aircraft would assume (Figure 3.5).
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Figure 3.5
3 9 0 th Bomb Group Formation Flimsy, Mission #173, 14 August 
194485
The flimsy depicted the formation from above, showing groupings of three-aircraft
elements (Figure 3.6) that were grouped into six to nine aircraft squadrons, and, finally, the
entire group formation (Figure 3.7). The position of each individual aircraft determined which
way the aircraft commander would spend the day looking. Those in the front of the individual
"vee" elements served as the leader for that grouping and primarily looked forward. Those on
the right side of the formation would have a clear, unobstructed view of their leader to their left,
85,"390th Bomb Group Formation Flimsy--Mission #173, Ludwigshafen, Germany", August 19, 1944, 390th Bomb
Group Memorial Museum Archives. Note that the positions are identified by aircraft tail number and the
aircraft commander's last name. Also, the hand drawn figures around the groups of three aircraft denote
the element configurations.
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upon whom they were flying formation, while those on the left side would spend the day looking
across the cockpit and the copilot with a poorer view of their leader.
Figure 3.6
Three aircraft element formation 86
The group lead pilot noted how the formation would maneuver throughout the mission,
paying particular attention to how he and the lead pilots from the other groups flying the mission
would form together into their Combat Boxes, and how the Combat Boxes would then form into
the Combat Wing for the trip to the target. He also noted how the Combat Wing would split up
for the bomb run, and how it would reform at the mission rendezvous point after the bombing for
the return trip home. For the group lead pilot, the entire mission was a complex process of
assembling, disassembling, and reassembling a massive multi-element socio-technical system
into different configurations that would enable it to best execute its purpose, while providing
itself the maximum amount of protection.
86 Pilot Training Manual for the B-i 7, 111.
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Figure 3.7
Twelve aircraft formation8 7
After the General Briefing, the pilots remained in the briefing room and reviewed
pertinent engine control data for the day and waited for any last minute instructions before they
gathered their oxygen masks and cold weather flying gear and proceeded to their aircraft.88 The
copilots departed to gather the escape kits for the crew, pocket-sized, waterproof packages that
included silk maps of Northern Europe, compasses, French money, and rations for use in the
event that they were shot down on the mission. They also received ten chocolate Mars bars, one
for each crewmember, although they often froze solid and became inedible during the mission if
left out exposed to the extreme cold of high altitude during the mission.89
At the aircraft, the aircraft commander ensured that both the aircraft and the crew were
ready for the mission. He checked the aircraft status with the ground crew, confirming that they
had accomplished the necessary servicing, and then performed his preflight inspection, a walk
around the aircraft exterior to visually confirm its readiness. After the walk around, the aircraft
commander "accepted" the aircraft, personally taking responsibility for "the safety and efficiency
87 Ibid., 114.
88 Roger A. Freeman, The Mighty Eighth War Manual (London: Jane's Publishing Company, Ltd, 1984), 13.
89 Jesse Richard Pitts, Return to Base: Memoirs of a B-17 Copilot Kimbolton, England, 1943-1944 (Charlottesville,
VA: Howell Press Inc., 2004), 39; J. Thompson Freeman, "J. Thompson Freeman," interview by Ryan
Fairfield, Video, 2001, J. Freeman Collection (AFC/2001/001/66840), Veterans History Project, American
Folklife Center, Library of Congress, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/diglib/vhp/bib/loc.natlib.afc2OO1001.66840.
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of (the) valuable equipment and the lives of the crew." 90 He then gathered the crew together,
ensuring that they had all necessary equipment, and had the navigator brief them on the mission
plan for the day. With the preflight preparation complete, he and the crew climbed into the
aircraft.
Figure 3.8
B-17F Flying Fortress9 1
The Cockpit
The pilot proceeded to the cockpit, which in the B-17 cockpit was located above and
behind the navigator/bombardier compartment. Arrayed around the two leather seats in the
cockpit, six windows provided the aircraft commander and copilot adequate forward and
sideways visibility, although the aircraft nose blocked their view below and in front of the
aircraft, and two other windows, one above each seat, provided limited upward visibility (Figure
3.8). Two control yokes and sets of rudder pedals gave both pilots full control of the aircraft
through a system of mechanical linkages-rods, bells, cranks, and pulleys that connected their
hands and feet to the flight control surfaces.92 A single throttle quadrant between the seats
90 Pilot Training Manualfor the B-17, 40.
91 B-17 Flying Fortress, Photograph, n.d., http://www.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/020903-o-9999j-005.jpg
(accessed 15 February 2011).
92 B-17F Pilot's Flight Operating Instructions, T. 0. No. 01-20EF-I (U.S. War Department, 1942), 44-47.
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controlled the aircraft's four engines (Figure 3.9).
Figure 3.9
B-17 Cockpit93
The forward instrument panel served as the aircraft control and information center, and
contained all of the aircraft flight instruments and engine, oil, and hydraulic system gauges that
provided the pilots all of the information needed to fly the aircraft (Figure 3.10). The flight
instruments were concentrated in the center of the panel, easily visible to both pilots. These
instruments displayed the aircraft attitude, altitude, airspeed, and heading, acting as the pilot's
"senses" in flight, enabling him to assess and control the aircraft's physical state. On the left
side of the panel, in front of the aircraft commander, were navigation and mission-oriented
instruments, such as the radio and flux gate compasses, and the Pilot Direction Indicator (PDI),
which transmitted turn direction signals from the bombardier during the bomb, discussed later.
The right side of the instrument panel contained the engine, oil, and hydraulic gauges, providing
information on the health of the aircraft, conveniently located in front of the copilot, enabling
him to easily accomplish his duties as the engineering officer.
93 Steve Birdsall, Famous Aircraft: The B-17 Flying Fortress (New York: Arco Publishing Co., Inc., 1965), 2.
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Figure 3.10
B-17 Pilot Cockpit Instrument Panel94
The arrangement of the instruments and gauges on the B- 17 instrument panel is
interesting, in that it required that the aircraft commander and the copilot share information in
order to create a full picture of the aircraft status when in operation. By design, it split the
cognitive burden of flying the airplane between the two pilots. The aircraft commander had easy
access to the information that enabled him to control and execute the crew's bombardment
mission, while the copilot had access to the information regarding the aircraft's internal
engineering status. However, both pilots had equal access to the flight instruments, enabling
them to share the task of physically flying the aircraft.
Building the System
Constructing the formation that would carry the bombs to their targets in Europe was a
94 Pilot Training Manual for the B-1 7, 3 5 B.
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long, elaborate process of aligning, sorting, and arranging the individual elements. The aircraft
commander began that process on the ground for his crew, assembling them into the team that
would operate their aircraft, but soon they became an element in the larger system. All of the
bombers in the bomb group started at a single, scheduled time, and then taxied to the runway in
their takeoff order, which was also the order that they would rejoin in the air. This orderly
departure was essential for a smooth formation assembly. The lead aircraft took off first, its
crew intending to arrive at the rejoin point first, since all of the other aircraft joined on them.
Following the lead at thirty to forty-five second intervals, each aircraft, took the runway, the
copilot advanced the throttles and the aircraft commander steered the aircraft down the runway
for about 3,000 feet until the bomber rose into the air. 95
In clear weather, formation assembly was a relatively simple process, as the pilots could
easily maintain visual contact with the aircraft immediately in front. All of the aircraft climbed
away from the ground at the same speed and rate-1 50 miles per hour and 300 feet per minute-
which enabled them to maintain even spacing until they reached the rejoin point, where they
would close up and take their positions.96 The lead aircraft, arriving at the rejoin point first, set
up an orbit around the point at an altitude generally between 5,000 and 10,000 feet, and the other
bombers gathered and arranged themselves into position. If the carefully planned takeoff
sequence was disturbed for any reason, however, disorder could easily ensue. On 22 February
1944, during a Big Week mission scheduled against aircraft production centers in Bernberg, the
lead aircraft of the 3 8 1s' Bomb Group had a problem on the ground. Delayed by the move to a
spare aircraft, they were forced to takeoff last, at the rear of the procession. In the air, extremely
hazy weather decreased visibility, and the group's pilots had great difficulty locating the late lead
aircraft, approaching from below. Despite the lead aircraft launching several signal flares, the
group pilots could not find their leader to complete the rejoin and assemble the formation and,
consequently, sixteen aircraft aborted the mission and did not participate, reducing both the
bombardment system's offensive and defensive power. 97
Inclement weather always made formation assembly a greater challenge, and precision
95 Freeman, The Mighty Eighth War Manual, 17-18.9 6 Pilot Training Manual for the B-17, 113.
97 "Operations Report on Tactical Mission of 22 February 1944. To Commanding Officer, 1st Combat
Bombardment Wing, APO 634.", February 24, 1944, WG-1-HI 3 Feb 1944-29 Mar 1944, US Air Force
Historical Research Agency.
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flying became a top priority bringing flying to the fore. With no radar aids to guide them, pilots
could only rejoin in visual conditions, so they had to climb above the clouds before they could
assemble the formation. To get above the clouds into visual conditions, the aircraft commander
had to fiercely concentrate on the flight instruments, ensuring that he maintained the exact
airspeed and climb rate and followed the headings given him by the navigator, so that they would
arrive precisely at the rejoin point at the briefed altitude. Once at the point, he flew a prescribed
orbit and continuing climbing until the aircraft broke out on top above the weather. The entire
formation assembly deconfliction plan, designed to keep the bombers from running into each
other in the weather, was predicated on each aircraft flying the exact same flight path, separated
by time. Through early 1944, strict radio silence was observed during formation assembly to
avoid giving the Germans any advance warning of the impending attack, so there was no
opportunity to inform other aircraft if a bomber was not where expected. 98 Deviation from any
of the flight parameters put a bomber out of sequence in space and time, and risked collision with
another aircraft.
If the weather was particularly bad, the final assembly altitude could be above 20,000
feet, and the aircraft commander might have to maintain this precise flight attitude, airspeed, and
climb rate for up to two hours, which was incredibly taxing physically and mentally. In the
words of one B- 17 navigator,
Think of the strain on (the pilot)...For 120 minutes he can see nothing...All he
can do is stare at his instruments. He must keep his airspeed at 150 miles per
hour. He must keep his turn and bank indicator at a single needle width.. .He
must be sure all four engines are exactly synchronized, each showing the correct
manifold pressure. He is probably watching fifteen instruments. He must make
sure his radio compass needle is about fifteen degrees off center, to make sure
that the circumference of our climb keeps us out of Horham and Framlingham,
where the two other groups are ascending. At 10,000 feet, without permitting
any change in anything, he has to put on his oxygen mask.99
During that time, the copilot monitored and operated the engines and the navigator provided
position updates and headings, but as the leader of the crew, the aircraft commander still had to
perform his own task perfectly so that the bomber team, as a unit, could accomplish its mission.
98 Freeman, The Mighty Eighth War Manual, 21.
99 Crosby, A Wing and a Prayer, 46.
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His flying skill remained a key part of their ability to succeed.
In spite of the best efforts to the contrary, aircraft did occasionally collide during the
formation assembly process. General Curtis LeMay recalled
Every now and then there was that grim moment when you broke out of the
overcast... there you were on top of it, in brilliant sunlight, and just ahead or
maybe off to one side there'd be a couple of black columns of smoke puffing
right through the clouds. A couple of Forts had plowed into each other. It was
something that you didn't like to see... .If you were a commander you lay awake
at nights, trying to figure out ways and means to keep those bubbly black smoke
columns from being born. 100
Poor weather that caused collisions and the inability to assemble could have severe consequences
for the entire mission. On 22 February 1944 during assembly for a Big Week mission, several
groups failed to form up due to clouds and haze, as described above, and a number of bombers
collided, causing LeMay to cancel the 3 rd Bombardment Division's attack on the German city of
Schweinfurt. Their absence left a greater portion of the German defenses available to attack the
force of 15 th Air Force B-24s that were conducting a raid on Regensburg, and fifteen bombers
were lost. 101
Precision flying in the weather during the rejoin was critical. The aircraft instruments
were the aircraft commander's immediate senses, shaping his actions, but he could not sense
everything necessary for a safe rejoin. The navigator monitored their course and calculated their
position, providing aircraft heading adjustments as necessary, and the copilot monitored the
engine condition and the status of the other systems on the aircraft. The aircraft commander's
real skill was integrating all of these inputs and still maintaining control of the aircraft. As will
be described below, each aircraft commander struggled to control his individual element, but the
formation commander, likewise, struggled to control the entire system, and precision flying was
the key to control at that level, as well.
100 Curtis E. LeMay, Mission with LeMay: My Story (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), 291-292.
101 Arthur B. Ferguson, "Big Week," in The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 3-Europe: Argument to V-E
Day, ed. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983),
36-37.
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Operating the System
Leading the Formation
As described in Chapter 2, the Combat Box formation could include up to three groups of
18 bombers, for a total of 54 aircraft. Bomb Groups assembled their formations at separate
points, with the command pilot monitoring the rejoin from the front, correcting any discrepancies
in the position of the component squadrons, elements, or individual aircraft. Although the lead
pilot, sitting beside the command pilot in the left seat of the lead aircraft, was the first airborne
and ran little risk of colliding with another bomber, his flying skill had a great impact on the
formation's ability to assemble and maneuver.
As the formation lead, he had to provide a stable platform for all of the other pilots to
reference. "If the orders said 150 miles per hour, it was not 149 or 151, but 150!" related one B-
17 pilot. 0 2 Changes at the front of the formation could easily create a "whiplash" effect in the
formation, as the wingmen adjusted their power to maintain position, slowing down or speeding
up in response to any lead maneuvers. The farther an aircraft was away from the leader, the
greater the effect, with those on the outer edges potentially suffering the most. The formation
leader had to make smooth, shallow turns to keep the aircraft on the outside of the turn from
being slung all over the sky at the end of a cracking whip, while at the same time keeping those
on the inside of the turn from slowing down to the point of stalling and falling out of the air.
Flying as a successful group lead pilot required thinking not as an individual aircraft, but as an
extended system of eighteen aircraft, and flying precisely in his aircraft enabled the formation to
stay together and fly precisely.
Depending on the overall mission plan, a group formation might have to orbit over their
assembly point for over an hour before departing on time for the Combat Wing rejoin point and
the Combat Box assembly. As each group assumed its place and formed the Combat Box, the
bombardment system expanded, and the importance of precision flying on system integrity
multiplied. The lead pilot of the lead group became the lead pilot for the Combat Wing, and his
actions now affected an even larger group of individual bombers, as changes in airspeed or turns
had a much wider effect. He had to extend his "system sense" to include up to 54 aircraft to
maintain the formation integrity.
Just as flying the rejoin in the weather was a team effort between the aircraft commander,
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the navigator, and the copilot, maneuvering these formations was a team effort. Combat Boxes
frequently held over their rejoin point waiting while other Combat Boxes completed their
formation before they pushed to the target as a combined group or Bomb Division. These
division formations could contain several Combat Wings, and some of the largest missions
during the war comprised over 1,000 aircraft. Maneuvering a formation of 54 aircraft so that it
departed a fixed point at an exact time was a mental and physical challenge for both the lead
pilot and the lead navigator.
John Howland, a lead navigator in the 3 24 th Bombardment Squadron, one of the
Pathfinder squadrons, related how early in the war timing and maneuvering were largely
accomplished by "rules of thumb," and that the prevailing technique was to "allow plenty of time
and jog left or right to kill time while your are heading for the checkpoint."103 This solution was
unsatisfactory, as the jog turns created problems for all of the aircraft in the formation, making it
difficult to stay in position. Howland and his pilot, Jim Tyson, developed a procedural technique
for departing a fixed point on time, using a combination of timing and precise flying.
It took about four minutes and a circle 8 miles in diameter to turn a Combat Box
formation 180 degrees. This is a turn of needle width on (the pilot's) turn and
bank indicator. If we wanted to fly over a checkpoint on a course of 90 degrees
at exactly 0920 hours in the morning, (we) flew a reciprocal heading of 270
degrees. Then made certain that (we) passed 8 miles right or left of the
checkpoint at least 4 minutes prior to the scheduled departure time.' 04
By passing the point in the opposite direction, the lead pilot and lead navigator could time their
turn back toward the point to ensure that they passed over it on time.
Accomplishing this maneuvering technique required that the navigator know precisely
where he was in relation to the point, and that he communicate that information to the pilot along
with the required heading and airspeed. The pilot had to hold a constant airspeed, and maintain
between approximately 7 and 10 degrees of bank for 180 degrees to ensure that the turn took
precisely four minutes to complete. The amount of bank necessary to complete the turn in a
given amount of time varied with altitude, as it was dependent upon true airspeed, therefore the
pilot's primary attitude reference instrument, the attitude indicator or "flight indicator," was
103 John Howland, "The 324th Pathfinder Force in the 91st Bomb Group: How it Came to Be", 2006,
http://www.91stbombgroup.com/9 1st_tales/Pathfinder.html (accessed 17 February 2011).
104 Ibid.
124
insufficient for the task. To accomplish the turn, the pilot used the turn and bank indicator
(Figure 3.11), a gyroscopically driven instrument that displayed the rate and direction of turn,
rather than the degree or amount of turn to control his turn rate. A single needle width turn, or
standard rate turn, produced a 180-degree turn in one minute. The turn and bank indicator
enabled the pilot to use what he could directly control, the aircraft bank, to indirectly control the
performance he desired, the aircraft turn rate. Teamwork enabled the formation to maneuver as
an integrated system, but precision flying still remained at the center of this elaborate, sometimes
deadly, aerial ballet at the beginning of every mission.
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Figure 3.11
Turn and bank indicator10 5
Following the Leader
Once the fully assembled formation departed for the target area in Europe, the lead pilot's
job became relatively easier. He followed the navigator's direction and maintained a steady lead
aircraft-flying platform-if he was a good leader. The command pilot monitored the status of
the entire formation and the weather, for it was his job to determine whether the mission should
continue to the target. Once beyond about 150 miles from the English coast, the formation was
105 Instrument Flying: Basic Without Radio Aids, 1943, 34.
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out of radio contact with headquarters and the decision authority to continue rested with him.
For all of the rest of the aircraft in the formation, the quality of the lead pilot's flying
dictated the ease of theirjob. The B-17 was a beautiful aircraft-sleek, smooth, and modern. It
was, however, difficult to handle at the high altitudes used by the bomber formations when
penetrating German airspace. Bert Stiles, a B-17 copilot during the war related that it was "a big
heavy monster that had to be heaved around the sky," and certainly "no fun to fly." 106
Correcting position required large, physically tiring flight control movements by the aircraft
commander and constant power adjustments by the copilot. Even with a good leader, there could
be a great deal of maneuvering to stay in position, and on long missions, the aircraft commander
and copilot would take turns flying to mitigate the effects of fatigue.
Aircraft position within the formation could also affect how easy it was to stay in
position. Each group generated a large amount of prop wash, and if a lead pilot was not careful,
he could lead his entire formation into an area of severe turbulence generated by the group
ahead. In some of the very big raids of multiple hundreds of bombers, this turbulence was a
significant problem, and even led to some fatalities. On the 3 February 1945 mission against
Berlin, one group lead pilot kept his formation in turbulence that caused "tossing of the
plane... violent enough to be frightening" for so long that it caused one of the group's aircraft to
break into pieces and crash into another aircraft, killing all but two of the crewmembers.107
106 Stiles, Serenade to the Big Bird, 75-76.
107 Bill Frankhouser, World War Ii Odyssey: Pennsylvania Dutch Farm Boy Becomes 8th Air Force Navigator
(Bedford, VA: Hamilton's, 1997), 133-136.
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Figure 3.12
B-17s in high-altitude formation.108
Flying in the formation required flying skill at every level, from the leader out front to the
aircraft commander in the last bomber in the lowest group, but every pilot in the formation,
whether leader or follower, surrendered some measure of control to another element of the
system. The lead pilot followed the lead navigator's directions, the wing pilots followed their
leader, but each aircraft commander was still physically flying his own aircraft. It was, however,
over the target during the bomb run that the idea of sharing control became a conflict over
control, brought about by technology, between the aircraft commander and bombardier and the
effort to drop precision bombs.
Flying and Bombing-Who is Driving?
As described in Chapter 2, bombing evolved as a team pursuit. The ACTS bombardment
doctrine clearly defined the pilot and bombardier together as the bombing team and emphasized
the importance of cooperation between the two during a bombing mission. As will be explained
in detail in Chapter 5 on the bombardier, there is only one point in space from which an
unguided bomb dropped from an aircraft will hit a specific point on the surface of the earth. In
early bomber aircraft, the pilot, although steering the aircraft, was generally unable to see below
108 B-17 vapor trails fill the sky, Photograph, n.d., US Air Force Historical Research Agency,
http://www.afhra.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/080306-f-3927A-056.jpg (accessed 5 April 2011).
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and in front of it, and as he was unable to either see the target or calculate the position of the
bomb dropping point, he could not steer the aircraft to it. The bombardier, sitting in a better
position to see the target, could use his bombsight to calculate and identify the bomb dropping
point, but because he was not flying, could not steer the aircraft to it. The bombardier had to
provide directions to the pilot and bombing was, by necessity, a cooperative effort between the
two crewmembers.
Early efforts at signaling directions between the two men during World War I consisted
of the bombardier yelling directions to the pilot, but were largely ineffective in the open, noisy
cockpits of early aircraft. To overcome this limitation, signaling reins were attached to each side
of the pilot, and the bombardier could pull on the reins to signal a right or left turn, as necessary
(Figure 3.13). This was, of course, very imprecise, as there was no way to indicate the amount
of turn necessary, and it also required the bombardier to remove his hands from the bombsight to
signal the turn, reducing his accuracy. By 1921, the U.S. Navy was testing a "Pilot Directing
Bombsight" in some of their aircraft, which used a bank of electrical lights installed in the pilot's
cockpit, controlled by the bombardier to indicate the need to turn and the direction. 109
Figure 3.13
A bombardier and pilot demonstrate the signaling reins used to communicate turn commands during a bomb
110
run.
109 Virginia Toole, The Development ofBombing Equipment in the Army Air Forces, May 22, 1945, 2, Call 201-13,
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(Washington, DC: The Office of Air Force History, 1978), 398.
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Pilot direction indicators, or PDIs, evolved through the 1920s, undergoing several
improvements until the Sperry Gyroscope Company developed the D- 1, which became the Army
standard instrument. The D- 1 allowed the bombardier to manually turn a knob that, through a
flexible coupling, controlled the position of a needle contained in a gauge in the pilot's cockpit.
The needle's position indicated the necessary direction and magnitude of turn. While more
precise than indicator lights, it was rather primitive and still required that the bombardier use one
hand to operate it while operating the bombsight with the other. It was not until the Navy fielded
Carl Norden's revolutionary Mark XI bombsight in the late 1920s that PDIs became practical
and effective aids to bombing."'
Norden improved the PDI's accuracy by integrating it directly into his bombsight design.
As the bombardier moved the gyroscopically stabilized bombsight to align it with the target, it
simultaneously moved a brush over a resistor coil, and a voltmeter measured the direction and
magnitude of the turn by measuring the strength of an electrical signal passing through that
brush. This signal actuated an electromagnet that deflected a needle on the PDI gauge in the
pilot's cockpit (Figure 3.14).112 The pilot turned in the direction of the needle, and since the
bombardier kept the bombsight aligned with the target, the needle moved toward the center of
the gauge as the aircraft heading moved closer to the correct heading to the target. When the
needle was centered on the dial, the aircraft was on the correct course and the pilot rolled out of
his turn and maintained that heading.
Stephen L. McFarland, America's Pursuit of Precision Bombing, 1910-1945 (Washington, DC: Smithsonian
Institution Press, 1995), 35-36.
112 Ibid., 36.
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Figure 3.14
Pilot Direction Indicator (PDI) 1 3
Norden's automatic PDI/bombsight integration was a significant improvement over
previous attempts at coordination, but was not embraced universally by the pilots. Many felt that
the PDI interfered with their prerogatives as pilots because it gave constant, quantified direction,
mandating how they flew their aircraft, whereas they wished to continue to "fly by the seat of
their pants."' 14 Since the PDI was linked directly to the Norden bombsight, which had proven to
be the most accurate bombsight yet produced, it now indicated the "correct" course for the
aircraft. The idea that there was a "correct" course meant, obviously, that if the pilot did not fly
that course, he was flying an "incorrect" one. The idea of a machine, under the direct control of
another non-pilot crewmember, providing mandatory directions that dictated the pilot's actions
implied a loss of control over the aircraft.
This idea of a correct course, determined by the bombsight/bombardier/PDI socio-
technical system, assailed the pilot's position as the aircraft system controller and directly
implied that he could neither determine nor fly the correct course based upon his skill alone. In
the past, the pilot could override the bombardier's crude directions if he thought that his instincts
and flying skill would produce a more accurate result, but now, the bombsight/bombardier/PDI
combination produced and indicated a new level of "correctness" for the flight path, and thus for
the pilot's actions. Deviations from the PDI's direction, critically assuming that the bombardier
was operating the bombsight correctly, meant that the bombs would miss their target. The
113 Pilot Direction Indicator (PDI), C-i Autopilot - Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum, Photograph, n.d.,
http://www.nasm.si.edu/collections/artifact.cfm?id=A20001057000 (accessed 19 February 2011).
114 McFarland, America's Pursuit of Precision Bombing, 36.
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bombardier now knew better where the aircraft had to fly because the bombsight was so much
better than in the past, therefore, the pilot had to follow the bombardier's direction. This had the
potential effect of redefining the pilot's role during the bomb run from being the pilot who was
the aircraft commander, to an entity acting simply as a flight control actuator, responding to
external input from another controlling source-the bombardier.
In practice, however, the PDI improved bombing accuracy only marginally. It did not
compensate for aircraft oscillation, which was a significant source of bombing error, and the
system still relied upon the pilot reacting to the directions of what was really still an imprecise
instrument. Despite the accuracy of the solution derived by the bombardier and bombsight, the
directions passed to the pilot were too crude to allow him to execute them precisely and, as will
be seen in Chapter 5, even the smallest deviations from the necessary course led to bombing
errors. The communication between the computing element-the bombardier/bombsight-and
the execution element-the pilot and aircraft-was not good enough to reliably achieve the
precision bombing system solution. The next logical step, then, was to fix that communication
link, and the solution to the problem was the integration of another new machine, one that would
further question the pilot's role as the system controller by taking over his centrally defining
skill-flying the aircraft.
Pilots, Autopilots, and Bombing-Losing Control?
On 14 February 1935, Carl Norden delivered to the U.S. Navy what he believed to be the
solution to the coordination problem between the bombardier and the pilot. Called Stabilized
Bombing Approach Equipment (SBAE), it was an electrically driven, gyrostabilized,
mechanically actuated system that linked the Norden bombsight directly to the bomber aircraft
flight controls (Figure 3.15). The SBAE was a single-purpose system that gave the bombardier
the ability to control the bomber's flight path by transmitting steering commands generated when
he moved the bombsight directly to the flight controls, bypassing the pilot in the process." The
result of three years of development and the first successful coupling of the bombsight to the
flight controls, the SBAE was not the first attempt to do so, as efforts to combine the systems had
begun a decade earlier.
115 Toole, The Development of Bombing Equipment in the Army Air Forces, 86-87; McFarland, America's Pursuit
ofPrecision Bombing, 120. The U.S. Navy controlled the contract with Norden's company. All of his
business dealings were through them, including his production for the Air Corps.
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Oct. 25, 1949.
Filed April 24, 1940
T. H. BARTH
AIRCRAFT CONTROL SYSTEM
Figure 3.15
The SBAE as shown in "Aircraft Control System" Patent No. 2,485,953, filed by Theodore Barth.1 16
Since at least as early as 1926, the Air Corps had been specifically interested in using
automated machines to improve bombing accuracy. The first attempt to do so through
bombsight/flight control linkage occurred in 1927, when the Air Corps Materiel Division
contracted with Alexander de Seversky, a Russian pilot, aeronautical engineer, and sometime
116 Theodore H. Barth, "Aircraft Control System, U.S. Patent 2,485,953" (New York, NY, October 24, 1940), 1.
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2,485,953
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airpower theorist, to build the Seversky Automatic Azimuth Drift Control, an experimental
autopilot that he proposed to connect to a Sperry C-I bombsight. Seversky intended his device
to give the bombardier the ability to directly counter the effect of drift, a significant source of
bombing error, by allowing him to move the flight controls when he moved the bombsight.
However, the design never matured, and Seversky was unable to produce a functioning system
and the Air Corps severed its relationship with him in 1930.117 In the interim, however, the
Sperry Gyroscope Company made the first concrete advance in the area.
The Sperry Gyroscope Company, founded by Elmer Sperry in 1910, had a long history
with aircraft autopilots. Elmer Sperry and his son, Lawrence, designed and installed the first
aircraft stabilization system in 1910, in an effort to help reduce the high rate of fatalities
associated with powered flight. Recognizing that air was a very "unstable medium" and that the
aircraft pilot had to "work constantly to maintain the stability of the (flying) machine about all
three axes," the Sperry's built a system designed to help the pilot maintain controlled flight using
concepts developed during the design of their gyroscopic ship stabilization system two years
earlier."18 The system consisted of a large gyroscope suspended underneath a Beach monoplane,
but was not connected to the aircraft flight controls. The concept was that the force of the
spinning gyroscope would counter any flight disturbance, using inertial force to return the
aircraft to an upright, level attitude.' '9 Although the experiment with the Bates monoplane
failed, in 1912, the Sperrys did build the first successful stabilization system, Sperry Gyroscopic
Stabilizer, and installed it on a Curtiss Hydroplane (Figure 3.16).
117 Toole, The Development of Bombing Equipment in the Army Air Forces, 35-39.
118 Elmer A. Sperry, "Engineering applications of the Gyroscope," Journal of the Franklin Institute 175, no. 5 (May
1913): 474-475.
119 Thomas Parke Hughes, Elmer Sperry: Inventor and Engineer (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 110-
112, 173-175.
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Figure 3.16
The world's first gyroscopic automatic pilot, the Sperry Gyroscopic Stabilizer, developed by Lawrence
Sperry and installed and flown on this Curtiss "Hydroplane" in flight tests at Hammondsport, NY in 1912120
The Sperry Gyroscopic Stabilizer consisted of four gyros that provided both longitudinal
and lateral stability. When engaged, the gyros detected changes in aircraft attitude and, in
response, immediately actuated compressed air-powered servomotors that moved the flight
control surfaces to return the aircraft to level flight. The gyros, servos, and linkages performed
the same tasks as a human pilot. They sensed changes in the aircraft in the aircraft attitude and
then actuating the flight controls to counter that change-thus becoming the first automatic pilot.
The system was publicly well-received, and a 1914 New York Times article even presented as
superior to the human pilot, explaining
One of the great difficulties in hand operation of both the elevating
planes and side controls is that the machine has to make a very appreciable
deviation from the normal flying position before the operator is conscious of it,
and he, in turn, makes a correspondingly large corrective setting of the planes.
So the average lying in any strong wind is a series of dips to and fro, or
sideways. As the skill of the aviator becomes greater the dips become smaller.
But to some extent they are always there.
120 World's First Gyroscopic Automatic Pilot (Sperry), Photograph, 8" x 10", 1912, 146.01-58, IRIS No. 1148112,
Envelope-Sperry Gyroscope Co., 8 X 10" Photographs (7), US Air Force Historical Research Agency.
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With the gyroscopic stabilizer the servo-motors are brought into play at the first
tendency of the machine to tilt or dip, and the deviation is corrected without the airman
having any knowledge of its start.m
The system was a great success, and when Lawrence Sperry demonstrated it in flight at the
Concourse par l'Union pour la Sdcuriti en Aeroplane in Paris, he won the 25,000-franc "Safety-
Flight" prize (Figure 3.17).122
Figure 3.17
Lawrence Sperry winning the 25,000-franc Concourse par l'Union pour la Sicuriti en Aeroplane "Safety-
Flight" prize in Paris in 1914. Sperry, the pilot, displays his hands while his mechanic stands on the wing. 12 3
The Sperry Company continued developing the autopilot after World War I, spurred by
interest from William B. Mayo, Chief engineer of the Ford Motor Company, who saw potential
applications for commercial flight. Ford installed the first successful "robot pilot" in a Ford C-9
commercial transport in 1929, where it occupied the right seat position normally reserved for the
copilot. Measuring 14" x 14" x 10", it weighed about fifty pounds and consisted of both
horizontal and directional air-driven gyros, and "servo motor units with three double acting
clutches with the necessary attachments for them to operate the elevators, ailerons and rudder
121 Harold Hoeber, "LONG-SOUGHT AEROPLANE STABILIZER INVENTED AT LAST; Lawrence B. Sperry
Performs Seemingly Impossible Feats by Aid of His Father's Gyroscope Device," The New York Times
(New York, NY, July 19, 1914), sec. Magazine Section.
122 Hughes, Elmer Sperry: Inventor and Engineer, 179-199.
No hands!, Photograph, 8" x 10", 1914, 146.01-58, IRIS No. 1148112, Envelope-Sperry Gyroscope Co., 8 X 10"
Photographs (7), US Air Force Historical Research Agency.
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controls."12 4 Those necessary attachments were long cables, attached directly to the aircraft
flight control surfaces and essentially comprising a duplicate set of flight controls independent of
the human pilot. The great advance made by this autopilot was that it connected the rudders to
the ailerons so that in a turn, the aircraft could maintain coordinated, level flight. Up to that
point, coordinated movement of the ailerons and rudder was achievable only by a human pilot.12 5
The system proved very successful in test flights during 1929, and greatly impressed the
Air Corps leadership, which promptly announced that
The Automatic Pilot has arrived. Large airplanes may now be controlled by the
untiring metallic arm of an ingenious mechanism - a mechanism which pilots
airplanes straight and level and will hold them on a given course indefinitely. 126
Over fifty hours of testing, the Sperry system demonstrated that it could "fly more accurately
than even a seasoned pilot," and showed promise for improving aerial navigation as well as
reducing the physical burden placed on pilots during long-duration missions. The Air Corps,
after dealing with Seversky's failure, soon adopted it as their standard autopilot, named it the A-
1, and installed it in several of its bombers (Figure 3.18).127
124 Edward 0. Purtee, Development and Adaptation ofAircraft Instruments for Military Use (Historical Division,
Intelligence, T-2, Air Technical Service Command, 1946), 180.
125 Interestingly, it was the Wright Brothers' implementation of a mechanical device that moved the rudder in
concert with their wing warping mechanism that enabled them to conquer the challenge of controlled flight
almost three decades earlier. See F. E. C. Culick and Henry R. Jex, "Aerodynamics, Stability, and Control
of the 1903 Wright Flyer," in The Wright Flyer: An Engineering Perspective, ed. Howard S. Wolko
(National Air and Space Museum, 1987), 19-43.
126 Toole, The Development of Bombing Equipment in the Army Air Forces, 64.
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Figure 3.18
Major Hugh Knerr demonstrates "hands off" flying in this Curtiss Condor B-2 bomber during Air Corps
maneuvers in 1930. He is sitting up, out of the cockpit to show that he is not touching the controls. This
picture also shows how difficult it was for the pilot to see anything below and in front of the aircraft.12 8
Knowing that the Air Corps had contracted with Seversky to couple an automatic pilot
and bombsight to improve bombing accuracy, the Sperry Company, also in the bombsight design
business, was also working on a design for such a system as it developed the A-I autopilot. On
18 October 1929, Mortimer Bates, a Sperry employee, patented a device called the "Bomb Sight
Alignment and Rudder Control," which paired the A-I with a Sperry C-4 bombsight, which was
a modified C-1, the same bombsight that Seversky had used. Bates' design was the first to
present a fully integrated system that purposely eliminated the human from portions of the
bombing process to increase accuracy. Unique provisions and capabilities incorporated into
patent number 1,880,671 included
- The provision of means whereby the steering of an aircraft may be directly
under the control of the bomber at the bombsight. More particularly it is an
object of this invention to enable the bomber to steer the dirigible craft in
the act of sighting upon a target.
- The pilot is relieved of the duty of steering the craft during the time of
sighting and alignment on the target, and the alignment is accomplished
more quickly and more effectively.
128 Knerr-Condor B2 autopilot, Photograph, 1930, US Air Force Historical Research Agency.
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- The bomber can relieve himself of the duty of steering the craft when the
latter is headed for the target by switching over the control of said steering
to an automatic means such as a gyroscopically maintained baseline. 129
The system thus attempted to accomplish three key functions: provide the bombardier the ability
to fly the aircraft while sighting the target, eliminate the pilot from the process to speed up
aircraft reaction time, and transfer flight control from the bombardier to the automatic pilot once
the target was sighted in the bombsight, eliminating the bombardier from flying the aircraft. In
effect, the system took over as much of the flying responsibility as was technologically possible
at the time.
The Air Corps was very interested in the Sperry system, and on 22 January 1930,
contracted to acquire first twenty-five, and then thirty-five, of the units. At this time, the Air
Corps was not aware that the U.S. Navy had contracted with Carl Norden to build his Mark XI
bombsight, as the Navy maintained a heavy veil of secrecy over the program. Consequently, the
Air Corps committed itself to the Sperry Company for both autopilot and bombsight
development. The Sperry Company delivered the first C-4 bombsight with the autopilot on 12
March 1931, but it proved disappointing. The bombsight itself was too large and cumbersome
and performed poorly, while the autopilot directional system was inefficient and difficult to
synchronize with the target. The autopilot also was also temperamental and required a great deal
of adjustment in flight. The long cables used to manipulate the flight control surfaces constantly
lost tension when exposed to the rapid temperature drops at high altitude, causing the controls to
become "mushy" and imprecise. The entire system also suffered from electrical problems,
caused by inconsistent power generation from its air-driven generators. Disappointed, the Air
Corps soon cancelled its orders for the system and chose to pursue other bombsights that might
be coupled to a modified version of the autopilot.130
In spite of the setback, the Sperry Company continued its autopilot development,
modifying the A-1 by replacing its mechanical linkages with hydraulic hoses. The result was a
slower acting, smooth-response system, much more successful, but more appropriate for the
comfort-driven demands of commercial travel rather than the precision-driven needs of the Air
129 Mortimer R. Bates, "Bomb Sight Alignment and Rudder Control, U.S. Patent 1,880,671" (Brooklyn, NY,
October 18, 1929), 1, lines 3-3 1.
130 Toole, The Development of Bombing Equipment in the Army Air Forces, 3 8-39; McFarland, America's Pursuit
of Precision Bombing, 39.
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Corps.13 ' It was a tremendously capable system, but was not suitable for the precision bombing
mission. Sperry continued improving upon it and by the late 1930s had built several new
versions, each better than the last. By 1941, they had evolved the technology to the point that
they produced the first all-electric autopilot, the A-5. The A-5 was very advanced
technologically, using three dual-element vacuum tube amplifiers to amplify signals produced by
the autopilot gyros in the three axes of flight: roll, pitch, and yaw. The amplifiers sent correction
signals electronically to electrohydraulic servomechanisms that responded more quickly and
accurately than the electromechanical systems used in earlier autopilots.' While the A-5 was a
great autopilot, Sperry was still not able to produce a precision bombing system that met the Air
Corps' needs.
Although the Sperry Company held an obvious lead over all of their peer competitors in
autopilot technology, they struggled with bombsight development, as will be explored in Chapter
5. When the Air Corps contracted with Carl Norden through the Navy in 1933, it should have
knocked Sperry out of the bombing business. However, Norden's SBAE was not a true
autopilot. It only linked the bombsight to the flight controls and could not serve as a more
complete aircraft stabilization system that could improve navigation performance and relieve a
fatigued pilot on long missions. Since the Air Corps was interested in a system that they could
use for both bombing and as an autopilot, Sperry maintained their efforts to try to develop such
an integrated system.
Sperry continued its bombsight development through the 1930s, and in 1940, presented
the Air Corps the S-1 bombsight as an alternative to the Norden, which was in short supply due
to production problems. Paired with the A-5 autopilot, the system appeared to hold great
promise, leading one Air Corps Materiel Division officer to conclude that the system might
become the sole one used on bombardment aircraft in the near future. 3 3 However, both the S-1
and A-5 were beset with technical problems, ranging from excessive jitter in the optics to
difficulty maintaining turn and altitude control in flight. It was only due to an acute shortage of
Norden bombsights in January 1942 that the system was installed in many B-24 bombers
destined for immediate combat operations. Substandard performance and continued problems
131 McFarland, America's Pursuit ofPrecision Bombing, 118.
132 Loyd Searle, "The Bombsight War: Norden vs. Sperry," IEEE Spectrum 26, no. 9 (1989): 63.
133 McFarland, America's Pursuit of Precision Bombing, 144.
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led the Air Corps to cancel all current and future orders for the systems in August 1943.134
Fortunately for the Air Corps, by that time a crucial breakthrough had turned the Norden
bombsight into the type of precision bombing system that they so desired, one that combined the
benefits of both electrically controlled and electromechanical systems.
SBAE and AFCE-Task Control vs. System Control
When Carl Norden set out to solve the communication problem between the bombardier
and pilot in 1933, he produced a system that did just that. His SBAE system that connected the
bombsight to the flight controls gave the bombardier limited control over the aircraft flight path,
and reduced the pilot's role in the aircraft control loop. The SBAE used two gyroscopes: one for
aircraft azimuth control and one for pitch control. When the gyroscopes detected any deviation
from their level, aligned position, electrical signals transmitted correctional instructions to
centrally located servomotors that, in turn, pulled long wire cables attached to the flight control
surfaces, moving them as necessary to change the aircraft attitude until the gyroscopes returned
to their horizontal and vertical aligned positions. 35 These cables ran the length of the aircraft
from the servomotors to the control surfaces, comprising a separate flight control system from
the primary one used by the pilot, but were located in the same area as the primary flight control
rods, cranks, and pulleys.
The SBAE mechanically linked the bombsight to the azimuth gyro, and when the
bombardier rotated the bombsight in azimuth, as when aligning it with the aim point, those
linkages generated the necessary electrical signals through a series of brushes and transmitted
them to the servomotors that actuated the ailerons and rudder.1 36 The aircraft turned in response
until it was heading in the direction indicated by the bombardier, giving him control of the
aircraft flight path, but in roll and yaw only. Although the SBAE turned the aircraft to the
direction indicated by the bombardier, it was not useful for navigation, as it could not hold a
particular heading other than that commanded by the bombardier through the bombsight.
Additionally, once established on a given heading, it would maintain that heading until
commanded to change, but only as a heading relative to the bombsight position. Since it had no
134 Toole, The Development of Bombing Equipment in the Army Air Forces, 67-70.
135 McFarland, America 's Pursuit of Precision Bombing, 120.
136 Barth, "Aircraft Control System, U.S. Patent 2,485,953."
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connection to any azimuth-indicating instrument, such as a magnetic compass, it could not hold a
directional heading, just one in relation to the bombsight.
Neither did the SBAE did not give the bombardier any control over the aircraft pitch.
Pitch was controlled independently by the vertical flight gyro, which was not connected to the
bombsight but did respond to its movement if necessary during a turn to keep the aircraft in level
flight." 7 In addition to not being able to control the aircraft altitude, the bombardier's control
was further limited by the fact that he had no control over the aircraft speed, a characteristic
common to all of the systems under examination. The SBAE was just that-stabilized bombing
approach equipment. It was a single-function, task-specific system designed to improve
bombing accuracy. Carl Norden was not interested in relieving the pilot of any burden and, in
his own words, was concerned only with "precision flight regardless of weather conditions and
only for the purpose of improving bombsight performance." 38
As an aid to bombing, the SBAE was successful. In Navy tests, bombing results were
30-40 percent more accurate with the system than under manual control in smooth to bumpy air,
and in very rough air, when the bombardiers using the bombsight alone would not drop for fear
of bombing off of the bomb range, the results were as good as the manual bombing results in
smooth air.139 However, the SBAE was subject to some severe shortcomings, particularly when
used in the high-altitude environment. Just as with the Sperry A-I autopilot, the SBAE control
cables lost their tension and ability to actuate the flight controls in the extreme cold of high
altitude bombing missions, making the system at best non-precise and at worst, useless. It also
suffered from a lack of mechanical coordination and refinement, often skidding through turns in
uncoordinated flight and its abrupt control inputs provided a sometimes violent ride for the
bomber's crew.140 It was, however, the only option available for improving bombing accuracy.
Based upon the Navy test results, the Air Corps acquired an SBAE in 1938, and installed
it in a Martin B- 18 bomber for testing. They also renamed the system Automatic Flight Control
Equipment (AFCE) to circumvent the Navy's SECRET classification of the SBAE, which was
137Ibid.
138 Quoted in McFarland, America's Pursuit of Precision Bombing, 120.
139 Toole, The Development of Bombing Equipment in the Army Air Forces, 88; McFarland, America's Pursuit of
Precision Bombing, 121.
140 Albert L. Pardini, The Legendary Secret Norden Bombsight (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 1999), 93-
94.
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hindering the Air Corps' acquisition process. 14 1 At the conclusion of the tests, Air Corps
engineers concluded that since it gave more accurate aircraft control to the bombardier than
existing PDI systems, it would likely
1. decrease the amount of training required by novice bombardiers
2. decrease greatly the errors of the less efficient bombing teams,
3. would probably decrease to a lesser degree the errors of the better bombing
teams,
4. would allow the bombing run to be decreased materially
5. would allow the bombardier to direct the airplane on a zigzag course to the
target. 142
The AFCE was an obvious improvement to the bombardment system, but it remained a task-
specific system, suitable for bombing only, and even while testing it, the Air Corps was
simultaneously pursuing other options that more closely met their needs.
While Norden was developing the SBAE, the Air Corps had been installing Sperry
autopilots in all of its bombers to help with navigation and reduce pilot fatigue on long missions.
Air Corps leadership had long since decided that they needed autopilots in bombers, but that they
needed it to function as both an autopilot and a precision bombing aid.143 Even the renaming of
the bombing-specific SBAE to a more general flight-control oriented AFCE was consistent with
their wishes to obtain a more complete, capable system. By the time the engineers installed the
AFCE in the first Martin bomber, the Air Corps was already using the Sperry A-3 system in its
bombers, which was an improved version of the A- 1. Not satisfied with having to use two
automatic flight control systems on aircraft where every pound of equipment meant one less
pound of bombs, the Air Corps Materiel Division aggressively pursued integrating the Norden
bombsight with the Sperry autopilot.
The Air Corps tried and failed in 1937 to integrate a Sperry A-2 autopilot with the
Norden bombsight, and by January 1940, as war clouds loomed on the horizon, informed the
Navy that they were going to pursue integrating the all-electric Sperry A-5. This also proved a
failure, as the A-5 had numerous previously mentioned problems, and the power requirements
141 Raymond Walters, Bombsight Maintenance Training in the AAF, Army Air Forces Historical Study 8
(Washington, DC: U.S. Army Air Forces Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Historical Division, June
1944), 4, US Air Force Historical Research Agency.
142 Toole, The Development of Bombing Equipment in the Army Air Forces, 88-89.
143 McFarland, America's Pursuit of Precision Bombing, 38.
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for the autopilot and bombsight were incompatible. The bombsight operated on direct current, as
did all of the bomber instruments at the time, and the autopilot operated on alternating current. 144
In response, the Navy began an effort to integrate the Sperry A-3 with the bombsight, achieving
partial success by the middle of 1941. However, the integration was incomplete and to operate
correctly, the human pilot had to control the aircraft ailerons because the bombsight could not
produce a proportional banking signal. 14 This hybrid solution was hardly better than the PDI
system it was supposed to replace, and probably worse. In the mean time, Air Corps engineers in
the Materiel Division stumbled across a key machine, developed by the Minneapolis-Honeywell
(M-H) Corporation, which not only greatly improved the AFCE, but made it into a highly
functional autopilot, as well.
The Honeywell C-1 Autopilot-System Control in a Box
At the turn of the twentieth century, the Minneapolis Heat Regulator Company began
developing electrical proportional control systems for building heating and cooling systems. By
the 1930s, the company, now Minneapolis-Honeywell, had developed the Modutrol, a controller
that was very effective at modulating the heating and cooling of buildings through the
proportional mixing of hot and cold air, and in late 1940, their engineers developed a version of
it for use in controlling the ambient environment in aircraft. This servo-amplifier system
controlled the temperature through a system of multiple, proportional settings and constant
output that was constantly regulated, as opposed to the old damper-flapper system design which
was either open or closed. The design enabled the system to handle the challenging environment
created in aircraft, which were typically subject to extreme changes in temperature as they
climbed or descended thousands of feet in a short period. 146
M-H pitched the control system to the Army in January 1941, but received little initial
interest. However, a month later, representatives from the Photographic Division at Wright Field
contacted them about adapting the system to provide precise motor control for keeping airborne
reconnaissance cameras level in flight. In a matter of a few weeks, M-H engineers had
developed a system that not only kept the camera level, but enabled remote control of its attitude,
144 Carl Frische, "Carl Frische Interview - Percy Halpert History," Video, n.d., http://vimeo.com/9677367 (accessed
5 April 2011).
145 McFarland, America's Pursuit of Precision Bombing, 124.
146 Jeffrey L. Rodengen, The Legend ofHoneywell (Ft. Lauderdale, FL: Write Stuff Syndicate, Inc., 1995), 65-66.
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as well. This capability caught the attention of the Army Air Forces engineers working on the
autopilot/Norden integration project.147
In mid-1941, USAAF personnel showed M-H engineers "a device mostly covered by a
white sheet, and asked if they could adapt potentiometers to an exposed gyroscope, creating an
electronic transference of motion from the potentiometers" through their amplifier to a servo
motor. 148 The device was the AFCE azimuth stabilizer, and in ten days, M-H developed a
system that worked almost flawlessly on the pitch axis of a mock up autopilot system. After
modifying the system with a larger amplifier to enable the controller to actuate the large servos
necessary to move the massive flight control surfaces of a B-17 bomber, the USAAF installed
the pitch controller in a test aircraft. In his history of the Honeywell Corporation, The Legend of
Honeywell, Jeffrey Rodengen relates that Captain Don Diehl, the pilot of the test aircraft, was
somewhat skeptical of the system and asked M-H technician George Borell to "sit in the tail of
the plane with a pair of bolt cutters and cut the servo line if it failed to work."149 It turned out
that Diehl's understandable request was unnecessary, but it was possible because of the M-H
system's revolutionary design.
Instead of using mechanical rods or cables to connect servos to the aircraft flight control
surfaces, the new autopilot used electrical wires that ran from the control unit that was connected
to the gyros to servos that were located near the flight controls. If the wires were cut, the system
could not actuate the flight controls. In the final design, M-H engineers routed the electrical
wires through different areas of the aircraft than those used by the primary flight controls,
essentially creating a fully functioning backup flight control system for the bomber. This was
extremely useful, as in the event that the primary system was damaged in combat, the backup
system might escape damage and allow the pilot to still control the aircraft. The B-1 7 Pilot
Training Manual actually advocated the use of the autopilot in an emergency (Figure 3.19), and
there are several stories of B- 1 7s returning to land safely with the pilot using the autopilot for
control after the primary controls were damaged by enemy fire. 5 0
147 Ibid., 65-67.
148 Ibid., 71.
149 Ibid.
150 See Peter M. Bowers, Fortress in the Sky (Grenada Hills, CA: Sentry Books, Inc., 1976); Roger A. Freeman, B-
17 Fortress at War (London: Ian Allen Ltd, 1977).
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Figure 3.19
Emergency Use of Autopilot entry in the B-17 Pilot Training Manual15 1
The USAAF flight test of the M-H prototype system was an unqualified success, and a
redesigned, fully functional system was installed in a B-17 a few months later for more testing.
After only 160 hours of flight test, the USAAF was convinced that this new system, the C-I
Autopilot, was the solution to their requirement for an integrated autopilot/bombing system. By
the fall of 1942, it was approved for use in bombing missions and in 1943, became the service's
standard autopilot system and was installed in all of the heavy and very heavy bombers used by
the United States during World War II.152
Automating Flying
The C-I Autopilot was a hybrid system of mechanical and electronic elements that could
control an aircraft attitude in the pitch, roll, and yaw axes, described as "an electromechanical
robot which automatically flies the aircraft in straight-and-level flight or maneuvers it in
response to fingertip controls operated by the pilot or bombardier" (Figure 3.20).m5 Its primary
components were
- The directional gyro, located in the Norden bombsight stabilizer in the
bombardier's compartment that sensed changes in the aircraft azimuth
- The flight gyro, located near the center of the aircraft that sensed changes in
the aircraft pitch or roll
- A series of potentiometers that translated the flight attitude deviations
generated by the gyros into electrical correction signals
151 Pilot Training Manual for the B-17, 178.
152 This included the B-17, B-24, and B-29. Early in the war, many B-24s had the Sperry S-I bombsight and A-5
autopilot installed due to a shortage of Norden bombsights and the, as yet, unresolved autopilot problem.
153 Many of these aircraft used those systems through the entire war.
Handbook of Operations and Service Instructions: Automatic Pilot Type C-1 (AN I1-60AA-1) (Dayton, OH: The
Otterbein Press, 1943), 3.
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- An amplifier that boosted those signals and translated them into electrical
commands sent to servomotors connected to the flight controls
- Servomotors that actuated the flight controls in response to the commands
received from the amplifier
- Two autopilot control panels, one each for the pilot and bombardier, used to
engage the autopilot and adjust its operation15 4
These components formed a closed-loop control system that, once set and adjusted by the human
pilot, could maintain a steady state flight attitude commanded by the pilot or bombardier. It
could maintain a constant attitude, whether wings-level or in a turn, and a constant heading in a
straight line. However, like the SBAE, the early versions of the system were not an effective aid
to aerial navigation, as they were not integrated with a true direction-indicating instrument, such
as the aperiodic compass, and thus could not hold a specific navigational heading.
Figure 3.20
B-17 C-1 Autopilot schematic drawing155
154 Here 's How: Operation of the C-1 Autopilot (Minneapolis Honeywell Aeronautical Division, n.d.), 2-5.
155 Pilot Training Manual for the B-17, 175.
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The C-I Autopilot was represented as a device that worked "much the same way as a
human pilot," but one that flew much more precisely and accurately (Figure 3.21).156
Figure 3.21
Precision flying and the pilot vs. the autopilot15 7
In describing how the autopilot worked, the 1944 Student's Manual: Bombing used to train -
USAAF bombardiers actually presented the autopilot as a direct human analog. It explained that
the gyros worked like the pilot's "eyes," sensing the environment, and when they detected a
change, sent control signals to the amplifier, the autopilot's "brain." The amplifier transmitted
the signals through electric bridge circuits and wires, the autopilot's "nervous system," to the
servos that manipulated the flight controls, the system's "muscles" (Figure 3.22).
156 Handbook of Operations and Service Instructions: Automatic Pilot Type C-1, 4.157 Handbook of Overhaul Instructions: Automatic Pilot Type C-] (AN 11-60AA-2) (Marion, IN: Central Press, Inc.,
1944), 4.
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Figure 3.22
The cybernetic autopilot 15 8
This distinctly human, physiological portrait basically characterized the
electromechanical autopilot as a set of perceptual organs that transmitted commands to a set of
effector organs through a central nervous system. Today, this analogy seems, if not obvious, at
least understandable. Interestingly, in 1944, this view of a technological system as a human
analog was far from common. In fact, it was not until after the war, in 1948, that Norbert Weiner
formally advanced the concept with the publishing of his book Cybernetics: or Control and
Communication in the Animal and the Machine.159 Wiener notably drew parallels between the
process of communication in the human nervous system to that used in servomechanical control
systems. Wiener went on to become regarded as the father of the field of cybernetics, but the
structure of his ideas was evident well before he published his book. Interestingly, this
progressive notion evolved in the military, the organization that Lewis Mumford famously
158 Students 'Manual. Bombing (Army Air Forces Training Command, 1944), 3-1-2.
159 See Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics: Or, Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine, 2nd ed.
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965).
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viewed as resistant to innovation and invention and regarded as "the refuge of third-rate
minds." 6 0
Controlling the Controller-C-1 Autopilot Operation and Building a Partnership
The C-I Autopilot was controlled through one of two control panels, one located in the
pilot's cockpit and one in the bombardier's compartment. Either one could control the system in
flight, but the pilot's panel was the master control, providing the system power, more capability,
and it could override commands from the bombardier's panel (Figure 3.23). The panel contained
all of the controls necessary to set up the system, adjust and engage it in flight, and turn the
aircraft, as well as a series of lights that indicated whether the system was set up and operating
properly.
Figure 3.23
The pilot's autopilot control panel16 1
The C-I Autopilot took a great deal of setup and adjustment throughout the mission.
Once airborne, the aircraft commander's first concern was powering up the system and teaching
160 Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1934), 95.161 Bombardiers'Information File (AAF Form 24B) (U.S. War Department, 1944), 5-1-3.
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it which way was up. To do so, he first turned on the system and waited for the gyros to spin up
and erect. Once complete, he leveled the aircraft, established a stable cruising airspeed, and
trimmed it for level flight. This step was critical, because it established the initial conditions for
the autopilot, essentially constructing its "universe," the reference frame from which it would
make all of its decisions. The human pilot had to create as close to a true vertical and horizontal
reference for the flight and azimuth gyros as possible, because they would become the
autopilot's definition of the true vertical and horizontal, and all autopilot maneuvers would be in
relation to these settings. The pilot used his own flight instruments to establish and confirm that
true horizontal and vertical position, and it was his skill at doing so that established how good the
autopilot could be. 162
Once the aircraft was trimmed for level flight, the aircraft commander had the
bombardier center the PDI so that it showed a good heading reference. The PDI was still used
with the C-1 Autopilot as a backup system in the event of an autopilot failure. With the PDI set,
the pilot engaged the autopilot in stages, first the ailerons, then the rudder, and finally the
elevator. He then analyzed the autopilot's performance, checking to see if it kept the aircraft in a
level attitude. If necessary, he made fine adjustments to the autopilot settings trim knobs on the
control panel that could correct any deviations. Once again, it was the pilot's perception that
established the autopilot's understanding of its own universe.
Next, the pilot determined the autopilot's behavior through setting how it would react to
its created environment by adjusting the system Sensitivity and Ratio settings. Sensitivity was
comparable to a human pilot's reaction time. High settings brought quick responses to the
slightest change in aircraft attitude, while low settings delayed the reaction. High settings meant
that the crew was in for a jerkier, but more precise flight, while low settings were smoother, but
less precise. The Ratio setting determined the amount of control surface movement the autopilot
commanded in response to a deviation. Set too high, the autopilot would over control the
aircraft, and "hunt" for the correct attitude with large control movements that continually
overshot the desired condition. Set too low, the autopilot would under control the aircraft, and
control movements would be too slow. Proper setting of the Sensitivity and Ratio controls was
critical for a smooth, precise flight on autopilot.
162 The autopilot procedures in this and the following paragraphs are drawn from Handbook of Operations and
Service Instructions: Automatic Pilot Type C-1; Here's How: Operation of the C-1 Autopilot; Pilot
Training Manualfor the B-17; Bombardiers' Information File.
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Finally, the pilot adjusted the turn compensation setting to ensure that the aircraft
performed coordinated turns, with the ailerons and rudder working correctly in unison. To do
this, he had the bombardier use the turn controller on his bombsight to command a turn. The
aircraft was supposed to assume an 180 bank coordinated turn, and the pilot confirmed the
attitude on his instruments, if necessary, adjusting the aileron, rudder, or elevator turn settings to
achieve coordinated flight (Figure 3.24). This setting was crucial, as it affected how precisely
the autopilot flew the aircraft in a turn, which would most likely occur when the bombardier was
controlling its actions during the most critical part of the flight-the bomb run. Once again, the
pilot's perception of the correct aircraft attitude was central to the autopilot performing its role
when flying the aircraft.
Figure 3.24
Autopilot turn compensation163
With the final adjustments made, the pilot or bombardier could use the autopilot in flight.
However, as the setup and adjustment process described above indicate, the autopilot was only as
good as the pilot allowed it to be. A misadjusted autopilot would not sense or react properly in
flight, and accomplishing the process correctly became a new measure of skill. Just as the ability
to stay closely tucked in the correct position in formation demonstrated that a pilot had good
flying skills, setting up the autopilot so that it provided a smooth, stable platform was a skill in
163 Here's How: Operation of the C-1 Autopilot, 13.
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itself equally worth mention, as illustrated by one B- 17 copilot's assessment of his aircraft
commander.
He could fly his airplane too. He could sock in close in formation and hold it
there all day long. He never got sore and started kicking the airplane around.
And he knew plenty about engines and flaps and landing gear and hydraulic
systems and electrical systems. He could set up an auto-pilot the way the
Honeywell Company intended. 16 4
In an odd twist, the ability to use an automated system that appeared to take away the
fundamental task that defined the pilot-flying-became a mark of skill at that very task.
The process of setting up and adjusting the C- 1 Autopilot was a process of creating a
relationship between the pilot and the autopilot. The pilot, through his flying skill, established
the physical references that the autopilot used to define its environment. His definition of the
true vertical and horizontal became the autopilot's definitions-its "ground truth." It used those
references to detect any deviations from that truth, and then corrected them through a series of
control reactions, also defined by the pilot. While engaged, the autopilot was flying the aircraft
to the extent that it was designed-it could hold a flight attitude and respond to change
commands transmitted from the autopilot control panel or bombsight, as will be discussed.
However, it was flying the way that the pilot told it to fly, adjusted to his perceptions and
reacting as he programmed. As those perceptions varied from individual human pilot to
individual human pilot, the autopilot was essentially an extension of the human pilot that
programmed it and was an embodied version of that pilot.
The autopilot created a new way of controlling the aircraft and thus a new "piloting"
skill. With the pilot in direct control of the aircraft, flying skill involved the pilot's ability to
control the aircraft with physical reflexes triggered by his own sensory input. With the autopilot,
however, the pilot was one step removed from direct control. No longer was it his sensory input
that triggered the reflex action that moved the flight controls, nor was it his reflex that was flying
the aircraft-it was the autopilot's. He had to understand how the autopilot operated, how it
sensed and responded. The new skill involved putting the machine in a position where it could
excel, establishing the correct initial conditions so that it could respond to a correct sensory
input, as well as dictating that response.
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164 Stiles, Serenade to the Big Bird, 56.
This new skill, however, was linked directly to the pilot's own flying skill. An
imprecisely set up autopilot responded imprecisely and flew imprecisely. If the human pilot
could not establish the correct initial conditions or dictate the appropriate response, the autopilot
response, while correct for what it had been "told" by the pilot, would be incorrect.
Additionally, the human pilot had to continually monitor the autopilot, as gyroscope precession
could affect its ability to maintain level flight or a straight course. Thus, the pilot became an
intermediary in the process, evaluating the autopilot's response to sensory input against his own
and adjusting the "ground truth" as necessary to maintain precision flight. The pilot never
stepped out of the aircraft control system, merely shifted his place within it, allowing the
autopilot to perform some of "his" tasks.
Flying With the Autopilot
The autopilot could be commanded to perform turns through both the autopilot control
panel and, when engaged, the Norden bombsight. To turn the aircraft, the pilot rotated the Turn
Control knob located in the upper left corner of the autopilot control panel in the desired
direction of turn (Figure 3.25). The pointer on the knob commanded a bank attitude, with the
beginning of the shaded areas at the 3:30 and 8:30 positions indicating 300 of bank. Turning
beyond this point into the shaded areas commanded over 30* of bank, and pilots were warned
against doing so in rough air, as it ran the risk of upsetting the vertical flight gyro. Coming out
of a turn, the instruction manual likewise warned pilots to pause at the "0 " setting until the
aircraft reached a wings level attitude, otherwise, the recovery to level flight would not "be
smooth."16 5 As with setting up and adjusting the autopilot, there was a certain skill involved in
using it to control the aircraft, as well.
165 Here's How: Operation of the C-1 Autopilot, 14-15.
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Figure 3.25
The C-1 Autopilot Turn Control Knob166
Although the autopilot control panel gave the pilot the ability to turn the aircraft, it could
not command the aircraft to climb or descend. Its application was limited to straight and level
flight, which it did very well. In the words of copilot Bert Stiles
If you can set up the auto-pilot and coast along alone, a Fort is a dream girl.
You could have a cocktail party in the nose and a dance in the bomb bay and it
would fly on the same heading and go on and on till the gas ran out.167
While useful for reducing fatigue on long, single ship missions, the autopilot could not aid the
pilot in the most demanding type of flying, though-maintaining position in a fluid, sometimes
violent formation. That type of flying, heaving a "big monster" around the sky, made Stiles and
other bomber pilots dream of "fighters and Cubs and gliders, anything little that flies by the
touch system."168 Although there was no hope of decreasing the size of the bomber to make it
easier to fly, Minneapolis-Honeywell greatly improved how they flew later in the war when they
invented the "Formation Stick," an improvement to the C-I Autopilot that gave men like Stiles
the "touch system" control that they desired, but also further complicated the answer to the
question of who was really flying the aircraft.
166 Ibid., 14.
167 Stiles, Serenade to the Big Bird, 75.
168 Ibid., 76.
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The Formation Stick-Now Who is Flying?
The Formation Stick was a top-secret addition to the C-I Autopilot, first installed on 11
April 1945. A miniature control stick that controlled the aircraft through the autopilot, the
Formation Stick enabled the pilot or copilot to maneuver the aircraft "with a minimum of effort"
(Figure 3.26).169 In an aircraft that sometimes required significant physical effort to fly, this was
a tremendous improvement. At the time, the 27 April 1945 M-H Company newsletter proudly
proclaimed
The advantage is that where manual control of a heavy bomber requires a force
of perhaps 100 pounds, electronic control through the Formation Stick requires
less effort than a child uses in turning a bicycle. 70
Figure 3.26
The C-1 Autopilot Formation Stick171
The aircraft commander and copilot each had a separate Formation Stick, with the aircraft
commander's installed to the left of his flight control yoke and the copilot's to the right of his
yoke. The Formation Stick was designed to fly the aircraft in the same manner as the stick in a
169 Pilot Training Manualfor the B-17, 181.
170 Quoted in Rodengen, The Legend of Honeywell, 80.171 Pilot Training Manualfor the B-17, 181.
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trainer or fighter aircraft-pulling back commanded a climb, pushing forward commanded a
dive, and pressure to either side commanded a roll in the same direction. Sensors in a control
box located at the base of the stick detected the pilot's commands and electrically actuated the
autopilot servos to move the flight controls. Although the pilot commanded the flight control
movement, the autopilot executed the actual movement.
The Formation Stick actuated the flight controls through a set of electromechanical
assemblies contained in the control mechanism box below the stick (Figure 3.27). These
assemblies, one for pitch that controlled the aircraft elevator and one for roll that controlled the
aircraft ailerons, consisted of a potentiometer, gear train, and centrifugal brake that worked
together to translate pilot stick movements to electrical signals sent to the autopilot. When the
pilot moved the stick, a cam moved a wiper on the potentiometer, generating a signal that was
then sent to the autopilot control amplifier through the C-1 control box. 7 2 As with turns initiated
with the autopilot Turn Control Knob, the amplifier controlled the servos connected to the
appropriate flight controls. Although the system provided control in only the pitch and roll axes
and used mechanical as well as electrical controls, the Formation Stick assembly was the direct
forefather of the fly-by-wire flight control systems developed in the 1960s and 1970s.
172 Operation, Service and Overhaul Instructions with Parts Catalog for Formation Stick Control System for C-]
Autopilot (AN 11-60AA-9) (Commanding General, Army Air Forces, 1945), 3-4.
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Figure 3.27
C-1 Autopilot Formation Stick system schematic diagram 173
The system had three settings, each dictating the amount of autopilot involvement in the
flying process while using the stick. The "ON SERVO BOOST" mode put the stick in direct
control of the autopilot and was used for quick maneuvering, such as when flying in a wing
position in a tight formation. The "ON ELEV. ONLY" mode provided the pilot only pitch
control while the autopilot itself maintained control of the ailerons and rudder. This mode was
used during the bomb run when the bombardier was controlling the autopilot through the
bombsight. In the "ON" mode, the autopilot flew the aircraft as set up through the autopilot
control panel, but gave the pilot the same turn control that he previously had with the Turn
Control Knob while adding the ability to control the aircraft pitch, as well. This mode was for
use when little maneuvering was expected, such as when leading a formation or flying in a loose
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wing position. 7 4 The three different modes gave the pilot the option how much help he desired
to have flying the aircraft. Designed to give the pilot more control in the fluid formation
environment, the Formation Stick enabled precision flying to a degree that had been rarely
possible and greatly reduced pilot fatigue.
Control, Sharing Control, and the "N plus 1 Factor"
From the earliest Sperry Gyroscopic Stabilizer to the C-1 Autopilot with the Formation
Stick, the autopilot never had complete control of the aircraft, only that control which the aircraft
commander ceded to it. When it was used, the pilot shared his control with the machine, using
its particular strengths to increase the pilot's own ability to control the aircraft. He was able to
regain full control at any point, however, by either overpowering the autopilot's controls or by
turning the system off altogether. Certainly, in many cases the autopilot was a more precise flyer
than the human pilot, able to detect and correct deviations from the desired flight attitude more
quickly, however, that precision was defined by the pilot's own setting and adjustment of the
system. By setting the autopilot's referential frame, the pilot made the machine an extension of
himself. In truth, the autopilot was better at maintaining the level of precision that the human
pilot established.
The autopilot evolved as another tool for the pilot and aircraft commander-a critical
tool. While he gave up certain flying tasks to the autopilot, the act actually gave the pilot greater
control over the system as a whole, because it allowed him to devote some of his limited
cognitive capacity to other concerns, such as the condition of the aircraft crew, systems, or its
position in the formation or mission as a whole. William Lear, legendary aviation pioneer and
developer of the lightweight autopilot, explained this concept in a 1960 interview
People have what is known as an "N factor"---I call it an N plus 1 factor. In
other words, every man can do N number of things. He can do two things,
three, four, five, six, at once, but whatever his N factor is, he can do all those
things and do them pretty well. Now, then, if you give him N plus 1, which is 1
more thing to do than he's capable of doing, you confuse him so badly that
instead of being able to do the number of things that he's able to do plus the
extra thing, he can't do any of the things now, because his computer, his brain,
bogs down because it got one more signal in than it will tolerate. You may have
an N factor of 15, but 16 will bog you down....In general, an autopilot is the
174 Pilot Training Manual for the B-17, 182.
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real answer to (the problem of pilot task saturation), for the simple reason that it
leaves the pilot in the ideal position of not using up his N factors. 7 5
In short, the autopilot increased the aircraft commander's capacity to act as the system controller.
Although the pilot allowed the autopilot to perform some of the flying tasks, he did not
really become "less" of a pilot-his is role merely changed. He shifted from being in direct
control of the tasks to supervising the autopilot's execution of those tasks.' 7 6 Just as his role as
the aircraft commander demanded that he monitor the performance of each human member of
the crew, his role as the pilot demanded that he monitor the performance of the autopilot. He
was no more giving up control of the aircraft to the autopilot when it was in use than when he
took navigational direction from the aircraft navigator. The nature of this relationship between
the pilot and the autopilot, however, was not a simple case of easy acceptance and equal
teamwork, as became obvious when the C- 1 Autopilot was put to its other use-giving the
bombardier control of the aircraft during the bomb run.
The Pilot and the Autopilot
The Sperry Gyroscopic Stabilizer arrived less than ten years after the Wright brothers'
first flight at Kitty Hawk, and the autopilot has existed almost as long as the human pilot in
175 William Lear, "William Lear (Flight Interviews)," interview by Kenneth Leish, Transcript, May 1960, K146.34-
63, IRIS No. 471800, US Air Force Historical Research Agency.
176 The nature and role of human supervisory control over automated systems has been explored in depth by
numerous scholars, and is a current topic of research among many examining human-machine relationships
in the operation of highly automated systems, such as the remotely piloted vehicle systems in use by many
militaries. See Raja Parasuraman, Thomas B. Sheridan, and Christopher D. Wickens, "A Model for Types
and Levels of Human Interaction with Automation," IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics,
Part A: Systems and Humans 30, no. 3 (May 2000): 286-297; Thomas B. Sheridan, Telerobotics,
Automation, and Human Supervisory Control (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992); Thomas B. Sheridan,
"Task Analysis, Task Allocation, and Supervisory Control," in Handbook of Human-Computer Interaction,
ed. Martin Helander, Thomas K. Landauer, and Prasad V. Prabhu, 2nd ed. (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1997),
87-105. There are varying levels of supervisory control, based upon the capabilities of both the automated
systems and the humans supervising them. The C-i represents a system that required a great deal of
supervision, as the system itself had only rudimentary automation capability. Autopilots have evolved into
much more complete flight management systems, in extreme cases capable of conducting an entire flight
from takeoff to landing, with the human pilot acting only as a monitor. The pitfalls and consequences of
ceding this much control to automated machines is another area of interest and concern among researchers,
as the dangers of complacent human behavior become evident in events such as in October 2009 when
Northwest Flight 188 flew far beyond its destination on autopilot while the two pilots onboard were
preoccupied with extraneous tasks. See Micheline Maynard and Matthew L. Wald, "Experts Puzzle Over
How Flight Overshot Airport," The New York Times, October 24, 2009; Arnold Reiner, "Pilots on
Autopilot", December 16, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/17/opinion/i 7reiner.html?r=1 &em c=etal (accessed 17 December
2009).
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powered aircraft. However, acceptance of the use of an automated machine to maintain control
in flight was far from universal. The role of automation in aviation was debated from the very
start, as shown in a 1910 British book on aerial navigation that describes how the question of the
use of automation to obtain stability in flight divided aviators into two groups.
One school holds that equilibrium can be made automatic to a very large degree;
the other, known as the American school, following the methods of the Brothers
Wright, claims that equilibrium is a matter for the skill of the aviator, who, with
practice, acquires perfect control of his machine.1 77
Building on a classification of these groups as chauffeurs and airmen, engineer and historian
Walter Vincenti advanced that the chauffeurs "conceived that the airplane should be a highly
stable vehicle, a kind of winged automobile that simply required steering by the pilot."1 78 As
expressed by historian David Mindell, this primarily European attitude essentially separated the
aviators from their machines, and cast the aviator's role as to "guide, rather than direct" the
aircraft.'7 9 This attitude was very favorable toward the use of automation, and extended, to the
idea of shared control.
The airmen, primarily American pilots, building on the Wright brothers' ideas about
control viewed the ability to control the aircraft as a central identifying characteristic of the
aviator himself. Again, Mindell illustrates that it was the Wright brothers' solution to the
problems of control that enabled powered flight to begin with. In solving that problem, they
invented "not simply an airplane that could fly, but also the very idea of an airplane as a dynamic
machine under the control of a human pilot (emphasis in original)."18 0 For the Wrights, the
aircraft and aviator were an integral part of a single system, with one element defined by the
ability to be controlled, and the other by the specific ability and skill to exert that control.
As described earlier, the Wrights trained many of the initial U.S. Army pilots, and their
"airman" attitude became an integral part of the identity of the Army aviator. Even though the
177 Quoted in Walter G. Vincenti, What Engineers Know and How They Know It: Analytical Studies from
Aeronautical History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 57.
178 Ibid.. The classification of chauffeurs and airmen comes from Charles Harvard Gibbs-Smith, Aviation: An
Historical Survey from Its Origins to the End of World War II (London: H.M.S.O., 1970).
179 David A. Mindell, Digital Apollo: Human and Machine in Spaceflight (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2008),
21.
180 Ibid.
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pilot rapidly grew beyond just being an aircraft flyer as the role of command grew, flying was
still a central identifying characteristic. The concept of the autopilot ran counter to the pilot's
view of himself-the use of a machine to exert control was a direct questioning of the his own
skill. It was at the beginning of the bomb run over the heavily defended Axis targets on
European soil during the CBO that this attitude came in conflict with the need to execute the
precision bombing mission.
The Autopilot and Bombing-Flying the Bomb Run
The C-I Autopilot did not become the standard autopilot system until the middle of 1943,
and it was Carl Norden's AFCE that saw the first combat use. The original AFCE was designed
only to give the bombardier the ability to directly maneuver the bomber to the point in space
where the bombsight could release the bombs and hit the aimpoint, replacing the PDI. Ideally,
the aircraft commander would turn over the control of the aircraft heading to the bombardier at
the start of the bomb run, which will be described in depth in Chapter 5, and while the
bombardier steered the aircraft to the bomb release point, the aircraft commander manually
controlled the airspeed, and the AFCE kept the aircraft level. Early attempts at using the system,
however, met with little success. The system was mechanically unreliable and, critically, when it
was functioning the pilots would not allow it to work as designed.181
As described in Chapter 2, during the opening stage of the CBO, the USAAF bombers
used formation tactics developed during the 1930s, which emphasized bombing by individual
aircraft from loose formations, designed to give each aircraft room to maneuver and still provide
some protection from the defensive flak batteries stationed around the target. Because the pilots
believed that if they flew straight and level for more than ten seconds they were bound to be shot
down, they maneuvered as much as possible within the constraints of the formation to survive.is2
This maneuvering, unfortunately, gave the bombardier, at best, ten seconds to come up with a
bombing solution and maneuver the aircraft to the bomb dropping point so that the bombsight
could drop the bombs, a process that usually took at leastfifty seconds in training to complete
181 "The War Against the Sub Pens," in The Army Air Forces in World War , Vol. 2-Europe: Torch to Pointblank,
(Washington, DC: 1983. Reprint, Office of Air Force History. Originally published Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1949), 271-272.
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with any hope of precision results. Even though the bomber had the advantage of control with
the AFCE, he had little chance to hit the target.
The decision to fly tighter, straighter formations and bomb out of the Combat Box fixed
the problem of over maneuvering by the pilots, but a significant hurdle remained that blocked the
bombardiers ability to use the AFCE and bombsight to bomb precisely-the pilots themselves.
Because of the problems associated with the system, including the mechanical malfunctions and
the imprecise way that the AFCE controlled the aircraft, they believed that they could fly more
precisely than Norden's machine. Indeed the AFCE itself lent some credence to their beliefs, as
related by B- 17 Navigator Harry Crosby, who was a passenger during the bomb run portion of
the mission.
The plane felt different. Instead of the smooth corrections that Blake (the
pilot) would make, the bombsight was jerking the plane around....The
compass needle bounced around, with the plane skidding back onto our
heading without the usual dip of the ailerons. The Norden bombsight was
running the automatic pilot, but Blake was a smoother flyer. 183
Nevertheless, precision bombing required a stable platform, and the AFCE was the only way to
improve stability.
Soon after adopting the Combat Box formation and the drop-on-leader bombing method,
8th AF leadership mandated that the lead crews use the AFCE during the bomb run. Major
General Haywood Hansell, Jr., commander of the 1st Bombardment Wing at the beginning of
1943, related how the lead pilots reacted to the directive.
It was exceedingly difficult to force the pilots of lead aircraft to submit to this
procedure. It meant turning the airplane-indeed the whole formation-over to
a bombardier who was not a pilot and who viewed the world through the
restricted field of a bombing telescope. And this had to be done at a time when
the combat was at its height and enemy fighters were boring straight into the
formation....It took all the disciplinary power at our disposal to make this
procedure work.18 4
Hansell's comments highlight how the idea of the autopilot seemed to conflict with the pilot's
183 Crosby, A Wing and a Prayer, 12.
184 Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler (Atlanta, GA: Higgins-McArthur/Longino & Porter,
Inc., 1972), 118-119.
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view of himself as a flyer, and, perhaps more significantly, as the aircraft and formation
commander. The use of the AFCE turned over not only the task of flying, which was central to
the pilot's personal identity, but also the task of command, which was central to his professional
identity. However, the 8th AF leadership continued to press their lead crews to use the system,
and soon, the benefits of that use were revealed.
On 18 March 1943, during a mission against the submarine pens at Vegesack, Germany,
the 8 th Air Force achieved its first significant success while bombing with the AFCE.185
Seventy-three B- 17s and twenty-four B-24s attacked a small, obscure collection of sheds and
shops covering an area that measured only 2,500 by 1,000 feet beside the Wesel River, near
Bremen. The bombers attacked from Combat Box formations and bombed on the leaders'
signal, all of whom used their autopilots during the bomb run. Post-strike photographic analysis
of the bombing showed that seventy-six percent of the bombs fell within 1,000 feet of the aim
point, and that seven submarines suffered significant damage.1 86
Both British and American and leaders hailed the mission as a great success. Winston
Churchill sent Lieutenant General Ira Eaker, the commander of the 8th Bomber Command, a
letter of congratulation with "all my compliments to you and your officers and men on your
brilliant exploit...," and Eaker himself sent a message to all of the members of his command,
saying
To my mind the Vegesack raid is the climax; it concludes the experiment.
There should no longer be the slightest vestige of doubt that our heavy bombers
with their trained crews can overcome any enemy opposition and destroy their
targets.187
Colonel Archie Old, commander of the 45 th Combat Bomber Wing and decorated pilot-leader of
the historic raid against Schweinfurt in August 1943, was an instant convert, and described why
his crews were successful in combat.
185.
It is unclear which type of equipment was used on the Vegesack raid, Norden's AFCE or the Honeywell C-i
Autopilot. 8th AF bombers were modified in the field as the new equipment became available, and it was
186 not until later that year that it became the standard autopilot equipment.Roger A. Freeman, The Mighty Eighth War Diary (Motorbooks Intl, 1990), 46-47; James Parton, "Air Force
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187 Originally published Bethesda, MD: Adler & Adler Publishers, Inc., 1986), 243-244.
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We had it on automatic pilot; that's where you could do the best piloting
because the bombardier is flying the airplane. Some of my lead crews, I
would have to threaten to court-marital them if they didn't do that because
they thought they could fly it better. They couldn't. It was all geared
together. 188
By the middle of 1943, all of the B- 17s in the ETO were equipped with the C-I Autopilot, and
the system's consistent performance slowly converted the bomber pilots into believers. The
human-machine team of the bombardier and bombsight could produce better results than the
human-human team of the bombardier and pilot.189 The combination of the change in bombing
formation tactics and the use of the autopilot clearly improved 8th AF bombing effectiveness.
After 1 October 1943, the average dimensions of a formation's bombing pattern on the ground
improved from 3,080 to 2,400 square feet, and the percentage of bombs within 1,000 feet of the
center of that pattern improved from 24 to 40 percent.' 90
Conclusion
Command and Shared Control-The Pilot, Machines, and Doctrine
In the United States, the military pilot was born a technically skilled specialist, created
from the Wright brothers' concepts of the aircraft as a machine that could be controlled and the
airman as that controller. Within the U.S. Army, the skill of exerting that control-flying-
became the centrally defining characteristic of the military pilot, conveying upon him a singular
social status that brought with it extra rank and pay. However, the requirements placed on the
pilot soon evolved beyond the physio-cognitive skill of controlling an aircraft in the air to
include the knowledge and skill of employing the aircraft in a military role.
Employment of the aircraft demanded a new skill-that of system control-the ability to
achieve and maintain control over a group of humans and machines all working toward a
common goal. While command of the aircraft and the skill of flying remained a necessary skill,
mandated by Congressional action, the ever increasing complexity of both aircraft and weapons
technology and the evolving doctrinal missions for which they were used demanded a wider
range of expert knowledge and skill. This forced the pilot to evolve from a technically skilled
188 Gerald Astor, The Mighty Eighth (Dutton Adult, 1997), 164; "Biographies: Lieutenant General Archie J. Old
Jr.", n.d., http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio.asp?biolD=6650 (accessed 23 December 2010).189 Rodengen, The Legend of Honeywell, 74-75.
190 Hansell, Jr., The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler, 119.
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specialist to a generalist who could control different human-machine elements and focus their
efforts toward achieving a doctrinally defined mission.
The precision bombing mission demanded that the pilot control at several levels, from the
individual aircraft to the large-scale formation. Effectively controlling at each of these levels
required sharing control with humans and, eventually, machines. Initially, the pilot had to cede
some control to the bombardier, as he had the responsibility for operating the bombsight, which
was the "business end" of their mission. Accepting direction from the bombardier with the
primitive early methods of signaling between the two was acceptable, because the pilot's skill at
following those directions was the determining factor in bombing accuracy. Even when using
the PDI, the pilot's flying skill was still a critical factor. However, when it became apparent that
imprecise flying remained a large limiting factor in bombing accuracy and the autopilot was
presented as the solution, there was resistance to ceding control to a machine.
Resistance to the autopilot, however, was short lived. Through the bombardment
doctrine developed during the Interwar years, the bomber pilot had evolved into the aircraft
commander. In this role, he learned to share flying duties and thus some control of the aircraft
with a human-the copilot. By working together and sharing flying duties, the aircraft
commander could employ the aircraft more effectively. In fact, it was the leaders of the Air
Corps, themselves pilots, who were the strongest advocates for the development and use of
automatic pilots so that they could improve the accuracy of their bombing. Once it became
apparent that the autopilot could fly critical portions of the mission more precisely than the pilot,
acceptance was assured.
Additionally, the autopilot was not autonomously automatic-it had to be set up and
adjusted by the human pilot, and thus became his extension when in operation. It actually
demanded that the human develop a new skill-the precise set up and continued operation of the
autopilot. Still based on his central ability to fly, this new skill was a mixture of precise flying
and supervisory control. The pilot still remained responsible for flying, but his role changed.
The autopilot became no more a threat to the aircraft commander's identity than the copilot did.
Both were extensions of his control over the aircraft system, as was the bombardier, to be seen in
the following chapter.
Changes in employment doctrine following World War I that emphasized large formation
tactics imposed the need for control sharing outside the individual aircraft. The large formation
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was broken down into manageable elements, and the overall leader ceded control of those
elements, whether at the group, squadron, element, or individual aircraft level, to the leader at
that level. Each controlled their part, focused on playing their role in the system at the next
level. Each element, however, had a commander, whether at the lowest aircraft level or the
highest formation and mission commander level, and with this command came the final and
ultimate responsibility for controlling their element and achieving the mission objective.
A machine initially shaped and defined the pilot, but evolving bombardment doctrine wrought
changes that redefined him into a system controller and commander. That evolution created an
individual that accepted the sharing of control with both humans and machines, as they all
comprised a single system. Rather than the individual, rebellious Knight of the Sky, he became,
as depicted below in Figure 3.28, the master controller of a socio-technical team of humans and
machines.
Figure 3.28
The System Controller19 1
191 Pilot Training Manualfor the B-17, 174.
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Chapter 4
Shared Cognition-Aerial Navigation and the Navigator as the Integrator
Bremen. Friday, 8 October 1943. Navigator Harry Crosby sat in the nose of B-17 42-
3393, Just-A-Snappin', ready to lead the entire Third Combat Wing against the heavily defended
city of Bremen. He and his crew had spent the past two days with the rest of the mission's lead
crews at the 3 rd Air Division Headquarters preparing for this maximum effort mission, ensuring
that they could find, identify, and destroy their targets located around the city of Bremen.
After reviewing the mission planning data during the Navigator's Brief that morning, he
met with his crew at the aircraft and briefed them on the plan for the day, including the route
that they would follow, the weather they could expect, and the type and location of the defenses
that they would face. Following an uneventful takeoff, Crosby directed his pilot, Everett Blakely,
to the formation rejoin point over the town of Lowestoft, using the Splasher radio beacon and
ground references to determine the aircraft heading and arriving there within 40 seconds of his
planned arrival time. The rest of the formation joined them at the point, and at the appointed
time, they turned out over the English Channel for the European continent.
Navigating by dead reckoning the entire way, Crosby directed the formation to a point
near the island of Borkonny, where the formation would cross the German coastline. Constantly
busy, Crosby calculated his position every ten minutes, recorded it in his Flight Log, plotted it on
his air plot chart, and adjusted the formation lead aircraft's heading to stay on course. Although
enemy defensive fighters harassed the formation, Crosby paid little attention to either them or
the .50-caliber machine gun hanging over his head, as he focused entirely on determining where
the formation was and where it needed to go. As they crossed over the Initial Point for the bomb
run near the city of Emden, Bremen and the target area was visible in the distance beneath a
dense cloud of angry flak Crosby pointed out the target to his bombardier, 2nd Lt. James
Douglass, at the same time noting the location of the enemy fighters and flak in his Flight Log
Crosby sat and watched Douglass as a burst offlak penetrated the Plexiglas nose of the
aircraft 30 seconds short of the target. Right after bomb release, Crosby was violently tossed
around the nose compartment when they were struck by another burst offlak Immediately after
the pilot recovered the aircraft, Crosby computed the shortest course home, directly across over
200 miles of hostile German-held territory. Harassed by enemy fighters all the way to the coast,
he feverishly navigated, giving Blakely directions the whole way, but paying little attention to his
own machine gun as the rest of the crew fired theirs at the attacking fighters.
After nearly ditching in the English Channel, Crosby located an abandoned airfield just
beyond the English coastline and successfully guided Blakely to it. With the flight controls
ineffective and brakes inoperative, Blakely crash landed Just-A-Snappin', sliding down the
runway and hitting the only tree on the airfield, totaling the aircraft, but surviving to fight
another day.'
1 Adapted from Edward Jablonski, Flying Fortresses: The Illustrated Biography of the B-I 7s and the Men Who
Flew Them (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965), 184-195; Frank D. Murphy, Luck of the
Draw: Reflections on the Air War in Europe (Trumbull, CT: FNP Military Division, 2001), 141-142; Harry
Crosby, A Wing and a Prayer: The "Bloody 100th" Bomb Group ofthe U.S. Eighth Air Force in Action
Over Europe in World War II (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), 127-135; "Black Week -
Bremen", n.d., http://www.100thbg.com/mainpages/history/history4/bw_bremen.htm, accessed 26
December 2010; Combat Chronology, 1941-1945 (Washington, DC: Center for Air Force History, 1991),
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Introduction
This chapter examines the navigation socio-technical element in the bombardment
system. It describes aerial navigation on a bombardment mission as a complex, automated
process of shared cognition, conducted by a human technical specialist and the unique
computational and navigational technologies that defined him professionally. First, it describes
the creation of the bomber navigator as a single-task, technical specialist, reluctantly accepted as
a non-pilot member of the bomber crew only under the demands of the high-altitude daylight
precision bombing (HADPB) doctrine and rapid wartime expansion, whose skills were rooted in
the tradition of maritime navigation and who was defined by his mastery of a complex set of
specialized instruments. Second, it describes aerial navigation as a shared cognitive process,
wherein the navigator used purpose-built calculating tools to translate and integrate several sets
of diverse data in what Bruno Latour called a "centre of calculation" to build idealized textual,
temporal, and spatial models of the bomber mission, which then served as execution-level
instructions for the conduct of the mission. Third, it examines the navigator's flight working
environment as a second "centre of calculation" and the tools that he used to try to recreate those
models in the air to navigate his aircraft to the target of the day. Finally, it examines how the
HADPB doctrine shaped his actions in flight based upon his position in the overall bombing
system, and how unique calculating technologies mechanized those actions.
The Line
Of all of the challenges facing bomber crews in the European Theater of Operations
(ETO) on the morning of a Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) mission, none was more
immediately pressing than finding the target for the day's mission. The target was their purpose.
If they could not find it, the complex bombardment system, of which they were an integral part,
could not drop its bombs and all of the Herculean effort that went into planning and executing
the massive raids that were the centerpiece of the Allied strategy against the Third Reich were
for naught. Ensuring that they found that target was the responsibility of one crewmember-the
navigator-the specially trained human who, with his maps, calculators, and instruments, would
guide the bomber crews individually and collectively to their target and back home again.
199; Ian L. Hawkins, B-i 7s over Berlin: Personal Stories from the 95th Bomb Group (H) (Brassey's Inc,
1995), 170-171.
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Most of the navigators on a CBO mission found out where they were going on the
morning of the mission during the General Briefing. They sat in the briefing room, waiting
along with the rest of the members of their bomber crews for the briefing officer to pull back the
curtain covering the big mission map to reveal the long red woolen line that would be their guide
for the next several hours-the route to the target. For the pilots, whose job it was to get their
aircraft to the target and back, the length of the line determined how long they were going to
have to wrestle their B- 17s through the air, commanding their own piece of the bombardment
system. For the bombardiers, the midpoint represented the location where they would put
months of specialized training to use when they dropped their bombs on the target. For every
man in the room, its path determined the type and strength of the resistance that they could
expect from the defending German fighters and anti-aircraft batteries, providing him a sense of
his chance of surviving the mission. For the navigators, however, the line itself represented
more. The red woolen line was their job. They would spend the rest of the day directing their
aircraft along the line's path, working diligently to establish their position relative to it and
calculating any necessary navigational changes to correct any diversions from it. While the other
crewmembers had their unique jobs, the navigator's job was to make sure that they arrived in the
right location at the right time to accomplish them.
Those navigators gathered in the briefing room were a unique group of men. With their
mechanical computers, navigational charts, plotters, and pencils, they were "the only officer on
the crew who had nothing whatsoever to do with operation and control of the plane." 2 Chosen
largely for their talents in mathematics and dial and chart reading, they were technical specialists,
and their very presence was largely a product of the Air Corps decision to pursue the HADPB
doctrine. They would spend the rest of the day using a set of specialized tools and instruments in
a shared cognitive process to first plan where they would go, then integrating together a diverse
set of observations and measurements, continually translating between an idealized navigational
world to the physical reality of the bombing mission, to calculate the correct direction for the
pilot to steer the aircraft so that they could find their target and then their way home, all the while
ready to operate a .50-caliber machine gun when under attack or step in and "pinch hit" for
another crew member, if necessary. They and their instruments formed a cohesive socio-
technical element focused on a single task-aerial navigation.
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Aerial Navigation and the Birth of the Specialist
At the U.S. entry into World War II in 1941, the navigator, as a non-pilot, technical
specialist, was a relatively new and underrepresented member of the U.S. Army Air Forces
(USAAF). The U.S. Army had been flying powered aircraft since 1909, but it was not until
thirty years later, in 1939, when the pre-World War II Air Corps expansion programs began the
great increase in the size of the bomber aircraft force, that the role of the non-pilot navigator was
formally established and a robust institutional training program developed.3 Indeed, after almost
four decades of powered flight, aerial navigation itself remained an immature scientific art, still
building upon its maritime roots.
At the start of World War II, aerial navigation was almost as much an art as a science.
Monte Wright, in his history of aerial navigation, described it as
a hybrid science that uses a variety of instruments and techniques to
determine three things: the present position of a vehicle, the direction to
steer to reach a desired position, and the estimated time of arrival at that
desired position.4
At that time, it required specialized knowledge in the use of "precision" instruments that gave
imprecise answers, and the ability to artfully interpret those answers through mathematics to
determine an estimated position on the face of the earth-all while moving at speeds well over
100 miles per hour.
Aerial navigation sprung directly from maritime navigation, and by the time man took to
the air in the twentieth century, mariners had mastered the art and science navigation to a great
degree, using charts, compasses, sextants, and other specialized instruments to routinely navigate
sea craft around the globe. Navigation was a requisite skill for all naval officers, and the ability
to operate those complex instruments and solve the complicated mathematical problems that they
created was an integral part of their professional repertoire and identity. The instruments were
complex and required a great deal of skill to use, but were well adapted to the slow pace of sea
travel and the stable work environment aboard ships. In the event of a particularly difficult
3 Ben R. Baldwin, Individual Training ofNavigators in the AAF, Army Air Forces Historical Study 27 (Washington,
DC: U.S. Army Air Forces Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Historical Division, January 1945), 2-6.
4 Monte Duane Wright, Most Probable Position: A History of Aerial Navigation to 1941 (Lawrence, KS: The
University of Kansas Press, 1972), 3.
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problem, this slow pace enabled navigators to take the time to confer with each other and reach a
solution without unduly endangering their ship.5
With the advent of powered flight, navigation took on a new dimension. Speed, or, more
properly, the lack of it, was no longer an ally in the face of confusion, as even the earliest aircraft
had to fly much faster than ships sailed in order to remain aloft. Time also became an enemy, as
the limited fuel supply carried by an aircraft defined the amount of time it could remain in the air
before having to return to earth, placing even greater importance on knowing an aircraft's
position, particularly in relation to the very limited number of areas where it could safely land.
Aerial navigation, or avigation as it was called through the mid- 193 Os, required the use of many
of the same instruments as maritime navigation, but demanded that they be used more quickly
and without the benefit of centuries of accumulated knowledge of the location and behavior of
dominant oceanic currents and prevailing wind patterns that affected, with at least some
predictability, the travel direction of the sailing vessel.6
Initially, aviators learned to orient themselves in the air by looking at the ground for
references or objects that they could recognize on a map, but as they ventured out on longer
flights over water or other areas with insufficient map coverage, it became necessary to adapt
existing navigation instruments to flight. The use of the compass was an obvious first step
toward navigating as it could only tell an aviator where he was going, but it could not tell him
where he was, and the unique environment of flight made the adoption of other primary maritime
navigation instruments difficult. Instruments such as the sextant required two hands and a lot of
attention to operate, making them unusable by a pilot flying an aircraft that required two hands
and a great deal of attention to keep from crashing, and, additionally, it took time to operate them
correctly. While this was of little consequence in a slow moving ship, an aircraft could travel
several miles in the time it took to use a sextant, rendering its position reading obsolete almost
immediately. This problem plagued virtually every navigation instrument, and aerial navigation
grew as a discipline where the navigator determined where the aircraft was, rather than where it
is.7
5 Ibid., 16.
6 Norris B. Harbold, The Log ofAir Navigation (San Antonio, TX: The Naylor Company, 1970), 35-37.
7 Wright, Most Probable Position: A History ofAerial Navigation to 1941, 16.
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Gradually, aviators developed specialized instruments that could help them estimate and
calculate their progress through the air. However, the inherent speed and inability to stop mid-
flight to clear up any confusion made aerial navigation an art and science unto itself, requiring
the acquisition of a great deal of knowledge about those instruments and how to use them.
Arthur Hughes, an early historian of aerial navigation, characterized aerial navigation as a crisis,
the successful resolution of which required the development of an instinct regarding sense of
direction and the use of navigational tools. He summed this up in a set of rough precepts that he
believed, if followed, made good navigators:
(weigh) the pros and cons quickly, and making a final judgment-never
panic, and be sure to have it all worked out beforehand-keep constant
check with steady improvement as the outcome-believe in the sense of
direction, which is more prominent in some than others, but can be
acquired and preserved by fitness of body and mind.
Hughes precepts paint a picture of the aerial navigator as a close relative of the maritime
navigator, but also more as a specialist who, due to the rapidly moving context in which he
operated, required special training to succeed at his task through levelheaded planning, dogged
persistence in observation, and a decisive nature, constantly working toward iterative
improvement and precision.
As aircraft technology developed, enabling longer flights over farther distances, aerial
navigation became an increasingly important part of aviation itself, and a pilot was literally lost
if he could not navigate effectively. Successful navigation required that the aviator develop a
new skill set, oriented toward understanding the unique environment of flight and interpreting
that environment through the mastery of some very specialized instruments. However, in spite
of its mission focus on flying and the military use of aircraft, the U.S. Army Air Corps showed
little particular interest in navigation as a skill, and did little to develop navigation skills in its
aviators or foster navigation professionals through its first three decades of existence.
The Growth of Aerial Navigation in the Air Corps
From 1909 through October 1933, the Air Corps had no formal training program for
teaching aerial navigation. Early military aircraft had limited range, making navigation between
8 Arthur J. Hughes, History ofA ir Navigation (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1946), 30.
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takeoff and landing relatively easy, and as Air Corps pilots rarely flew in the weather, their
aircraft were not equipped with the instruments to do so. Since little navigation was necessary,
neither was there an established requirement for a non-pilot navigation specialist as a part of an
aircraft's aircrew. Navigation existed as merely one of the many skills that pilots learned as a
part of their normal training, and although a few specialized in it, just as others specialized in
bombing, it received little attention.9 Within the bombardment mission particularly, navigation
and bombardment were "simply another degree of specialization for (some pilots) to concentrate
on."'0
As will be explained further in Chapter 5, early Air Corps bombardment doctrine clearly
defined the role of the pilot-bomber, or bombardier, identifying him as a critical member of the
bombing team. The navigator, however, was far less prominent, and the role appeared in
discussion only in the earliest versions of the Air Corps Tactical School's (ACTS) Bombardment
text, and then only in a limited role "when the distance to the target warrants it."" Even then, it
did not identify the navigator as a separate member of the bomber crew; rather, navigation was a
duty assigned to the bombardier in the formation leader's aircraft, and specific discussion of the
role disappeared with the publishing of the 1930 version of the text.
As discussion of the navigator disappeared from bombardment doctrine, advances in
aviation technology during the 1920s greatly increased the range over which aircraft could
operate, revealing a growing importance of aerial navigation. Events such as Charles
Lindbergh's solo flight across the Atlantic Ocean and the Air Corps' first long distance flight
between Oakland, California, and the Hawaiian Islands, on 28-29 June 1927 using celestial and
radio beam navigation methods, raised awareness that military aircraft could soon start operating
over much longer distances. This prompted the Air Corps Information Division to propose that it
might be useful to establish a school for training "aerial navigators," but a proposal to the Chief
of the Air Corps the following year to establish such a school foundered, a victim of budget and
equipment shortages, and the Air Corps paid little attention to the development of formal,
institutional navigation training for the next five years."
9 Baldwin, Individual Training of Navigators in the AAF, 2.
10 Wright, Most Probable Position: A History ofA erial Navigation to 1941, 184.
1Bombardment: 1924-1925 (Langley Field, VA: Air Service Tactical School, 1924), 42.
'2 Baldwin, Individual Training ofNavigators in the AAF, 46-59 In 1933, the importance of navigation skills was
highlighted when the Air Corps began delivering airmail when the president cancelled civilian airmail
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By 1933, aircraft technology had advanced to the point that bombers were flying much
longer distances, lending more credence to the idea of carrying a specially trained navigator as
part of the bomber aircrew. At the same time, the Air Corps was justifying its request for long-
range bomber aircraft to Congress based on the needs of the coastal defense mission, which
meant long flights over water, out of sight of land, making the need for a navigation specialist
even more apparent. In October of that year, the Air Corps began experimental advanced
navigation training programs at Langley Field, Virginia, and Rockwell Field, California, with the
purpose of producing those navigation specialists. The program focused on applying known
navigation procedures and adapting them to the more accurate air navigation instruments that
were becoming available. The attendees were principally instrument rated pilots who received a
special navigator flight qualification upon graduation, but a very limited number of non-pilot,
aircraft observers also attended and graduated from the program. 4
The navigation training program consisted of a total of 160 hours of instruction, with 83
hours of that time spent on the ground, and the students focused on navigation techniques and the
care, use and calibration of navigational instruments. Care and calibration of the instruments
were a central part of the curriculum, as the graduates would be responsible for the accuracy of
those same instruments in their aircraft once they graduated, and they had to be fully capable of
ensuring their correct operation. As military aircraft of that era were neither designed nor built
to carry a navigation specialist, the Air Corps had to make special provisions to accommodate
the aerial instruction portion of the curriculum. To make room for the navigator, floorboards
were installed in modified Keystone B-3A bombers, turning the bomb bays into a functional
contracts in the wake of corrupt practices in the contract award process in the Postmaster General's office.
In what World War I ace and then-vice president of Eastern Air Transport Eddie Rickenbacker termed
"legalized murder," the Air Corps lost sixty six aircraft and twelve pilots were killed as they flew in some
of the worst winter weather seen in years. Air Corps aircraft did not have adequate flight instruments for
flying in bad weather or at night, when most of the mail was transported, nor did they have the necessary
equipment to enable them to navigate via the newly installed radio-beacon navigation system. While
airline pilots were used to adverse weather conditions, the Air Corps pilots were not, as they had little
experience and less training flying and navigating on flight instruments alone. See John F. Shiner, Foulois
and the U.S. Army Air Corps, 1931-1935 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, U.S. Air Force,
1983), 125-149; Eddie Rickenbacker, Rickenbacker (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967), 185. For
more on the development of blind flying techniques, see Richard Hallion, Legacy of Flight: The
Guggenheim Contribution to American Aviation (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977); James H.
Doolittle, I Could Never Be So Lucky Again: An Autobiography (New York, NY: Bantam Books, 1991).
13 Wright, Most Probable Position: A History ofAerial Navigation to 1941, 18 1.
14 Baldwin, Individual Training of Navigators in the AAF, 54.
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navigation crew compartments (Figure 4. ).1 Trainees spent 77 hours in the bellies of these
aircraft, practicing and developing new navigational techniques, including celestial navigation.
Although the students and instructors made several advances in aerial navigation, the under
funded, poorly equipped program lasted only two years, and ultimately produced few
graduates.16
Figure 4.1
Keystone B-3A bomber 17
The schools at Langley and Rockwell ceased operation by July 1935, and navigator
training once again became the responsibility of individual tactical units. The graduates of the
programs taught navigation at those individual units, instructing both qualified instrument pilots
and non-pilot commissioned officers, although again, there was little interest among the pilots
toward receiving advanced navigation training. In the words of Colonel Henry Potter, Jimmy
Doolittle's navigator on the famed Tokyo bombing raid, pilots viewed navigation as something
that they practiced "when it was necessary but very, very little of it on their own volition."'
Through the latter half of the 1930s, these local programs produced only enough trained
graduates to meet their own local needs. However, the Air Corps did not completely neglect
15 Harbold, The Log ofAir Navigation, 31-33.
17Baldwin, Individual Training of Navigators in the AAF, 45-46, 56.
Keystone B-3A bomber, Photograph, n.d., National Museum of the United States Air Force,
http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/06042 1-F- 1234P-004.jpg (accessed 1
December 2010).
18Henry A. Potter, "Interview with Col. Henry A. Potter," interview by James C. Hasdorff, Oral History Transcript,
June 8, 1979, 20, K239.0512-1129 C.1, IRIS No. 01049853, US Air Force Historical Research Agency.
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navigation, as the 19 th Bombardment Wing at Rockwell continued to develop "the art of celestial
navigation and its application to long range bombardment missions," because it showed promise
for navigating over long flights out of sight of land. 19
Through the latter half of the 1930s, the continued increase in the complexity of aircraft
and the instruments used to fly and employ them led some in the Air Corps to question the
magnitude of the burden imposed upon the pilot in a bomber aircraft, who was still expected to
understand and perform all of the functions of the bomber crew. As will be explored further in
Chapter 5, one Bombardment Wing commander, a pilot, proposed in 1936 the consideration of
training of non-pilots to perform the non-pilot additional duties required during a bombardment
mission, including bombing, gunnery, and radio operation.20 While indicating that there was a
growing recognition of the need for non-pilot specialists in bomber aircraft to perform the
bombing mission, it is telling that he did not mention navigation, a function performed on every
flight, regardless of mission, further emphasizing that the Air Corps still viewed it as an
additional duty and not a primary concern. In a separate effort to develop non-pilot navigation
specialists the following year, the Chief of the Air Corps Plans Section proposed the training of
240 non-pilot bombardier-navigators to address an existing personnel shortage, suggesting that
students eliminated from pilot training should be screened for potential. While the Air Corps
did not adopt the recommendation at that time, it foretold the plan that would soon be
implemented to build the massive bombardment force that would engage the Axis powers in
World War II.
In 1939, when the Air Corps began the first of a series of enormous expansion programs
in response to the war in Europe, there were only 166 qualified navigators in the service, most of
who were pilots. 22 These expansion programs, executed from 1939 through 1942, called for a
massive increase over pre-war levels in the number of aircraft in the service, and as the HADPB
doctrine was first and foremost in the minds of Air Corps leadership, this meant a dramatic
increase in the number of bombers. By the time the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on 7
December 1941, the Air Corps had activated a total of seventy tactical aircraft groups, including
19 Harbold, The Log ofA ir Navigation, 66.
20 Lt. Col. C. L. Tinker to Lt. L. Kuter, "Ltr. to Lt. Kuter re: Text on Bomb Aviation", April 24, 1936, Enclosed in
ACTS 1935 Bombardment text.
21 Wright, Most Probable Position: A History ofA erial Navigation to 1941, 185.
22 Baldwin, Individual Training of Navigators in the AAF, 2.
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23fourteen heavy bombardment and nine medium bombardment groups. Already far short of the
number of pilots needed tofly these aircraft (many of which had not yet been built), the Air
Corps was nowhere close to being able to fill the rest of the crew positions of these aircraft with
trained pilots, as had been the policy in the past. A subsequent policy decision to include a
"competent officer navigator in the crew of each airplane" further magnified the shortage and
created an immediate need for thousands of trained aerial navigators.2 4 Sheer necessity forced
the Air Corps to accept the use of non-pilots on its bomber crews, and the age of the non-pilot
navigation specialist was begun.
Recruiting Human Calculators
Filling the immediate and growing need for navigators, which soon would require
training over 20,000 men per year, presented the Air Corps a significant challenge. How would
they find and select recruits for navigation training? Initially, little thought was put into the
candidate selection process, and trainees were chosen from among recruits who had been
eliminated, or "washed out," of pilot training. Those responsible for training these recruits
criticized the policy for placing the importance of the navigator below that of the pilot on the
aircrew, and they believed it had a negative impact on morale in the navigation schools.
Indeed, echoes dissatisfaction carried over after training in some cases, as observed by one
bomber pilot during the war.
Giving a washed-out pilot a shot at navigating.. .has its faults. I lived to
see in the combat zone the frustration of a would-be pilot relegated to... a
navigator's computer. It was a problem with no adequate answer.26
In October 1941, the navigator selection policy changed, and since early experience had shown
that a strong academic background appeared to increase the chance of a recruit completing the
23 James Lea Cate and E. Kathleen Williams, "The Air Corps Prepares for War, 1939-194 1," in The Army Air
Forces in World War II, Vol. 1-Plans and Early Operations, ed. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate
(Washington, DC: 1983. Reprint, Office of Air Force History. Originally published Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1948), 105.
2 4 Baldwin, Individual Training of Navigators in the AAF, 2.
25 Robert L. Thompson, Initial Selection of Candidates for Pilot, Bombardier and Navigator Training, Army Air
Forces Historical Study 2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Air Forces Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Historical Division, November 1943), 22.
26 Philip Ardery, Bomber Pilot: A Memoir of World War II (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1978), 20.
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navigation training course, the USAAF began selecting candidates based upon education and
aptitude. As with pilots, those selected for navigator training were required to have a high school
education, but also obtain satisfactory scores on a battery of three aptitude tests that were
administered to all Air Corps recruits: a physics test, the Army General Classification Test, and
the Army Mechanical Aptitude Test. On average, those entered into navigation training had
stronger educational backgrounds than their pilot or bombardier peers.27
As the war progressed, the emphasis on selecting better educated navigator trainees
continued, and once the Aviation Cadet Qualifying Examination (ACQE) was developed, the
USAAF used it to evaluate incoming recruits' aptitude for navigator training, just as it did for
evaluating aptitude for pilot and bombardier training. 28 As with predicting pilot training success,
the ACQE proved to be an accurate predictor of navigator training success. Performance on the
mathematics, vocabulary, and reading comprehension sections correlated most strongly with a
recruit's chance of successfully completing navigation training. Those with a strong academic
background made good navigators, and while the USAAF considered the candidate's personal
choice during the selection process, those with high scores in these areas were steered toward
navigation. In fact, the standards for assignment of a recruit to navigation training were higher
than those established for any other crewmember.29
Pilot training was, by far, the preference for recruits before and during the war, and the
USAAF initially had difficulty finding volunteers for navigator training. As part of a wartime
recruiting program that simultaneously downplayed the role of the bomber pilot and emphasized
the role of the rest of the bomber crew, the USAAF specifically targeted individuals inclined
toward mathematics for navigator training. A period USAAF recruiting brochure pitched the
successful navigator candidate as someone whose education had included sound fundamental
groundwork in mathematics and who had an interest in astronomy. It glowingly described the
navigator as "the man behind the man at the controls" whose vital responsibility enabled the pilot
to guide the ship directly to its objective. 30 A 1943 recruiting ad in Popular Science portrayed
the navigator as "the quarterback," while simultaneously linking him to the charts and
27 Thompson, Initial Selection of Candidates for Pilot, Bombardier and Navigator Training, 22-23.
28 The Air Corps became the Army Air Forces in June 1941.
29 Thompson, Initial Selection of Candidates for Pilot, Bombardier and Navigator Training, 39-44; Baldwin,
Individual Training of Navigators in the AAF, 33.
30 Aviation Cadet Training for the Army Air Forces, n.d., 16.
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instruments that served as the tools of his trade (Figure 4.2). The choice of the analogy of the
quarterback is interesting and somewhat misleading. The quarterback is usually viewed as the
leader of the football team, but the USAAF clearly designated and valued the pilot as the leader
of the bombardment team, as explained in the previous chapter.
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Figure 4.2
1943 Air Corps recruiting advertisement in Popular Science 1
31 U.S. Army Recruiting Service, "You'll be on the Greatest Team in the World!," Popular Science, December
1943, 19.
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Equality among the members of the bomber crew, however, was a dominant recruiting
theme, and in a 1942 John Huston-directed recruiting film, Winning Your Wings, actor Jimmy
Stewart, himself a decorated B-17 and B-24 pilot who flew combat sorties in the ETO, extolled
the virtues of each of the members of a bomber crew, explaining that they were each "equally
important members of the team." After only briefly mentioning the pilots as the "guys (who
could) take the plane off and put it back down again," he described the navigator, pictured in the
film hunched over a small map-covered desk, in much more depth as "the man with his pencils
and calculators.. .responsible for getting the giant bomber to its destination and back again."32
Stewart's description and the accompanying visual depiction captured the prototypical image of
the navigator as man-machine computer, inseparable from the tools that enabled him to perform
his job (Figure 4.3).
Figure 4.3
The Navigator at his workstation.
Note the map, the dividers in his right hand, and the bag containing his E6-B computer to his left.
32John Huston, Winning Your Wings, Recruiting (U.S. Army Air Forces, 1942),
http://www.archive.org/details/WinningYourWings (accessed 12 December 2010); Starr Smith, Jimmy
Stewart: Bomber Pilot (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2006).
33 Lt. Grant H. Benson, B-17 Navigator, Photograph, October 7, 1944, 342-FH-3A49656-K4197, National Archives
and Records Administration, http://www.footnote.com/image/#161288809 (accessed 1 December 2010).
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That image, the marriage between the man and his tools, developed so strongly that popular
culture captured it in a song, "The Navigator, " which was popular in 1943.
The Navigator
With a mercator and a pencil and an A-10 octant too,
He will get you there and get you back with the praise of all the crew,
When the E. TA. is running out and destination's due,
The pilot turns to him and says, "Where the hell are you?"
CHORUS (repeat after each verse)
But it's the navigator who keeps you on the track,
The navigator, the navigator who gets you there and back,
Ifyou want to go Tokyo or the road to Mandalay,
Who shows you the way? The navigator.
When they can't see down below and they don't know what to do,
He will look up to the heavens and he'll shoot a star or two,
With a speed line and a course line, he'll get himself a fix,
For he's the navigator, with his little bag of tricks.
Oh, there's variation, deviation, calibration too,
But the compensation errors are the ones that see him through,
His computer is the instrument on which he stakes his life,
Don't ask for his computer, for he'd sooner lend his wife.
When you start evasive action to avoid the bursts offlak,
The gunner works without a care, he knows who'll bring him back.
The pilot will cavort about and dodge around the sky,
But there is only one, they know, on whom they can rely.
If you want to know just where you are, at any time at all,
He will take out his dividers and he'll show he's "on the ball."
He hasn't time for smoking, relaxation is taboo-
He never takes a nap, because he has ajob to do.
From the World War II song "The
Navigator"34
This was likely a staged photograph, as Lt. Benson is not wearing gloves, and the propeller from the #2
engine, which can be seen out the window above his head, is stationary.
3 4 Tom Childs and Danny Roth, "The Navigator," in The Wild Blue Yonder: Songs of the Air Force, ed. C. W. Getz
(San Mateo, CA: Redwood Press, 1981), N-1, song copyright 1943.
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Although navigation training was not the most popular choice among AAF recruits, these
efforts were a success. Some men were drawn to the profession by an interest in maps or
mathematics, while others, who were well qualified, saw it as an opportunity to serve their
country after washing out of pilot training. Regardless of their motivation, the USAAF had no
difficulty procuring enough qualified candidates after 1942 to meet operational requirements.3 5
Training the Integrator
To train this massive volume of new recruits, the USAAF had to depart from its practice
of training pilots as navigation specialists at the unit level, and in August 1940, established the
first formal non-pilot navigation specialist school at Coral Gables, Florida, contracting with Pan
American Airways to train 850 navigator students. Obviously well short of meeting their
forecast requirements, the USAAF subsequently established five navigation schools of its own
by late 1943 to meet the huge operational demand for trained navigators in the operational
theaters. By the middle of 1944, these schools had graduated over 26,000 trainees.36
Those selected for navigation training were subjected to a rigorous curriculum that, by
December 1944 had grown to twenty weeks in length. Recruits spent most of the time on the
ground, learning the principles of dead reckoning (DR), pilotage, radio, and celestial navigation,
focusing on how to use, calibrate, and care for the necessary tools. 37 Instruction in DR
navigation occupied much of the training syllabus, as it was considered "the basis of all (aerial)
navigation." 38 The 15 July 1941 Aerial Navigator Training syllabus used at USAAF navigation
schools mandated 203 hours of classroom instruction in DR out of a programmed total of 403
hours dedicated to navigation methods. Trainees learned the basic operation and care of their
Thomas Greer, "Individual Flying Training," in The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 6-Men and Planes,
ed. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, vol. 6 (Washington, DC: 1983. Reprint, Office of Air Force
History. Originally published Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), 589; Harbold, The Log ofAir
Navigation, 89; Potter, "Interview with Col. Henry A. Potter."; Howard M. Fish, "Interview with Lt. Gen.
Howard M. Fish," interview by Mark C. Cleary, Oral History Transcript, February 3, 1982, K239.0512-
1304 C.1, IRIS No. 01052947, US Air Force Historical Research Agency.
36 Baldwin, Individual Training ofNavigators in the AAF, 2-6, Chart 1; Greer, "Individual Flying Training," 585-
586.
37"Navigation Training, General Training Program (T.C. Memorandum Number 50-12-1, 22 July 1943)," in
Individual Training of Navigators in the AAF - Army Air Forces Historical Studies: No. 27 (Washington,
DC: U.S. Army Air Forces Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Historical Division, 1945), Appendix 2 p.
1.
38 Navigators'Information File, AAF Regulation No. 62-15 (U.S. War Department, 1945), 2-0-1.
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instruments, including the compass, drift meter, and radio compass, as well as how to read and
construct maps.
The remaining 200 hours of instruction covered celestial navigation, which was treated as
a specialized technique for determining aircraft position for use in establishing a DR navigation
solution.39 In combat in the ETO, celestial navigation was the least used navigation method of
all, but it remained a large part of the training syllabus because it was so complex, requiring
special navigation instruments such as the sextant and octant, and it took a great deal of
instruction and practice to become even moderately proficient.4 0
Dead reckoning and celestial navigation both required extensive use of mathematics.
Navigators had to solve many different types of problems, from geometrical vector problems that
resolved the drift effect caused by flight level winds to trigonometric functions that translated the
position of a specific heavenly body in the sky to a position on the surface of the earth. Trainees
spent three months attending math and engineering classes at civilian universities before arriving
at the navigation schools, preparing for the brisk pace of instruction driven by the exigencies of
wartime. Even with that preparation, however, navigation training proved quite intensive and
demanding, as trainees learned several different subjects at the same time. The difficulty of this
training is a dominant theme in navigator memoirs that cover the period, and the accelerated pace
at which it was conducted posed a challenge even to those who were inclined toward the subject
prior to their arrival.4'
The trainees also spent a great deal of time learning how to calibrate their instruments, as
those in use at the time were subject to many forces that influenced their accuracy. The
ferromagnetic and electromagnetic fields generated by the aircraft and its electrical equipment
could produce significant errors in the magnetic and gyroscopic instruments, and the navigator
had to understand how to correct for those errors. These instruments essentially became an
extension of his "senses" in flight, as will be discussed below, and he had to understand how
each instrument worked so that he could anticipate how the changing environment in flight could
affect his perception of it.
39 "Program of Instruction: Training of Aerial Navigators for military students to be given in Air Corps Flying
Schools (15 July 1941)," in Individual Training ofNavigators in the AAF - Army Air Forces Historical
Studies: No. 27 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Air Forces Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Historical
Division, 1945), Appendix 1 p. 1-2.
40 Crosby, A Wing and a Prayer, 71.
41 Frank Farr, B-17 Navigator (Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2009), 125.
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At the end of his training, the navigator was unique among airmen. He was a technical
specialist, heir to a profession steeped in mathematics, charts, and instruments, but performing a
task that the Air Corps had long treated as an additional duty for pilots. Although professionally
he had effectively not existed before the war, he was given the key responsibility of ensuring that
his aircraft found its way to the target and back, a function that was central to mission success,
and yet was initially selected from among those who had failed in their attempt to learn to fly. It
was his ability to perform that job that defined him professionally and distinguished him from his
peers on the bomber crew.
Navigating in the European Theater of Operations (ETO)-The "Centre of Calculation"
The navigators in the ETO used DR navigation as the primary means to get their aircraft
to the target and back. Not only was it the method in which they were most qualified, higher
headquarters Operational Instructions mandated that they rely on it and that they use "all
available aids to the maximum in checking (their work)," which included technical means such
as radio fixes and pilotage.42 Dead reckoning was theoretically the most dependable form of
navigation, as the navigator needed no other tools or technologies than those he carried with him
to the aircraft or those installed in virtually every bomber.
Dead reckoning navigation is a process of continual estimation where the navigator
constantly calculates aircraft position given that he knows how far, how fast, and for how long it
has traveled its last known, confirmed position. Navigators in the ETO used two types of DR on
bombing missions during the war. The first, known as pilotage, is a basic, or "no-instrument,"
type of navigation where the navigator determined the aircraft position by visual reference to the
ground, and passed course and speed adjustments to the pilot to correct any deviation from the
desired course. During the bomb run, the navigator used "pin-point pilotage," working to
establish the aircraft position to within of a mile so that he could direct the aircraft to a
position where the bombardier could locate, identify, and bomb the target.43 Pilotage was visual
navigation, and required visual contact with the ground, the ability to identify ground references,
and the ability to locate them on the map. Anything that obscured the view of the ground, such
42 "2d Bombardment Wing Instructions No. 55-10 Operations: Navigation", March 10, 1943, 2 A.D. Instructions
Sep/43-May/45 Call 526.179-80, US Air Force Historical Research Agency.
43 Air Navigation (Army Air Forces Training Command, 1944), 34; B-1 7: Pilot Training Manualfor the Flying
Fortress, AAF Manual No. 50-13 (Headquarters AAF, Office of Flying Safety, 1945), 15.
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as cloud cover or smoke from a burning target, could easily prevent the navigator from
navigating with this method.
For the majority of the bombing mission, the navigator used another form of DR that did
not depend upon the ability to see the ground-precision dead reckoning. Precision DR
involved a lengthy process of preplanning the intended flight, calculating, tracking, and
recording the aircraft progress, plotting that progress on a special chart, and directing the pilot to
make necessary course and airspeed corrections to maintain the planned route.
Dead reckoning navigation was a complex process that demanded constant attention and
required the use of specific navigational tools that acted as the navigator's extended "senses,"
providing him data that represented different aspects of the aircraft's movement through physical
space, such as airspeed, direction, and altitude. In turn, the navigator interpreted and integrated
that data using specialized computational tools to manipulate it to build a rational representation
of the aircraft movement and position. As such, navigation was what cognitive anthropologist
and ethnographer Edwin Hutchins calls a distinctly computational activity, problem solving
accomplished by harnessing the different cognitive capabilities resident in humans and
specialized computational tools, bringing them together to transform different sets of information
into a navigational solution.44 This process happened several times during a mission, both on the
ground and in the air, in what Bruno Latour called a "centres of calculation."45 Examining what
happened in these centers of calculation provides the avenue through which we may understand
how the navigator used his specialized knowledge and tools together to navigate on a bombing
mission.
In his book Science in Action, Latour examines how scientists do science, describing it as
a process of gathering samples of data and transforming them into other forms by organizing
them into new elements, such as tables or charts, which enable a new and meaningful
representation of the world that solves a problem. With each translation, something is gained-a
new way to interpret the data as a new representation. It is this process of translation, Latour
insists, that one must understand if you are to understand how scientists do science. It is the
gathering and assembling data into meaningful representations that tells us what is going on, and
44 Edwin Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996), 50.
45 Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1988), 232.
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it occurs in the centres of calculation. 46
To understand how a navigator does navigation, we must examine what happens in his
centres of calculation-the mission planning room on the ground and the navigator's
compartment in the bomber aircraft. We must examine how he gathered data and what he did
with it. What tools does he use to gather it? What did he do with it once it is gathered? How
did he organize it? What did he transform it into and, most importantly, what is the
representation that he built and what did it tell him? Precision DR involved several Latourian
translations, the first of which the navigator accomplished on the ground before the mission in
the centre of calculation defined by the mission planning room, and it was the most critical as it
established the interpretive framework for the rest of the mission.
The Bombing Mission-Living the Routine
The navigator's responsibilities on the day of a mission were plainly spelled out in the
Navigators' Information File, an official manual that contained a comprehensive set of
instructions that captured not only the basics of navigation, but also applied wisdom, garnered
from the experience of combat-tested navigators. Issued to every navigator in the USAAF, it
was his "playbook." It established a routine that he followed on every mission that ensured that
he accomplished all of the actions necessary for the successful completion of his job,.
At the conclusion of the General Briefing on the morning of a mission, the Group
Navigator or his designated representative gathered all of the mission navigators in a Navigator's
Briefing, held in first centre of calculation-the Mission Planning Room. The Group Navigator
was the bomb group's chief navigator, usually someone with a good deal of experience and
chosen based upon demonstrated excellent performance, and was responsible for much of the
group's mission planning. During the briefing, he presented the mission plan that he and his
staff had developed the night before, when the Group headquarters had received initial
notification of the mission. He gave each navigator all of the materials necessary to DR for the
day's mission, including a map that contained the details of the route to the target, the
coordinates of all of the turning points, the navigational course and distance in nautical miles
between them, and the expected time of arrival (ETA) at each point.
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46 Ibid., 236-237.
Although the Group Navigator had already planned the mission and they would all fly to
the target together in formation, every navigator in the room recorded the information, for each
was responsible for planning the mission as if flying to the target and back alone.47 This enabled
him to become more familiar with the route to and from the target as well as check the Group
Navigator's work. However, it was not unknown for navigators to merely do a cursory check of
the pre-calculated data and accept the Group Navigator's solution.48 For most of the navigators,
this was the first time that they got a chance to examine the details of their task for the day. A
smaller group of lead navigators, however, generally met an hour before the main briefing to
review the plan and spend more time getting familiar with their task.49
Where Are We Going?-Mission Planning and Creating the Ideal out of Reality
Before the flight the navigator shall:
Plan his flight in detail
Check and know the weather along and adjacent to
the line offlight
Check and know the fuel consumption of his plane
Navigators' Information File, p. 1-1-1
Mission planning was the navigator's first step in DR. It was a shared cognitive process,
during which the navigator used his knowledge and training in navigation to use purpose-built
computing devices that themselves contained specialized navigation knowledge to create a
systematic description of the steps necessary to execute the mission for the day, in the process
establishing mental and physical frames of reference that would define and guide his actions for
the day. The two primary products of the mission planning process, the Flight Plan and the
mission map, were idealized numerical and spatial representations of the mission, created
through a complex process where the navigator translated data from the physical space in which
the aircraft operated with unique computing devices to the ideal space defined by specialized
navigational charts in which he himself operated. Together, they constituted a model of the
mission, a model that the navigator would attempt to recreate in the air.
47 Elmer Bendiner, The Fall of Fortresses: A Personal Account of the Most Daring-and Deadly-American Air
Battles of World War II (New York: Putnam, 1980), 93.
4 8 Navigators 'Information File, 4-13-1; Crosby, A Wing and a Prayer, 3-4.
49 The specific role of the lead navigator is discussed later in this chapter.
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The focus of the first part of the mission planning process was the preparation an AAF
Form 21, Aircraft Flight Log, which served as the official planning document and record of the
flight (Figure 4.4). The Form 21 was split into three parts: the top section was reserved for
important mission data, the middle section contained the Flight Plan, and the bottom section,
discussed later, contained the Flight Record. In the top section, the navigator recorded critical
data, such as the date, the names of the pilot and navigator, the scheduled engine start and takeoff
times, the airplane's tail number and position in the formation, sun and moon rise and set times,
and information about the alternate landing base in case of poor weather at the home airfield
upon return.
Figure 4.4
AAF Form 21 Flight Plan and Log50
The Form 21 was the navigator's first unique "computing device," enabling him to
combine known information, such as the takeoff time, enroute waypoints, and engine
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5 0Navigators' Information File, 4-7-2.
performance data with key environmental data, such as the forecast winds at the mission flight
altitude into a new, combined data set. This new data set, a product of the first Latourian
translation, was the Flight Plan, a set of instructions that, if followed, would get the aircraft from
the home base, to the target, and back home without running out of fuel. The Flight Plan served
as a continuous numerical and textual reference for where the airplane should be in space, time,
and fuel level during the mission.
The 1 "t Translation-Constructing the Mission in Direction, Distance, Time, and Fuel
The Flight Plan was the navigator's DR planning guide. It detailed each portion of the
bombing mission in terms of direction, distance, time, and fuel. It provided the bomber crew an
idea of "what to expect enroute and what to do about it when the expected (or unexpected)"
happened.5 1 As the textual and numerical record of the planned mission, the Flight Plan
separated the mission into individual segments, called legs, defined by discrete, named
navigational departure and destination points along the intended flight route, such as towns,
islands, or numerical coordinates. The leftmost column of the form listed the individual legs of
the mission in the order that they would be flown, and the columns that followed across the form
to the right described the headings that must fly, the speed that they must travel, and the amount
of time and fuel that they would expend.
The first six columns on the Flight Plan defined the mission leg in direction. The first
column contained the True Course (TC), which was the desired ground track for the leg,
referenced from True North (the North Pole). The next column contained the Drift correction,
which was the anticipated amount of heading correction necessary to counter the effects of the
forecast winds at the mission altitude that would cause the aircraft to deviate from the True
Course. The navigator recorded the forecast winds so that he could assess the accuracy of his
preflight calculations once the actual Drift was calculated in the air, or use them for any enroute
calculations while airborne if actual Drift readings were unavailable.
The next column contained the True Heading (TH), which was the heading that the
aircraft would have to maintain to follow the True Course for that leg. The navigator calculated
the True Heading by applying the Drift correction to the True Course. The distinction between
51Instrument Flying: Advanced With Radio Aids, TO. No. 30-100B-1 (Headquarters, Army Air Forces, 1944), 63,
parenthesis in original.
Air Navigation, 131-135.
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course and heading is critical, as the course was the direction that the navigator wanted the
aircraft to follow, while the heading was the direction that the aircraft had to point in order to
follow that course. Unless the winds at altitude were right on either the nose or the tail of the
aircraft, producing zero drift, the course and heading must differ.
The final direction column on the Flight Plan contained the Magnetic Heading (MH) for
the leg, which was the True Heading adjusted for the known magnetic variation for that portion
of the mission. The earth's magnetic field caused the aircraft's magnetic compass to read
erroneously, but since the variation was known, the navigator applied it to the True Heading to
obtain the heading that the pilot could fly on his magnetic compass so that the aircraft would
follow the true course over the ground.53
The Flight Plan served as an execution-level description of the upcoming mission,
containing instructions that the navigator gave the pilot to execute physically using the
instruments and controls available on the aircraft to accomplish the mission. It was a complex
computing device that allowed the navigator to transform different data sets, by themselves
insufficient, into a new data set that thoroughly described the mission in direction in discrete,
understandable terms. The generation of the courses and headings that made up that data set,
however, was another shared cognitive process consisting of complex calculations and
translations enabled by more unique computing devices.
Construction of the Ideal-True Course and the Mercator Chart
The navigator's first challenge in defining each mission leg in direction was determining
the True Course. The Group Navigator's planning staff chose the points that defined the mission
segments during the initial mission planning. Operational requirements, such as the need to
avoid location of known threats such as enemy anti-aircraft batteries, the need to conserve
enough fuel to complete the mission, and tactics or feints intended to deceive the enemy about
the target location in order to complicate their air defense efforts drove their selection.54 They
East magnetic variation was subtracted from the True Heading to get the Magnetic Heading, and west variation
was added. To remember the mathematical function, aviators use the phrase "East is least, West is best."
See Instrument Flying: Basic With Radio Aids, TO. No. 30-100A-1 (Headquarters, Army Air Forces,
1943).
54 Benjamin Thomas Jeremiah, "Benjamin Thomas Jeremiah," interview by Jerri R. Donohue, Audio, February 12,
2008, Benjamin Jeremiah Collection (AFC/2001/001/57024), Veterans History Project, American Folklife
Center, Library of Congress, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/diglib/vhp/story/loc.natlib.afc2OO1001.57024/ (accessed
15 November 2010).
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plotted the points on a special mission map, creating an initial spatial representation of the
mission. The points on the map represented real locations on the surface of the earth, and the
straight line that connected them represented the ground track that the aircraft must fly to
complete the mission segment. The navigator used mathematics and translation enabled by a
specialized navigation map-the Mercator Chart-to compute the courses for the ground track.
The earth is spherical, rather than flat, and the shortest route between two points is a
"great circle" course, defined by the intersection of the earth's surface and plane that passed
through the points as well as the center of the earth. Although they are the shortest distance,
great circle courses are impractical, as they are difficult to calculate and fly. The convergence of
the meridians of longitude as they approach the planetary poles requires that the aircraft
constantly change heading at the rate of that convergence to remain on course to the
destination.5 5 Calculating that course is tedious and repetitive, and no navigational flight
instrument existed during World War II that could display the constantly changing course for the
pilot to follow in flight. To simplify both the flight planning and execution, the navigator used
the Mercator chart to calculate a straight, or rhumb line, course between two points (Figure 4.5).
Figure 4.5
Great circle vs. rhumb line course on a Mercator Chart5 6
Mercator charts, the most widely used charts in aerial navigation, are complex
computational devices that effectively translate the curved surface of the earth into a flat plane.5 7
555 Harry C. Carver, An Introduction to Air Navigation (Ann Arbor, MI: Edwards Brothers, Inc., 1943), 6.5 6 Air Navigation, 92.
57 The concept of navigational charts as computational devices is developed in detail in Hutchins, Cognition in the
Wild.
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They create a spatial representation where the convergent lines of longitude maintain parallel
spacing, creating a constant angular relationship to True North on the map, in turn constructing
an ideal representation of the relative position of all points on the map. By orienting all points
on the map in this ideal space, the calculation of a constant course between any two points
becomes easy.58
The navigator used a Weems Plotter to determine that course. It was a combination
protractor and straight edge that, when aligned along the desired course line, displayed the
angular difference between True North and that course line (Figure 4.6). The resultant angle
represented the True Course between the two points that defined the mission leg in the idealized
space created by the Mercator chart. The course measurement itself was a simple operation, but
the Mercator chart's translation of spherical space to idealized planar space made the
measurement possible.
FLI T~i
Figure 4.6
Weems plotter and course measurement 5 9
Slowly Moving from Ideal to Real-Winds, Drift, True Heading, and the E6-B Computer
The Mercator chart's True Course represented the ideal straight-line path for the mission
leg. Next, the navigator had to determine the True Heading that the aircraft would have to fly in
order to follow that course. Inflight, aircraft are subject to the effect of winds that, if not aligned
with its course, will cause it to be "blown off course." A wind vector not aligned with the
58 Above 60 degrees latitude, the Mercator projection becomes too distorted for navigation purposes, and special
navigation charts are used in these regions. See Air Navigation, 92.
59 Ibid., 95.
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aircraft heading pushes it off course in the direction of the wind. The angular difference between
the desired course and the actual course, caused by the effect of the wind, is called Drift.
Counteracting Drift requires steering into the wind sufficiently to negate the imposed force
(Figure 4.7). Incorporating the Drift component was the first step toward combining the ideal
world of the Mercator chart with the real, physical world in which the navigator and the rest of
the bomber crew had to operate, where many forces, environmental and otherwise, would
influence their actions.
XA
Figure 4.7
Drift correction 60
Calculating the angular Drift correction requires solving a basic vector triangle problem.
While easily accomplished by plotting vector triangles on graph paper while on the ground in the
Mission Planning room, this method was impractical in flight because flight instruments,
ammunition, and machine guns limited the amount of room in the navigator's workspace. He
could not store, organize, and lay out numerous sheets of graph paper over his small desk area,
already covered by his maps, charts, and Flight Log. Instead, he used a specially designed
calculator, the E6-B Aerial Dead Reckoning Computer, to perform the Drift calculations.61
The E6-B Computer-"The Airman's Bible" 62
The E6-B Aerial Dead Reckoning Computer, a two-sided, manual computer, was the
primary navigational computer issued to navigators, bombardiers, and pilots during World War
60 Ibid., 83.
61 Carver, An Introduction to Air Navigation, Chapter 3, Wind Diagrams.
J. W. Smallwood, Tomlin's Crew: A Bombardier's Story (Manhattan, KA: Sunflower University Press, 1992), 21.
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II. Small enough to fit into a jacket pocket, it was designed to accomplish almost all navigation
and bombing computations necessary to complete a Flight Plan, as well as for use while
63
navigating during flight. One side consisted of a circular slide rule, which enabled the user to
perform several flight-related computations, such as distance, time, and speed calculation,
conversion from pressure altitude to true altitude, true, indicated, and calibrated airspeed
conversion, and computation of fuel consumption (Figure 4.8). The reverse side of the computer
enabled the user to rapidly solve vector problems, such as deriving wind vectors and drift
corrections. Navigator trainees spent many hours learning to use the E6-B. The 1941 Air Corps
Navigation School Program of Instruction for Training ofAerial Navigators dedicated 10 hours
specifically to its correct operation, and the trainees used it continuously throughout the rest of
the program.64 Complicated but useful, it was, in the words of one B- 17 navigator, "a
remarkable instrument" that required "many hours (of practice) before we achieved mastery."65
IF 1
Figure 4.8
Navigator trainees practicing using the front side of an E6-B computer 6 6
The E6-B, or "whiz-wheel," was a unique aerial navigation cultural artifact, and one that
is still in use to this day.67 Designed for DR navigation computations, it was the latest addition
to a series of mechanical computers designed specifically for aerial navigation. These computers
arose from the need for a reliable, compact, lightweight, easy to use method to compute rapid
63 Bombardiers' Information File (AAF Form 24B) (U.S. War Department, 1944), 1-3-0.
64,"Air Corps Navigation School Program of Instruction (15 July 1941)," 3-7.
65 Farr, B-17 Navigator, 166-167.
66 Departure Point: Class of 44-4 (San Marcos Army Air Field, San Marcos, TX: AAF Navigation School, 1944).
67 "Whiz-wheel" is a faintly derogatory slang term aviators use to describe the E6-B and its successors.
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solutions to navigation problems. Because aircraft flew fast, the computer had to solve problems
quickly, to allow the navigator to narrow the distance between knowing where he is and where
he was.
The navigator could solve the time-distance problems and perform the altitude and
airspeed conversions necessary for DR navigation with the slide rule side of the E6-B, all within
the tight confines of an aircraft cockpit while wearing heavy gloves. The vector-solving side had
a compass rose that contained a translucent disk, upon which the operator could draw vector
problems with a pencil. Overlaying a sliding computational grid, this side of the computer
enabled the operator to quickly solve for drift, course, and ground speed (Figure 4.9).68 Because
the navigator could easily erase a previous solution, it was very flexible and could solve an
unlimited number of problems. The E6-B was an indispensable tool for aerial navigation used
for mission planning and in flight calculations. Just as the slide rule became a "status symbol"
for engineering students in the 1950s and 1960s, it became an enduring symbol of the navigator,
even earning a place in a stanza in the Childs and Roth song "The Navigator":
His computer is the instrument on which he stakes his life,
Don't ask for his computer, for he'd sooner lend his wife. 69
Figure 4.9
E6-B wind triangle solution 7 0
68
Paul McConnell, "Some Early Computers for Aviators," IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 13, no. 2 (June
1991): 155-156.
69 Michael R. Williams, "Early Calculation," in Computing Before Computers, ed. William Aspray (Ames, IA: Iowa
State University Press, 1990), 33; Childs and Roth, "The Navigator," N-1.
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During mission planning, the navigator used the vector side of the E6-B, with its
transparent plotting disk, sliding chart, and drift-and-variation scale to calculate the wind Drift
effect. Provided he knew any two of three directions-wind, True Heading, or True Course-
and any two of the three speeds-wind speed, True Airspeed (TAS), or groundspeed-he could
solve for the third, unknown value. The navigator used the wind and True Course values to
derive the True Heading value for each leg of the mission, and entered the values on the Flight
Plan.
With the True Heading value known, the navigator could calculate the final, and most
critical, directional value-the Magnetic Heading. Applying the known magnetic variation
along the mission leg to the True Heading produced the Magnetic Heading, which was the
heading that the pilot would actually fly during the mission. With this last calculation, the
navigator, having translated the idealized angular definition created in the idealized space
defined by the Mercator chart back into the physical world within which the bombing mission
would occur, finished defining the mission in direction and entered all of the values on the Flight
Plan.
Distance
In addition to defining the mission in direction, the navigator defined it in distance. The
navigator had to know how far it was between the destination points because it determined how
long the pilot would fly his computed headings. Although the Mercator chart greatly simplified
the calculation of the aircraft course for each leg, it complicated the calculation of the length.
The distance scale on a Mercator chart is not constant, as it would be on a spherical map, or
globe. The process of making the longitude lines parallel demands that the lines of latitude on
the chart, which are equidistant on a sphere, must increase in their spacing as the plotted position
moves farther from the equator toward the polar regions. Thus, the display of one mile at the
equator is shorter than the display of one mile farther north. While the Mercator chart simplifies
the navigator's task in angle (course), it complicates it in distance.
To compensate for the non-constant distance scale, the navigator used the "mid-latitude"
formula, wherein he derived an average distance measurement for each leg of the mission based
70 Bombardiers'Information File, 3-1-3.
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on the distance scale at the midpoint of that leg.7 1 He accomplished this by examining the line
that connected the points of the leg and visually choosing the middle. He then used the distance
scale on the latitude line at that point to set the scale for the entire leg and could easily calculate
the leg's distance by measuring with that scale. He performed this for each leg of the mission
and entered the value on the Flight Plan. Once again, the navigator performed a translation from
the idealized space of the Mercator chart to the physical world of the bomber.
Time
The navigator then used the geographic length of each leg to calculate the amount of time
required to fly that leg. In the air, the navigator could measure the distance flown over the
ground directly only when the aircraft passed over two points whose distance apart was known.
When the ground was obscured, as was often the case for large portions of bombing missions in
the ETO, the navigator had to measure distance by measuring time, so that he knew when the
aircraft completed each leg and when to assume a new heading. The navigator calculated the
anticipated time for each leg of the mission on the Flight Plan, and recorded it as the Estimated
Time of Arrival (ETA). He also kept a running total for the flight's elapsed time, which served
as a schedule of when they were supposed to be at each point.
To calculate the time for each leg, he did a simple time-distance calculation on his E6-B
using the aircraft groundspeed and length of the leg. He first calculated the groundspeed with his
E-6B by solving another vector problem that determined what effect the forecast mission winds
would have on the aircraft speed over the ground (the same winds used for the Drift calculation),
and either added or subtracted that value from the aircraft true airspeed that he the pilot would
fly during the mission. Bomber formations generally flew at about 150 miles per hour, and by
combining the two values, he determined how fast the aircraft should travel over the ground. By
translating distance to time through the groundspeed, the navigator defined the aircraft position
during the mission in another set of terms that he could use both on the ground and in the air.
When the ground was visible, the navigator could maintain a groundplot of the aircraft
position over the earth's surface on a chart, and calculate the distance flown by measuring the
distance between the points. However, in situations where ground references were absent, such
as over water or when clouds obscured the ground, such measurements were not possible, and
71 Carver, An Introduction to Air Navigation, 192.
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the navigator kept track of his position with an air plot, which was a record of the aircraft's dead
reckoning position in the air.7 Weather was a big problem during the CBO, and clouds often
obscured the ground for large portions of the mission, but using the air plot method made visual
contact with the ground less important and allowed the navigator to perform his job.
By regulation, navigators in the ETO were required to maintain an air plot, constantly
computing aircraft position by performing time-speed-distance calculations from the last known
dead reckoning position and plotting them on a navigational chart, recording the time of the plot,
as well.73 At any time after that reading, he could determine how far the aircraft had flown by
dividing the amount of time from the last dead reckoning position by the aircraft ground speed
and determine how far the aircraft had flown. Knowing the aircraft position and maintaining the
air plot was the focus of all of the navigator's efforts during the mission. Later in the war, air
position indicators, which could calculate the aircraft position throughout the flight, were
installed in bomber aircraft, but the navigator still had to maintain a dead reckoning log of the
aircraft position.74
Fuel
During mission planning, the navigator also had to ensure that the aircraft had sufficient
fuel to complete the planned mission. He did this by multiplying fuel consumption values that
he obtained from specific aircraft performance charts that indicated how much fuel the aircraft
should use while flying at the planned mission altitude. He calculated the amount of fuel that
would be consumed on each leg with the slide rule side of his E6-B, recorded it in the last
column on the Flight Plan, and kept a running total of how much fuel the aircraft should have at
the end of each leg. He referred to these critical values often during the mission, as any evidence
of fuel consumption greater than that planned could mean that the aircraft might not have enough
fuel to make it back home. By translating time into fuel quantity through the fuel consumption
performance charts, the navigator constructed yet another cognitive model of the mission.
Once completed, the Flight Plan comprised a complete textual record of the mission plan.
It defined the mission in direction, distance, time, and fuel quantity, and contained a record of the
72 Air Navigation, 127.
"2d Bombardment Wing Instructions No. 55-16: Operations-Navigation", August 3, 1944, 2 A.D. Instructions Jan
1944-May 1945 Call 526.179-55, US Air Force Historical Research Agency; Air Navigation, 127-128.
7 4 Navigators 'Information File, 2-7-1 - 2-7-3.
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forecast winds, which were the navigator's major flight planning assumption, so that he could
assess the validity of the plan after measuring the actual winds at the mission altitude. It formed
a complete frame of reference for the mission, one that would be the constant yardstick by which
the navigator and pilot would assess the mission as they flew it (Figure 4.10).
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Figure 4.10
Flight Record from Mission No. 173, 14 August 1944, Ludwigshafen, Germany
75,"Flight Plan and Flight Record, Mission No. 173, Ludwigshafen--Bruce Lowe, Navigator", August 14, 1944,
390th Bomb Group Memorial Museum Archives. This flight plan was used on 14 August 1944 on a
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While it appeared to be a simple bureaucratic form filled with text and numbers, the
Flight Plan was really a complex translation device that brought separate sets of data together
that, after the navigator had further manipulated them, formed a new set of data. That new set of
data, arranged chronologically on the Flight Plan, allowed the navigator to construct five models
of the mission. The first was a textual list of the waypoints along the mission, recording in
words where the aircraft would travel. The second through fourth models were numerical,
constructing the mission in direction, distance, time, and fuel quantity. Each was a discrete but
related model that predicted where the aircraft would be during the mission. Together, they
became a single set of instructions, executable by the pilot, which would get the aircraft to the
target and back home to complete the mission. With the textual and numerical models of the
mission complete, the navigator next built a spatial model of the upcoming mission.
The 2 Translation-Constructing the Mission in Space and the Mission Map
With the Flight Plan complete, the navigator performed the next key planning task-the
creation of the mission map (Figure 4.11). The mission map was the navigator's primary spatial
reference during the mission. It integrated the space and time elements of the Flight Plan, and
combined them with other key mission events. In addition to displaying the entire planned flight
route, it showed the locations of key events and places, such as formation rejoin points, fighter
escort rendezvous and departure points, and the location of known enemy anti-aircraft (flak) gun
emplacements. 76 However, the map had very few ground references, and those were limited
primarily to coastlines and large cities. It was also the chart that the navigator would use in
flight to construct the air plot, enabling him to track his dead reckoning position relative to the
planned position.
bombing mission to Ludwigshafen. Note that the top portion is completely filled out, defining twenty one
discrete legs for the mission. The names of the legs are a mix of location names as well as navigational
coordinates.
76 Jeremiah, "Benjamin Thomas Jeremiah."
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Figure 4.11
Mission Map for Mission No. 327 to Berlin, 29 April 194477
The map provided a manageable frame of reference that enabled the navigator to visually
anchor the airplane's physical position on the face of the earth in a limited fashion, since there
was little detail. When Edwin Hutchins examined maritime navigation in his book Cognition in
the Wild, he described navigational charts as spatial analogies, where "positions on a map or
chart have correspondence with positions in a depicted large scale space." 78 The mission map
created that spatial analogy for the aerial navigator by representing the entire mission flight route
within the context of the ETO, as well as how individual positions related to the flight route
itself. Since it included elapsed times it created a temporal analogy, as well, anchoring the
aircraft to a time line that captured the aircraft's temporal route through the mission.
By plotting the physical and temporal route, the navigator transformed the chart into
another complex calculation device that greatly simplified his job in the air. It became a form of
permanent memory for the aircraft. By using it to create the air plot during the mission, the
navigator could instantaneously determine how they were progressing, and then make any
necessary adjustments in their actions to remedy any discrepancies in their performance. As a
referential device, it also changed the navigator's perception of space and time. No longer did it
matter where they were as referenced by a position on the face of the earth, nor was the actual
time, as read on a watch, any longer relevant. The line on the map and the times associated with
77
"The Berlin Bombing Mission Flown by The 8th Air Force on April 29, 1944--Map 392 route Berlin.jpg", April
29, 1944, http://www.b24.net/stories/annette.htm (accessed 4 March 2011). The increasing distance
between the horizontal longitude lines as you move north on the map show that this is a Mercator chart.
78 Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild, 61-63.
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it became the spatial and temporal reality. They were either on or off course, and either on,
ahead, or behind the timeline. As related by B-17 navigator Emmett Herndon,
I used to draw the courses on... the maps... and wrote times that we were supposed
to be at certain places, and then I sort of did like a golfer. I was plus or minus, I
was behind or ahead and I was right or left of the course. So I put little Xs on my
map.79
While the map maintained an overall spatial relationship, the ability to simply and rapidly assess
local relative position made the navigator's job of correcting course errors much easier.
The Flight Plan and Mission Map as Cultural Artifacts
Before discussing mission itself, it is interesting to note how the Flight Plan and mission
map became unique navigational cultural artifacts that extended beyond their role as a list of
transformed instructions or a visual representation of the mission. They also captured the unique
language necessary to understand and perform aerial navigation. Direction and time, both in
particular, were recorded in a specific format, designed to convey as much information as
possible. The USAAF Air Navigation Manual directed that
true direction should be indicated always by three numerals (068); magnetic or
compass directions, by three numerals followed by the letter M or C (090 M; 086
C). Time of day always is indicated on a 24-hour basis in four figures (1348);
elapsed time, by hours, minutes, and seconds (3h 45' 30,).80
In this fashion, the same numbers became distinctly different representations based upon how
they were written, and could thus be used to capture and define multiple pieces of data. By using
this unique language during their construction, the navigator transformed the Flight Plan and
mission map from mundane record keeping devices or visual depictions into something
representative of their profession, uniquely navigational tools.
Mission planning was a shared cognitive process, during which the navigator used his
knowledge and training in navigation to use purpose-built computing devices that themselves
79 Emmet B. Herndon, "Emmet B. Herndon," interview by Troy Reeves, Audio/transcript, February 5, 2002, Emmet
Herndon Collection (AFC/2001/001/473), Veterans History Project, American Folklife Center, Library of
Congress, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/diglib/vhp/bib/loc.natlib.afc20O1001.00473 (accessed 15 November 2010).
80 Air Navigation, 125-126.
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contained specialized navigation knowledge to create two distinct representations of the
upcoming mission-the Flight Plan and the mission map. The Mission Planning room served as
a Latourian "centre of calculation," where diverse data sets were combined in a unique way to
create new understandings of the physical world. The Flight Plan and the mission map were
idealized numerical and spatial representations of the mission, created through a complex
process where the navigator translated data from the physical space in which the aircraft operated
with unique computing devices to the ideal space defined by specialized navigational charts in
which he himself operated. Together, they constituted a model of the mission, a model that the
navigator would attempt to recreate in the air.
The Mission
Sharing Knowledge-Briefing the Crew at the Airplane
At the airplane, briefyour crew on particulars of the flight.8'
Navigators'Information File, p. 4-13-1
After mission planning, the navigator proceeded to his assigned aircraft, joining the rest
of his crew. Flight crews generally arrived at their aircraft at least an hour before takeoff to
allow enough time to complete all of the preflight preparation for the mission. At that time, the
navigator briefed the rest of the crew on the particulars of the flight, covering the formation plan,
the times that they would cross both friendly and enemy coast lines on departure and return, the
rendezvous time with any fighter escort, and the locations of anticipated enemy fighter attack
(Figure 4.12). He also described key checkpoints along the route that he wanted assistance in
locating during the flight, and how he wanted them reported. 82 This verbal briefing provided the
crew an idea of what to expect during the flight, clarifying and providing more detail than the big
picture presented in the General Briefing. It also created a common mental model and frame of
reference for what they, as a crew, could expect to experience together on the mission.
81 Navigators'Information File, 4-13-1.
82 Ibid.; Roger A. Freeman, The Mighty Eighth War Manual (London: Jane's Publishing Company, Ltd, 1984), 13-
16; Crosby, A Wing and a Prayer.
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Figure 4.12
Crew Members Of The 379 Bomb Group Study A Map Of The Target Area Before Taking Off From Their
Base In England For A Mission Over Enemy Territory. 20 January 1944.83
Along with the verbal brief, the navigator often gave the pilot a prepared mission aid.
This "small-scale track chart with predicted times, courses, and distances" enabled the pilot to
keep track of the mission progress, as well as anticipate upcoming directions or events. 84 By
creating a common expectation, it eased coordination between the two human elements in the
bombardment system that communicated most frequently during the mission, increasing the
potential for effective coordination. Once he completed his ground briefings, the navigator
entered the aircraft and took his place in the second "centre of calculation" to prepare for the
flight portion of the mission.
The Office-The Navigator's Compartment and Navigation Tools
Before the flight the navigator shall: Have all his equipment in the plane
Check his instruments
Navigators'Information File, p. 1-1-2
The navigator entered the aircraft and proceeded forward to the navigator's compartment
to finish preparing for the mission. The B- 17 was the first Air Corps bomber to have a dedicated
83 Crew Members Of The 3 79th Bomb Group Study A Map Of The Target Area Before Taking Off From Their Base
In England For A Mission Over Enemy Territory. 20 January 1944. England, Photograph, January 20,
1944, 342-FH-3A14051-71673AC, National Archives and Records Administration,
http://www.footnote.com/image/#39016268 (accessed 1 December 2010).
84 Navigators'Information File, 4-13-1.
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section for both the navigator and the bombardier, and it was located in the front of the aircraft,
where the two crewmen shared the space from the aircraft's Plexiglas nose back to the bulkhead
that formed the forward end of the pilots' compartment.8 5 The bombardier occupied the forward
area, and the navigator occupied the portion of the compartment that extended from rear of the
bombardier's seat to the rear bulkhead, placing him between the bombardier and the pilots
(Figure 4.13).86
Figure 4.13
The crew compartment layout in the B-1787
The men accessed this area by either entering the aircraft through the rear fuselage door
and walking the length of the aircraft, through the bomb bay, or by swinging themselves up
through a hatch in the nose, located just below the flight deck forward of the landing gear.
Entering through the hatch required "a kind of chin-up maneuver," executed by grasping the
inside edge of the opening and swinging the legs up and into the aircraft. It was never easy, and
those choosing to enter this way usually required assistance, particularly when wearing heavy
flying gear designed for cold, high altitude flight.8
Generously described as "snug," or more accurately as "cramped," the navigator had to
stoop over when entering the compartment door to avoid hitting his head on the underside of the
flight deck where the aircraft commander and copilot sat. The compartment itself contained a
small swivel chair, permanently attached to the floor in front of a work table, a 36-inch long, 18-
inch wide shelf attached to the left rear corner of the compartment (facing forward in the
8 Harbold, The Log ofA ir Navigation, 77.
86 B-7F Pilot's Flight Operating instructions, T 0. No. 01-2OE F-1 (U .S. W ar De partment, 1942), 93.
8 Pilot Training Manual for the B-i17, 29.
8 8 Pilot Training Manual for the B-i17; Freeman, The Mighty Eighth War Manual, 16 ; Mur phy, Luck of the Draw,
91.
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aircraft), and numerous aircraft and navigation instruments, described below. His view outside
the aircraft was limited to four windows, two on each side of the fuselage.
The two left-side windows, positioned above the work table, provided a view of the left
wing and the No. 2 engine (left inboard). A .50 caliber machine gun, suspended above the table
and constantly "in the way," protruded from the forward window in early B-17 models, and took
up a significant amount of room.89 The gun's ammunition box, attached to the upper left-rear
corner of the compartment, further reduced headroom (Figure 4.14). The windows on the right
side provided a similar, but less obstructed view. Late-model B-17s had a Plexiglas astrodome,
located forward of the navigator's table and centered on the top of fuselage, which housed an
astrocompass and provided a 360-degree view from which to take celestial navigation
observations.
Boeing B-JF cutaway showing the bombardier's and navigator's compartment
Courtesy of the Boeing Business Services Company
Figure 4.14
The B-17F bombardier and navigator's compartment90
89 The B-17E and -F models had .50 caliber guns in the navigator position. B-17C and -D aircraft had .30 caliber
machine guns that could be installed in one of six positions in the nose, including the navigator position. A
few B-17Fs and all B-17Gs (the last in the line of aircraft models) had the navigator's guns removed and a
powered chin turret with twin .50 caliber machine guns was installed instead. See Peter M. Bowers,
Fortress in the Sky (Grenada Hills, CA: Sentry Books, Inc., 1976); Crosby, A Wing and a Prayer, 44.90 Murphy, Luck of the Draw.
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In addition to navigation instruments and machine guns, the navigator's compartment
contained the necessary equipment for survival and communication in the oxygen-deprived,
extremely cold conditions routinely experienced on high-altitude bombing missions. An oxygen
regulator provided oxygen inflight above 10,000 feet, and an electrical outlet, located above the
aperiodic compass, provided electrical power to provide warmth through an electrically heated
flight suit. Below that outlet, a heat vent pumped an inadequate supply of warm air into the
compartment. A radio headset and interphone connection enabled him to talk to anyone in the
crew, as well as listen to the radio transmissions during the mission.
Sensing and Measuring Performance-Altitude, Temperature, and Airspeed
The navigator spent most of the mission seated at his work table, from which his view of
the world outside the aircraft was very limited. He could see very little of the ground, and his
view out the front of the aircraft was obscured by the bombardier and his equipment. In place of
sight, the navigator had special instruments at his station, all within easy reach, that acted as his
"senses." The navigator and these instruments formed a united socio-technical element in the'
aircraft, with the instruments acting as part of the sensing element, extending the navigator's
senses beyond the limits of the aircraft and enabling him to gather necessary data, and the
navigator acting as the integrating and calculating element, both working together to navigate the
bomber.
Just above the table, attached to the outer fuselage, were a set of repeater flight
instruments, including an air temperature indicator, an airspeed indicator, and an altimeter.
These three instruments provided him critical information about the aircraft's physical
performance and environment that he needed to navigate precisely. Their readings, however,
required interpretation and conversion before they became useful. The air-temperature indicator
displayed the outside air temperature sensed by a small probe that extended out of the aircraft
fuselage. Air temperature was an important piece of data, as it helped the navigator correct
erroneous readings from some of his other instruments. However, the temperature readings
themselves were inaccurate, distorted by the friction of the air passing over the probe inflight.
The navigator read the temperature from the gauge and converted it using a conversion table
found in a table in his Navigators' Information File, performing the calculation with his E6-B
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computer (Figure 4.15). He used this new value to convert the readings from the airspeed gauge
and the altimeter.
'120' Isi 0
Figure 4.15
TAS-Temp conversion factors from the Navigators'Information File1
The airspeed indicator displayed indicated airspeed (IAS) rather than true airspeed
(TAS), which was what the navigator really needed for DR navigation. TAS varies based upon
temperature and altitude, so he used his E6-B to convert the gauge's displayed value to get an
accurate value. He obtained the altitude for the computation from the altimeter, but had to
convert its value first, as well. The altimeter displayed the barometric altitude, but he needed
pressure altitude, which he again converted with his E6-B. These three "sensors" provided basic
information about the aircraft environment, but like eyes with astigmatism, their readings had to
be corrected before they could be used for precision calculation. The E6-B, designed for such
correction, acted as the navigator's glasses, presenting a more accurate view of the environment.
With the aircraft performance values established, the navigator used the other instruments at his
work station to determine where the aircraft was going.
Sensing and Direction-The Aperiodic Compass, Directional Gyro, and Magnetic Gyro
Fluxgate Compass
Situated around the compartment were several direction-indicating instruments, including
the aperiodic magnetic compass, the directional gyro, or gyro compass, and the magnetic gyro
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91 Navigators' Information File, 2-1-1.
flux gate compass. 92 The aperiodic compass, the least accurate of the heading instruments,
indicated the aircraft's magnetic heading. An incremental improvement over the basic magnetic
compass, the aperiodic compass minimized the stabilization delay, or period, in the heading
display induced by an aircraft turn or acceleration. Known as the "navigator's compass" for its
slow movement, it was resistant to aircraft motion, but its accuracy suffered from exposure to
ferrous metals in and around the navigator's compartment, as well as magnetic fields produced
by aircraft electronic equipment.93 The Navigators' Information File dedicated two pages to
describing how to calculate various algebraically derived compensation coefficients that the
navigator could apply to the compass reading to obtain a more accurate aircraft heading. 94
The directional gyro was a more stable instrument that functioned as a turn indicator
rather than a heading indicator. Consisting of a gyroscopically stabilized platform, it remained
aligned with the longitudinal axis of the aircraft and helped the navigator maintain flight
direction by indicating the number of degrees of aircraft heading change when the pilot turned
the aircraft. Although it did not lag, swing, or oscillate during the turn, as a magnetic compass
would, the gyro precessed, or drifted, over time, and no longer indicated an accurate heading.
Per the equipment specifications, drift rates of up to 2%2 every fifteen minutes were acceptable.
Effective use of the directional gyro required that the navigator determine the instrument's drift
rate every flight and then compensate for it. He did this by "recaging" the gyro occasionally,
reorienting it along the aircraft's longitudinal axis. While useful, it provided a specific type of
information and required an understanding of gyroscopic principles to be effective.
The magnetic flux gate compass combined the gyroscope's stability with a compass's
ability to indicate heading. Equipped with an electrically driven gyroscope, the flux gate
compass determined the aircraft magnetic heading by using a remote magnetic sensing device
installed in a location that minimized magnetic interference. A remote transmitter sent the
heading via an electrical signal that several compass units could receive at once, providing both
the navigator and pilot access to the heading data. The fluxgate compass had an adjustable outer
dial on its case that the navigator could set to display true rather than magnetic heading, making
92 B-] 7F Pilot's Flight Operating Instructions, 90-93; Murphy, Luck of the Draw, 92. The specific location of some
of the instruments varied in different models of the aircraft, but the basic instruments remained the same.
93 Edward 0. Purtee, Development and Adaptation ofAircraft Instruments for Military Use (Historical Division,
Intelligence, T-2, Air Technical Service Command, 1946), 3 9-40.
94 Navigators'Information File, 2-9-1, 2-9-2.
95 Ibid., 2-10-1.
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it very useful for creating his air plot. A complex instrument, the magnetic flux gate compass
required frequent alignment and testing, and had a dedicated test unit that would test its accuracy
and compensate for errors.96
The aircraft instruments in the navigator's compartment were his surrogate senses,
providing information that he otherwise could not obtain. They supplied useful, but incomplete,
data about aircraft performance, displaying values that he had to convert continually in order to
navigate precisely. Likewise, the stand-alone heading indicators provided useful data, but
needed continual adjustment to maintain their accuracy, as well as a well-developed skill in
interpreting the data that they displayed. As such, sensing accurate data evolved as a cooperative
process within the socio-technical element defined by the navigator and his tools, neither one
effective without the other. With airplane heading solved, the navigator finally had to determine
how the environment-wind and weather-affected its movement across the surface of the earth.
Sensing and Translation-The B-5 Driftmeter and Automatic Bombing Computer
The flight instruments and navigation instruments provided the navigator data, but he
also had instruments that helped process that information. The B-5 Driftmeter and the
Automatic Bombing (AB) Computer, part of the Norden bombsight, helped the navigator
determine the aircraft drift rate in the air, which he then used to calculate the aircraft
groundspeed. The B-5 Driftmeter, installed in virtually all bombers during World War II, was a
non-stabilized, non-synchronous visual instrument used to observe and record aircraft drift
across the ground (Figure 4.16). It consisted of a telescope that extended out the side of the
aircraft used to observe stationary objects below. The navigator traced the progress of those
objects across the objective lens with an index, linked mechanically to a pencil that recorded the
movement on a glass plate overlaid on parallel horizontal timing reference lines (Figure 4.17).
During a mission, once the navigator had recorded the movement of several objects on the glass
plate, he rotated it and read the angle that they formed with the aircraft longitudinal axis from a
scale at the top of the instrument. This graphical analog-to-digital conversion gave him the
aircraft drift angle.
96 Purtee, Development and Adaptation ofAircraft Instruments for Military Use, 46-50; Navigators' Information
File, 2-9-2 - 2-9-4.
97 Purtee, Development and Adaptation ofAircraft Instruments for Military Use, 112-113.
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Figure 4.16
B-5 Driftmeter9 8
In addition to calculating the drift, the B-5 Driftmeter enabled the navigator to measure
and calculate groundspeed. The parallel lines on the instrument were equally spaced, and after
timing the passage of an object between these timing reference lines, he set that value, along with
the aircraft altitude on a small circular mechanical computer, which can be seen on the lower left
section of the device in Figure 4.16. The computer performed a simple geometric calculation
that produced a groundspeed value, completing another analog-to-digital conversion that
translated movement into useful data. The B-5 Driftmeter was difficult to operate and not very
accurate. Since it was not gyroscopically stabilized, the navigator would often have to perform
several readings and average them to obtain a reasonably accurate measurement in bumpy
weather or at low altitude. It took "time and patience to gain confidence in its use," and was not
popular with bomber navigators, many of whom had trained with much more capable systems in
the United States before deploying to the ETO.99
98 B-5 Drift Meter, n.d., http://www.questmasters.us/B-24 Page_5.html (accessed 24 November 2010).
99 Navigators'Information File, 2-8-2 - 2-8-3; Rebecca Hancock Cameron, Training to Fly: Military Flight
Training, 1907-1945 (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1999), 426-427. The B-
3 Driftmeter, used during navigation training was gyroscopically stabilized and preferred over the B-5. See
Purtee, Development and Adaptation ofA ircraft Instruments for Military Use, 11 1- 113.
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Figure 4.17
Using the Driftmeter 100
On aircraft equipped with the Norden bombsight, the navigator could use the
bombardier's AB computer, a more sophisticated mechanical computer than the one on the
driftmeter, to compute drift and groundspeed directly (Figure 4.18). The AB computer was a
complex slide rule connected to the gyroscopically stabilized bombsight. To calculate the drift
and groundspeed, the navigator directed the pilot to fly the aircraft at a constant altitude and
airspeed while the bombardier sighted and tracked a stationary object on the ground, "zeroing
out" its movement in the bombsight's optical telescope. 10' The bombardier obtained the angle
between the bombsight sight line and the aircraft longitudinal axis from a scale on the
bombsight, which equaled the aircraft drift angle. The bombardier then set that value on the AB
computer along with the aircraft true airspeed, which he either obtained from the navigator or
calculated himself with his E6-B, and the computer indicated the aircraft groundspeed. The
Norden bombsight and AB computer used together produced more accurate drift and
groundspeed calculations, but required the participation and cooperation of other members of the
bomber crew.
100 Air Navigation, 8 8.
101 This process is described in Chapter 5.
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Figure 4.18
The Automatic Bombing Computer10 2
The AB computer provided a redundant drift-computation capability, in the event that the
navigator's primary instrument, the B-5, was inoperable. Just as the copilot could replace the
aircraft commander as the bomber pilot, the autopilot control system could replace the primary
flight control system, or, as will be seen in the following chapter, the bombardier could replace
the navigator, the bombardment system at the aircraft level had built in adaptive capabilities that
enabled it to still perform in the event of some partial failure. In this case, however, the
"redundant" instrument was actually more accurate than was the primary instrument. The AB
computer calculated drift more accurately than the B-5, in part because it was integrated with the
gyroscopically stabilized bombsight, enabling more precise tracking of targets on the ground and
thus more precise drift calculation. Interestingly, the USAAF had developed the B-3
gyroscopically stabilized drift meter during the late 1930s, with performance far superior to that
of the B-5 and hailed in 1937 as "one of the finest instruments of its class known in the
world."1o3 However, in the rush to procure sufficient drift meters to equip all of the new
bombers being built for the war, the USAAF decided to purchase instead the cheaper, less
complex, and easier to build B-5. As a consequence, in a clear comment about how the HADPB
doctrine and the importance of precision bombing affected even such matters as navigation
102 Bombardiers' Information File, 3-2-1.
103 Purtee, Development and Adaptation ofA ircraft Instruments for Military Use, 111.
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instrument acquisition, the bombardier actually had a better navigation instrument than the
navigator, because he needed it for precision bombing.
The aircraft flight instruments, the directional instruments, and the drift instruments
installed in the navigator's compartment all provided data that he needed to perform his job.
They acted as his extended senses and, in the case of the B-5 Driftmeter and the AB computer,
his extended computational ability. Individually, however, the data they produced was
insufficient, and he often had to estimate, interpret, or convert it before it became useful. Once
converted, however, whether from an indicated or magnetic value to a true value or from an
analog line to a digital drift angle, he could combine the new values with other converted data
and create navigation data-the same data that he used during the mission planning process, only
now it was observed rather than assumed data, and it indicated what was happening rather than
what was planned.
Together, the navigator and his instruments formed a contained socio-technical
navigational element in the bombardment system. With the data that the instruments produced,
the navigator could create enough information to precision dead reckon navigate, and other than
using the AB computer which required the participation of the bombardier and pilot, it was a
self-contained element. The navigator, however, was an integral part of the bombardment
system, and he routinely reached out beyond this narrowly-defined system to other elements of
the larger aircraft system to perform his job.
Position Fixing From Outside-The Radio Compass, Gee, and LORAN
While the navigator spent most of his time with his own navigational instruments dead
reckoning the aircraft position, he also updated his position using electronic and visual means to
establish position fixes. These fixes, when available, provided additional navigational
information that not only updated the aircraft position, but served as a check on the navigator's
work. At each fix, he compared his DR-calculated position with the fix position and, based on
any errors, could update the wind assumptions he was using to navigate, increasing the accuracy
of his future computations.
The frequently poor weather conditions in the ETO affected the type of fix that the
navigator could establish. Studies showed that over the eight years prior to 1943, cloud cover
over the European continent obscured typical targets frequently, providing, on average, fewer
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than six days per month suitable for high-altitude visual bombing. During the months from
November to February, that number dropped to two or three days per month. 10 4 Inability to see
the ground meant that the navigators could not visually update their positions or verify their DR-
calculated position. Weather similarly affected the ability to use celestial navigation techniques,
often obscuring the sky above the bombers, as did the contrails produced by the massive
formations as they trekked across the continent. Even on clear days, these contrails could put the
majority of the formation in obscured conditions, preventing the navigator from "shooting" the
sun. As such, navigators in the ETO did not use celestial navigation on bombing missions, but
did use other systems that electronically extended their navigational senses.10 5
The B- 17 had a radio compass installed that could receive broadcast electronic signals
from dedicated radio navigation beacons or any broadcast radio station. When the receiver
operator tuned to the appropriate frequency, the bearing pointer indicated the transmitter's
direction relative to the aircraft. As long as the navigator knew the identity and location of
transmitter, he could establish the aircraft position on a radial spoke emanating from it. The
receiver displayed the bearing on a radio compass indicator inset into the navigator's table, as
well as on duplicate indicators in the pilot's cockpit and at the radio operator's station.146 A
duplicate set of controls also existed in each location, giving the navigator, pilots, and radio
operator the ability to tune the radio receiver. 107 The radio operator, however, usually
maintained control of the radio, tuning to the frequency requested by the navigator or pilot.
While the radio compass indicated bearing, it could not indicate the range of the aircraft
from the transmitter. Thus, the navigator could establish only that the aircraft was somewhere on
the radial. To establish a more precise fix, he had to tune to at least two different transmitters
and plot their bearing radials on a map. He could then establish the aircraft position at the
intersection of those radials-sort of. Since the aircraft was continually moving, the plotted
intersection was not an indicator of where the airplane actually was in space, rather a
combination where it had been at the first reading and where it was at the final reading. The
104 John W. Stormont, The Combined Bomber Offensive: April Through December 1943, U.S. Air Force Historical
Study 119 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Air Forces Historical Office, March 1946), 150.
105 Crosby, A Wing and a Prayer, 71; Baldwin, Individual Training of Navigators in the AAF, 92.
106 Heavy bombers had dedicated radio operators on their crews, responsible for operating all of the bomber's radio
equipment. The radio operator also served as a gunner, and manned a .50-caliber machine gun when not
operating the radio equipment.
107 Pilot Training Manualfor the B-17; Instrument Flying: Advanced With Radio Aids, TO. No. 30-100B-1, 29-30.
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aircraft also continued traveling as he plotted the bearings, further decreasing the accuracy of his
answer. Thus, the navigator had to be cautious about adjusting his DR solution based upon a
radio fix. Much as a Kalmann filter operates today, he had to be ready to reject a position fix
that was too far outside what he considered a reasonable amount of error in his DR solution.
Navigators used radio navigation as a navigational aid rather than a primary navigation
technique, as on most combat missions in the ETO, the bombers were out of range of radio
stations in England.' 08 Navigators could take fixes from radio transmitters on the European
continent, but their bearing information was always suspect. The enemy used deceptive, or
"meaconing," techniques, to attempt to lead the bombers off course, where they surreptitiously
transmitted seemingly genuine signals that actually produced false compass readings. These
difficulties became greater the deeper the bombers penetrated into enemy territory, but
navigators were trained to recognize the effects of both of these electronic attack techniques so
that they could recognize their effects and know when not to trust them.' 09
While radio navigation was not dependable over the European continent, bomber
navigators used it very frequently during the formation join up process over England, as well as
during the return portion of the mission. The British set up a network of 15 medium frequency
radio beacons called "Splashers," each with four transmitters, that defined specific bomber group
rejoin points. 10 When the weather was poor, navigators would tune in to the correct transmitter
for the day and direct the pilot to a predefined rejoin point. Each beacon rotated which of its four
transmitters it used throughout the day, attempting to minimize the potential effect of jamming or
meaconing. Navigators or radio operators received the transmission schedule during the
morning briefing, enabling them to tune to the correct frequency when necessary. In 1943, the
British expanded the radio navigation network with "Bunchers," installing 33 of the lower
power, more difficult to detect and jam transmitters near U.S. bomber bases (Figure 4.19). By
the end of the war, the radio-based rejoin procedures they were so effective that they were used
for all formation rejoins, regardless of the weather."'
108 Navigators' Information File, 2-23-3.
109 Ibid., 2-23-3 
- 2-23-4.
110 The formation rejoin process is discussed in Chapter 4.
111 Freeman, The Mighty Eighth War Manual, 35.
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1 Bassingbourn 12 Bury St Edmunds 23 Horham
2 Podington 13 Boxted 24 Hemsby
3 Kimbolton 14 Ridgewell 27 Bawdsey
4 Cottesmore 15 Horsham St Faith 28 Leiston
5 Shipdham 16 Rattlesden 29 Grafton Underwood
6 Hethel 17 Debden 30 Glatton
7 Harwick 18 Mount Farm 31 Old Buckenham
8 Halesworth 19 Manningtree 32 Kings Cliffe
9 Snetterton Heath 20 Deopham Green 33 Harrington
10 Knettishall 21 North Pickenham 35 Attlebridge
11 Framlingham 22 Sudbury
(No 8 moved to Bungay in winter 1944-45. No 31 was originally Toome.)
Figure 4.19
Splasher and Buncher beacon locations used for formation assembly112
GEE
The British used another radio navigation system in the war called "Gee," which was an
abbreviation for "grid." Initially developed as an aid for bombing in non-visual conditions (night
or weather), the Gee system consisted of a chain of several master-slave radio station sets, with
two or three slaves per master located about 150 kilometers apart. The master sets broadcast
radar-like pulses that the slave sets rebroadcast after modulating the signal with predetermined,
accurate delays. In aircraft equipped with Gee receivers, the navigator tuned in both sets of
signals and the system measured the difference between them. Unlike normal radio transmitters
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112 Ibid., 36.
that indicated bearing only, the Gee system displayed range only, which it calculated from the
delay between the signals. The navigator plotted the range-arc on a special map containing the
Gee station locations, and by taking readings from two or more stations could determine his
position with relative accuracy. The system, however, operated with a very short wavelength,
and was limited to line-of-sight operation, thus, coverage did not extend very far over the
European continent."3
Like all of the navigator's other sensing instruments, the Gee system required a good deal
of training and practice to operate, and interpreting the display was an art in itself (Figure 4.20).
Since it was a British system, navigators received their training only after they arrived in the
combat theater, and many flew numerous bombing missions before they learned how to use it
effectively. Until trained, Gee was merely "a clumsy gadget that occupied half of (the)
navigator's table and offered only blips on a screen that had to be interpreted on a multicolored
map criss-crossed with grids resembling isobars on a weather map." 1 4 One of Gee's major
shortcomings was its short range, but a new system, developed by an American team, led by
Alfred Loomis at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Radiation Laboratory, soon
overcame that limitation.
113 Louis Brown, A Radar History of World War II. Technical and Military Imperatives (Bristol: Institute of Physics
Publishing, 1999), 288-289.
114 Murphy, Luck of the Draw, 135-136.
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Figure 4.20
Gee display115
LORAN
LORAN, or long range navigation sets, worked in much the same way as the Gee system,
with time encoded signals providing the receiver an arc line of position relative to a transmitter.
Again, the navigator could fix his position by obtaining separate readings from two stations, but
LORAN was useful over a longer range, as it operated at a much lower frequency than Gee. It
had an effective range of about 700 nautical miles during the day and 1,400 nautical miles at
night, and by the end of the war, LORAN navigation coverage extended over most of Europe.64.
Its performance was generally better than that expected from celestial navigation fixes, but
accuracy depended upon numerous factors, including the aircraft's position relative to the
transmitters as well as the navigator's ability to match and read the signals on the receiver-
115 J. H. Buck and J. A. Pierce, "Nonradar Navigational Methods," in Radar Aids to Navigation, ed. John S. Hall,
16 M.I.T. Radiation Laboratory Series (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1947), 62.
16Ibid., 64.
219
indicator. A skilled navigator could expect location errors ranging from less than one-half mile
to up to ten miles, depending upon the conditions.' 1 7
As with Gee, the LORAN system required a great deal of adjustment, calibration, and
skill to use effectively. Before use, the navigator had to ensure that the system was functioning
properly, which entailed a lengthy process of adjusting the receiver, tuners, and the display.
Accurately interpreting the signals required an understanding of the system's technical
limitations as well as the ability to identify the station to which the system was tuned, as many
LORAN stations operated on the same frequency (Figure 4.21). The navigator carried a special
handbook of operating instructions on every flight, containing this and other essential
information for system operation.' 1 8 With its greater range and geographic coverage, LORAN
was a great technological advance in navigation, enhancing both the navigator's sensing and
navigational abilities.
117 Navigators'Information File, 2-26-1 - 2-26-2; Brown, A Radar History of World War II, 430-431.
118 Navigators'Information File, 2-26-1 - 2-26-2.
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Figure 4.21
LORAN display119
The radio compass, Gee, and LORAN all electronically extended the navigator's senses
and provided some measure of ability to obtain position fixes to confirm his DR navigation
position. All of the systems used off board electromagnetic sources to help the navigator
calculate his position, providing an early glimpse of a distinct technological trend wherein such
systems, removed from the aircraft that used them, would provide increasingly more information
and capability to the crew. While the electronic systems were useful to trained navigators, all
119 Buck and Pierce, "Nonradar Navigational Methods," 65.
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navigators could use a larger, responsive, non-electronic asset on the aircraft to extend his senses
and help him navigate-the rest of the bomber crew.
The Navigator's Eyes
The bomber crew provided the navigator a large set of eyes, distributed throughout the
aircraft in many locations that provided a much better view of the ground. Working effectively
with the rest of the crew was an essential element of successful navigation, and the Navigators'
Information File detailed the suggested relationship between the navigator and specific
crewmembers.12 0 The navigator interfaced most frequently with the pilots, as they were the ones
who physically executed his directions. He constantly talked to whoever was flying, whether the
aircraft commander or the copilot, coordinating headings and airspeeds, working to ensure that
they executed his instructions quickly and accurately, because precise flying was essential for
precise navigation. Maintenance of constant airspeeds, headings, and altitudes made accurate
instrument reading and position calculation easier. The navigator also enlisted the help of the
non-flying pilot, as he had a better view out the front of the aircraft and could help significantly
with pilotage navigation by reporting prominent landmarks for visual fixes.
The navigator worked closely with the bombardier, who could supply or verify drift
readings or, in a pinch, perform some of the navigation calculations on his own E6-B computer.
He also had the best view of the ground through the aircraft's Plexiglas nose and could most
easily identify ground references. During the bomb run, the navigator and bombardier worked as
a team, identifying the landmarks and references that would lead them to the target. The
radioman was a crucial link to the radio navigation systems, and properly instructed, could
provide radio position reports on a regular basis. The gunners, occupying positions along the
aircraft fuselage, in the aircraft tail, and underneath in the ball turret, provided the navigator a
valuable extended visual network, and could provide valuable pilotage input if instructed
correctly.
The aircraft instruments and navigation systems in the navigator's compartment provided
the navigator the information necessary to establish his aircraft position through dead reckoning
and execute his Flight Plan. On board information came from the aircraft performance
instruments that provided raw data, including outside air temperature, barometric altitude, and
120 Navigators'Information File, 4-1-2.
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indicated airspeed. He used his E6-B computer to convert this information into more accurate,
true values that he could use to compute the solution to the constant time-speed-distance problem
that he faced through the entire mission. The drift reading instruments, the B-5 Driftmeter and
the Norden AB computer, provided valuable relative motion information, which, through another
process of calculation, the navigator used to determine the magnitude and effect of the wind at
altitude on the aircraft's flight path. All of these instruments required care, calibration, and skill
to use correctly.
The radio navigation instruments provided off board information about the aircraft
position, which the navigator used to confirm his dead reckoning calculations. The information
provided, which got progressively more accurate as the war progressed, came from systems that
were complex to operate and potentially susceptible to jamming or incorrect use. To use the
information, the navigator had to understand how the systems worked, how to tune and calibrate
them, and how to interpret the information that they supplied. The crew provided valuable
information that augmented what the instruments supplied, in many cases establishing a visual
link with the outside world not available from the navigator's compartment. All of the
instruments in the navigator's compartment, paired with the crew's input and the navigator's
ability to transform the information that they provided, gave the navigator the ability to perform
his job for the upcoming mission, executing the Flight Plan to direct the bomber to the target and
back again.
The navigator gathered many different types of data from many sources, sometimes
converting it, but always combining it and in the process transformed it into navigational
position data. The navigator's compartment was the second "centre of calculation," where the
navigator performed his true function-that of integrator and transformer. His function and
existence was tied to his ability to use and master his extended instrument senses, calculate, and
transform what they told him into the information that enabled the rest of the crew to perform
their jobs, and it was through those instruments and calculations that they saw him as a member
of the crew.
Professional Identity
If the bomber crew saw the navigator through his tools and calculations, it also reflected
his own perception of his role in the aircraft. Many viewed themselves as "high altitude
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bookkeepers," performing what was essentially an academic function, somewhat detached from
the rest of the crew.12 1 This self-identity was strong, as expressed by navigator Frank Murphy.
I wondered.. .whether the rest of the men on bomber crews considered the
navigator to be an oddball. He was the only officer on the crew who had nothing
whatsoever to do with operation and control of the airplane. He climbed aboard
lugging a briefcase crammed with maps, Mercator charts, books, paper, pencils,
drawing instruments, a hand-held calculator, and strange looking optical
instruments. He was invariably hunched over his narrow shelf-like table in front
of which was a repeater set of basic flight instruments and radio controls. He
looked at his watch constantly, drew lines, and scribbled notes to himself on the
papers, maps and charts in front of him, much like Scrooge's wretched drudge,
Bob Cratchet, in Dickens' classic tale, A Christmas Carol.1 22
Also much like Dickens' put-upon drudge, the navigator toiled away with little control over the
world outside his own compartment in the aircraft.
Although the navigator performed the vital task of getting the bomber to the target and
back, he held no position of leadership in the crew. He was an officer like the pilots and
bombardier, but he had no official responsibility beyond himself. The aircraft commander led
the entire crew and the bombardier was responsible for the aerial gunners on the crew, but the
navigator's role was singular. That singular role extended beyond the aircraft, similarly limiting
the opportunity for leadership or command in the squadron. As expressed by B- 17 navigator Bill
Frankhouser:
Navigators were not participants in decisions at Squadron Operations about crew
assignments, etc. These leadership functions were the domain of the pilots, who
usually relayed pertinent information to their crews. 123
As explained in the previous chapter, in addition to flying, the pilots led. The just navigators
performed a task-they navigated. 124
121 Robert Clark Culp, "Robert Clark Culp," interview by Jim Culp, Video, August 24, 2008, Robert Culp
Collection (AFC/2001/001/63223), Veterans History Project, American Folklife Center, Library of
Congress, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/diglib/vhp/bib/loc.natlib.afc2001001.63223 (accessed 28 November 2010).
122 Murphy, Luck of the Draw, 76-77.
123 Bill Frankhouser, World War H Odyssey: Pennsylvania Dutch Farm Boy Becomes 8th Air Force Navigator
(Bedford, VA: Hamilton's, 1997), 127.
124 The lack of leadership opportunities in the Air Corps and its successors for non-pilots is discussed in the next
chapter.
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Beyond navigation, there was little to identify navigators. Following the war, one
navigator, recognizing that he was just a "task," implored his squadron commander to help him
get to pilot training, pleading
Boss, I was a navigator in World War II and came out a nobody. This is my one
chance to be someone and to get ahead as a pilot in this Air Force I love.
The self-perception as a "nobody" was rooted in more than a lack of leadership opportunity,
though. The task of navigation itself, with its data gathering, conversion, processing, and forms
was constructed to be as mechanized as possible. Likewise, the human performing that task was
constructed to be as mechanized as possible.
Mechanizing the Man-The Mission and the Act of Navigating
During the flight the navigator shall:
At all times use every means available of determining position
Check his compass on every heading
Give position reports on request
Keep a complete log of events
Initiate requests for navigational aids from crew members
Navigators' Information File, p. 4-12-1
With the mission planned and his instruments checked, the navigator was ready to
perform his job-he would spend the rest of the day "living" the Flight Plan, mechanically
observing, calculating, and recording his position from the start of the mission to the finish. His
primary job inflight was to know where he was at all times and keep a constant record of that
position. In the ETO, that meant DR navigation, maintaining an air plot, and keeping a constant,
accurate record on the bottom portion of his AAF Form 21, the Flight Record. He began dead
reckoning on the ground immediately, recording the times of engine start, aircraft taxi, and
takeoff. Once in the air, he settled into a steady routine of observation, position calculation, and
recording that, if uninterrupted by enemy action such as fighter attack that required him to
operate his machine gun, he would maintain until they landed back home at the end of the
mission. However, although all of the navigators were responsible for the position of their own
Major General John C. Giraudo, "Interview with Major General John C. Giraudo," interview by Lt. Col. Charles
M. Heltsley, Oral History Transcript, January 8, 1985, 97, K239.0512-785 C.1, IRIS No. 1105191, US Air
Force Historical Research Agency.
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aircraft-bounded element in the bombardment system, they were not all created equal. Their
position in the larger system itself, dictated by the formation tactics used in the HADPB doctrine,
just as with the pilot, directly influenced their actions and how they navigated during the
mission.
Leading, Following, and the Impact of Doctrine
The decision to adopt the drop-on-leader Combat Box formation tactics shaped how
much and to what extent the navigators on a mission actually navigated. Although all were
qualified in DR, the creation of a lead crew for each wing, group, and squadron dictated largely
their actions during the mission. Those designated as lead navigators flew at the front of the
formation and were responsible for ensuring that all of the aircraft within it successfully reached
their destination.126 They were the only ones who performed all of the duties involved in
precision DR navigation, keeping track of their position, calculating the correct heading to the
next checkpoint, and, most importantly, directing the pilot which heading to fly.
Leads were designated at each level of the formation-wing, group, and squadron. At
the lower levels, the lead navigators performed their duties until they took their position in the
larger formation, and then assumed the subordinate role described below. Since they had the
lead responsibility, these navigators were the "brain" of their element of the formation and spent
the hour prior to the General Briefing learning more about the day's mission, getting as familiar
as possible with the plan.
The Wing lead navigator had the greatest responsibility, as he had the lead for an entire
Combat Box of up to fifty-four aircraft. If the Command Pilot and overall mission commander
was in his aircraft, he could be leading multiple Combat Boxes and hundreds of bombers to the
target. 2 7 Since the success of the entire bomber force rested upon his ability to guide them to
the target, the lead position carried great prestige. Selection as a lead navigator was overt
acknowledgement of professional skill and ability, and often accompanied by promotion in rank.
It was not, however, a universally sought distinction. The responsibility of leading was great and
there was an increased level of personal danger, as defending German fighters, understanding the
importance of the lead bomber to the mission, often specifically targeted it. The responsibility
126 Navigators'Information File, 4-12-1.
127 The command pilot and his role is discussed in Chapter 4.
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and danger caused some crews to refuse the opportunity to lead when offered, preferring to take
their chances deeper in the formation. Others, however, viewed it as a challenge and path to
professional distinction among their peers.128
Each wing, group, and squadron had a deputy lead navigator in the formation, as well.
The deputies backed up the leads, ready to take the leadership of the formation if the lead
navigator's aircraft aborted the mission or was shot down. The deputies all navigated, but spent
most of the mission following the lead navigator, and they, as well as the rest of the navigators in
the formation, performed a specific type of DR navigation called "follow-the-pilot."
Follow-the-pilot
Follow-the-pilot was precision dead reckoning without controlling the heading of the
airplane-the navigator had to follow precisely the pilot's actions without having control over
them, constantly monitoring the aircraft heading, altitude, and airspeed, recording it so that he
could calculate drift and groundspeed.129 Since the pilot was continually maneuvering to
maintain his position in the formation, these values fluctuated constantly, making the navigator's
job of precision navigating more difficult, as he had to estimate the average heading, altitude,
and airspeed between his position calculations, and his resultant dead reckoning position
calculations were thus susceptible to many sources of error. Most concerned with these errors
were the deputy lead navigators, as they had to be as accurate as possible should they have to
assume the lead role.
An accurate estimate of position was critical for each aircraft, though, if they became
separated from the formation and had to proceed back to their home base alone. As such, a
smooth, precise pilot was the navigator's best friend. The more precisely the pilot flew, the more
precisely the navigator could navigate. Follow-the-pilot was the primary form of navigation
used by the non-lead navigators for most of the mission, but immediately after takeoff and before
accomplishing the rejoin, all of them had to DR on their own.
In one sense, the lead navigator was the only one truly navigating, as only he provided
direction to the pilot. However, because of follow-the-pilot DR, all of the navigators knew
128 Frankhouser, World War II Odyssey, 106-107; Thomas Childers, Wings of Morning: The Story of the Last
American Bomber Shot down Over Germany in World War I1 (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1995), 148-
149; Crosby, A Wing and a Prayer, 4, 56.
129Navigators' Information File, 2-0-1.
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where they were to some degree. Interestingly, although they constituted a single bombardment
system and all performed the same calculations during the flight, using external sources such as
radio, Gee, or LORAN as available, and communicating with their own crewmembers to get
visual information, they did not communicate with each other. The USAAF imposed a strict
policy of radio silence during bombing missions to minimize the amount of warning provided the
enemy about an impending attack. Generally, only the command pilot talked to other aircraft in
the bomber formation over the command frequency, and navigators were unable to communicate
with each other to either confirm their own navigation solution or question that of someone else.
On occasion, this policy of radio silence led to severe mistakes. Several times, lead
navigators who had miscalculated their position led their formations off the flight-planned route
directly into heavily concentrated German defenses, causing severe bomber losses.1 30 On other
occasions, lost lead navigators caused entire formations to drop their bombs on the wrong target.
Lieutenant Nunzio Addabbo, a navigator in the 60 1st Bomb Squadron related such an incident.
The most spectacular raid that we had, that I remember best, was the raid on
thFebruary 14 , 1945. We were scheduled to bomb Dresden. Well, when we
approached what we, everybody, thought was Dresden, I knew that we were
flying to the wrong target and I told our pilot, Sam, "You know, we are not
headed to Dresden; we are running the wrong heading. We seem to be heading
toward Prague." And, as we got closer and closer to the target, apparently
because of the radio silence, that message never got to the lead plane.
Consequently, instead of bombing Dresden, we bombed Prague, in error. I had it
all in my log and, in fact, when we got back to the base, I reported it as being the
wrong target... .The news that we had bombed the wrong target never came out
until the next day and only a few were made known of the fact. I consider that a
colossal cover-up.'3 1
Bomber navigators used radio technology to gather data so that they could calculate and
estimate their position, and yet were unable to use that same technology to exchange
processed information between the human calculation units themselves. In another
episode, navigator John Howland and his pilot were "chewed out" by their group
commander following a mission when they broke radio silence and requested that the
130 Bert Stiles, Serenade to the Big Bird (New York: W.W. Norton, 1952), 19.
131 Nunzio Addabbo, "Lt. Nunzio Addabbo, 398th Bomb Group Navigator, 601st Squadron, Eighth Air Force,"
interview by Marilyn Gibb-Rice, Video/transcript, December 1, 2007,
http://www.398th.org/History/Veterans/Voices/Interviews/InterviewAddabboNunzio.html (accessed 23
November 2010).
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lead bomber return to the flight plan after having steered off course, which had resulted in
the shooting down of another aircraft.1 3 2 While the bomber formation was a single
system containing many individual integrating elements, it was not given the capability to
perform that same integration at the system level.
Flying the Mission
Upon takeoff, every navigator began a rigorous routine, using his navigational
instruments, E6-B, maps, and charts in a fashion that would vary little for the next ten or so
hours until they landed back at their home base. The lead navigator's initial concern was guiding
the lead pilot to the correct formation rejoin point, defined by either a Splasher or a Buncher
beacon, and arriving there on time so that the rest of the formation could rejoin with their
aircraft. All of the other navigators did the same thing, striving to guide their pilot to the same
point. They took radio fixes, drew the bearings on a map spread out on the work table, and
plotted their aircraft position, obtaining those fixes at regular intervals from his own radio
compass or, more likely, from the radio operator. Each navigator had his own technique as to
how often he wanted these reports, but generally desired them more frequently when the aircraft
was in the weather and the crew could not see the ground. 33
During the trip to the rejoin point, the navigator began evaluating the aircraft's external
environment, measuring the actual winds that they were experiencing in flight and comparing
them to the forecast winds that he had used to create his flight plan. Regulation directed that
they try to obtain accurate wind data during this initial phase of the mission so that they could
both determine the accuracy of their mission planning products as well as evaluate any impact on
the planned flight route. 3 4 They measured the wind while the pilot flew a constant heading and
airspeed, measuring the drift across the ground and using the E6-B to solve the vector problem.
Obviously, he could do this only when the weather did not obscure the ground. They recorded
the observed winds and updated their headings appropriately.
Upon reaching the rejoin point, the lead aircraft established an oval-shaped orbit defined
by the radio fix, maintaining a constant airspeed and altitude so that the rest of the planes in the
132 John Howland, "The 324th Pathfinder Force in the 91st Bomb Group: How it Came to Be", 2006,
http://www.91stbombgroup.com/9 1st_tales/Pathfinder.html (accessed 17 February 2011).
133 Crosby, A Wing and a Prayer, 9.
134 "2d Bombardment Wing Instructions No. 55-16: Operations-Navigation."
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formation could rejoin in preparation for the next phase of the mission. The entire rejoin process
could take several hours, and the lead navigator continued to calculate the aircraft position and
record it in his Flight Log. Upon rejoining, the rest of the navigators in the formation began their
"follow the pilot" navigation, anticipating the time when the entire formation would depart on
the trip to the target.
Timing was a critical part of the navigator's job. The Flight Plan modeled the mission in
both space and time, and it was not enough to just be at the right place. Bombing missions were
large, highly scripted events, with sometimes thousands of aircraft participating. In addition to
hundreds of bombers, hundreds of fighter escort aircraft might participate, and they all
coordinated their actions in space and time. A missed rendezvous with escort fighters meant that
the bomber formation would have to proceed to the target without offensive air support, which
could lead to greatly increased losses to the enemy air defenses. The navigator continually
referred to his watch, tracking their progress through time and updating the pilot on the next
event.
The Flight Plan included the ETAs for all of the navigation points and major events on
the mission. Precision was critical, and the navigator used a combination of increasing or
decreasing indicated airspeed to influence the arrival time, as well as basic geometry, cutting
corners to gain time or overshooting a turn point or even directing additional complete 360 turns
to lose time. Adjusting timing was an art and a science, with no hard and fast rules. Getting it
right required the acquisition of a special type of judgment, or air sense, through practice and
experience. Every navigator practiced timing during the formation rejoin, and the lead navigator
continued to do so for the entire mission.
At the scheduled mission push time, the giant stream of bombers set out from England
toward their target in Europe, many individual elements comprising a single bombardment
system. From this point in the mission, the navigator settled into a rigorous routine dictated by
his position in the formation. The lead navigator navigated to the IP using precision DR,
spending all of his time reading the aircraft performance instruments, taking what radio, Gee,
LORAN, or pilotage fixes he could acquire, and constantly calculating drift and groundspeed.
He updated his position regularly and computed new headings that he then passed to the lead
pilot for him to fly. He had control of the direction of the formation, and as long as the pilot flew
the headings, altitudes, and airspeeds that the navigator desired, he could be reasonably certain of
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his position. The rest of the navigators performed their "follow the pilot" navigation, with the
added burden of having to estimate their progress based on the pilot's actions, but focused on
maintaining track of their position nonetheless.
As the mission progressed, the navigator continued reading his instruments and
performing his calculations, his view of the world changing only through what his navigational
senses presented to him. He had little regard for the environment outside the aircraft. As the
formation climbed above twenty thousand feet for the trip to Europe, however, the environment
inside the aircraft changed drastically. Temperatures in the poorly-heated nose of the bomber
could plunge well below zero degrees Fahrenheit, making any task difficult, never mind one that
required the dexterous use of one's fingers and hands to manipulate small knobs, dials, and
calculators, or the use of a pencil and plotter to draw precise lines on a map.
Every crewmember wore heavy, sheepskin-lined flight clothing and heavy gloves as
protection from the cold. However, the gloves were bulky and the protection that they provided
came at the cost of preventing any fine motor work. Navigators found themselves continually
exposed to the danger of frostbite, as they continually removed the gloves so that they could
operate their equipment. Some chose to wear less protective silk gloves or nothing at all when
they worked, but risked severe cold injury.13 5 The cold could be a real distraction, as could
attacking enemy fighters, preventing the navigator from effectively performing the task of
collecting and integrating the data the enabled precise navigation.
Integration was the key to precision navigation. The navigator had to gather, calculate,
and process a great deal of data to navigate precisely. In the air, as on the ground during mission
planning, he used another key translation technology to master that process. Just as the Flight
Plan dictated the mission planning process, the Flight Log dictated the navigation process.
The Tyranny of Routine-The Flight Log, the Air Plot, and the Mechanization of the Man
The Flight Log was the center of the navigator's activity in flight. Consisting of the
lower portion of the AAF Form 21, it contained many of the same data columns that made up the
Flight Plan, including heading, speed, drift, fuel, and position data. Every five to fifteen minutes,
he recorded compass headings, altitude, temperature, weather, unusual occurrences, or any other
135 Donald R. Jenkins, "Donald R. Jenkins, Rutgers College Class of 1944," interview by Shaun Illingworth,
Transcript, July 23, 2006, Rutgers Oral History Archives of World War II,
http://oralhistory.rutgers.edu/Interviews/jenkinsdonald.html (accessed 21 December 2010).
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factors affecting the flight, and then calculated his navigational position. On long missions, this
constituted a tremendous amount of data, but the Flight Record was large enough that he could
record an entry every ten minutes for an eleven-hour flight (Figure 4.22).136
Figure 4.22
AAF Form 21 Flight Plan and Log 13 7
The Flight Log dictated the navigator's actions in flight. Just as the completed Flight
Plan provided a list of executable instructions for the pilot, the columns in the Flight Record
provided a list of executable instructions for the navigator. Whether he was in the lead or on the
wing, the very process of filling it out required that he perform all of the actions necessary to DR
navigate, constantly calculating his position and ETA for the next point on the mission. The
136 Leroy W. Newby, Target Ploesti: View from a Bombsight (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1983), 23-24; Navigators'
Information File, 4-7-1.
137 Navigators'Information File, 4-7-2.
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process was all-consuming, and the Navigators' Information File encouraged navigators to
"remain cool and work almost mechanically in recording all that takes place."3"' Indeed, it took
so much attention and maintenance that one B- 17 navigator to stated
I could be even more efficient in the clouds because I wasn't distracted by having
to do pilotage, checking the ground. I just kept the books.' 39
In "keeping the books," the navigator created a numerical and textual representation of the
aircraft position and fuel state in the same format used to create the "ideal" position and fuel
state on the Flight Plan. By translating the aircraft's physical position and state into numbers and
text, could compare where he was, or thought he was, to where he had planned to be, and make
any necessary corrections. Filling out the Flight Log was the essence of navigation on a
bombing mission, for it anchored his physical location to the red woolen line that defined where
he had to be.
While the Flight Log provided a direct method of continually comparing the aircraft's
actual position with the desired position, it also served as the official record of the flight.
Navigators were taught to keep them meticulously because they were admissible in a military
court as evidence concerning the conduct of the flight.140 In at least one instance, diligent
adherence to the discipline of record keeping saved one navigator from severe punitive action.
While substituting for a bomber crew's regular navigator, Lieutenant Benjamin Jeremiah ran into
trouble on a mission. The pilots and the rest of the crew, obviously not wanting to proceed to the
target, ignored his navigational directions. Jeremiah recorded every exchange, position, and
action as the crew fabricated an aircraft malfunction so that they could avoid flying the mission.
Upon landing, Jeremiah turned in his Flight Record to the squadron operations officer, reporting
what had occurred. The crew was disciplined and removed from the combat theater, but
Jeremiah was exonerated. 141
The above incident is interesting because it illustrates some of the how social order and
control could be enforced on a bomber crew. As described in Chapter 2, the aircraft commander
was the "moral controller" for the bomber crew. He was to be conscious of any attempt by the
138 Ibid., 4-13-2.
139 Crosby, A Wing and a Prayer, 11.
140 Air Navigation, 41.
141 Jeremiah, "Benjamin Thomas Jeremiah."
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crew to avoid the hazards of the bombing mission and instill the "offensive spirit" in them so that
they would perform their jobs. In reality, the entire crew shared this burden because the
navigator kept record of all events, normal or abnormal. Any deviation from the plan required
that all of the crewmembers be complicit, willing not only to fabricate a malfunction that would
keep them out of the mission, but cause one of their own to falsify an official record. In the
above case, the navigator was not "one of their own," but a substitute and not under the same
moral pressure perhaps as a navigator who had trained from the beginning with the crew and
formed a tighter social bond. Would the situation have been different with the crew's regular
navigator? The navigator, through his normal duties as part of his assigned task, exerted a great
deal of informal moral control and authority over the bomber crew element of the bombardment
system.
The Flight Record was not the only record that the navigator kept in flight. He also
continually updated his air plot on his Mercator mission map. The map's primary function was
to enable the navigator to track the aircraft position in relation to the mission in its idealized
space. As he calculated his position or obtained fixes from radio or pilotage updates, he
converted them into a position on the map, continually translating the aircraft position from the
physical to the idealized world in which he largely existed. As with the Flight Record, the air
plot served as another method of measuring how well the aircraft was conforming to the plan
created earlier that morning.
This process of maintaining this position in both the temporal space of the Flight Log and
the idealized space of the mission map drew the navigator into what was almost a different
world. Certainly, he physically existed in the aircraft with the rest of the crew, but also in the
idealized world of points, courses, fuel quantity, and straight latitude lines. For some, the
transportation was so complete that they began to lose track of their physical location. As one
navigator related, he could tell
exactly where the airplane was located with great precision at the time of takeoff,
and again at the time of landing, although (he) might need to ask somebody, on
some embarrassing occasion, to confirm the name of (the) arrival airport.14 2
142 John Matt, Crewdog: A Saga of a Young American (Hamilton, VA: Waterford Books, 1992), 70-71.
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The actual physical position of the aircraft became irrelevant. Position was important only in the
context of the specific reference frame that he had built for himself in the Flight Plan and on the
mission map.
The process of effecting that translation, the position recording in the Flight Record and
on the air plot was all consuming-so much so that for some, it even blocked out the stress of
aerial combat. In an April 2007 interview, navigator George Skidmore replied upon being asked
whether he experienced any physical feeling on his first combat mission replied:
Skidmore: You're too busy to have any feeling.
Interviewer: Did you feel, say, nauseous?
Skidmore: No. You're busy trying to do calculations, busy trying to fill in a
log, to keep track of what was going on, and you didn't have any
special feelings about anything. You were just too busy trying to
get things done.143
This was a significantly different experience than that of the other crewmembers, some of who
went so far as to insist that the navigator, preoccupied with his job, did not really experience
combat at all. Navigator Donald Jenkins recalled post-war conversations with his bombardier
about their missions together.
We'd get [to] talking about some mission, this or that, and he finally figured, "No,
you didn't really know what combat was like," he'd tell me. "You didn't see this
or that or the other thing," [laughter] but that was true, though. The navigator
kept pretty busy, but you could hear it on the interphone, people talking about,
you know, that somebody got hit or something like that.... No, that's sort of the
way it went.14 4
These comments are extremely interesting in the context of the original purpose of this study-
the question of whether the physical removal of the operator from the RPA fundamentally
changes the tasks accomplished on an air combat mission. In Peter Singer's sterilized machine-
centric air combat system, the RPA pilot no longer rates as a combatant because he is removed
from the aircraft, and yet, the navigator on the B- 17, inarguably a physically present participant
143 George Bernard Skidmore, "George Bernard Skidmore, WWII Veteran, 15th Air Force, 449th Bomb Group,
718th Bomb Squadron," interview by Shaun Illingsworth and Elaine Blatt, Transcript, April 27, 2007,
Rutgers Oral History Archives of World War II,
http://oralhistory.rutgers.edu/Interviews/skidmore-george.html.
144 Jenkins, "Donald R. Jenkins, Rutgers College Class of 1944."
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in the thick of one of the bloodiest campaigns of World War II, is perceived to not have
experienced combat. What, then, can we really say about the role of physical location in
combat?
The navigator navigated-all of the time. At the IP, he shifted to visual navigation,
working with the bombardier to locate the target, but as soon as the bombardier dropped them, he
resumed his DR tasks.14 5 He was trained to use the machine gun hanging above his desk, but his
role as the directional brain of the aircraft element often took precedence over using it. He was
the one who could get the bomber and its crew back home. He had to be the mechanical
direction machine.
Figure 4.23
The Difficulties of Aerial Navigation14 6
In flight, the navigator's every action was oriented toward executing the plan that he had
assembled earlier in the day. The tools that he used were designed to extend his senses so that he
could gather, calculate, and translate data that allowed him to shift back and forth between the
physical reality of the bomber's environment and the idealized environment of the Flight Plan. It
was the navigator's compartment, with its concentration of instruments and tools that served as a
second Latourian "centre of calculation," where he drew in disparate data, organized it, and
effected this translation. It enabled him to serve as the integrator, calculator, and translator for
145 The navigator and bombardier's actions are described in Chapter 5.
146 Departure Point: Class of 44-4.
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his element of the bombing system, whether at the individual aircraft or formation level.
Performing that translation was an all-consuming process, driven by the "technology" of the
Flight Record. It guided the navigator's actions, automating them so that he produced a
navigation solution that indicated both the aircraft position in the real world as well as the
relative position in the missionized ideal world.
Conclusion
Shared Cognition-The Navigator, Technology, and Doctrine
Aerial navigation grew out of maritime navigation, but the contextual differences in
application, the aircraft speed, fuel limitations, and ability to land at only select locations made
the adaptation of existing navigational instruments insufficient for the task. Aerial navigators
developed specialized instruments to accommodate the unique environment of flight, and in the
process, they themselves developed as specialists, expert in the care, calibration, use, and
mathematical operations necessary for their operation.
Aerial navigation evolved as a complex process of knowledge and capability sharing
between these specialized tools and their operators. The navigation instruments in the aircraft
could sense things that the navigator could not, while the Mercator map and the E6-B computer
enabled him to easily perform complex calculations and translations and build conceptual molels
so that he could navigate in the context of the bombing mission. The most important
technologies within the bombing mission context, however, were the Flight Plan and the Flight
Record, as they enabled the navigator to take disparate sets of data, reorganize them, and turn
them into a new, more useful data set that enabled the bombardment system as a whole to get to
the target.
The technologies and the navigator came together in a single socio-technical element in
the larger bombing system. Each of the technologies brought a particular capability, whether
sensing, calculation, or translation. The navigator also brought a set of capabilities, including the
ability to interpret the instruments' data, integrate that data, and translate it so that it became
useful in the context of navigating on a bombing mission. Each, alone, was insufficient to
perform aerial navigation, but together, their shared knowledge and capabilities could determine
an aircraft position, locate it in both the idealized navigational world and the physical world, and
determine how to manipulate the physical variables of flight-heading and airspeed-to reach a
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desired destination. Navigation within the socio-technical element was a process of shared
cognition between the human and technological elements that took place in the mission planning
room and the navigator's compartment in the bomber-"centres of calculation," where all of the
data could come together and be transformed into something different.
Aerial navigation is an iterative process, and precision demands rapid iteration. The
bomber navigator used no mechanical automated machines to integrate the data that enabled
navigation, but the Flight Plan and the Flight Record served to mechanize the
navigator/technology socio-technical element by mechanizing the human actions in the
navigation process. The demands of the necessary observation, calculation, and filling out of the
forms on the ground and in the air dictated action to the extent that it limited both the ability to
accomplish other tasks and the influence of the external environment on the navigator himself.
The forms themselves created a mechanized system for navigation.
The HADPB doctrine also distinctly shaped the bomber navigator and his actions. He
largely owed his existence as a member of the bomber crew to the long-range nature of bombing
missions, and his location in the overall bomber formation dictated what actions were necessary
during the mission. Lead navigators accomplished all navigational tasks, determining where his
aircraft was and where it would go. Deputy lead and wing navigators had to determine where
they were without the luxury of controlling where they were going, but their actions within their
"centre of calculation" were essentially similar to that of the lead navigator. They collected data,
processed it, and plotted it. As we shall see in the following chapters, the navigator's actions
were the least affected by the bombing doctrine that actually contributed to his existence as a
member of the bomber crew.
The bomber navigator was part of a single-task socio-technical element in the
bombardment system, defined by his job and the tools that he used to accomplish it. Unlike the
pilot, he did not exist beyond the limited skill set that enabled him to use those tools. Although
largely created and valued because of the HADPB doctrine, he was the least affected of all of the
crewmembers when the USAAF adopted the drop-on-leader doctrine because his task remained
fundamentally unchanged. That, however, was not the case for the final crewmember under
examination and subject of the next chapter-the bombardier.
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Chapter 5
Interpretation, Definition, and Redefinition-Bombing and the Bombardier as the Man in
the Machine
Bremen. Friday, 8 October 1943. 2"d Lt. James Douglass, the bombardier on Just-A-
Snappin', stood behind pilots Everett Blakely and John Kidd as they took off ahead of the entire
3rd Combat Wing. Douglass was the lead bombardier for the 3rd Wing that day, but waited to
take his position in the Plexiglas nose of the aircraft until they were safely airborne. Sitting in
the nose of the bomber was the worst place to be in the event of a crash on takeoff
Otherwise idle after takeoff Douglass sat in his seat and watched as the Wing formed its
Combat Box. As they departed the assembly point, he settled in behind the .30-caliber machine
suspended next to him in the nose compartment, defending their right front quarter from attack
by German fighters. Making landfall near the island of Borkonny, he saw several of these
fighters ferociously attacking the formation, but had no opportunity to retaliate as the P-47s
accompanying the bomber formation kept them safe from attack.
Approaching the Initial Point, he shifted his attention away from the air battle and began
preparing the aircraft for the bomb run. The flak intensified as they continued toward Bremen,
destroying several bombers, but he focused on the ground below, cross-checking his maps and
target photographs for the ground references that would lead them to the target. As the lead
bombardier, he had to find the target. Every other bombardier in the 3rd Wing was going to drop
their bombs on his signal. If he hit the target, so would they. If he missed...
Douglass set up his Norden bombsight, entering the data necessary for precision
bombing. Dense clouds of black smoke marked the route to the target as he hunched over the
sight, pressed his right eye against the rubber cushion, and began working his magic with the
Army Air Forces'finest precision bombing instrument. Taking control of the aircraft from
Blakely, he rapidly adjusted the Norden's many knobs and gradually set the crosshairs on the
target, using the bombsight and autopilot to fly the bomber to the bomb release point.
Thirty seconds before the release point, a burst offlak penetrated the window to the right
of Douglass' head, tearing through his clothing and injuring his hand. In spite of this, he
continued to fine-tune his bombing solution, manipulating the Norden to bring the aircraft to the
perfect position in space so that he could drop his bombs. As the bombsight automatically
released the bombs, he called "Bombs away! " and returned control of the aircraft to Blakely,
but was immediately tossed about the nose compartment, as another burst offlak knocked the
bomber into a steep dive. Later photographic evidence showed that his bombs -and the
formation 's-were both accurate and destructive.
During the lonely journey back to England, Douglass manned his machine gun and
fought off the attacking enemy fighters with the rest of the aircraft's gunners. As a group, they
later claimed twelve enemy kills, but received credit for only seven, one of which was credited to
Douglass. Suffering more damage from coastal flak batteries as they crossed over the English
Channel, they limped back to England and crash landed at an abandoned airstrip, hitting a tree
and crushing the nose and one wing in the process. In spite of the damage, the mission was
highly successful, as the target in Bremen suffered severe damage. Douglass and his bombsight
had done their job for the formation.'
Adapted from Edward Jablonski, Flying Fortresses: The Illustrated Biography of the B-1 7s and the Men Who
Flew Them (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965), 184-195; Frank D. Murphy, Luck of the
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Introduction
This chapter examines the bombing socio-technical element in the bombardment system.
It describes bombing as a singular, socio-technical task, accomplished by a human-machine
system consisting of a bombsight designed to make up for human shortcomings in real-time
integration, calculation, and precision flying, and the bombardier, a specially trained human,
defined professionally by his ability to operate that bombsight, whose primary function was to
act as an environmental and contextual sensor and interpreter for the bombsight, providing it the
data it required to do its job. It examines how the mastery of the bombsight defined the
bombardier and created him as a professional being, and how the subsequent evolution of the
doctrine of high-altitude, daylight precision bombing (HADPB) dismantled that identity. First, it
describes how bombsights developed to make up for the human inability to solve the bomb
dropping problem in real-time. Second, it presents the Norden bombsight as the solution to that
problem, describing how it developed as a complex mechanical computer that automated as
much of the bombing process as possible, how it solved the bomb release point problem by
creating an real-time, dynamic analog of the aircraft-target physical relationship, and how its
integration with the aircraft autopilot enabled the bombardier to realize that solution. Third, it
describes the engineering of the bombardier as a single-task, technical specialist whose
professional identity was completely defined by his mastery of the bombsight, how his ability to
find, identify, and track the target made him an interdependent part of the socio-technical
bombing element, and how his actions were mechanized to enable that element to function
during the most high-stress portion of the bombing mission. Fourth, it describes the
bombardier's role as an essential cognitive element in the system and how he built visual and
mental models that enabled him to interpret the physical environment and provide the bombsight
the necessary data to solve the bombing problem. Finally, it examines how the HADPB doctrine
and drop-on-leader formation bombing largely dismantled the bombardier as a professional
entity by requiring that his unique professional skill exist only in one small part of the overall
bombardment system.
Draw: Reflections on the Air War in Europe (Trumbull, CT: FNP Military Division, 2001), 141-142; Harry
Crosby, A Wing and a Prayer: The "Bloody 100th" Bomb Group of the U.S. Eighth Air Force in Action
Over Europe in World War II (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), 127-135; "Black Week -
Bremen", n.d., http://www.100thbg.com/mainpages/history/history4/bw__bremen.htm, accessed 26
December 2010; Combat Chronology, 1941-1945 (Washington, DC: Center for Air Force History, 1991),
199; Ian L. Hawkins, B-17s over Berlin: Personal Stories from the 95th Bomb Group (H) (Brassey's Inc,
1995), 170-171.
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The Bombardier and the Point of the Mission
Of all of the officers on a B- 17 crew, the bombardier's job was probably the most
unambiguous and clearly defined-the accurate and effective bombing of the target. The B-1 7
Pilot Training Manual defined it as
the ultimate purpose of (the) entire airplane and crew. Every other
function is preparatory to hitting and destroying the target....The success
or failure of the mission depends upon what he accomplishes in that short
interval of the bombing run.2
The giant formations of bombers faced weather, anti-aircraft defenses, and defensive fighters for
one purpose-to put their bombs on the target for the day. In the words of one of the first
bombardier's to drop bombs on Germany, "a pilot could do a great job of flying the plane for six
or even eight hours, and the navigator could plot the course just right. But, the whole thing
really boiled down to the bombardier, by taking control as he neared the target and by
synchronizing the bombsight to hit the target." 3 The bombardier's job was precision bombing.
Upon his shoulders rested the success or failure of the entire mission.
The First Glimpse of Precision
On 9 October 1911, Thomas DeWitt Milling, one of the U.S. Army's first qualified
pilots, took off on a test flight from the flying training airfield at College Park, Maryland,
accompanied by passenger Riley Scott, a former lieutenant in the Army's Coastal Artillery.
Scott carried with him a stopwatch, a barometric altimeter, a table of ballistics figures, and a
device that he called a "bomb dropper." The bomb dropper, which Scott invented, was
an apparatus whereby the operator may place himself in a position directly
above the object to be attacked, or if the craft be in motion, to enable the
operator to drop or shoot the projectile at a given time before he reaches a
vertical position over the target. And in either case to enable the
operator.. .to strike the object aimed at with more certainty and greater
accuracy than has heretofore been possible.4
2 B-1 7: Pilot Training Manualfor the Flying Fortress, AAF Manual No. 50-13 (Headquarters AAF, Office of Flying
Safety, 1945), 18.
J. W. Smallwood, Tomlin's Crew: A Bombardier's Story (Manhattan, KA: Sunflower University Press, 1992), 20.
4 Riley Estel Scott, "Means For Dropping Projectiles From Aerial Crafts, U.S. Patent 991,378" (Peekskill, NY, May
4, 1910), 1.
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It consisted of a pivoting telescope, used to calculate the aircraft ground speed and act as an
aiming device, and a sling underneath the aircraft that held two 18-pound bombs (figures 5.1 and
5.2). As Scott lay prone on the lower wing of the Wright biplane operating the bomb dropper
and dropping the bombs, Milling made several passes over a 4-foot-by-5-foot target at an altitude
of 400 feet and a speed of 40 miles per hour, landing and reloading in between. On the first pass,
Scott's two bombs missed the target by 62 feet. On the second, he cut his error nearly in half,
missing by just 32 feet. On Scott's third and final pass, he placed his bombs within 10 feet of the
target.5
Figure 5.1
A single bomb suspended from Riley Scott's "bomb dropper"6
Scott's results were remarkable, and caused a great stir among the Army aviators at
College Park. He and his "bomb dropper" had produced far more accurate results than their very
limited experiments with bomb dropping to that point. Following the flight, the Washington Post
recorded Milling's almost unbridled optimism about the new system's performance and its
potential benefit for military aviation.
5 Richard Hallion, Taking Flight: Inventing the Aerial Age from Antiquity Through the First World War (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2003), 300-301; Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper, 1949), 34;
Stephen L. McFarland, America's Pursuit ofPrecision Bombing, 1910-1945 (Washington, DC:
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995), 9. Most sources set the date of Scott's flight as 10 October 1910.
However, Richard Hallion records the date as 9 October, based upon the fact that the Washington Post
reported the mission results on 10 October. See Hallion, Taking Flight, note 22 p. 482.
6 Lieut. Scott's Aero Bomb, Photograph, 1911, Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington,
DC, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/ggb2005012025/ (accessed 14 October 2010).
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With the device that Lieut. Scott has invented I am sure that it will not be
long before the army will be able to completely destroy any large fortress
or fort in the world. A fleet of rapidly moving aeroplanes, at the height of
2,000 feet, could drop each a 250-pound bomb of nitroglycerin upon the
enemy below, and escape unharmed, while the shells would wreak death
and destruction.7
Given that the aircraft of the time were unable to lift more than three hundred pounds over and
above the weight of the pilot and that operation of the bombsight required carrying an additional
passenger, Milling's prediction seems quite optimistic. However, he and the other Army airmen
recognized great military value in providing aircraft "the power of destruction."8
7 "Aero Drops a Shell," The Washington Post, October 10, 1910, 1.
8 Arnold, Global Mission, 34.
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Figure 5.2
Riley Scott's "bomb dropper" device, as represented in U.S. Patent No. 991,3799
As noteworthy as Scott's results may have been, U.S. Army leadership showed little
interest in the bombsight and refused to purchase it. Undaunted, Scott entered his invention in
the Michelin bombing competition at the Villacoublay airdrome in France the next year, beating
all other competitors and winning the $5,000 prize. His results generated a great deal of interest
among the European military observers present, particularly from the German and French
9 Scott, "Means For Dropping Projectiles From Aerial Crafts, U.S. Patent 991,378," drawings, page 2.
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General Staffs. The French promptly bought the bombsight, as did the Germans, who further
developed the device and were soon using it against the Allies during World War 1.'
The First Socio-technical Bombing System
Scott's bombsight was a revolutionary advance in the nascent science of aerial bomb
dropping, but its significance extended beyond its ability to allow airmen to drop bombs more
precisely. It was the first true socio-technical bombing system that combined the unique human
abilities to find, identify, and track the target with unique machines with the abilities to measure
speed, altitude, and ballistic performance into a single, interdependent entity.
The earliest attempts at bombing had been limited to "seat of the pants" efforts, where the
pilot or aircraft passenger dropped hand-held bombs over the side of the aircraft, guessing the
release point based upon estimates of aircraft speed, altitude, and the bomb's ballistic fall time.
The results were predictably poor and accurate hits were more a result of luck rather than skill, as
they relied entirely upon the extremely imprecise human perception and interpretation of a very
dynamic environment. The first "technological" aid for the human bomb dropper was very
basic, consisting of a line painted on a bomber aircraft fuselage that assisted the pilot in lining up
with the target. While it provided a rudimentary spatial reference for the pilot, it showed little
improvement in accuracy, as it worked only for one speed, altitude, and bomb type, and success
again depended much more upon luck than skill."
Scott substantially improved upon this concept by using specific machines to eliminate
some of the element of luck and replace it with skill. By integrating the aneroid barometric
altimeter, the pivoting telescope and stopwatch, and the pre-calculated ballistic tables, Scott
brought together machines that were more expert at their tasks than were humans. These
instruments were able to quantify some elements the bomber's environment, albeit without great
precision, by providing data that reduced some of the uncertainty associated with bomb
dropping. Simply knowing the aircraft altitude and airspeed enabled the bombardier to use the
ballistic tables to determine the angle at which the bomb must be dropped to hit the desired
10 Hallion, Taking Flight, 301-302; Arnold, Global Mission, 34. The Scott bombsight was used for the first time in
combat one year later by American mercenary Bert Hall, flying for the Hungarians in the Balkan War of
1912. See Hallion, Taking Flight, 302. Belatedly, the Air Corps purchased 10 Riley-Scott type sights after
World War I, as they "incorporated the best known principles of general sight design." See Virginia Toole,
The Development of Bombing Equipment in the Army Air Forces, May 22, 1945, 23-24, Call 201-13, US
Air Force Historical Research Agency.
1 McFarland, America's Pursuit of Precision Bombing, 8-9.
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target (Figure 5.3). The pivoting telescope enabled him to set and measure that angle, and when
the target appeared under the crosshairs in the eyepiece, indicated when to drop the bomb.
THEORY OF BOMB-SIGHTING
Fig 1LI.
In fhg. H the height of the aeroplane
V - the ground speed
Figure 5.3
The bomb-sighting angle, a, as depicted in the 1918 Notes on Aerial Bombardment 12
The bombsight, however, was not infallible. It was complex and cumbersome to operate,
required skilled humans to operate both the bombsight and the aircraft carrying it, and neglected
several significant variables, such as the effect of wind on both the aircraft and bomb. The
bombsight operator had to complete numerous actions in rapid sequence, including sighting the
target, operating the stopwatch, calculating the groundspeed, reading the altimeter, looking up
the ballistics data, and finding the target in the sighting telescope. Even at forty miles per hour,
it required much practice and training to develop the skills necessary to operate it correctly on a
consistent basis. Likewise, the bombing solution was only as good as the data used to compute
12 Notes on Aerial Bombardment, 1918, 11.
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it, which meant that the aircraft pilot had to keep the aircraft steady, at a constant altitude and
airspeed during the entire process while the bombsight operator performed his tasks.
Neither did the bombsight compensate for the effect of wind on the path of the falling
bomb, which could cause it to fall short, long, or push it off line away from the target. Granted,
the aircraft of that era could not climb very high, particularly carrying a load of bombs and a
couple of airmen, and given that the bombsight could be used only at low altitude, wind made, in
Scott's words, "but little difference." 3 Likewise, low altitude compensated for pilot
imprecision, as the bomb time of fall was short enough that these errors were small in magnitude.
Soon, however, the increasingly capable anti-aircraft defenses that developed with the reality of
combat bombing would force bomber aircraft to higher altitudes, increasing the magnitude and
significance of both types of errors. Although his solution was imperfect, Scott defined and
addressed many of the technical challenges of precision bombing, created a socio-technical
solution for the problems that he understood, and laid the fundamental design groundwork for
virtually all of the bombsight designers who would follow.
The Bombing Problem
Hitting a stationary target on the ground with a bomb dropped from an aircraft is,
conceptually, a simple, three-step problem. First, determine the location in space from which the
ballistic trajectory of the bomb will carry it to the target, second, fly the aircraft to that point, and
third, release the bomb.1 4 The difficulty lies in calculating and finding that point, flying
precisely to it, and dropping the bomb at the exact instant of arrival. Further complicating the
problem is that the aircraft carrying the bomb is likely to have only one opportunity to get it
right, as fuel limitations and the danger posed by opposing fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft
defenses may well preclude a second chance.
Finding That Point in Space-Course, Range, Trail, and Cross Trail
The first step in determining the bomb release point is solving for range, or calculating
how far in advance of the target to release the bomb. The two key variables that control the
13 "Aero Drops a Shell," 1.
14 Students' Manual: Bombing (Army Air Forces Training Command, 1944), 1-2-1. This discussion addresses
bombing stationary targets, as they were the focus of the Combined Bomber Offensive during World War
1I. Bombing moving targets is more difficult still, as more variables enter the problem, all of which are
beyond the control of the bombardier.
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range are the aircraft groundspeed, determined by the aircraft's true airspeed and the effect of the
wind at altitude, and the bomb's time of fall, dictated by the aircraft altitude. At the instant that a
bomb drops from the aircraft, it is traveling forward at the same rate as the aircraft. In a perfect
vacuum, it would remain directly beneath the aircraft as it falls to earth due to the force of
gravity. However, air resistance causes it to decelerate and fall behind the aircraft as it descends,
and that increasing distance is called trail, defined as "the horizontal distance measured on the
ground from the point of impact to a point directly beneath the airplane at the moment of impact"
(Figure 5.4). " Time of fall obviously increases with aircraft altitude, and as air resistance retards
the bomb's progress longer, trail increases correspondingly as well. Wind can also affect trail,
with a head with increasing it, or a tail wind decreasing it.
T R
Figure 5.4
Trail1 6
The second step in determining the bomb release point is calculating the aircraft course
that will compensate for any lateral drift in the bomb's trajectory caused by a crosswind. A
crosswind will push the bomb away from the aircraft's track across the ground, and this value,
measured as the bomb's lateral distance at ground impact from the aircraft ground track, is called
crosstrail (Figure 5.5). Again, the longer the time of fall, the greater the amount of crosstrail
produced by the wind. The aircraft heading at bomb release must account for the effect of the
wind on both the aircraft and the bomb. While turning into the wind compensates for the aircraft
drift, as explained in Chapter 4, additional compensation is needed to allow for the wind's effect
on the bomb as it falls. Therefore, the final aircraft heading must place the aircraft upwind of the
target.
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15 Ibid., 1-2-2.
16 Ibid., 1-2-3.
Figure 5.5
Crosstrail 1 7
Solving for range and course by compensating for trail and crosstrail is a complex three-
dimensional problem, characterized in 1943 by a writer in Popular Science as "pitching the
bomb toward the target as a pitcher throws a curve across home plate."18 Figure 5.6, taken from
the Army Air Forces Board's 1944 Revision of Handbookfor Bombardiers, graphically displays
the complexity of determining the release point.
~L1~
STATIONARY
TARGET
MOVING AIR
STILL AIR
Figure 5.6 19
The bombing solution
17 Ibid., 1-2-10.
18 Allen Raymond, "Bombsight Solves Problems: Geometry and Ballistics Give it its Deadly Accuracy," Popular
Science, December 1943, 119.
19 Revision ofHandbookfor Bombardiers (The Army Air Forces Board, August 9, 1944), Figure 1, Call 245.64,
IRIS No. 156569, US Air Force Historical Research Agency.
249
While the problem is complex, determining the release point requires knowing only four
pieces of data.
1. The aircraft altitude above the target, used to calculate the bomb's time of fall.
2. The aircraft ground speed, used to calculate the distance the bomb will travel during
that time of fall.
3. The ballistic characteristics of the bomb that define how air resistance will affect its
flight through the air, used to modify the calculated distance that the bomb will travel
during the fall.
4. The aircraft drift, used to calculate the correct heading for the aircraft to produce the
required offset to compensate for the effect of the crosswind on both the aircraft and
bomb.
Collecting and converting that data and performing the geometric and vector calculations in real
time, however, is far beyond the independent cognitive capability of most humans, requiring the
assistance of purpose-built measuring and computing devices.
Even with that assistance and the bomb release point determined, accurately dropping
bombs still requires solving two other major problems that involve both humans and machines:
flying precisely to the release point and recognizing that the aircraft is there to release the bomb
at the correct instant. The creation of a socio-technical device that accomplishes all three of
these tasks was, and remains, the focus of every bombsight designer since Riley Scott hit his first
target. The bombsight development process that led to the production of the Norden bombsight,
used by the USAAF during the CBO, was one of a series of actions that gradually increased the
bombardier's ability to measure his physical environment and interpret it for the bombsight,
while automating the complex, dynamic mathematic calculations associated with determining the
bomb release point and the physical actions necessary to perform precision flight.
Partial Solutions-Simple Machines and the First Bombsights
The first bombsights that evolved beyond painted lines or simple nails pounded into the
aircraft fuselage to act as rudimentary aiming devices were vector-type bombsights. Developed
in ignorance of the Scott bombsight, these vector type bombsights crudely solved only the range
portion of the bomb release point problem using data supplied by the bombsight operator. The
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bombardier, or pilot in a single-seat aircraft, adjusted several levers that set the aircraft altitude,
ground speed, and bomb ballistic fall time, which set the position of two pins on a sliding scale
that, when aligned visually, displayed to the operator the correct angle at which to release the
bombs (Figure 5.7). The operator then sighted along the pins, and when they aligned with the
target, he manually released the bombs (Figure 5.8).
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Wimperis Mark IA Bombsight 20
These sights were extremely imprecise, in part because the data used to set them up was
very inaccurate. The operator had to calculate the groundspeed with a stopwatch and, in many
cases, had to guess the aircraft altitude, as the altimeters in use at the time were very unreliable
and often displayed readings that erred in excess of ten percent of the true altitude.2' Although
the bomb ballistic data was accurate, the bombsight operator chose the setting based upon the
estimated groundspeed and altitude, so in fact it was no better than the operator's ability to
accurately determine those values. Neither did these bombsights compensate for drift, limiting
the aircraft to bomb runs either directly with or against the wind over the target. Like Scott's
20 Mark IA Bombsight, Technical drawing, n.d.,
http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/070205-F-1234P-003.jpg (accessed 13
October 2010). This bombsight was designed and produced after World War I. It was modified for higher
altitude operations, but still did not compensate for drift.
Edward 0. Purtee, Development and Adaptation ofAircraft Instruments for Military Use (Historical Division,
Intelligence, T-2, Air Technical Service Command, 1946), 73.
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bombsight, they were more effective at lower altitudes where the effect of the wind was less, but
virtually useless as the bombing altitude increased.
Figure 5.8
Early, non-drift setting Wimperis bombsight installed on an American DH-42
Lieutenant Commander H. E. Wimperis of the Air Ministry and Imperial College of
Science, London, made one of the first attempts at solving the drift problem by modifying one of
his own earlier bombsight designs. Wimperis' improved "drift setting bombsight" added an
angular drift adjustment bar, which the operator set based upon the crosswind over the target.
Determining the crosswind, however, added significantly to the pre-bomb run preparation
requirements. The pilot had to fly a timing leg perpendicular to the planned bombing attack
course, while the bombardier calculated first the ground speed, again with a stopwatch, and then
the crosswind by subtracting the ground speed from the aircraft's indicated air speed. During the
bomb run, the pilot again had to fly directly upwind or downwind toward the target while the
bombardier lined up the rear sight with the drift bar, the front sight with the altitude bar, and
determined what heading would bring the target in line with both. Once that new heading was
established, the bombardier signaled it to the pilot so that he could change course.23 It was a
22 Wimperis Bombsight on a DH-4, Photograph, n.d.,
http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/070205-F-1234P-001.jpg (accessed 13
October 2010).
23 McFarland, America's Pursuit ofPrecision Bombing, 15.
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cumbersome, poor solution, but the Air Corps and Navy aircraft used Wimperis' sight and
variations of it for many years after World War I.
The Wimperis bombsight, as with all bombsights, required that the bombsight operator
have some method of signaling the pilot so that he could have some control over the aircraft
heading once he determined the correct bombing solution. As discussed in Chapter 3, these
signals were initially passed by yelling between the aircraft cockpits, then with signaling reins
attached to the pilot's sides, and eventually with indicator lights on the pilot's front instrument
panel. None of these methods was either satisfactory or precise, and it took a great deal of
practice for a bombardier-pilot pair to develop the necessary understanding and coordination to
drop even moderately accurate bombs. All told, the Wimperis bombsight provided only a crude
solution for the range problem, providing rough compensation for trail and crosstrail based upon
very suspect data. Additionally, it made no compensation for imprecise flying on the part of the
pilot, nor for the inherent pitch and roll oscillation of the aircraft inflight, and at its best with a
well-trained crew, it was moderately accurate only at altitudes below 5,000 feet.24
Bombing Errors and the Difficulties of the Socio-technical
Experience with these early bombsights revealed that there were two types of errors that
decreased bombing accuracy: range errors, where the bomb fell either long or short of the target,
and line, or course errors, where the bomb fell to the side of the target. A 1918 pamphlet
entitled Notes on Aerial Bombardment, brought back from Europe by Captain H. B. Inglis of the
Army Air Service Armament Division at McCook Field, Ohio, identified the sources of these
errors and their effect on accuracy.
Range errors fell into four categories:
1. The bombsight was not horizontal, leading to an inaccurate angle measurement
2. The ground speed was wrongly estimated by the bomber, leading to an inaccurate
bomb dropping angle prediction
3. The altitude was measured incorrectly, leading to an inaccurate time of fall value
4. The bombardier delayed in dropping the bomb past the bomb dropping point,
leading to bombs falling past the target2 5
24 Toole, The Development of Bombing Equipment in the Army Air Forces, 9-12; McFarland, America's Pursuit of
Precision Bombing, 14-16.
25 Notes on Aerial Bombardment, 14-15.
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Equipment deficiencies generated the first three sources of error, with the greatest error caused
by the sight not being level. Notes on Aerial Bombardment detailed that a 2* forward tilt error in
the dropping angle led to a 226-foot error in a bomb dropped from just 600 feet. A ground speed
error of only 5 miles per hour led to an error of 150 feet in a bomb dropped from 6,000 feet.
Altitude errors varied, as they could either cause the bomb to fall short if the altitude was
overestimated, or fall long if it was underestimated.26
The fourth source of range error, delay in dropping the bomb, was human. The delay
between the bombardier recognizing that the bomb must be released and physically releasing it,
or his reaction time, caused bombs to fall past the target. In a 1921 lecture to the Air Service
Tactical School at Langley Field, Virginia, Frank Short, a bombing expert in the Army Ordnance
Department, quantified its effects for the students:
reaction time for the individual is in the neighborhood of one-tenth to one-
fifth of a second for skilled men. The latter figure will cause an error of
about 30 ft. if the bomb is released too soon or too late; assuming the same
actual ground speed at all heights, this error is independent of altitude.2 7
The range error problem was complex, as the effect of each individual source of error
compounded the effect of the others, and since the sources were both technological and human,
range error was a distinctly socio-technical problem.
Line errors fell into two categories:
1. The aircraft course was not in line with the target, causing the bomb's path to
diverge from the target
2. The aircraft was "listing," or not wings level at the instant the bombardier
released the bombs, again, causing the bomb's path to diverge from the
target28
These errors, more serious than range errors, were attributable to a combination of drift,
the human pilot's inability to steer the aircraft course accurately, and his inability to fly precisely
enough to keep the wings level. Course errors caused a lateral accuracy error of
26 Ibid.
27 Frank Short, "Bomb Sights, Lecture delivered at Langley Field, Virginia by Frank Short, Expert, Ord. Dept.,
U.S.A." (lecture, Langley Field, VA, 1921), 10, Box 828 File: F-5G/1921/Bombsights Development of
Bombsights and Gyroscopes, National Museum of the United States Air Force.
28 Notes on Aerial Bombardment, 15.
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tan (# of degrees off course) x (the distance the bomb travels) = miss distance (ft),
and a roll errors caused a lateral accuracy error of
tan (# of degrees of aircraft roll) x (aircraft altitude) = miss distance (ft). 29
As with the range errors, line errors were distinctly socio-technical. Drift calculation was
dependent upon technical means, but aircraft control was dependent upon the pilot's ability to
keep the wings level.
The most significant source of error, however, was aircraft oscillation. The bomber
aircraft attitude constantly varied in pitch and roll as the pilot moved the flight controls to
maintain controlled flight. This constant movement induced both range and course errors
because they upset the bombsight's level reference.30 If the bombsight was not level in
relationship to the target environment-the surface of the earth-all of its calculations would be
in error and the bomb would miss. This, again, was a socio-technical problem, as the solution
required increasing the pilot's ability to fly precisely and keep the aircraft stable as well as
designing a bombsight that could both determine and maintain a "true" vertical reference with
respect to the target.
With these basic sources of error identified, resolving them became a process of
accomplishing three steps:
1. Defining the bombsight's physical environment-measuring and quantifying the
aircraft airspeed, altitude, and course accurately enough to permit precise
calculations of the bomb release point.
2. Controlling the bombsight's physical environment-creating and maintaining a
"true" level reference for the bombsight so that it could use that data to calculate the
position of the bomb release point.
3. Eliminating sources of human error by developing a method of controlling aircraft
altitude, airspeed, and course precisely enough to fly to the bomb release point, as
well as releasing the bombs precisely at that point.
The process of accomplishing these steps was difficult and iterative, as it involved solving both
technical and human problems in a single system. Although Henry Inglis brought back Notes on
Aerial Bombardment after World War I, efforts to reduce the bombing errors that it identified
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2 9 Ibid.
30 Ibid., 15-16.
had already begun, with bombsight designers focusing both on stabilization so that they could
replicate the true vertical and on solving the problem of calculating drift and groundspeed.
Resolving the Errors-Technology and the Bombsight
The first stabilizing bombsight was a French-developed Michelin sight, used during
World War I. Based on Riley Scott's design, the Michelin sight was stabilized both in pitch and
in roll by a set of pneumatic shock absorbers that reacted to the position of a pendulum contained
within the unit that provided a vertical reference. It was the first sight to stabilize in this manner
and the most accurate bombsight used during the war, but it did not compensate for wind drift
and was still dependent upon timing to determine ground speed. Calculating the ground speed
required the pilot to fly a timing leg of up to 1% minutes directly at the target, during which the
aircraft was exposed to hostile defensive fire.3 1 Following the war, the Air Corps procured
several Michelin sights and attempted to improve upon their design, however, these attempts, led
by bombsight designer George Estoppey, demonstrated that pendulum-stabilization showed little
promise, and by 1924, efforts shifted to adapting gyroscopic stabilization to bombsights.
Concurrent with their efforts to develop gyroscopic aircraft stabilizers, described in
Chapter 3, the Sperry Gyroscope Company was also working on using gyroscopes to stabilize
bombsights. Sperry developed its first gyroscopically stabilized bombsight in 1914, using the
same principles to keep the bombsight level used to keep aircraft level in flight. In 1918, the
U.S. Navy acquired a few of these sights, but found their performance unsatisfactory, as the
gyroscopes were unable to keep the sights level and they soon took them out of service.32 The
root problem was that, unlike the larger gyroscopes used for aircraft stabilization, bombsight
gyros had to be small enough to fit into the bombsight. Smaller size meant less rotating mass,
and the gyros were either too small to produce enough counterforce to keep the sight level,
suffered from excess precession, or just failed.
Although their first attempt failed, Sperry continued their efforts throughout the decade in
conjunction with their autopilot development to produce a gyroscopically stabilized bombsight.
By 1933, they had made some progress and were producing the Model 0-1, which was the
predecessor of Sperry's eventual S-1 bombsight. While the Model 0-1 was an improvement, it
31 Toole, The Development of Bombing Equipment in the Army Air Forces, 21; McFarland, America's Pursuit of
Precision Bombing, 16.
32 Thomas Parke Hughes, Elmer Sperry: Inventor and Engineer (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 237.
256
had several technical that adversely affected its accuracy. Neither the Air Corps nor the Navy
was interested in procuring it, as they had discovered a superior bombsight, produced by former
Sperry employee Carl L. Norden.33
Norden, a promising engineer, had worked for the Sperry Company before World War I
on ship stabilization systems, and he remained as a consultant through the end of the war. He
began working on bombsights in 1921 as a consultant to the U.S. Navy, and by 1928, had
founded his own company, Carl L. Norden, Inc., and was on contract and producing the Norden
Mark XI gyrostabilized bombsight.34 The Navy bought several Mark XI bombsights, as their
performance in both testing and operational use was impressive. They maintained a true level
reference far better than their competitors and contained an integrated timing device that
simplified ground speed calculation and were more accurate any existing bombsight. However,
they were complex and difficult maintain, and Norden wanted to produce something better. By
1931, he succeeded, producing the initial test version of the Mark XV/M-Series bombsight-a
truly revolutionary gyrostabilized, "synchronous" bombsight.35 The M-Series sight far
outperformed even the Mark XI, and in 1933, just as Sperry produced the inferior Model 0-1,
both the Army and Navy contracted with Norden as their primary supplier of bombsights.
The M-Series bombsight was remarkable because of its gyro stabilization, but equally
remarkable as the first successful synchronous bombsight. Developed during the 1920s as an
alternate, more accurate method of determining the aircraft ground speed, synchronization was
the process of measuring the telescope's rate of motion as it tracked a fixed point on the ground.
When the bombsight operator kept a target stationary under the crosshairs in the telescope lens,
the telescope movement rate was "synchronized" with the aircraft groundspeed, and given a
known altitude, measuring the bombsight telescope's movement rate enabled the easy derivation
of groundspeed through a simple geometric calculation. Synchronous bombsights essentially
3 Philip A. St. John, Bombardier: A History, Volume II (Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing Company, 1998), 23.
Sperry mated the Model 0-1 bombsight with their A-2 Autopilot, and although it was a less than
satisfactory combination, the system was installed in a group of B-17s that the United States sent to Great
Britain as a part of the Lend Lease Program before entering the war. It was the first coupled
bombsight/autopilot system used against the Germans in World War II. See this reference, p. 23.
Loyd Searle, "The Bombsight War: Norden vs. Sperry," IEEE Spectrum 26, no. 9 (1989): 60.
Albert L. Pardini, The Legendary Secret Norden Bombsight (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 1999), 53-67.
Mark XV was the Navy designation for the bombsight. The U.S. Army designated it the M-series
bombsight, and as it went through numerous improvements, it received a new number. The most famous
version was the M-9, fielded in October 1943. See ; St. John, Bombardier: A History, Volume II, 22.
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enabled the bombsight operator to construct the aircraft-target spatial relationship within the
bombsight by recreating the closing rate between the two in miniature.
While the M-Series bombsight was the first successful synchronized bombsight, George
Estoppey had actually developed the Air Corps' first one in 1929, the Estoppey D-5, but it was
overly complex and difficult to operate. The D-5 required the bombardier to directly control the
bombsight optical mechanism's rate of movement by manipulating a set of knobs and gears to
mechanically rotate the telescope to track a target on the ground. In addition to its mechanical
complexity and cumbersome operation, the D-5 used a less-effective pendulum stabilizer, left
over from Estoppey's stabilization efforts earlier in the decade. Although conceptually it showed
great promise, it was less accurate than older bombsights and was not produced.36
Norden's synchronizing mechanism was far superior. Rather than making the bombsight
operator manually control the telescope's rate of movement, the M-Series sight allowed the
operator to control the rate of motion indirectly by turning a knob on the side of the bombsight
that adjusted the speed of an electric motor, which, through a wheel and disk integrator, drove
the sight's optical mechanism. This greatly simplified operation made it much for the operator to
synchronize the bombsight on a ground target and made calculating the aircraft groundspeed
much easier and more accurate, making the bombsight sight truly useful, rather than just an
impressive concept demonstrator.
By inventing a practical leveling, synchronous bombsight, Carl Norden resolved two of
the major sources of bombing accuracy error with technology. Gyroscopic leveling compensated
for the ever-present aircraft oscillation and allowed the bombsight operator establish and
maintain a true vertical reference, controlling the bombsight's physical environment so that it
could accurately measure the data needed to calculate the location of the bomb release point.
The synchronous mechanism enabled the bombsight to obtain that data, allowing it to measure
the aircraft groundspeed and, as will be explained, the amount of drift, and use it to calculate the
bomb release point. The M-Series bombsight also eliminated many of the sources of human
error that caused bombing inaccuracy, but to understand how it did so, we must examine more
36 Julius King, Jr., Development ofAirborne Armament, 1910-1961: Volume I, Bombing Systems, AFSC Historical
Publications Series (Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Historical Division, Office of Information, Aeronautical
Systems Division, October 1961), 1-8 - 1-9; Toole, The Development ofBombing Equipment in the Army
Air Forces, 50.
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closely the bombsight itself, how it worked, and, most importantly, how the bombsight operator
used it.
Recreating Reality in a Machine-The Norden Bombsight and the Autopilot
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Figure 5.9 37
The Norden bombsight's major elements and functions, as depicted in Popular Science
Norden's bombsight was a true technological marvel, and while it was simpler than
Estoppey's D-5, it was still a very complex electro-mechanical computing and control device.
Developed originally for the Navy to bomb maneuvering ships from low altitude, its superior
accuracy made it, when paired with a long-range bomber, the technological realization of the Air
Corps' budding HADPB doctrine.38 The results of early Air Corps tests with the bombsight were
impressive, so much so that Norden and his business partner Ted Barth made the famous claim
that the bombsight could drop a bomb into a "pickle barrel" from 20,000 feet.39 The bombsight
Volta Torrey, "The War's Most Closely Guarded Secret Revealed: How the Norden Bombsight Does Its Job,"
Popular Science, June 1945, 71.
38 The M-Series bombsight went through several modifications to adapt it to high-altitude bombing. In addition to
allowing for longer bomb times of fall, the mechanism itself had to be machined to much tighter
engineering tolerances, as any errors within the bombsight mechanism translated to inaccurate bombing
results. Through its entire production run, Norden and the other companies subcontracted to produce the
bombsights during the war faced continual challenges maintaining these precise tolerances, and in several
cases, the Air Corps refused to buy units that did not meet specification. The entire story of the acquisition
and production of the M-Series bombsight is very complicated, encompassing bureaucratic jockeying
among the military services, patent infringement among the bombsight designers and developers, and
corporate efforts to monopolize the bombsight market. For more detail, see Case History ofNorden
Bombsight and C-1 Automatic Pilot, Parts I and II (Historical Office, Air Technical Service Command,
Wright Field, January 1945), 202.2-35 Part I and Part II, IRIS No. 142135 and 142136, US Air Force
Historical Research Agency; King, Jr., Development ofAirborne Armament, 1910-1961: Volume I,
Bombing Systems; Searle, "The Bombsight War: Norden vs. Sperry."; McFarland, America's Pursuit of
Precision Bombing; Paul McConnell, "Some Early Computers for Aviators," IEEE Annals of the History of
Computing 13, no. 2 (June 1991): 155-177.
This legendary, exaggerated claim was made many times by many people, and became the popular perception of
the United States' bombing capability. The pickle barrel and the M-Series bombsight became almost
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itself consisted of two major components that performed the functions depicted in Figure 5.9: the
stabilizer, containing the directional gyro and mounted on the bombsight pedestal in the
bombardier's compartment, and the sight head, the sighting and computing mechanism that
attached to the top of the stabilizer (Figure 5.10).
Figure 5.10
The Norden M-Series Bombsight. The sight head is the oblong-shaped unit in the upper right of the figure,
and the sight head is the boxy unit in the lower left. 40
The stabilizer served as the base of the bombsight and remained in the aircraft at all times
(Figure 5.11). It contained the directional gyro, which stabilized the aircraft on the yaw axis
when coupled to the Stabilized Bombing Approach Equipment (SBAE), or Minneapolis-
Honeywell (M-H) C-I Autopilot in later aircraft. The stabilizer was an integral part of the
synonymous during World War II. See McFarland, America's Pursuit ofPrecision Bombing, caption,
photo 1, page 44.40 Bombardiers' Information File (AAF Form 24B) (U.S. War Department, 1944), 6-1-1.
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method by which the Norden bombsight solved the course portion of the bomb release point
problem, and was the key machine that enabled the bombardier to "fly" the aircraft, which he
could do one of three ways: by using the controls on the autopilot control panel installed in the
bombardier's compartment, by moving the directional panel arm on the exterior of the stabilizer,
or by moving the bombsight head. All three methods were separate and used during different
phases of the mission.
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Figure 5.11
The stabilizer unit4 1
The bombardier's autopilot control panel was the same as the one installed in the pilots'
cockpit, and active only when the bombardier engaged the autopilot clutch on the stabilizer.
Commands from the pilot's panel, however, overrode the bombardier's commands, and it
operated as described in Chapter 3. The bombardier generally used the autopilot control panel
only if he had to adjust the autopilot settings prior to the bomb run, as it was not designed for
rapid, reactive maneuvering. For more reactive maneuvering, he could bypass the panel and turn
the aircraft with the autopilot clutch arm extension, located on top of the stabilizer and enabled
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41 Students' Manual: Bombing, 3-2-5.
by disengaging the directional arm lock. In this mode, the autopilot turned the aircraft when the
bombardier moved the arm to the side. The autopilot clutch arm extension was small, however,
and commanding turns in a bouncing aircraft was difficult when encumbered by the heavy
gloves necessary to ward off the extreme cold of high altitude. Later in the war, the arms were
modified with turn knobs that were easier to grasp and manipulate (Figure 5.12). In their
absence, many bombardiers chose to remove their heavy gloves and wear thinner, silk gloves so
that they had better manual dexterity, just as the navigator did when recording data in his Flight
Log.4 Bombardiers used this mechanism to turn the aircraft for evasive maneuvers during the
bomb run, until they switched to autopilot control through the bombsight.
Figure 5.12
The autopilot clutch arm extension turn knob 43
The Norden bombsight provided the third method by which the bombardier could steer
the aircraft. With the bombsight clutch engaged, the directional gyro detected changes in the
bombsight's lateral orientation as it rotated on top of the stabilizer, translating bombardier's
movement of the bombsight head into steering commands for the PDI and autopilot. As the
bombardier moved the bombsight to place the target under the crosshairs in the telescope, the
autopilot turned the aircraft to fly it to the appropriate bomb release point. While the autopilot
control panel, the autopilot clutch arm extension, and the bombsight gave the bombardier limited
control of the SBAE or M-H C-1 Autopilot, his human-machine relationship with the system was
fundamentally different from the one that developed between the pilot and the autopilot.
The pilot's relationship with the autopilot was one of shared control. The autopilot did
not perform a task that the pilot could not perform, rather, it performed a task-flying-more
42 Jack R. Myers, Shot at and Missed: Recollections of a World War H Bombardier (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 2004), 50.
43 Here 's How: Operation of the C-1 Autopilot (Minneapolis Honeywell Aeronautical Division, n.d.), 12.
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precisely than the pilot could. Its capability to do so added to the pilot's ability to perform his
primary job of aircraft or system control, and was his aid in accomplishing that job, but did not
change his fundamental role. With the bombardier, however, the autopilot did perform a task
that the bombardier could not. Without the autopilot, the bombardier could not fly the aircraft,
or effectively control it. Before the SBAE or C-1, the bombardier could only direct the pilot
through the PDI, and the pilot had to accept the directions before he acted, which gave him final
physical control authority over the aircraft and the mission. With them, the bombardier actually
acquired some direct control over the mission.44 The autopilot, as a machine, did fundamentally
change the bombardier's role from one of director to one of controller.
The bombardier needed the autopilot to accomplish the task of precision bombing, and
the autopilot was his cybernetic partner in that task (Figure 5.13). Each had a role in the limited
amount of flying that they together accomplished. It was the critical link between the
bombardier and the bombsight that made them into an effective, socio-technical bombardment
element.
Figure 5.13
The bombardier and his cybernetic autopilot partner45
Attached to the top of the stabilizer was the Norden bombsight head, which was an
appropriate name because contained the "brains" of the socio-technical bombardment element.
Its primary function was to calculate the location of the bomb release point based upon data
44 As explained in Chapter 4, that control was limited to the aircraft heading only. The bombardier could not change
the aircraft altitude, and the pilot controlled the throttles.
45 Bombardiers'Information File, 3-1-4.
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entered by the bombardier, data that defined the bombsight's physical relationship to the target.
The sight head was approximately 16 inches wide, 9 inches deep, and 12 inches high, and known
colloquially as the "Blue Ox," or the "football," because it was tapered at both ends (Figure
5.14).6 It contained the sighting optics and telescope, a direct current gyroscope for stabilizing
those optics, and the rate end, which was a mechanical computer for determining range, trail, and
the bomb release point.
Figure 5.14
The sight head 47
The rate end was the synchronous part of the bombsight, and the cognitive element in the
bombsight head. It solved for range, trail, and the bomb release point when the bombardier, after
entering environmental data such as the aircraft true airspeed, altitude, and drift angle,
synchronized the movement of the gyro stabilized optical mirror in the telescope with a target on
the ground. When the bombardier synchronized the optics with the target, the bombsight
determined the exact angle necessary to drop the bombs, and when the optics reached that angle,
it automatically released the bombs from the aircraft by transmitting an electrical signal to the
46 Philip A. St. John, Bombardier: A History, Volume I (Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing Company, 1993), 28;
Charles D. Bright, ed., Historical Dictionary of the U.S. Air Force (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992),
408; "Boeing Advertisement--Blue Ox," Life, January 25, 1943, 77.
47 Norden Bombsight, Photograph, n.d., U.S. Centennial of Flight Commission,
http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Dictionary/NORDENBOMBSIGHT/DI145G1.htm (accessed 22
March 2011).
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bomb rack. Achieving that synchronization, however, was a complex task requiring quick
perception and manual dexterity. 4 8
Interpreting and Defining the Environment
Before synchronizing on the target during the bomb run, the bombardier had to level the
bombsight stabilizer by adjusting a clamp on the base, referring to two bubble indicators while
the pilot had the aircraft flying straight and level and on autopilot. Achieving a good initial level
before sighting on the target prevented the need for large, time consuming vertical adjustments to
the optics during the bomb run. The bombardier then entered the aircraft bomb run altitude with
a knob on the side of the rate end. That knob controlled the speed of the electric motor that spun
a disk inside the rate end. In a no-wind situation, where the aircraft ground speed equaled the
true airspeed, that disk would rotate the bombsight optics at a rate equal to the aircraft movement
over the ground, so that an object viewed through the optics would appear stationary in range,
thus synchronized.
The bombardier also entered the trail value on the trail lever for the particular type of
bomb and the bombing altitude from a set of bombing tables, which positioned a roller on the
disk that was proportional to the trail value. This effectively subtracted the trail value from the
bombsight range calculation, telling the bombsight when to release the bomb to hit a target
synchronized in the telescope, and also provided an input to the crosstrail mechanism, which
determined the necessary lateral offset from the target. By setting the altitude and trail values in
advance, all that remained for the bombardier to accomplish during the bomb run was to
compensate for the aircraft drift so that the bombsight could calculate the final release point.
48
The following section on bombsight operation draws upon the following sources: Students' Manual: Bombing,
Chapter 4; Bombardiers'Information File, Chapter 6; McConnell, "Some Early Computers for Aviators."
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Figure 5.15
The vertical gyroscope leveling knobs 9
To complete the final synchronization on the target, the bombardier "uncaged" a
gyroscope encased in the rate end that stabilized the bombsight optics. This gyroscope made the
Norden bombsight "gyroscopically stabilized" by establishing and maintaining a true vertical
reference. Before proceeding further, the bombardier adjusted the gyroscope to level the optics,
using the same two bubble indicators used earlier to level the stabilizer base. He centered the
bubbles using two separate knobs to adjust the gyro in pitch and roll, turning them to place the
bubble on the central reference line (Figure 5.15).50
In stable air, the leveling process was relatively easy. The bombardier turned the knobs
to adjust first one axis, then the other, until both bubbles were centered. However, if the aircraft
was buffeted by weather or prop wash from the other aircraft in the formation, or if there was an
oscillation in the flight controls caused by a malfunctioning or misadjusted autopilot, the
bombardier had to interpret the bubble's motion, estimating the point where the optics were
level. Estimating the level from a moving bubble was an acquired skill, and inexperienced
bombardiers had to avoid becoming "bubble happy," a condition where they fixated on the
bubbles trying to achieve a perfect level to the point of distraction. The official USAAF Norden
bombsight training films cautioned against bubble happiness, because the preoccupied
bombardier usually failed to complete the rest of his tasks and subsequently missed his target.51
49 Students'Manual: Bombing, 4-3-10.50 Harvey C. Cragon, How the Norden Bombsight Works: From Sighting the Target to Bomb Release (Plano, TX:
Bradley Graphics and Printing, 2010), 59.
51 The Norden Bombsight: The Leveling System (Army Air Forces Training Film Production Laboratory, 1943).
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With the bombsight level and the bombing data set, all that remained for the bombardier
was to fix the crosshairs in the sighting telescope on the target and drop the bombs. If not
already accomplished, he engaged the bombsight clutch, coupling the bombsight to the autopilot,
visually acquired the target through the telescope, and attempted to place the crosshairs on the
target by "killing the drift" (Figure 5.16). He did this by observing the target movement relative
to the vertical crosshair in the sight, and then turned the bombsight in the direction of the motion,
in turn, telling the autopilot to turn the aircraft in that direction. Since he had preset the drift
angle and trail value prior to beginning the bomb run, the bombsight was already correcting for
the calculated aircraft drift, and all that remained was to fine tune the aircraft heading to account
for the difference between the predicted and actual crosswind component with a pair of coupled
knobs on the lower right side of the sight head.
Figure 5.16
The crosshairs in the bombsight telescope5 2
The outer knob changed the line of sight and the aircraft heading the same amount,
pointing the aircraft and the bombsight at the same point. The inner knob changed the aircraft
heading without changing the bombsight line of sight, with the directional stabilizer holding the
bombsight alignment (Figure 5.17). To counter any course error, the bombardier rotated both
knobs together to center the target under the crosshairs, in the process changing the bombsight
line of sight and the aircraft heading to account for drift. When used together, the knobs changed
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52 Students'Manual: Bombing, 5-2-6.
the aircraft heading five times as much as they changed the line of sight, orienting the aircraft
into the wind to counter crosswind drift. This simple mechanical coupling greatly simplified
the process of killing the drift by automatically compensating for the wind. The 5:1 fixed
movement ratio was not the exact solution for every situation, but it did establish a course very
close to the final course value, requiring only slight adjustment by the bombardier to get the
aircraft lined up on the final, correct course.
RESTRICTED
DRIFT KNOB
TURN KNOB
Figure 5.17
The drift and turn knobs54
As the bombardier rotated the bombsight, the crosstrail mechanism automatically tilted
the optics to maintain their alignment over the position on the ground, which enabled the
bombsight to automatically calculate the appropriate amount of total drift correction. Another
ingenious mechanical coupling, this mechanism enabled the bombardier to concentrate only on
lining up the vertical crosshair on the target, while the bombsight itself calculated and applied the
drift correction. Working together, these two mechanical calculators relieved the bombardier
from having to solve drift-compensation problems on his E6-B computer during the bomb run
while under fire.
After the bombardier established a stable course with little or no drift, he shifted to
synchronizing the bombsight in range. With the bombing altitude already set and the aircraft
course almost determined, synchronizing for range provided the final value necessary for the
Norden bombsight to "hit the pickle barrel"--the aircraft closure rate with the target, or its
53 The Norden Bombsight: Operation (Army Air Forces Training Film Production Laboratory, 1943).
54 Students'Manual: Bombing, 4-1-5.
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ground speed. The bombardier again had two knobs to adjust when solving for range; a
displacement knob that moved the sighting mirror in the bombsight telescope along the line of
sight that enabled him to place the horizontal crosshair on the target, and a rate knob, which
controlled the rate at which the sighting mirror rotated along the line of sight. After placing the
horizontal crosshair on the target with the displacement knob, the bombardier adjusted the rate
knob, moving the roller on the spinning disk in the rate end until the mirror rotated at a rate equal
to the rate of the motion of the target beneath the aircraft. As with the course, he did this through
a series of iterative adjustments, moving the horizontal crosshair onto the target with the
displacement knob and then adjusting the rate as necessary to keep it there. The sight was
synchronized when the crosshairs remained fixed on the target.
Through the process of synchronizing the bombsight in course and range, the bombardier
recreated the relationship between the aircraft and the target within the bombsight. The course
and crosstrail settings established the lateral displacement from the target, and the sighting angle
and bombing altitude established the vertical displacement. When the rate synchronization
recreated the aircraft groundspeed, it completed a model of this relationship in the idealized
space that the bombardier created when he established the "true" vertical and direction
references when he leveled and aligned the flight and directional gyros. It was, as aviation
computer historian Paul McConnell points out, a "true analog."5 5
With the bombsight fully synchronized and the data input, the final bomb release point
solution was complete. The bombsight automatically calculated the appropriate bomb release
angle from the altitude, trail, and ground speed values input by the bombardier, and when the
optics reached that angle, a set of electrical contacts came together and triggered the electric
signal that released the bombs. The Air Service Armament Laboratory at McCook Field in
Dayton, Ohio, tested the first electrical bomb release device in late 1922 or early 1923, and
although only a proof-of-concept, the device, which was designed to "release a bomb at an
instant unknown to the bomber himself' by setting it to trigger at a predetermined bombing
angle, worked perfectly.56 It represented a viable solution to errors related to human reaction
time, and Norden adapted the concept to the M-Series bombsight.
McConnell, "Some Early Computers for Aviators," 170.
56 Charles Paulus, Report on Automatic Bomb Sight for Use With Electrical Bomb Releasing Mechanisms (McCook
Field, Dayton, OH: War Department Air Service Engineering Division, February 8, 1923), 2, Box 829 File:
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The electrical release mechanism was automatic, but did not completely remove the
human from the bomb release process. The bombardier had to raise a release lever on the sight
head that acted as a "consent to release" switch. If the bombardier did not raise the lever, the
bombsight could not send the signal. He remained the final release authority for the bombs, so if
he deemed it inappropriate to drop them, he could prevent the bombsight from doing so. This
provided a measure of safety and the ability to avoid tragic mistakes, as illustrated by the actions
of bombardier Everly Crouser, lead bombardier on a post-D-Day strike against an intersection of
three roads in France. Upon identifying several hundred French citizens on the target,
celebrating and waving flags, Crouser chose to retain his bombs and bypass the target, rather
than kill French civilians. 57 When used, however, the electrical release mechanism was a key
component of the bombsight, and one that made it as accurate as it was.
The Norden M-Series bombsight was a powerful analog computer, capable of computing
the solution to a complex, three-dimensional trigonometric problem far faster than a human
being could do so, and when paired with the bombardier, they formed a powerful, complex
socio-technical unit focused on precision bombing. The bombsight combined the modern
technologies of gyroscopes and electronic switching with a disk and wheel integrator, a
mechanical computer whose use of proportional measurement has roots that stretch back through
centuries of analog computing devices, to compute the location of the bomb release point.58 it
automated the calculation of that point, simplified the process of flying to it, and automated the
release of the bombs, eliminating range errors due to the limitations of human reaction time.
However, it could not perform these functions without the bombardier, who interpreted and
defined the bombsight's physical environment, providing it both the data that it needed and the
capability to calculate that which he could not provide. Mastering that complex process of
interpreting and defining the environment--operating the bombsight-required expertise at a
specific human skill set, and the need for that expertise led to the creation of an "engineered"
human, whose identity would become completely defined by his ability to use the bombsight.
F-5G/1923- /Bombsights Automatic Bomb Sight for Use with Electrical Bomb Releasing
Mechanisms/Field Instructions, National Museum of the United States Air Force.
5 Everly G. Crouser, "People On The Target," in Bombardier: A History, Volume II, by Philip A. St. John
(Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing Company, 1998), 31.
58 Allan G. Bromley, "Analog Computing Devices," in Computing Before Computers, ed. William Aspray (Ames,
IA: Iowa State University Press, 1990), 163-168.
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Figure 5.18
The Norden M-Series bombsight in operation59
Solving the Problem-Engineering the Bombardier
The history of the development of the bombardier in the Air Corps shares many common
themes with the development of the navigator. Like navigation, the Air Corps' leadership long
considered bombing just another task for the bomber pilot-a necessary skill that he was
expected to perform as needed. As with the navigator, the bombardier did not exist as a
dominant, single-task, non-pilot technical specialist until the pressures of wartime expansion and
the HADPB doctrine forced his creation. Similarly, mastery of a specific machine and task
defined him and provided his personal and professional identity. Finally, even more so than
navigator training, bombardier training rigorously fused human and machine together into an
integrated, socio-technical man-machine.
While the bombardier did not exist as a dominant non-pilot entity before World War II,
Air Corps bombardment doctrine recognized the importance of the task of bombing and the need
for a specific member of the bomber crew to perform that task far sooner than for navigation.
59 Torrey, "The War's Most Closely Guarded Secret Revealed: How the Norden Bombsight Does Its Job," 71.
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Whereas the navigator appeared only in the earliest versions of the Air Corps Tactical School
(ACTS) Bombardment Text, and then only as "the bomber in the formation leader's plane," the
text discussed the role of the "bomber" in all versions, from the earliest through 1938, the last
year of the school's operation.60
The doctrinal use of the title "bomber" is itself instructive. It describes a specific task
rather than a specific profession. It is akin to calling a pilot a "flyer" rather than a pilot because
he or she performs the task of flying an airplane.61 The term "bomber" specifically identifies the
person as the task. The timing of the official shift to the use of the term bombardier, which
identifies the person who performs the task rather than the task itself, is unclear. Doctrinally,
bomber appeared at least as late as 1935, but by the publishing of the 1938 version of the ACTS
Bombardment text, bombardier was in use. Regardless of the exact timing of the shift, it
emphasizes that the Air Corps viewed bombing itself as a just a task.
From the earliest iterations of bombardment doctrine, the bomber's role as a technical
specialist associated with specific equipment was clear. The 1924-25 Bombardment text defined
the bomber's duties as follows:
to see that everything connected with carrying and releasing the bombs is
in proper condition. He supervises loading the bombs and the setting of
the release mechanism. He watches the fusing and accompanies the
armament officer in making a final inspection. He checks the condition of
his sight. When the bombs are loaded and fused a considerable time
before take-off, the safety pins are left in place in the fuses. The bomber
removes these just prior to take-off. He inspects his guns and ammunition.
He studies the route to be flown and, like the pilot, prepares himself to
know his location at any time during the mission. Particularly, he selects
prominent landmarks near the target by means of which he can orient
himself at all times despite the confusion which may prevail during the
attack. He consults with the pilot regarding altitude and speed of
bombing, and arranges signals to be used with the pilot and with the other
teams.
60 Bombardment: 1924-1925 (Langley Field, VA: Air Service Tactical School, 1924), 42. The paragraph headings
that described the roles of the Pilot and the Bomber both used capital letters in the 1924-25 text. Both the
navigator and gunner were listed with lower case letters, implying lesser importance. In the 1926 text and
beyond, the capitalization was dropped, but, as discussed previously, the navigator had disappeared by the
publishing of the 1930 text. For a history of the Air Corps Tactical School, see Robert T. Finney, History
ofthe Air Corps Tactical School: 1920-1940, USAF Historical Study 100 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Research
Studies Institute, USAF Historical Division, Air University, March 1955).
61 The term flyer is used today in the Air Force as a general label for aviators, but applies generically to those
involved in flying aircraft, such as pilots, navigators, and combat systems officers.
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The bomber must know the mechanism and operation of his bomb
rack as thoroughly as the pilot knows his motor. He must know the exact
amount of pull necessary to release the particular bomb to be carried. He
must understand the arming and safing device. He must be prepared to rid
the plane of any bomb which hangs in the rack. His operation of the bomb
sight must be automatic so that he is required to give it a minimum of
thought and attention (emphasis added).62
This description is interesting on three specific accounts. First, it narrowly defines the bomber's
duties as a list of specific tasks, and does so in terms of his equipment. His primary
responsibility was to understand and correctly operate the specific systems related to dropping
bombs, but also had a very specific list of actions to perform. Second, it essentially defines the
role of the bombardier who would fly in the heavy bombers in the CBO nearly twenty years in
the future. As this early text was based upon the experience gained during World War I, it
demonstrates that there was little change in the duties or view of the bombardier for several
decades. Bombing was a finite, defined task. Finally, it emphasizes the bombardier's operation
of the bombsight must be automatic, requiring little thought or attention. Even in 1924, when
bombsights were relatively simple devices, there was conscious recognition of the complexity of
precision bombing and that the bomber and the bombsight comprised a single man-machine unit
and that success demanded that they act as one.
Before World War II, the Air Service and Air Corps considered bombing primarily a
pilot's job. During World War I, most bombardiers were also qualified bomber pilots, but as
with navigation, a limited number of non-pilot Airplane Observers performed the function, as
well. Unlike navigation, however, the Air Corps allowed enlisted pilots to train as
bombardiers.63 After the war, as was the case with the navigator, there was strong resistance to
training non-pilots as bombardiers, but as bombsights became progressively more complex, that
attitude began to change. A belief grew, at least in some circles, that this increasing complexity
might eventually require further specialization, and that a need might arise for a technical
specialist whose only duty was to operate the bombsight.
62 Bombardment: 1924-1925, 41-42.
63 St. John, Bombardier: A History, Volume 1, 32; The existence and role of enlisted aviators, particularly pilots, in
the Air Corps and its successors is somewhat limited and beyond the scope of this project. For more on the
topic, see Lee Arbon, They Also Flew: The Enlisted Pilot Legacy 1912-1942 (Washington, DC:
Smithsonian Institution Scholarly Press, 1998).
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In 1936, Lieutenant Colonel C. L. Tinker, commander of the 7th Bombardment Group at
Hamilton Field, California, wrote a letter to the instructors at the ACTS addressing the role of the
bombardier as defined in the draft of the upcoming revision of the school's Bombardment text,
stating that
while the theory of each bombardier being a skilled pilot, machine gunner,
and radio operator is a desirable one, it is believed that the exigencies of
personnel procurement in war time will prohibit this. Particularly with the
advent of the large bombardment airplanes, it appears that individual
members of the crew must more and more specialize in their particular
responsibility, which will make it less probable that the bombardiers can
be thoroughly trained in each duty. 64
When Tinker wrote this letter in 1936, the Air Corps was already using a limited number of
Norden bombsights. As the commander of a bombardment wing, he had first-hand experience
with the technical complexity and difficulty operating the device, and understood the amount of
time and training necessary to make a bombardier's actions automatic enough for precision
bombing, and his comments about the "exigencies of personnel procurement in war time" would
prove particularly prescient.
As with navigator training, the Air Corps did not consolidate or standardize bombardier
training until forced by the personnel pressures associated with the World War II Air Corps
expansion programs. Until that time, the Air Corps trained bombardiers at the unit level in one
of its nine individual bombardment groups, five located in the United States and four overseas.
The overwhelming majority of the graduates of these schools were enlisted pilots, and although
each program addressed the basics of bombing, the curricula were not standard across groups,
and none approached the depth of instruction necessary to create true bombardment experts. 65
These pre-war unit-level schools produced many graduates, as by 1930, Air Corps policy
dictated that all of the pilots in bombardment squadrons qualify as bombardiers as part of their
normal duty responsibilities. However, just like navigation, most pilots viewed bombing as a
detractor that took them away from that which they loved-flying aircraft. For most, "dropping
64 Lt. Col. C. L. Tinker to Lt. L. Kuter, "Ltr. to Lt. Kuter re: Text on Bomb Aviation", April 24, 1936, Enclosed in
ACTS 1935 Bombardment text.
65 St. John, Bombardier: A History, Volume II, 11.
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bombs was a secondary occupation... and hitting a target was a sometime thing, and not always
important at that." 66 Bombing remained a task, while piloting the aircraft was their profession.
At the outset of the first wartime expansion program in 1939, the Air Corps faced a
similar situation with bombardiers as it did with navigators-the need to fill many more
requirements than they had pilots with which to fill them. Wartime planners forecast a necessary
bombardier-to-pilot ratio of approximately 1 to 5, which under the initial 30,000 pilot program
meant that the Air Corps needed to train almost 6,000 new bombardiers. Given time and
personnel limitations, the Air Corps could not continue its practice of first qualifying
bombardiers as pilots. Consequently, another non-pilot technical specialist was born when they
adopted the very idea of training non-pilots as bombardiers advanced five years earlier by Lt.
Col. Tinker, with an initial training plan to train 3,300 officer bombardiers and fill out the
requirement with enlisted trainees.67
The existing group bombardier schools could not handle the increased volume of
trainees, and when the forecast 50,000 pilot program called for over 11,000 bombardiers and the
70,000 pilot program over 14,000, the need for a centralized, high-capacity, formal training
structure, similar to the one being established for navigator training, became obvious. In April
1941, the inaugural class of 34 trained bombardiers graduated from the first formal bombardment
school, established at Lowry Field, Colorado. By the end of the war, the USAAF had opened 16
more schools and trained over 47,200 bombardiers. Interestingly, with the establishment of this
first school came the decision to stop training enlisted bombardiers and limit training to officer
candidates only, as was being done with pilots and navigators, and the last group of enlisted
bombardiers graduated from training on 19 December 1942.68
As with the navigation, it took a war to elevate bombing above the level of task and raise
it to the level of profession. The bomber had become the bombardier, and was a necessary
member of the bomber crew. However, his association with a specific machine-the
bombsight-more so than even the navigator, would define him as a professional and shape his
recruitment, training, and ultimately his use in combat.
66 Ibid., 12.
67 Ben R. Baldwin, Individual Training ofBombardiers, Army Air Forces Historical Study 5 (Washington, DC: U.S.
68 Army Air Forces Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Historical Division, May 1944), 8, 23.St. John, Bombardier: A History, Volume II, 12-13, 31; Baldwin, Individual Training ofBombardiers, 21-25.
275
Recruiting-Creating the Role and the Construction of the Bombardier
In a familiar theme, the initial plan for sourcing bombardier trainees was the same as the
plan for sourcing navigators-using pilot training washouts. Predictably, there were similar
concerns about poor morale among trainees and the bombardier training community resisted the
practice. However, unlike navigation, the number of recruits who volunteered for bombardier
training never met the required quota, as only 4-5% of Aviation Cadet recruits voluntarily opted
for bombardier training when given the option.69 Overwhelmingly, they preferred pilot training,
as reflected in the words of one B-29 navigator:
We were vaguely aware that there were such flying officers as navigators
and bombardiers, but no one ever joined the Air Corps to become one.
The pilots were the glory boys. They were the ones who got the publicity,
and it was their pictures that you saw in national magazines. I wanted to
be a pilot. In my mind it was either that or wash out. Other alternatives
had not even occurred to me.70
In short, most recruits wanted to drive the plane rather than ride in it. There was also an added
element of danger for the bombardier that may have negatively affected the number of
volunteers. The bombardier's crew position in all of the World War II heavy and very heavy
bombers was right in the front of the aircraft, where the bombardier was protected only by the
clear Plexiglas nose. It was the most exposed position in the aircraft, and bombardiers suffered
more casualties than any other bomber crewmember during the war.7 1 Throughout the war, the
USAAF had to continue using nonvolunteers and pilot training washouts as bombardiers.7 2
The Air Corps tried to alter this negative attitude in the same recruiting campaign that
had targeted mathematically oriented young men for navigation training. However, the
recruiting angle for bombardiers was not as clear, as it was difficult to determine who was best
suited for bombardier training. While high school graduates did perform better in bombardier
training than non-graduates, there was no clear link between specific academic qualifications and
success. Aviation Cadet Qualifying Examination results indicated strong correlation only
between performance on the reading comprehension section of the examination and completion
69 Baldwin, Individual Training of Bombardiers, 6.
70 Larry Nelson, Hellfor Honshu: An Army Air Corps Navigator Tells the Story of the World War II Bombing Raids
on Japan (Denver, CO: Outskirts Press, Inc., 2007), 19.
71 McFarland, America's Pursuit of Precision Bombing, 153-154.
72 Baldwin, Individual Training of Bombardiers, 7-8.
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of bombardier training. This was of little help, however, as it was not unique to bombardiers and
showed positive correlation for pilot and navigator training, as well. Performance on the
mechanical comprehension section showed some correlation, which makes sense as the
bombardiers worked with complex machinery, but this section was actually a better predictor of
success in pilot training.
Of interest, performance on the judgment section, which was the best section for
predicting pilot success, showed no correlation with success in bombardier training.73 In short,
bombardier training was structured to teach the trainee how to execute a set of instructions that
did not require the application of judgment. It recalls the quote from B-24 pilot William
Carigan, referenced in Chapter 3, that "bombardiers were chosen from those who gave quick and
erroneous answers." 74 Action and execution were important, and if the task were appropriately
structured and controlled, sufficient.
The USAAF recruiting effort that downplayed the role of the bomber pilot focused
attention on the bombardier as the essential team member who reliably accomplished his task.
Period recruiting materials emphasized the critical importance of flawless performance at the key
moment in the mission, describing the bombardier's duty as
performed in a matter of seconds-but the most important seconds of the
flight. At the crucial moment, when the bomber reaches its objective, the
bombardier takes over from the pilot. Upon his skill in landing his bombs
on the target depends the success of the entire mission.
Jimmy Stewart, in Winning Your Wings, stressed the bombardier's role as the central purpose for
the entire mission, describing him as
the boy who doesn't miss. You see flying the plane is wasted motion
unless this lad hits the target on the noggin. The finest pilots in the Air
Force would be behind the eight ball if the bombardier couldn't hit
straight.76
73 Robert L. Thompson, Initial Selection of Candidates for Pilot, Bombardier and Navigator Training, Army Air
Forces Historical Study 2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Air Forces Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Historical Division, November 1943), 39-44.
William Carigan, Ad Lib: Flying the B-24 Liberator in World War H (Manhattan, KA: Sunflower University
Press, 1988), 74.
7 5 Aviation Cadet Training for the Army Air Forces, n.d., 15.
76 John Huston, Winning Your Wings, Recruiting (U.S. Army Air Forces, 1942),
http://www.archive.org/details/WinningYourWings (accessed 12 December 2010).
277
A recruiting ad in Popular Science further emphasized the importance of the task itself,
portraying the bombardier as
the fellow who presses the button and "lays the eggs." When your ship is
over the target, you'll take charge-and deliver the "knockout punch." 77
The message was clear and consistent-the bomber and its crew existed so that the bombardier
could perform this essential task-bombing. The single task of bombing defined the
bombardier.
The ideas presented in the recruiting campaign did influence some recruits to choose
bombardier training. Bill Smallwood, a B- 17 bombardier who flew in the CBO, recounts that the
significance of the task was a factor in his decision. He volunteered after talking to a combat
veteran bombardier who made the situation clear when he said "if the bombardier doesn't
function successfully on a mission, the whole thing is futile." 78 Some enjoyed the concept of the
responsibility, while other factors, such as the desire to get into combat as quickly as possible,
also played a role. Although Smallwood was not alone in his decision, the Air Corps' recruiting
efforts were not as successful as those aimed at navigator recruits, and the majority remained
pilot training washouts and nonvolunteers.
Perception and Professional Identity
The bombardier's self identity was distinctly shaped by the ideas presented in the
wartime recruiting campaign. Of interest in the recruiting advertisement in Popular Science
mentioned above is the direct reference to pressing "the button." It conveys the idea of the
bombardier as a man of action, in control of the task of dropping the bombs. However, under
normal circumstances, the Norden bombsight had no button for the bombardier to press. The
bombardier set up the bombsight and, at the appropriate moment, the bombsight itself
automatically released the bombs so that the limits of human reaction time did not cause the
bombs to miss the target. The bombardier was not excluded from the process, as he still had to
raise the release lever on the bombsight, but the bombsight itself effectively dropped the bombs.
77 U.S. Army Recruiting Service, "You'll be on the Greatest Team in the World!," Popular Science, December
1943, 19.
78 Smallwood, Tomlin's Crew, 13.
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The concept of pressing that button as the central purpose of the mission, though, did
assign priority to the bombardier-nothing was accomplished until he pressed that button. It
produced a simple visual image of a single action that was the culmination of the entire mission
and concentrated the prestige of the bombing mission on the bombardier. Lt. Col. Charles
"Combat" Hudson, a bombardier during the CBO, captured it thus:
(the bombardier) had to fly the aircraft under the most harrowing
conditions, straight and level over the target, for the pilot who flies the
aircraft to and from the target never drops the bombs. The Norden
bombsight was the most sophisticated bombsight in the world. This
bombsight, through manipulations by the bombardier, takes into
consideration several factors, including air density, wind force and
direction, air and ground speed of the aircraft, drift, bomb configuration
and other readings. Then it gradually centers two cross-hairs on the target,
which might be miles ahead, telling the bombardier, who by now has
taken charge and is actually flving the aircraft, how to get into the exact
position and altitude and precisely when to drop the bombs (italics in
original, underline added).79
Hudson's professional image is clear. He is the master of the bombsight, which tells him when
to drop the bombs. Again, the importance of that single task is a reinforced as a defining
element. However, if this study illustrates nothing else, it is obvious that the precision bombing
system was far more than a single human or machine accomplishing one key function.
Also interesting is Hudson's statement that it is the bombardier, not the pilot, who is
flying the aircraft at the crucial, most harrowing moment during the mission. As described
above, however, many bombardiers were washouts from pilot training, having failed to learn to
fly, and he makes no mention of the autopilot that allows him to "fly" the aircraft. While the
action of dropping the bombs is built up as the culmination of the entire crew's efforts, which
should be recognition enough of professional value, he finds it necessary to present that the
bombardier, by flying the aircraft, assumed control of the mission from the pilot.
By implying that it was he, rather than the pilot, flying at the critical point in the mission,
he is intentionally downplaying the pilot's role and skill, but it is a skill that he himself wished to
possess. In fact, there was even an attitude among the bombardier community that regarded
pilots as "glorified chauffeurs," whose only purpose was to deliver the bombardier to the point
79 Robin Neillands, The Bomber War: The Allied Air Offensive Against Nazi Germany (Woodstock, NY: Overlook
Press, 2001), 169.
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where he would assume control of the aircraft, and hence the mission, to accomplish their real
purpose. 80 That image of the bombardier as the master of the bombsight and the single living
purpose of the bombing mission is, however, misleading. The bombardier was, in fact, the
product of an extensive training program that focused on creating a single, interdependent socio-
technical bombardment unit that performed the task of precision bombing.
Combining the Socio and the Technical-Training and the Making of the Man-Machine
Just as early bombsight designers understood the technological and human shortcomings
that contributed to bombing error, so to did they recognize the importance of experience and
adequate bombardier training. After World War I, Henry Inglis summed up the relationship
between experience and accuracy thus:
The usual late war types of bombsights provide a considerable degree of
accuracy, but only in the hands of trained teams because they allow too
many personal errors of operation. Results are erratic because of varying
degrees of experience. 1
Experience could only be gained with time, but the bombardier training schools set up during
World War II were structured to provide the repetitive training that would turn the bombardier
recruit and his bombsight into a single, socio-technical man-machine.
The USAAF conducted bombardier training in two stages. The first stage, initial
training, is the focus of this discussion, and during that time, the bombardier trained only with
other bombardiers, learning the basics of bombardment. It was in initial training that the
bombardier learned how his particular tools operated and how to use them, as its purpose was to
produce an
individually qualified specialist, whose experience in teamwork (was)
limited almost entirely to that of pilot-bombardier cooperation and
who.. .had little or no experience in bombing from tactical aircraft and at
maximum altitudes.82
80 1st. Lt. I. Brown, "Training Aids-Victorville," in Trajectory (The Army Air Forces Instructors School
(Bombardier), 1943), 6.
81 Quoted in Toole, The Development of Bombing Equipment in the Army Air Forces, 5.
82 Baldwin, Individual Training of Bombardiers, 4.
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The second stage, operational training, was conducted with the rest of the bomber crew, but
focused on the more general conduct of a combat mission, and is beyond the scope of this study.
During that stage, the crew learned how to operate as a complete team and employ their aircraft
and weapon systems in a more combat representative manner, dropping bombs from maximum
tactical altitudes using combat tactics. 83
The length of the initial training stage varied throughout the war, as the need for
bombardiers in the combat theaters fluctuated. Shortest prior to June 1943, when the operational
need was the most pressing, it lasted 12 weeks. Graduates of this program were notably deficient
in many areas, including basic performance and problem solving. As the war progressed, the
program lengthened first to 18 weeks, and eventually to 24 weeks to incorporate more training
and better prepare the graduates for combat. 84 Ground training comprised the majority of each
program, during which, in addition to learning basic bombing theory, trainees focused on
learning how to operate their bombing equipment, including the bombsight, bomb racks, and the
AFCE or the C-I Autopilot. The aerial portion of the training program focused on two primary
areas: gaining enough proficiency with the bombing equipment to be able to drop consistently
accurate bombs, thus achieving the qualifying score necessary for graduation, and developing
smooth pilot-bombardier coordination.
Bombardier initial training revolved around the bombsight. It was during this time that
the bombardier and the bombsight became a single system. Most bombardiers trained on the
Norden M-Series bombsight, although through the middle of 1943, bombardiers destined to fly
the B-24 trained with the Sperry S-I sight. Troubles with reliability, accuracy, and availability
limited that sight's usefulness, and eventually caused the USAAF to discontinued using it.85
During training, recruits learned how to operate, repair, and calibrate these bombsights, while
also learning the theoretical elements of the bombing problem. The bombsight was at the center
of almost everything that they did, and they used specialized training devices, both on the ground
and in the air, to increase their familiarity and proficiency operating it.
83 Ibid., 54.
84 St. John, Bombardier. A History, Volume 11, 13-14; Baldwin, Individual Training of Bombardiers, 49-52.
85 The decision to discontinue the use of the Sperry S-1 bombsight has been debated several times. See Searle, "The
Bombsight War: Norden vs. Sperry" for a good summary of the argument for continuing the use of the
Sperry sight. The best sources for information on the acquisition and performance of both systems are
Case History of Norden Bombsight and C-I Automatic Pilot, Parts I and HI; Case History of S-I and A-5
Automatic Pilot (Wright Field, OH: Historical Office, Air Technical Service Command, June 1945), 202.2-
14 V.1 and V.2, IRIS No. 142110 and 142111, US Air Force Historical Research Agency.
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Procedure and Human Mechanization
On the ground, the bombardier first learned how to use the Norden in the skeletal A-2
bombsight trainer, a moving tricycle tower that held an operable bombsight and seats for the
bombardier, an instructor, and a "pilot" (Figure 5.19). During a training run, the bombardier
operated the bombsight just as he would in a bomber aircraft, attempting to "bomb" a target on
the floor. The target, or "bug," was small metal box, propelled by an electric motor, and its
movement simulated airborne drift. As the bombardier operated the bombsight, it passed
steering commands to the pilot on a PDI, just like in the aircraft. When the A-2 reached the
simulated bomb release point, an observer noted the bombsight position and recorded the
"bombing" result.86
Figure 5.19
Norden bombsight A-2 ground trainer87
86 The Norden Bombsight: Operation.
87 St. John, Bombardier: A History, Volume 1, 18. This photograph shows the bombardier seated at the base of the
trainer, looking through the bombsight, and the "pilot" peering out from behind the instructor's seat at the
top of the structure. The light-colored box-like device on the ground in front of the trainer is the bug. For
the run pictured, the bombardier is simulating a bombing attack from an altitude of 1,500 feet. For a higher
altitude simulation, he would sit in the top right seat with the bombsight installed in front of his position.
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In addition to providing training on the bombsight, the A-2 provided valuable crew-
coordination training between the bombardier and the simulator pilot. The bombardier learned
how his actions influenced the "aircraft" flight path. Later in the war, bombardiers trained in the
more advanced A-6 trainer, which simulated the bombardier's ability to control the aircraft with
the bombsight coupled to the autopilot (Figure 5.20). Trainees spent many hours in these
simulators, as repetition was the key to learning the procedures for operating the bombsight.
Co**st Pomos s n uss w maest mn,, ase
Figure 5.20
The A-6 Bombing Trainer, as depicted in the June 1945 issue of Popular Science.
Airborne training built directly upon the ground simulator training, once again using a
real bombsight in specially designed equipment. The trainees flew practice-bombing missions in
a modified Beech AT-i11 that had a Norden bombsight installed behind the Plexiglas nose of the
aircraft, similar to those installed on combat bombers (Figure 5.21). Two trainees flew on each
training mission with one instructor, taking turns dropping individual practice bombs on targets
located on a bombing range. The aircraft provided a more realistic environment and presented
more challenges for the trainee, from varying winds that changed the aircraft drift, to haze that
obscured the target, and turbulent air that upset both bombing solutions and the trainees'
stomachs. They dropped only one bomb at a time so that they could make multiple bombing
attacks during each sortie. Again, repetition was the key to success.
88 Torrey, "The War's Most Closely Guarded Secret Revealed: How the Norden Bombsight Does Its Job," 73.
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Coordination with the pilot received special emphasis in the air, as it did on the ground.
Effective coordination between the bombardier and pilot was as critical to precision bombing as
the ability to use the bombsight, both when using the PDI or, later, when using the C-1
Autopilot.89 When the bombardier was controlling the aircraft flight path, the pilot still had a
pivotal role, whether following the PDI or controlling the throttles while using the C-1, and was
thus included as a part of the small socio-technical system with the bombardier and his
bombsight. The success of the system depended upon all of the human and machine elements
working together harmoniously.
Figure 5.21
Beech Aircraft AT-11 90
Both the A-2 and the AT-11 gave the trainees many opportunities to practice the tasks
that they would perform on an actual combat mission. The ground and air training was
structured around repetition. Throughout each training event, their instructors preached the
mantra-"follow procedure, follow procedure." 91 Procedure was drummed into their heads in an
89 Baldwin, Individual Training of Bombardiers, 110.
90 Beech AT-1], Photograph, n.d., National Museum of the United States Air Force,
http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/050520-F-1234P-040.jpg (accessed 4
January 2011). Note that a censor has blacked out the lower portion of the nose in this picture to hide the
Norden bombsight.
91 Smallwood, Tomlin 's Crew, 34.
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effort to make their actions automatic. Unlike the navigator, who had his Flight Plan and Flight
Log to guide actions, the bombardier had to learn his by rote and be prepared to execute them
under the extreme pressure of the most stressful, dangerous portion of the mission-the bomb
run. The Norden bombsight had automatic functions that reduced the opportunity for human
error during bombing, and the bombardier training program did its best to mechanize the human
to the maximum extent possible, as well.
Bombardier and Bombsight-Bonding the Socio-technical
Through the training program, the emphasis on procedure and repetition did bring the
bombardier and bombsight together into a socio-technical unit, effectively thinking, acting, and
perceived as one. Training films intentionally portrayed the bombsight as "part of (the
bombardier's) brain," and its use even left a physical mark, fusing the bombardier's public image
with the device.92 The cover of the 18 May 1942 edition of Life magazine captures the iconic
image of the World War II bombardier, a black ring around his right eye, left there by the rubber
protective pad installed over the bombsight's optics to protect him injury during the turbulence
of flight (Figure 5.22). That black eye was the mark of the bombardier-it made him instantly
recognizable, as no other crewmember had one, or anything comparable for that matter.
92 The S-1 Bombsight: Principles (Army Air Forces Training Film Production Laboratory, 1943).
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Figure 5.22
The bombardier with his blackened right eye 9
The bombardier's bond with the bombsight extended, however, beyond a temporary
tattoo or the stretched concept of a man and machine thinking as one. The bombardiers also
made an emotional commitment to the bombsight. The Norden bombsight was a very expensive,
secret device, and they swore an oath to protect the secrecy of its existence and its operation. 94
93 William C. Shrout, Bombardier, May 18, 1942, Life Magazine.
94 Although often referred to as America's worst-kept wartime secret, the Norden bombsight's existence was not
officially acknowledged until 1944, when the New York Times revealed that the United States had
provided them to Russia that spring. See McFarland, America's Pursuit of Precision Bombing, 206.
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Cadet Oath
In the presence ofAlmighty God, I do solemnly swear and affirm that I
will accept the precious trust placed in me by my Commander in Chief the
President of the United States ofAmerica by whose direction I have been
chosenfor Bombardier Training.
I pledge myself to live and act according to the Code of Honor of the
Bombardiers of the Army Air Forces. I solemnly swear that I will keep
inviolate the secrecy of any and all confidential information revealed to
me, and in the full knowledge that I am a guardian of one of my country's
most priceless Military assets, do further swear to protect the secrecy of
the American Bombsight, if need be, with my life itself'"
In addition to protecting their knowledge of the bombsight and its operation, bombardiers were
directed to attempt to destroy it at all costs if there was any possibility that it might fall into
enemy hands. The exact method of destruction was not prescribed, but shooting was mentioned
as an option, although it was unlikely that this would sufficiently disable it, as one bombardier
noted, "that would only lead to bullets bouncing around the cockpit-they were tough little
instruments." 96
Figure 5.23
A bombardier cadet class taking the oath before seeing the Norden bombsight for the first time
While some may question the true gravity of an oath in which a human swears to protect
a mechanical instrument with his life, some bombardiers took it very seriously. Lt. Bill
95 Through the Crosshairs: Classbook for Bombardier Class 43-11 (Big Spring, TX: United States Army Air Forces
Advanced Bombardier School, 1943). Some considered the oath "superfluous," as soldiers already took an
oath to destroy equipment before it fell into enemy hands. See McFarland, America's Pursuit of Precision
Bombing, 276, note 18.
9 6 Neillands, The Bomber War, 169.
97 Taking the oath before seeing the secret Norden bombsight on the table, Photograph, n.d.,
http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/0505 2 0-F-1234P-038.jpg (accessed 7
January 2011), National Museum of the United States Air Force.
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Smallwood, a B-17 bombardier who was shot down and injured on 25 February 1944 during the
massive Regensburg mission, actually crawled back into the nose compartment of his stricken
bomber after helping other crew members escape, and shot his bombsight three times with a Colt
.45 automatic pistol before bailing out himself. His rationale? At bombardier school, he had
been trained "never to allow the enemy to get hold of the Norden sight."98 Smallwood's actions,
though likely ineffective, and willingness to risk his own life to protect the secrecy of the
bombsight, demonstrated some measure of the attachment between the bombardier and the
bombsight.
Through the repetition of the bombardier training program, with its specialized training
devices and focus on procedure, the bombardier and bombsight became a single socio-technical
unit. They were inseparable, with both defined by their shared function-precision bombing.
Together, they were the result of over twenty years of effort to reduce the technological and
human sources of error in bombing. The bombsight enabled the bombardier to perform
functions that a human could not perform unassisted, such as calculating the location of the
bomb release point in real time, directing the aircraft precisely to that point, and releasing the
bombs upon the instant of arrival. The bombardier interpreted and created the environment that
allowed the bombsight to perform those functions. Through technology and training, they were
automated as much as was possible at the time to ensure that they, as a unit, could perform under
the pressure of the most stressful portion of the bombing mission-the bomb run. The
bombardier, as the human part of that unit, was the one gathered with the rest of the members of
the bomber crew in the General Briefing room on the morning of their bombing mission.
The Purpose-Dropping Bombs and Hitting Targets
The Norden M-Series bombsight, with its ability to calculate the bomb release point,
accurately direct the aircraft to that point, and release the bombs at the instant that the aircraft
arrived, technologically eliminated most of the sources of bombing error. However, it was still
dependent upon the bombardier for two critical functions: first, find, identify, and track the
target, and second, interpret and enter the environmental data that the bombsight needed to
perform its calculations. The bombardier accomplished these actions in the air, but, as with
navigation, prepared for them extensively on the ground beforehand, beginning with mission
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98 Smallwood, Tomlin's Crew, 152.
planning. It was during that time that he learned the details of the mission and acquired the
essential data the enable him to construct a mental model of the mission that would guide his
actions in the air.
The Bombardier's Briefing
During the General Briefing, attended by all of the crewmembers, the bombardiers
learned the basics of the mission for the day, including details about the Initial Point (IP), axis,
altitude, and airspeed of the bomb run, as well as operational data about the target and aiming
point. The briefer also provided information on bomb loading, fuzing, fuel, ammunition, and
any special tactics planned for the mission.99 As with the rest of the crewmembers, it was the
first time that most of them found out where they were going that day. It was in the separate
Bombardier's Briefing afterward that they learned the essential details that would dictate their
actions during the mission (Figure 5.24).
At the bombardier's briefing, the Group Bombardier concentrated on the specifics and
mechanics of the bomb run. As with the Group Navigator, this bombardier rose to his position
based upon demonstrated excellent performance and was responsible for the group's mission
planning. Each bombardier received a flimsy containing bombing-specific information,
including the forecast winds and weather coverage over the target and precomputed bombing
data. This precomputed data included the planned altitude and airspeed for the bomb run, as well
as values for the bombsight trail setting and the bomb dropping and sighting angles. The values
were preliminary, as they were computed with forecast weather data, but served as initial
planning factors and could function as a check on the bombardier's inflight calculations, where
large deviations from the printed data could reveal errors made under the pressure of the bomb
run.' 00 After reviewing the data, the bombardiers' attention shifted to their primary function as
the human element of the bombardment unit-preparing to find and identify the target.
99 Bombardiers'Information File, 8-2-1.
100 Ibid., 8-2-1 
- 8-2-2.
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Figure 5.24
The Bombardier Brief 10 1
Mechanizing the Human-Building the Visual Mental Model
Finding and identifying the target was the bombardiers' final necessary task before
dropping his bombs. They spent the rest of the brief studying the planned flight route from the
IP to the bomb release point, reviewing maps, photographs, and other visual aids that would
enable them to construct a visual mental model of the upcoming mission so that they could
recognize the target when they arrived. Target location and identification was a crucial skill, and
in the words of one bombardier, "in many ways the bombardier that was able to locate and
recognize the target the soonest was the one that was the most successful."1 0 2 The maps and
photographs were collected into two types of folders. The first, the air objective folder, contained
an index of the targets in the area and provided a general description of the region and specific
targets, with extensive maps and photographs covering the entire target area. It remained on the
ground and the Group Bombardier and his staff used it for mission preparation only. The
second, the targetfolder, the mission bombardiers carried with them for reference during the
mission.
101 Bombardier briefing, Photograph, n.d., US Air Force Historical Research Agency,
http://www.afhra.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/080305-f-3927P-028.jpg.
102 Myers, Shot at and Missed, 212.
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Figure 5.25
8th Air Force target folder 10 3
The standard target folder used in the ETO was made from four sheets of 14-by-i 6-inch
heavy acetate, stitched together on three sides to form a booklet. The top was open so that the
bombardier could insert maps into the pockets, and the booklet was stiff so that he could stand it
on end beside him in the aircraft for ready reference (Figure 5.25). 104 The contents of the folder
varied, depending upon the amount of information available, but they generally contained
essential maps, photographs, and charts, arranged in the order that they would be needed on the
mission. Additionally, they might include regional or sectional aeronautical charts, scaled to
show the route to and from the target area, but little detail (Figure 5.26). Charts covering the
final phase of the target run, scaled at 1 inch to 4 nautical miles were included. These charts
centered on the primary target and displayed prominent landmarks such as railroads, highways,
water, and land elevations within a twelve-mile radius. They also showed the location of
alternate targets within a four-mile radius, available for attack in the event weather or smoke
obscured the primary target.10 5
103 Bombardiers'Information File, 8-3-2.
104 Ibid., 8-3-1.
105 Leroy W. Newby, Target Ploesti: Viewfrom a Bombsight (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1983), 222; Bombardiers'
Information File, 8-3-2.
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Figure 5.26
Regional chart of iPloesti, Rumania, from a target folder 106
For rapid, final target identification, the bombardiers also carried specialized target
charts and perspectives (Figure 5.27). The target charts were large scale, vertically oriented
charts centered on the target area, but eliminated many of the usual details included on
navigational charts, displaying only clear, geographical and cultural features that could assist in
target location. For example, they displayed the general shape of the city, the dominant land and
water patterns, railroads, and main highways, but did not show the entire street structure. The
chart included five perspectives that displayed the target area from likely axes of approach,
presenting a slant-view picture of the target area that showed how the terrain would look from
the mission altitude.10 7 The bombardiers used these and the other charts in the target folder to
familiarize themselves thoroughly with the entire route from IP to the target so that they could
quickly locate their position and, through pin-point pilotage navigation, direct the aircraft toward
the target.
106 Newby, Target Ploesti, 222.
107 Bombardiers 'Information File, 8-3-2 - 8-3-4.
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Figure 5.27
Circular Target Chart and Perspectives10 8
While the bombardier studied charts to learn the route to the target area, he also had to
study the target itself, so that he could rapidly identify the specific aim point for his bombs
among what might be a very large, complex industrial installation. When available, the Group
Intelligence Officer projected target area photographs onto a large screen and pointed out the
individual bombing aimpoints, as well as prominent physical features that would help the
bombardiers locate them. The air objective folder also usually contained target area photographs
for reference, taken from both vertical and oblique perspectives. The oblique photos were
generally more useful for target recognition, as they represented the actual view that the
bombardier would have during the target run. He would not see the target from the vertical
perspective until the aircraft was flying over the target, after he had already released his
bombs.109 As the war progressed, target photographic coverage increased, as each bomber had a
camera in the bomb bay that recorded the aircraft's bomb impact locations. The target area
photographs were obviously very useful for target recognition, as they showed detail that was
293
108 Ibid., 8-3-4.
109 Ibid., 8-3-5.
absent from the charts in the target folder. If enough were available, bombardiers were
authorized to carry them in their target folders on the mission.
In December 1943, the 1 st Bombardment Wing (Heavy) discovered a method of making
target study and recognition easier and more effective by constructing lifelike models, or "target
tables," that reconstructed the target area in miniature. Based on a technique developed by the S-
2 (Intelligence Officer) in a B-26 group, members of the wing planning staff built physical mock
ups of individual target areas on linoleum-topped legless tables. To construct a model, they
projected a target area photograph onto a tabletop with an epidiascope, and then sketched the
target outlines with chalk." 0 They applied dyed sawdust to simulate fields, sealing it in place
with shellac, built buildings of wood bits and plastic, and drew in roads, rivers, and lakes with
colored chalk, creating a three-dimensional model that the bombardiers could examine from any
angle. The models were very useful, and by February, the Wing had refined the process to the
point that they could produce them overnight, between the initial receipt of the Field Order and
the briefing time the next morning.'"
The bombardiers used all of this information, from the charts, photographs, and models,
to create a list of checkpoints along the route, identifiable features on the ground that they could
use to guide the aircraft to the target. Suitable ground references included anything distinct that
they could see and identify from the mission bombing altitude, both natural and manmade,
including river bends, prominent mountain peaks, storage tanks, railroad crossings, stadiums, or
any other contrasting objects. European targets, generally in or near cities, usually provided
several cultural features suitable for use as checkpoints, whereas for targets in the Far East,
which at the early stages of the war were on small Pacific islands, bombardiers had to rely upon
geographic relief or distinct land and water combinations for recognition." 2
Choosing appropriate checkpoints was a skill that bombardiers (and navigators)
developed with experience. The bomb run altitude was a large factor in determining what types
of ground features would be appropriate for selection. On high altitude missions, by far the most
common in the ETO, the bombardier's perspective was much broader and more features were
110 An epidiascope is a device that can project opaque or transparent images onto a screen. It uses bright light to
illuminate the image and then focuses and projects it through a series of prisms and mirrors.
S"1st Combat Bombardment Wing (H): Unit History 1 February, 1944 to 29 February, 1944", 1944, 4, Call WG-
1-HI 1 Feb 44-29 Feb 1944, US Air Force Historical Research Agency.
112 Bombardiers' Information File, 8-3-6 - 8-3-7.
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visible, but they lacked detail. On these missions, the emphasis was on the use of combinations
of large features or shapes, such as bridges crossing rivers or the shapes of city boundaries for
checkpoints.
As navigating to the target by this technique was an entirely visual exercise, adverse
weather could severely affect the bombardiers' ability to locate the target. A cloud layer beneath
the aircraft could obscure those key checkpoints, and without any valid location reference,
prevent the formation from accomplishing its mission. Poor weather in the ETO was a constant
problem during the CBO, particularly in the winter months. Frequently, poor weather over
England would prevent the bomber formations from taking off, and even when they could,
weather over continental Europe would often cause them to either bomb alternate targets or
return to England with their bombs. During January 1943, the 8 th AF accomplished only four out
of fourteen planned missions, and February was little better, with five effective missions.
Although the weather improved in the spring, weather was still a major factor, allowing nine
missions in March, four in April, and another nine in May.11 3
Weather was less a factor on the low altitude missions that 1 5 ,h Air Force bombers
occasionally flew against targets in Europe from their bomber bases in the Mediterranean
Theater of Operations, but the bombardiers faced other navigation challenges. At low altitude,
the perspective was much narrower and fewer prominent features were visible from the aircraft,
although those that were appeared in more detail. While low altitude bomb runs could provide
the valuable element of surprise, the apparent motion of the ground beneath the aircraft was
much faster than at higher altitudes, and the bombardier had far less time to find and identify
ground features, making navigation very difficult. Upon hearing that the final portion of the 15th
Air Force B-24 raid against the Nazi oil facilities in Ploesti, Rumania, on 1 August 1943 was
flown at an altitude of thirty feet, one exasperated 8th Air Force navigator was amazed,
commenting that navigation at that altitude was impossible, as "the terrain went by too fast to
locate it on the map. The mission was surely planned by the pilot."" 4
The bombardier's final step during the route and target study process was to distill all of
the information gathered during the mission planning process into a single route map that
113 Arthur B. Ferguson, The Early Operations of the Eighth A ir Force and the Origins of the Combined Bomber
Offensive 17 August 1942 to 10 June 1943, U.S. Air Force Historical Study 118 (Washington, DC: U.S.
114 Army Airforces Historical Office, October 1946), 215.Crosby, A Wing and a Prayer, 108.
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covered the portion of the mission from the IP to the target. He plotted the briefed bombing
approach course and marked his checkpoints on the map, and then used a plotter to construct
multiple axes of attack, providing references for numerous possible approaches to the target
should they be needed if the formation diverge from the primary route for any reason. Placing
these alternate routes on the map put them in relation to his chosen checkpoints, and increased
his chance of finding the target (Figure 5.28). This final map simplified the bomb run, distilling
it down to a single, handy reference that contained only that information absolutely necessary for
flying the route and finding the target.1 5 All of the hard work and preparation that went into
creating it, in the words of one B- 17 pilot, "paid off handsomely in allowing (the bombardier) to
distinguish the target under most unfavorable conditions, like cringing from pink bursts of flak
and uncontrolled aircraft."" 6
Figure 5.28
A sample IP to target run map
115 Bombardiers'Information File, 8-3-9.
116 Robert L. Hughes, "'Black Thursday' - 14 Oct 43", n.d.,
http://www.100thbg.com/mainpages/history/history4/blackthursday.htm.
117 Bombardiers'Information File, 8-3-9.
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The bombardier's final target route map was, much like the navigator's Flight Plan and
Mission Map, a sequential script for the bomb run. Each checkpoint marked another step toward
the target. The process of preparing that map, the combination of the aeronautical chart study,
photograph study and physical model study produced not only a physical guide to the target, but
a visual mental model, as well. Through the integration of all of the visual data, the bombardier
constructed an expectation of what he should see during the bomb run. That visual model
became a part of the collective cognition that he would share with the Norden bombsight during
the mission. The bombsight could calculate the bomb release point better than the human, but it
did not know where the target was until told by the bombardier. It depended upon the
bombardier to find and identify the target.
The Bombardier's Kit-Translation Tools and Interpreting the Environment
The bombsight was the bombardier's primary "tool," but he also used a variety of other
specialized calculation and translation instruments that enabled him to "talk" to the bombsight-
provide it the data that it needed to compute the bombing solution. Every student and graduate
bombardier was issued a zippered, cloth case that contained those other tools, the items that the
bombardier needed to set, operate, and adjust his bombsight. Enclosed were navigation tools,
such as draftsman's dividers and parallel rule, a Weems plotter, pencils, erasers, and transparent
triangles, as well as instruments for setting, using, and adjusting his bombsight. These included
at least four manual bombing computers, bombing tables, dropping angle charts, a stopwatch,
pliers, and a screwdriver." 8 He carried this case with him, in addition to his target folder, on
every mission.
The navigation tools were critical, because they enabled the bombardier to make any
necessary alterations to his charts or route plan if the mission changed once the formation got
airborne. He also used them to perform one of his primary alternate tasks-navigation. The
bombardier served as the backup navigator on the bomber crew, and his responsibility was to
take over that task should the navigator become incapacitated or killed during the mission.' 19 He
was expected to be as adept with the E6-B as the navigator and have the ability to guide the
118 St. John, Bombardier: A History, Volume I, 31.
119 B-24: Pilot Training Manualfor the Liberator (Headquarters AAF, Office of Flying Safety, 1944), 239.
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aircraft back home, if necessary, providing a welcome redundant capability for the aircraft level
of the bombardment system.
Calculation and Interpretation-Quantifying the Environment
The most important items in the bombardier's kit were his manual computers, which
enabled him to interpret the bomber's physical environment-altitude, airspeed, and drift-and
"communicate" it to the bombsight. The computer used most often during the mission was the
E6-B, as it provided the most capability to compute solutions to the general bombing and
navigation problems that might arise.12 0 Its capacity to solve multiple types of problems made it
very useful calculations where accuracy was important, but did not require a great deal of
precision. He used it just as did the navigator to compute the initial aircraft drift readings, which
he used as a starting point when setting up the Automatic Bombing (AB) computer, which
provided a much more precise value that was appropriate for the bombsight.
The three other manual computers in the bombardier's kit provided the capability to
compute the more precise data required by the bombsight for precision bombing. The C-2, G- 1,
and J- 1 computers were purpose-built, each for a specific calculation, and more accurate than the
E6-B. They were larger and less complex than the E6-B, enabling greater accuracy, but were
easier to manipulate and read in flight during the high-pressure, time-compression of the bomb
run. The C-2 computer (Figure 5.29) was a circular slide rule, used to calculate the aircraft's
bombing altitude, which was the aircraft height above the target at the time of bomb release. The
bombardier calculated it using the target pressure altitude, obtained during the pre-mission
briefing, aircraft pressure altitude above the target, calculated inflight with the E6-B, and the
mean outside air temperature, which he read directly from the thermometer readout on his left-
side instrument panel. Although the E6-B could perform the same calculation, the C-2 had a
larger scale, enabling more precise calculations, and two clear plastic, swinging reference arms
that made it easier to rapidly set up and read while wearing gloves in the extreme cold of high
altitude flight.
120 St. John, Bombardier: A History, Volume I, 32.
298
Figure 5.29
C-2 Bombing Altitude Computer12'
The G-l computer (Figure 5.30) calculated the aircraft true airspeed. Like the C-2, it was
larger and easier to use than the E6-B, with a single plastic swinging reference arm. The
bombardier used the J- 1 computer (Figure 5.31) to calculate the initial sight angle setting for the
bombsight telescope, and it was designed to rapidly produce sight angle solutions for bomb runs
of 30 or 45 seconds, both typical values. All three of these computers produced bombing data
that the bombardier set into the AB computer attached to the Norden bombsight.
Figure 5.30
G-1 True Airspeed Computer 2
121 Bombardiers'Information File, 3-3-3.
122 Ibid., 3-4-1.
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Figure 5.31
J-1 Time of Run-Sighting Angle Computer 123
The AB computer, discussed in the previous chapter, was another specialized manual
computer, attached directly to the Norden bombsight (Figure 5.32). Although it remained in the
aircraft and was not included in the bombardier's kit, it was a critical translation tool. Designed
to calculate drift and vector triangles like the E6-B, the AB computer did so more rapidly,
making it useful for calculating course corrections during the compressed period of the combat
bomb run. The bombardier set the wind direction and speed on the computer, taken from the
briefed weather forecast or measured as described in Chapter 4, and then attached a specific
tangent scale to the computer, based upon the bombing altitude, true airspeed, and type of bomb
loaded in the bomb bay. With those values set, the AB computer could display the correct drop
angle, groundspeed, and drift angle for any aircraft heading.12 4 The bombardier set up the AB
computer before the bomb run so that he could obtain a correct aircraft heading to the bomb
release point at any time during the run, which was particularly useful if the pilot had to perform
any evasive maneuvers that took them off of the planned bomb run heading.
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123 Ibid., 3-5-1.
124 Ibid., 3-2-2 
- 3-2-3.
Figure 5.32
The Automatic Bombing (AB) Computer
The final quantification tool in the bombardier's kit was a set of bombing tables that
contained ballistic data for the various types of bombs used during World War II. Based upon
the bombing altitude, the tables provided the bombardier the appropriate disk speed, actual time
of fall, trail, drop angle, and sighting angle for setting up the bombsight. They also contained
various conversion factors for altitudes or airspeeds not already quantified, that the bombardier
could use to calculate in the air based upon actual environmental conditions.126 This data was
critical for the bombsight's initial setup, and it helped the bombardier verify the its operation, as
well as set the initial sighting angle for the telescope, which put the crosshairs in the vicinity of
the target, making it easier to locate and identify.
The bombardier's computers and bombing tables were purpose-built tools that enabled
him to translate the bomber's physical environment into data usable by the bombsight to
calculate the bomb release point. The bombsight was useless without that data, and he served as
the socio-technical bombing element's "sensors" and interpreter, incorporating the physical
context of the bomb run with the bombsight's ability to rapidly calculate a solution based on that
context. This interdependent relationship defined the shared cognitive capability of that socio-
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125 Ibid., 3-2-1.
126 Ibid., 2-3-1 
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technical element, with both the human and machine possessing unique cognitive capabilities
that, when brought together, formed a more powerful whole.
The Bombing Mission and Bringing the Pieces Together
After the Bombardier's Brief, with the mission planning complete, the bombardier
proceeded to his aircraft to rendezvous with the rest of the bomber crew. Enroute to the aircraft,
he retrieved his Norden bombsight head from a special secure, steel-reinforced vault, where they
were stored and kept under guard at all times, for which only the installation commander and the
Armament Officer possessed the keys (Figure 5.33). Ordinarily, armament technicians issued
the sight heads before each mission, although on occasion they were left in the aircraft, protected
by armed guards and covered to keep them from sight. Once issued a sight head, a bombardier
was required to arm himself with a service pistol at all times.12 7 With the sight head in his
possession, protected in a heavy canvas bag, the bombardier joined his crew at the aircraft
(Figure 5.34).
Figure 5.33
Norden bombsight vault at RAF Halesworth, England 128
127 Pardini, The Legendary Secret Norden Bombsight, 220-222.
12 8 Norden bombsight vault at RAF Halesworth, Photograph, n.d.,
http://www.airfieldinformationexchange.org/community/showthread.php?996-Norden-Bomb-sight-
store/page2 (accessed 19 March 2011).
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Figure 5.34
A bombardier stepping to a B-17 12 9
The Bombardier's Compartment
Once at the aircraft, the bombardier checked the status of all of the armament, ensuring
that the bombs and machine gun ammunition were loaded and ready for use. He then entered the
compartment that he shared with the navigator in the nose of the aircraft. All of the his
equipment was located between the Plexiglas nose of the aircraft and the bombardier's seat,
which was riveted to the floor at the lip of the fuselage, in front of the navigator's instruments.
At the center of the compartment, right in front of the bombardier's seat, was the pedestal for the
Norden bombsight, wired to provide the 24-volt direct current power necessary to operate it.
The low, armor-backed seat was adjustable both vertically and horizontally so that the
bombardier could sit comfortably over his bombsight, which peered down through a flat portion
of underside of the Plexiglas nose (Figure 5.35).
The nose was designed to "give the bombardier a perfect view so he (could) see the
target," and the seat's location made that view "marvelous" and unequaled by any other crew
position.13 0 Early model B-17 noses had a metal frame that held the eleven Plexiglas
windowpanes, as well as several gun ports that allowed the installation of .30-caliber machine
129 "Boeing Advertisement--Blue Ox," 77. In this picture, you can see the pistol strapped to the bombardier's right
hip.
130 B-17F Pilot's Flight Operating Instructions, T 0. No. 01-20EF-J (U.S. War Department, 1942), 103; Myers,
Shot at and Missed, 218; John C. Minahan, "Bombardier," in B-17 Fortress at War, by Roger A. Freeman
(London: Ian Allen Ltd, 1977), 121.
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guns different locations. The B-17F replaced the metal-framed nose with a single-piece nose
cone, retaining the gun ports, but the B-i 7G, the last generation of the bomber, eliminated the
gun ports when Boeing installed a twin .50-caliber powered chin gun turret. While the nose was
well-designed for bombing, it provided little physical protection, and was thick enough only to
keep out "bird$4!7 and rain."131
Figure 5.35
A bombardier seated in the nose of a B-17G 132
131 Myers, Shot at and Missed, 50.
132 PhotoNordenBombardierjpg, Photograph, n.d.,
http://www.twinbeech.com/images/bombsight/PhotoNordenBombardier.jpg (accessed 19 Mar 2011). We
can see from the lack of gunports in the Plexiglas nose that this a B-17G. Also, above and to the right of
the bombardier's head we can see the gunsight for the twin-.50-caliber gun turret under the nose of the
aircraft.
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To the bombardier's left, as he looked out the nose, were his bomb controls and
instrument panel. Farthest forward were two control levers; one that opened the bomb bay doors
and another that controlled whether the bombs were electrically released by the bombsight or
mechanically "salvoed" and dropped all at once by the bombardier. Directly behind the levers,
the instrument panel contained an airspeed indicator, thermometer, altimeter, and intervalometer.
Also included were the C-I Autopilot control panel and the controls for turning on the PDI. To
the bombardier's right were his communication connection and controls, oxygen regulator, the
electrical outlet for his heated flight suit, and the ventilation control for the heating duct that
provided hot engine bleed air to defrost the nose and warm the bombsight. 33
The Nose Gun-A Secondary Responsibility?
Aside from the bombsight, the most dominant item in the aircraft nose was the machine
gun, and as he was the de facto nose gunner on the B- 17, on most missions the bombardier
would spend more time using it than the bombsight. While nominally responsible for all of the
armament on the aircraft, including all of the defensive machine guns, in practice, the
bombardier worried only about his gun, as each gunner on the crew was "an expert on his
weapon and pretty self-sufficient."13 4 Early models of the aircraft had several gun ports in the
nose, but the bombardier's .30-caliber gun was usually installed on the right side, covering the
front right sector of the aircraft, as the navigator's larger, .50-caliber machine gun protected the
front left sector. This setup, however, was inadequate, because the small-caliber gun had a
limited field of fire and left the nose of the aircraft poorly defended.
133 B-] 7F Pilot's Flight Operating Instructions, 103-105.
134 Minahan, "Bombardier," 123.
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Figure 5.36
A bombardier in the nose of a B-17G 13 5
During the course of the war, the USAAF modified the B- 17 several times to increase its
defensive firepower, particularly in the nose. In the B-17F, a .50-caliber machine gun replaced
the older, smaller weapon, somewhat improving defensive effectiveness, but it was the B- 17G
that gave the bomber a true frontal defense capability. Boeing installed a powered Bendix chin
turret with twin .50-caliber machine guns below the nose of the aircraft (Figure 5.36). This chin
turret provided much greater forward defensive coverage than a single gun, and incorporated an
optical gunsight that increased accuracy over the basic "iron" gunsights on the older guns (Figure
5.37). The optical sight, which rotated with the chin turret while the bombardier's seat remained
stationary, greatly increased the effectiveness of the aircraft's forward defensive firepower. One
limitation, however, was that when it was in use, it blocked access to the bombsight. To gain
135 Capt. Charles S. Hudson, Bombardier, In Nose Of A Plane At A Base In England, Photograph, n.d., 342-FH-
3A49627-K2155, National Archives and Records Administration,
http://www.footnote.com/image/#161286999 (accessed 19 March 2011).
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access, the bombardier had to swing the gunsight and the turret control unit away and stow it to
his right, and could not operate both systems at the same time.136
Figure 5.37
The optical gunsight and chin turret on the B-17G 137
While the bombardier spent most of the mission manning his machine gun, he was poorly
prepared to do so, particularly during the early stage of the CBO. Although bombardiers and
navigators were supposed to receive flexible gunnery training as a part of their normal flight
training in the United States, early in the war the pressing need for personnel in the ETO kept
many from getting it before deploying for combat. They did receive additional gunnery training
once they arrived in theater to better prepare them for the demands of maintaining the defensive
power of the bomber formation, but it was generally inadequate and attacking German fighters
soon discovered that the combination of the poor defensive coverage of the early-model B- 17s
and the lack of gunnery training made the aircraft very vulnerable to frontal attack.'
136 Bombardiers 'Information File, 7-10-1.
137 Ibid.
138 Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P. Harahan, eds., Strategic Air Warfare: An Interview with Generals Curtis E.
LeMay, Leon W Johnson, David A. Burchinal, and Jack J. Catton (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force
History, U.S. Air Force, 1988), 26-27; Thomas Greer, "Individual Flying Training," in The Army Air
Forces in World War II, Vol. 6-Men and Planes, ed. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, vol. 6
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Consequently, they developed and refined such tactics, and they proved very effective in the
early stages of the CBO. Many B-17s were lost before the powered chin turret nullified some of
the fighters' advantage.139
Takeoff and Preparation
After the bombardier checked the status of the aircraft's weapons, he settled in for the
ride. After takeoff and during the formation rejoin, he provided the navigator visual position
updates, if requested, and could help the pilot find other squadron and group aircraft as they tried
to assemble. During that time, he confirmed with the pilot that the autopilot system was on and
operating correctly, so that the gyros had ample time to reach their operating speed before they
were needed. Sometime after passing 10,000 feet, and before there was a threat of enemy air
attack, he left the nose compartment and walked to the bomb bay in the middle of the aircraft to
arm the bombs. The B-17 was unpressurized, so above 10,000 feet the crew had to breathe
supplemental oxygen to keep from dying of hypoxia, and while arming the bombs, the
bombardier carried a portable oxygen bottle, connected to his oxygen mask so that he could
survive. 140
Bombers carried several types of bombs with different fuzes, but generally, arming them
consisted of pulling a metal pin out of fuze on the nose or tail of the bomb, allowing an attached
propeller to spin freely (Figure 5.38). After pulling the pin, the bombs were still safe to carry, as
the fuze was not yet fully armed. The propeller had to turn several hundred rotations before it
actuated a mechanism that enabled the bomb to explode on contact, which happened once the
bomb got into the airstream when released from the aircraft. During arming, the bombardier
could also manually set a detonation delay into the fuze, controlling how long it would wait after
striking the target to detonate the bomb. Typical delays ranged from zero seconds to .10
seconds, and were dictated by target type. Some targets, such as those out in the open, required
no delay and the bombs were effective upon immediate impact. Other targets, such as those
contained in buildings hardened against attack, detonation was delayed so that the bomb could
(Washington, DC: 1983. Reprint, Office of Air Force History. Originally published Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1955), 589-595.
139 Baldwin, Individual Training ofBombardiers, 16, 33; Greer, "Individual Flying Training," 589-595.
140 Bombardiers'Information File, 9-6-1 - 9-6-2.
308
penetrate the building before detonating, thereby delivering the greatest amount of explosive
power to the correct location. 4
Figure 5.38
AN-M103 Delayed Action Arming Vane Nose Fuze142
After arming the bombs, the bombardier returned to the front of the bomber and took up
his position behind the nose gun. Shortly after the formation completed its assembly and
departed for the mission, he had the pilot trim the bomber for straight and level flight, set up the
autopilot, and verify that it was working correctly, preparing it for use during the upcoming
bomb run. Upon accomplishing that task, he fulfilled his function as the aircraft nose gunner for
the time that it would take the formation to get to the IP for the bomb run, defending the
formation from frontal attack, but taking the opportunity to compute the bombing altitude,
airspeed, and drift during any lull in the action.143
Approaching the IP-Leading, Following, and Drop-on-Leader Bombing
As the formation approached the IP, the bombardier's attention shifted to the upcoming
bomb run, but the HADPB doctrine and his place in the formation now dictated his actions.
Every bombardier in the formation was trained to operate the Norden bombsight, but just as with
the navigators, a professional and social strata existed among them. The adoption of the drop-
on-leader formation bombing doctrine in early 1943 and the subsequent and creation of the lead
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141 Ibid., Sections 7-1 and 7-2.
142 Ibid., 7-2-2.
143 Ibid., 8-1-2.
crew established lead, deputy lead, and wing bombardier positions. Each wing, group, and
squadron had a lead bombardier in the lead aircraft for their element of the Combat Box
formation, and the position held corresponding prestige. The lead bombardier flew in the lead
aircraft, and he was responsible for finding, identifying, and tracking the target, and it was his
bombsight that computed the bomb release point for the aircraft in his element of the formation.
When his aircraft reached that point and his bombsight released its bombs, the rest of the
formation released theirs, hence "drop-on-leader."
Lead bombardiers were selected based upon demonstrated superior performance. The
man out front had to be good, as the success of the entire formation depended upon his skill, but
while skill mattered greatly, it had to be accompanied by desire. Not every good bombardier
wanted to lead, as selection guaranteed that they would stay overseas longer and fly some of the
tougher missions. When selected, lead crews were assigned responsibility for a particular
geographic area and set of targets. It became their job to learn everything that they could about
those targets and the area surrounding them, thoroughly familiarizing themselves with the
ground references so that they could lead the formation to the right point and strike the target on
the first attempt. When headquarters scheduled a mission against one of the targets in their area
of responsibility, they led the mission. 144 If the crew was assigned a particularly tough or well-
defended set of targets, every one of their missions was guaranteed to be tough.
144 General Curtis E. LeMay, "Interview with General Curtis E. LeMay," interview by Col. Bill Peck, Oral History
Transcript, March 1965, K239.0512-785 C.1, IRIS No. 1000342, US Air Force Historical Research
Agency.
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Figure 5.39
The Combat Box formation lead and deputy lead aircraft145
A Combat Wing formation of fifty-four bombers included three Combat Box formations,
one of which was the lead group for the Wing, and each Combat Box comprised eighteen aircraft
(Figure 5.39). The Combat Box was the primary bombing formation element in the
bombardment system, and the lead crew in the lead Combat Box led the Combat Wing until the
IP, whereupon it split into its three separate groups for the rest of the bomb run (Figure 5.40).
Splitting into separate groups increased bombing effectiveness for two primary reasons. First, it
was much easier to maneuver the smaller formation of eighteen aircraft, increasing the chance of
successfully navigating to the target while still maintaining some mutual defensive capability.
145 Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler (Atlanta, GA: Higgins-McArthur/Longino & Porter,
Inc., 1972), 117. Shapes highlighting the formation positions added by author.
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Second, it enabled the groups to create separate between themselves so that they did not interfere
with each other in the target area and, by arriving at the target at slightly different times, it
provided the opportunity for some of the smoke from the previous group's attack to clear away,
reducing the chance of the target being obscured.146 Thus, of the original fifty-four bombardiers
in the formation, only three actually used the full capability of their bombsights.
TARGET
TARGET
SQUADRONS RETAIN ORIGINAL
ALTITUDE
GROUP ANS OUT ___
4MINUTESBEFORE LEAD SQUADRON TARGET
. HIGH SQUADRONLOW SQUADRON
Figure 5.40
Combat Wing breakup and Combat Box spacing maneuvers147
Each Combat Box also had at least one designated deputy lead bombardier, whose job it
was to take over the formation if the lead aircraft were disabled or shot down. The lead
bombardiers for each of the three component squadrons of six aircraft that made up the group
also served as deputy lead bombardiers. These bombardiers could not use the full capabilities of
their bombsights because their pilots had to maintain full control of the aircraft to maintain their
position in the formation. If the bombardier engaged the bombsight to the autopilot, it risked the
aircraft falling out of position or, even worse, collision with another aircraft. While they could
not synchronize their bombsights in course, thereby moving the aircraft to align directly with the
146 Ibid., 118.
147 Kohn and Harahan, Strategic Air Warfare.
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target, deputy lead bombardiers could synchronize in range, and still determine the correct
instant to drop the bombs. The theory was that the lead bombardier would synchronize in course
and range, and if his bombs should fail to release, the deputy lead bombardier would manually
release the bombs when he reached the appropriate range from the target, followed by the rest of
the formation. The aircraft formation was tight enough that the lateral displacement between
aircraft was immaterial as far as the effect on the ground. If the lead bombardier had
synchronized in course, the formation would pass over the correct bomb release point and the
result was actually almost the same as if the lead aircraft itself had dropped its bombs, as the
same bomb pattern would be laid on the target, delayed only by the deputy lead bombardier's
reaction time.148
On a mission that proceeded as planned, the rest of the bombardiers in the formation did
not use their bombsights at all. In fact, early in the war, there was a significant shortage of
Norden bombsights, and many bombers set out on missions without one installed in the
aircraft.14 9 For those that did have one, their only opportunity to use it was if they fell out of
formation and attacked a target on their own. While the drop-on-leader doctrine enabled those
aircraft without bombsights to drop more accurate bombs, it was not without problems.
The drop-on-leader technique decreased the accuracy of the individual bombers that had
bombsights in the formation, but increased the effectiveness of the formation itself by
concentrating the bombs in the desired area of the target.15 0 However, its dependence on the skill
of the lead bombardier meant that the entire formation's success rested upon his ability to
operate his bombsight skillfully. Indeed, there are many examples of entire formations dropping
their bombs on the wrong target when the lead bombardier erred or his equipment
malfunctioned. On 28 June 1943, during a planned attack on an airfield at the edge of Brussels,
one bomb group unintentionally bombed the center of the city, which was off limits as a target,
148 "Bombsights-High Altitude Bombing Procedure with Automatic Bombing Computer-'M' Series, Technical
Order (T.O.) 11-30-45" (War Department, Headquarters of the Army Air Forces, November 17, 1943), 2,
Box 829 File:F5-G/1943/Bombsights (N.D.) High Altitude Bombing Procedure (1943) Photos, undated
material, National Museum of the United States Air Force.
149 Case History of Norden Bombsight and C-1 Automatic Pilot, Parts I and II.
150 Hansell, Jr., The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler, 119.
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when the lead bombardier accidentally released his bombs early. Fortunately, the bombs struck a
German troop billeting area and killed only a few Belgian civilians.m"'
Likewise, to take advantage of the lead/deputy lead bombardier redundancy built into the
Combat Box formation, the lead crew had to be willing transfer control of the formation to one
of the deputy leads if they ran into trouble or had some sort of malfunction. However, this was
not always the case. On 11 January 1944, equipment problems plagued a large-scale, long-range
attack against an aircraft factory only fifty miles short of Berlin in Oschersleben, Germany.
Enemy fighters harassed the formation the entire way, badly damaging the lead B- 17 from the
9 1st Bomb Group when several 20mm cannon shells knocked out one engine and injured the
pilot and copilot. The crew, however, maintained the lead position in the formation.
Unfortunately, the damage to the aircraft extended to the mounting structure of the Norden
bombsight, adversely affecting its operation, and the entire Group's bombs missed the target
when they dropped on the lead bomber's errant signal. 5 2 The 1st Combat Bombardment Wing
history which recorded the event makes no mention of why the formation leader did not
surrender the lead for the bomb run to the deputy lead aircraft. Even with its limitations, the
advantages of the drop-on-leader doctrine outweighed the disadvantage, and once adopted, the
USAAF used it through the rest of the war.
Defining and Setting the Environment
Thirty to forty-five minutes before the IP, the lead and deputy leads prepared both their
aircraft and bombsight for the upcoming bomb run. The lead bombardier had his aircraft
commander engage the autopilot and check its operation, in so doing, began the process of
controlling the bombsight's environment by establishing a stable altitude so that they could input
an accurate altitude into the bombsight. Completing that, they verified their altitude, airspeed,
and drift calculations, completed the process of setting up their AB computers, and input all of
the data into their bombsights. With the altitude value set, these bombardiers verified the
bombsight's operation by checking that the internal disk was spinning at the correct rate for that
altitude. They plugged in specially designed hand-held tachometers that measured the speed of
151 Thomas Coffey, Decision Over Schweinfurt: The U.S. 8th Air Force Battle for Daylight Bombing (New York: D.
Mckay Co., 1977), 232-233.
152 "1st Combat Bombardment Wing (H): Unit History 1 January, 1944 to 31 January, 1944", 1944, 2-3, Call WG-
1-HI 1 Jan 44-31 Jan 1944, US Air Force Historical Research Agency.
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rotation, and adjusted the speed until they obtained at least three readings indicating that the disc
speed was within % RPM of the required value (Figure 5.41).153 Finally, they checked that all of
the switches that operated the bomb racks and the bomb bay doors were in the on position.
Figure 5.41
Norden bombsight Jaeger tachometer154
IP Through the Bomb Run-"The most nerve-wracking twenty minutes of the mission"155
At the IP, usually 20 to 40 miles from the target, the individual Combat Boxes split out of
the wing formation and began separate approaches toward their assigned targets (Figure 5.42).
At this point, the lead bombardier in the Combat Box assumed "absolute command" of the entire
formation, and began the process of following his navigation checkpoints to the target and
preparing the bombsight for the final stage of the bomb run, maintaining that command until the
bombs left the aircraft.156 The entire run from the IP to the release point could last up to twenty
minutes, depending on the length of the run and the effect of the wind at the formation's altitude.
A headwind would increase the length of the run, while a tailwind would decrease it. Every
bombardier performed his actions over those twenty minutes in a state of heightened danger.
The flak invariably intensified as they approached the target, and although the aircraft could
execute preplanned flak-avoidance maneuvers before the start of the bomb run, once the aircraft
153,"Handbook of Instructions for Bombsight Type M-9", June 5, 1945, Call 168.69-30, US Air Force Historical
Research Agency.
Jaeger Tachometer, Photograph, n.d., Armyairforces.com, http://forum.armyairforces.com/What-is-a-JAEGER-
155 TACHOMETER-m12941 1.aspx (accessed 30 March 2011).Myers, Shot at and Missed, 9.
156 Pilot Training Manualfor the B-17, 18.
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entered the final phase, evasive maneuvers were prohibited, as they decreased bombing
accuracy. Enemy fighters, however, usually ceased their attacks during the bomb run so that
they avoided getting accidentally shot down by their own forces, which was fortunate, as the
bombardiers in the front of the formation were busy with their bombsights and unable to operate
their guns.
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Figure 5.42
The IP to Target run157
This phase of the mission was, without question, the most intense physically and
emotionally. In the words of one veteran bombardier:
Usually as you start the bomb run, no matter how cool you try to appear to
your crew, your blood pressure if taken would probably register off the
scale. Your pulse sounds like a trip hammer as it pounds away at about
twice its normal rate. Something is caught in your throat that is slowly
choking you and you finally realize it is your own heart trying to come out
your mouth. Your bladder feels like it is going to empty all over you and
your rectum is chewing a hole in your leather seat. 5
The danger during the bomb run placed an enormous strain on all of the crewmembers, but the
bombardier had the added burden of knowing that if he did not accomplish his job and drop his
bombs, they would have faced the danger for naught.
Passing the IP, the pilot or the bombardier in the lead aircraft electrically opened the
bomb bay doors, and the rest of the crews in the formation followed suit when they saw the
157 Bombardiers' Information File, 8-5-3 - 8-5-4.
158 Myers, Shot at and Missed, 212.
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doors swing open. A light illuminated on both the pilot and bombardier's control panels when
the doors opened, but in the event that the electrical door motors failed, they could be opened
manually from within the bomb bay.159 The procedure was extremely risky, and required that
the bombardier climb onto the narrow catwalk suspended between the bomb racks and crank the
doors open with a crank handle. He had to remove his parachute in order to fit on the catwalk,
and take an oxygen bottle so that he could breathe. Opening the doors in this fashion was always
exciting, and provided, in the understated words of one bombardier, a "real sensation" as the
doors opened and "a terrific view of the ground below." 160
With the doors opened, the pilot adjusted the autopilot, if necessary, as the flight
characteristics of the aircraft changed with the large doors hanging in the airstream, and added
power to compensate for the additional drag. Once adjusted, the lead and deputy lead
bombardiers leveled the bombsight stabilizer, taking one more step toward controlling the
bombsight's environment by establishing the initial vertical reference. After rechecking the
correct setting of the bomb rack switches, they then shifted their attention to finding and
identifying the target.
The lead and the deputy lead bombardiers started the process of target acquisition after
the initial turn over the IP, using the route map and target folder to identify the ground
checkpoints that would lead them to the target. The navigators in these aircraft, having
temporarily given up the duties of directing the aircraft flight path, moved forward to assist with
the process. Each knelt beside the bombardier and placed one hand on his shoulder, signaling
that he was in position.161 In clear meteorological conditions, they usually acquired the target
fairly rapidly because of all of the preflight study and effort put into creating the target folders
and route maps. With the target in sight, these bombardiers then absorbed themselves in the
operation of his bombsight, while the rest of the bombardiers in the formation kept their eyes
glued to the lead aircraft, awaiting the signal to drop their bombs.
159 Bombardiers'Information File, 7-4-2.
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The lead bombardier made the final adjustment to the AB computer to establish the drift
angle, uncaged and leveled the vertical gyroscope to stabilize the optics, pressed his eye to the
black rubber cup of the telescope, synchronized the bombsight on the target, and steered the
bomber toward the bomb release point. As he raised the release lever on the bombsight, enabling
the automatic release mechanism, he had as much control over the entire bombardment system in
that moment as it was possible for him to have. He controlled the direction of eighteen aircraft,
as well as when they would release their weapons. Every other socio-technical element in the
system responded to his will-right up to the point that his aircraft reached the bomb release
point and the Norden bombsight electrically released the bombs from the bomb bay, when it
would all vanish.
The rest of the bombardiers in the formation kept their eyes glued to their leader, waiting
for the bombs fall from the aircraft so that they could release their own. This, of course, required
that the first see the bombs. At times, environmental conditions, such as haze or smoke, made
the bombs difficult to detect, particularly for bombardiers farther away from the lead aircraft at
the outer edges of the formation. Early in the war, the 1st Bomb Wing experimented with
painting the lead aircraft's bombs bright colors to make them easier to see, and even tied colored
cloth streamers to the bomb fins to make them more visible. After achieving limited success
with smoke flares attached to the bombs, powerful Skymarker bombs with highly visible smoke
trails were adopted in the autumn of 1943 for use in all lead aircraft, making them much easier to
visually detect.162 Since only the lead bombardier's bombs released automatically, all of the
other bombardiers had to manually release theirs, which reintroduced the potential for range
errors due to the limits of human reaction time. To account for this, lead bombardiers began
aiming and releasing their bombs just short of the target, and the rest of the bombardier's slight
delay in releasing their own bombs actually moved the formation's mean point of impact nearer
the target.163
As the lead bomber reached the computed bomb release point, several thousand pounds
of bombs fell from the bomb racks and the aircraft jumped noticeably.164 The lead bombardier,
after checking the indicator light on his bomb rack panel to ensure all of the bombs had been
162 Roger A. Freeman, The Mighty Eighth War Manual (London: Jane's Publishing Company, Ltd, 1984), 46.
163 Ibid.
164 Reichard, "Bomb Bay Doors Jammed," 43.
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released, made the classic call "Bombs Away!" over the bomber's internal communication
system, and immediately returned control of the aircraft back to the aircraft commander, who
turned the aircraft toward a Combat Wing rejoin point so that the Combat Boxes could reform
for the journey back to England.
Actions and Identity-Drop-on-Leader and the Dismantling of the Engineered Human
The twenty minutes from the IP through bomb release was the pinnacle of the lead
bombardier's mission. During that time, the months of training in the United States, the
extensive and repetitive practice on the ground and in the air, the hours of target study and
preparation, and the iron will to persevere through the terrifying defenses all came together. The
bombardier and the bombsight were a single, unified socio-technical system and the bombardier
was the bombardier. However, when the bombs left the aircraft, it severed his immediate
connection to the bombsight, and he became once again, as did the rest of the bombardiers in the
formation, the aircraft nose gunner. While the bombardier and the bombsight together made a
single socio-technical unit, it took the bombsight to make the bombardier. Without it, he was a
gunner-vitally important, but no longer "the ultimate purpose of (the) entire airplane and
crew."46 5 If the bombsight was so central to the identity of the lead bombardier, what of the
identity of the rest of the bombardiers in the formation? Their immediate connection to the
bombsight was far more tenuous and, in some cases, non existent.
Other than the three lead and perhaps fifteen deputy lead bombardiers, the rest of the
wing bombardiers in the formation did not even need their bombsights. Their job was to watch
the lead bomber and "toggle" their bombs on cue. Many flew without bombsights, and it was
not uncommon for a bombardier to fly numerous missions, sometimes over fifteen, before he
actually even used one.166 The construct of the formation and the drop-on-leader employment
doctrine made having a bombsight in every aircraft an expensive, unnecessary redundancy, and
by the middle of 1944, realizing how they were actually being used in the theater, the AAF
cancelled production orders for 2,375 bombsight heads. Interestingly, at the same time they
165 Pilot Training Manualfor the B-17, 18.
166 Frank A. Wiswall, "Frank A. Wiswall, WWII & Korean War Veteran, US Army Air Forces, US Eighth Air
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increased the requirements for bombsight stabilizers and C-I autopilot systems in an effort to get
fully functional autopilots into all of their heavy bombers.1 67
The widespread, institutional use of this toggling method of bombing gave rise to a new
term for the wing bombardier--"togglier." The term togglier conveyed a distinct image.
Whereas the bombardier was a highly trained individual, master of a complex, secret machine,
the togglier was merely a switch flipper. It completely recharacterized the bombardier's role and
how others perceived him on the crew, reflected in one copilot's comment that "all he (the
bombardier) had to do was toggle the bombs when the leader let his go. Soft life." 6 1 Indeed,
recalling his decision to choose navigator training over bombardier training, one 8th AF navigator
plainly stated
Well, I didn't want to be a bombardier. I'd just sit up there and toggle
switches [laughter]. 169
Even though bombardiering was never the most popular choice among recruits, this type of
attitude represents a long fall from the fellow who took charge and delivered the "knockout
punch." 70
The switch from bombardier to togglier even changed the structure of the crew. Since the
bombardier actually spent most of the mission acting as the aircraft nose gunner and most did not
use their bombsights, a trained gunner could realistically accomplish the job. This change in
task, which coincided with a shortage of trained bombardiers in theater, caused bomb unit
commanders to look elsewhere for personnel to drop bombs early in the war.17 1 Consequently,
select enlisted gunners and armament technicians, already trained in aerial gunnery, were chosen
to train as toggliers. Those selected received some training on how to operate the bomb racks
release systems, but many learned the job through real-mission experience, learning what they
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needed to know on the job by adapting quickly to their new role.172 This decision to use enlisted
crewmembers to act as toggliers, perhaps, illustrates the prominent role that the Norden
bombsight played in the bombardier's professional identity, as it occurred less than one year
after the USAAF made the decision to not train enlisted recruits in 1942. Once the role
transitioned from a specific, learned skill with an expensive, complex machine to flipping a
switch, the task of dropping bombs no longer maintained the status necessary to require an
officer to complete it.
While learning how to operate the systems was not difficult, effectively filling even the
reduced role of the bombardier was not always easy. The selection and training of these enlisted
toggliers ignored the bombardier-crew integration training that the bombardment doctrine writers
had deemed so important in the development of the bombardier, particularly the importance of
effective cooperation between the bombardier and the bomber pilot. One waist gunner thrust
into the role with no training, based only on the fact that he had washed out of bombardier
training, committed several errors on his first two missions due to inadequate training on the
equipment and a lack of understanding of how he interfaced with the rest of the crew. 7 3 The
human-machine link was critical at the bombardment element level (human-bombing
technology), but just as important was the human-human link in the larger, aircraft level of the
bombardment system. The mastery of the bombsight may have professionally defined the
bombardier, but it was integration with the rest of the socio-technical elements in the aircraft
made him successful. Absent that integration, the system performance suffered.
With adequate training, however, the togglier effectively ceased to exist as an integral
element of the individual bombardment team-the human and machine elements that made up
the individual bomber crew and its aircraft-and became instead an element in the larger
bombardment system, an extension of the lead bombardier and his Norden bombsight. The drop-
on-leader doctrine harnessed the togglier's capabilities together into a larger, centrally controlled
network, much as the control of the overall formation resided with the command pilot in the lead
aircraft. Drop-on-leader took control, autonomy, and professional status from most of the
172 Frank Yarmoski, "Interview with Sgt. Frank Yarmoski, 398th Bomb Group Togglier 601st Squadron, Eighth Air
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individuals in the bombardier position, but conveyed all that was lost onto the one in the lead.
While the doctrine maintained the importance of the task, the method by which it accomplished
that task largely dismantled the engineered human bombardier by separating most of them from
the very machine that not only defined them, but made the overall doctrine of HADPB possible.
Conclusion
Automation, Mechanization, and the Bonds of the Socio-technical
The bombardier, the Norden, bombsight, and the HADPB doctrine illustrate, perhaps
better than any other example, the interdependent nature of the parts of the socio-technical
bombardment system. Bombing emerged very early as a doctrinal mission, and the human
inability to perform that mission drove the development of a specialized machine that
compensated for those human inabilities by automating as much of the bombing process as
possible. The complicated nature of operating the bombsight and its need for accurate data and a
precisely interpreted and defined environment led to the creation of a specialized human, defined
by his mastery of the bombsight, as well as the doctrine that guided their use as an independent
socio-technical element. That doctrine, however, also largely destroyed that human as a
professional entity, when the drop-on-leader formation bombing tactics greatly diminished the
need for him as a technical specialist.
The Norden bombsight was the result of a bombing system development process that
focused on eliminating accuracy errors caused by both humans and machines. Gyrostabilization
compensated for the human inability to provide the bombsight a stable environment from which
to operate, and synchronization enabled the real time integration of bombing data, providing a
calculating capability unavailable in earlier bombsights. It also reduced human error by
automating as much of the bombing process as possible. Coupling the bombsight to the SBAE
or M-H C-I Autopilot eliminated communication errors between the bombardier and pilot and
gave the bombardier the ability to fly the aircraft to the bomb release point more precisely than
the human pilot alone. Automating the bomb release process eliminated the significant error due
to the limits of human reaction time. The bombsight, however, was not autonomous. It required
a skilled human to define its environment and operate its calculating mechanism.
The bombardier was a single-task specialist, much like the navigator, defined by his
ability to operate the bombsight. He did not exist as a dominant professional entity within the
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Air Corps until bombsights became too complex for a pilot to operate while still flying his
aircraft, and his actions were largely mechanized during training so that he could master that
complexity. The bombardier's primary function was to provide the bombsight the data that it
required, but could not obtain on its own. Like the navigator, he interpreted the bombsight's
physical environment through flight instruments, calculating the airspeed and altitude values
necessary for a precision bombing solution. Unlike the navigator, he did not integrate that data
and turn it into something new. The bombsight itself accomplished that with the mechanical
calculator contained within the sight head.
The bombardier, however, did share the bombing system's cognitive function with the
bombsight. His unique ability to find, identify, and track the target enabled the bombsight to
perform all of its functions. He accomplished this through a process of visual and mental model
building during the mission planning process, effectively building himself a visual script of what
he should see during the mission through the intense study of maps, charts, photographs, and
models. During the mission, he set up the bombsight, establishing and defining its environment,
giving it the ability to do its job, training it on the target. The bombsight, in return, with its
connection to the autopilot, gave the bombardier the key capability that he used to define his own
identity-the ability to fly the aircraft. He served the bombsight, but he was rewarded with a
measure of control over the whole bombardment system.
However, what technology giveth, doctrine taketh away. Where the bombardier derived
his own identity from his control of the bombardment system, however fleeting, a capability
supplied by automation, it was a form of automation that led to his loss of professional status.
The doctrinal shift from individual bombing to drop-on-leader formation bombing, with its use
of a single key bombardier at the front of the formation, reduced the role of all others to that of
automaton. See the bombs...toggle the switch. Once the majority of the bombardiers were
reduce to toggliers, their unique skill with a machine that was no longer installed on the aircraft
became unnecessary for the success of the mission, and they all but disappeared from the B- 17
crew.
The bombardier, the bombsight, and the HADPB doctrine were all interrelated. Each
influenced the shape, existence, and use of the other. The basic functions designed into Riley
Scott's bomb dropper in 1911, defined by the desire to drop precision bombs, were the same
functions included in the Norden bombsight, and in all subsequent precision targeting systems.
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The machine performed those functions for which it was better suited-real time, dynamic
calculation and near-instantaneous, precision action. The human performed those functions that,
at the time, were uniquely human-sensing the physical environment, defining that environment,
and visually finding, identifying, and tracking the target. Neither was perfect at their task, and
moving forward, each function would become the focus of further technological development, as
weapon system designers sought to create ever more precise systems.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This study began with a single question:
How has the physical dislocation of the operator, enabled by automation
technology, changed what the RPA operator does as compared to what a
manned-aircraft operator does?
It did not seek to answer that question, but rather proposed that as a single element of a larger
socio-technical system-a system comprised of interdependent humans, machines, and the
doctrine that guides their creation and use-we cannot understand what an aircraft operator does
without opening the system's "black box" and considering those actions in the context of its
entirety. It also advanced that we cannot understand to what extent automation has changed
what the aircraft operator does, or indeed if it has, without understanding how humans have used
automated machines in aerial combat systems in the past. The study thus set out to take the first
step toward building that understanding through the examination of the precision bombardment
system employed by the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) during the opening phase of
the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) in World War II, in an effort to establish a conceptual
mutual relationship between humans, machines, and doctrine in aerial combat systems that can
provide an intellectual framework to better frame the fundamental issues surrounding the original
question.
This project's major contribution to the study of complex systems, particularly aerial
combat systems, and the human-machine relationship within them, is the clear characterization
of those systems as socio-technical, extending beyond the confines of bipolar human-machine
relationships to include military doctrine as an integral element. It advances that military
doctrine, the set of fundamental beliefs that guide the construct and use of the socio-technical
systems nations use to employ military power, is as much a part of these human-machine
systems as the physical components because it, through intentional or preconceived interaction,
affects the behavior or output of the system as a whole. The study established the relationship
between humans, machines, and the high-altitude daylight precision bombing doctrine (HADPB)
by first examining the structure of the USAAF bombardment system, presenting it as a three-
level socio-technical system, describing the socio-technical elements at each level, including the
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primary automated machines involved, and how it was actually used in practice. Then, it
examined the actions and tasks performed by the three principal humans on the heavy bomber
crew-the pilot, the navigator, and the bombardier-describing and analyzing their professional
construct and creation, the machines that helped shape their professional identities, how those
humans and machines together accomplished the necessary tasks associated with the precision
bombing mission-flying, navigating, and bombing-and how the HADPB doctrine affected
their creation and use.
This concluding chapter first briefly reviews the major points of the study and then uses
them to characterize the general relationships between doctrine, machines, and humans in the
USAAF's precision bombardment system, providing a foundational conceptual structure that
will enable us to better understand the interdependent relationship between these elements in
other aerial combat systems, including how and why the elements are designed and used as they
are, and, most significantly for the original question that generated the study, how changes in an
element may affect another. Following that, defines the roles that each element in the
bombardment system played, paying particular attention to automated technology, and identifies
the unique contribution made by each. Finally, it considers the impact of this study on further
research into the human-machine-doctrine relationship in aerial combat systems, very briefly
applying the ideas to the F-Ill and F- 117 weapon systems.
The Colossal Network of Humans, Machines, and Ideas
The precision bombing system used by the USAAF during the CBO was the first true
aerial combat system, easily identified as such by the interdependent humans and machines that
worked together to perform the precision bombing mission. However, the system was more than
a simple collection of humans and machines. It also included the HADPB doctrine that
influenced the behavior of the system by shaping its purpose, design, and operation. The
doctrine created a clear purpose for the system, defined the tasks necessary to realize it,
established roles for humans to accomplish those tasks, guided technology development to
produce machines that enabled the humans to perform those tasks, and combined them for use in
a three-level structure that facilitated system control at each level.
At the lowest level of the bombardment system, the HADPB doctrine bound humans and
machines together into individual socio-technical elements, each focused on performing one of
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the specific tasks necessary for precision bombing. When combined at the intermediate level,
these individual human-machine teams formed the bomber crew that operated the bomber
aircraft, the system's primary machine that embodied the HADPB doctrine. Although functional
as individual precision bombing units, these aircraft did not become truly effective until
combined at the system's highest level into purpose-built formations of multiple aircraft,
working together as a single-entity to execute the doctrine.
The bomber formations were the execution element of the HADPB doctrine, and
although the doctrine defined their initial design and operation, their performance as a system
caused a change in the doctrine itself. When the realities of combat bombing at the outset of the
CBO proved that the original design actually prevented bombardiers from dropping precision
bombs with their Norden bombsights, experience trumped theory and USAAF leaders altered
their construction and employment method to increase system effectiveness. The adoption of the
drop-on-leader doctrine and Combat Box formation improved bombing effectiveness by
imposing greater control, but forced a significant doctrinal change that emphasized system
performance over individual performance and that redefined accuracy. The concurrent creation
of the lead crew concentrated system control in a select few individuals at the highest level of the
system, further enhancing system effectiveness but altering the behavior of the individuals at the
lower levels, fully establishing the interdependent relationship between doctrine, humans, and
machines by showing how doctrine shaped the professional construction, identity, and actions of
the human operators.
Command and Shared Control
The humans at the lowest level of the bombardment system, the pilot, the navigator, and
the bombardier, were distinctly socio-technical in construct. Each possessed a specific skill that
provided mastery of a particular machine associated with a singular task, a skill that defined
them professionally as a member of both the bomber crew and the larger system. The leader of
the bomber crew, the pilot is the most identifiable and the only one to transcend the strict
association with a particular task or machine. Initially valued for the technical skill that provided
control of the aircraft, the pilot's role in the system evolved into that of system controller as
aircraft and aerial combat missions became more complex. The need to control a group of
humans and machines working toward a common goal transformed his role into that of the
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aircraft commander, a generalist capable of making those diverse elements operate as a single
socio-technical unit at all levels of the bombardment system, but whose central skill-flying
remained relevant.
Doctrinally, the aircraft commander was responsible for the performance of all of the
functions on the aircraft, but did not possess the technical expertise to do so directly. He thus
commanded the aircraft system by sharing control with the other crewmembers, allowing each to
perform their own tasks. This process of shared control enabled a single pilot to effectively
control the bombardment system at the aircraft level, but also enabled designated command
pilots to assume greater control over the squadrons, groups, and wings that comprised the system
at the formation level. Through shared control, but unified command, these command pilots
controlled their groups of aircraft as single elements, depending upon the pilot-commanders at
lower levels to do the same with their own elements, making the massive bomber formations into
manageable systems focused on accomplishing the precision bombing mission.
While command became the defining characteristic or skill for the bomber pilot, it was
firmly rooted in his original skill-flying-as effective functioning of the system at all levels
required a capable pilot. Command and flying grew inseparable as the characteristics that
enabled control, and when the mandated use of the autopilot gave the bombardier the ability to
"fly" the aircraft during the most critical phase of the mission, pilots resisted the adoption and
use of the automation, as it threatened their professional identity and ability to control. Not only
did it give another crewmember, quite likely one who had failed to complete pilot training, the
capability to perform what had previously been an exclusive skill, it directly implied that the
autopilot was a better, more precise flyer than the human pilot. However, attitudes changed
when it became apparent that the autopilot, in addition to enabling the bombardier to more
precisely drop bombs, enhanced the pilot's ability to command the aircraft through shared
control, and it became accepted as an integral, necessary part of the system. Effective use of the
autopilot actually became a new measure of piloting ability, as understanding how the machine
worked, how to set it up, and how to adjust it for precision flight evolved into a new flying skill.
The human pilot and automatic pilot developed into an integral socio-technical team that,
together, flew the aircraft.
Sharing control with humans and machines enabled the pilot to perform more effectively
his roles as both pilot and commander, and this shaped a fundamental relationship with
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automation that has existed to the present day. Growing beyond his initial definition as a
technical specialist, the pilot's professional identity escaped the single machine-task constraint,
unlike the other key members of the bomber crew, who were more limited by singular tasks and
association with a single skill or machine.
Integration, Calculation, and Translation
The navigator, although not constrained by a single machine, was narrowly defined by a
single technical task, aerial navigation, which he accomplished with specialized instruments and
calculators through a process of shared cognition, acting primarily as a data integrator.
Navigation was a task initially accomplished by reluctant pilots, and non-pilot aerial navigators
did not exist until the increased complexity of the long range flights necessary to execute the
HADPB doctrine and the personnel pressures of the Air Corps expansion programs required their
creation as a separate individual, schooled in the use, care, and calibration of highly specialized
navigation instruments and mathematics.
The navigator performed his job in specialized "centres of calculation," unique locations
that enabled him to use the unique cognitive and calculation capabilities resident in maps, charts,
and mechanical calculators to integrate and transform disparate sets of data into new, useful
models for navigation. These idealized textual, temporal, and spatial models served as execution
level instructions that he used during the bomber mission to guide the aircraft to and from the
target, providing a constant reference that enabled him to translate the aircraft's physical position
into an idealized position and locate it in time, space, and relative to the mission flow.
Responsible for getting the bomber to and from the target and knowing where it was at all
times, the navigator possessed no direct control over its operation. Relying entirely on the pilot
to follow his instructions, he gathered data from his extended "senses," the aircraft flight
instruments and other members of the bomber crew, and combined it to locate the aircraft
position relative to the models created on the ground. He constantly transformed data in an
iterative process, repetitively estimating instrument readings, quantifying environmental
conditions, and calculating movement through the air, ofttimes with no sight of the ground, but
always transitioning between the physical world and the idealized world of the navigation
models. The persistent demand for constant calculation, position plotting, and record keeping
largely mechanized the navigator's actions, taxing his cognitive abilities to the point that he was
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often unable to accomplish other tasks and almost isolating him from the physical realities of
aerial combat.
Doctrine influenced the navigator's action, as the implementation of drop-on-leader
bombing and the lead crew dictated his specific role during the mission based upon his aircraft's
position in the formation. Only the lead navigator performed all of the functions of aerial
navigation-calculating his aircraft position and providing direction to the pilot, while the rest
performed a lesser task, "follow the pilot" navigation, where they carried out the same
calculations, but possessed no capability to control the aircraft heading or airspeed. This
complicated their task, as they had to continually estimate the aircraft direction and speed so that
they could calculate their aircraft position and track it within their navigational models.
The navigator was a technical specialist who performed a single task-he navigated-
unconcerned with the operation of the aircraft other than how it affected its position in time and
space within the bombing mission. As a professional member of the bomber crew and as an
individual, his skill at that task and the tools that he used to accomplish it wholly defined him.
Although aerial navigation used no automated machines at the beginning of the war, the USAAF
attempted to increase navigation precision by imposing control over the navigator through rigid
procedure, mechanizing his actions and making him as much a human-machine as possible.
Automation and task mechanization were paired in the pursuit of greater precision, however, in
the final socio-technical pair on the bomber crew-the bombardier and the Norden bombsight.
Interpretation, Definition, and Redefinition
Precision bombing was the sole mission of the bombardment system, and the bombardier
and the Norden bombsight were the socio-technical element at its center. With an unambiguous
task-dropping precision bombs with the Norden bombsight-both a task and skill with a
particular machine defined the bombardier most clearly of all of the crewmembers. Bombing
began as a socio-technical task, as humans used progressively more complex machines to
perform the complex, dynamic calculation, precision flying, and instantaneous bomb release
necessary for precision bombing. As with navigation, pilots initially dropped bombs, but the Air
Corps recognized the importance of the task sufficiently that it defined it clearly within its
bombardment doctrine, formalizing the position and duties that established the bombardier, with
the pilot, as a key member of the bombing team.
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While the bombardier was a key member of the bombing team, the bombsight made him
so. Bombsights aided the bombardier with the real-time integration, calculation, and precision
flying necessary to compute, locate, and fly to the bomb release point, and were the key to the
ability to bomb accurately. The Norden bombsight, the product of a long search for a single
machine capable of performing all of these functions, was the most accurate bomb-dropping
computer of its era. With the bombardier's assistance, it determined the correct point at which to
release the bombs and greatly reduced the source of human bombing error by automating both
the necessary real-time calculation and the task of actually dropping the bombs. When coupled
to the Minneapolis-Honeywell C- 1 Autopilot, it also helped the bombardier fly precisely to that
point, all of which improved accuracy significantly. Although the Air Corps recognized the
importance of training aviators to use this complex device, for the same reasons as the navigator,
the bombardier did not emerge until World War II as a non-pilot technical specialist.
In creating that specialist, the Air Corps constructed an individual completely entwined
with the bombsight, defined both by his ability to accurately interpret its physical environment
and find, identify, and track the target. Although the Norden bombsight automated much of the
bombing task, the Air Corps sought to reduce the remaining opportunity for human error by
mechanizing the bombardier's actions through repetitive training, much like the navigator,
effectively fusing him with the bombsight into a single auto-mechanical element. The ability to
use the bombsight put the bombardier at the center of the bombing mission, and when paired
with the capability to steer the bomber during the bomb run, provided by the autopilot to an
individual who had likely washed out of pilot training, it gave him significant control over the
aircraft during the most critical portion of the mission.
Control at that critical point became a central identifying characteristic for the
bombardier, but the alteration of the very HADPB doctrine that created his privileged position in
the bombardment system destroyed that identity. The adoption of the drop-on-leader doctrine
made the lead bombardier in the Combat Box the sole controlling element during the bomb run,
as only he operated the bombsight, steered the formation, and dictated when the bombardment
system, as a whole, dropped its bombs. All other bombardiers were relegated to the lesser duty
of "toggling" off their bombs on the leader's signal, using virtually none of the training that had
turned them into professional members of the bomber crew. Consequently, in the clearest
display of the connection between doctrine, individual action, and professional identity, they all
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but disappeared, replaced by lesser-trained toggliers whose only qualification was the ability to
arm the bombs and flip a switch. What technology and skill had granted, doctrine took away.
As the first complete aerial combat system constructed from interdependent humans,
machines, and doctrine, the bombardment system used during the CBO set the stage for all such
systems that followed. Examining the process of its design and use at all levels from a socio-
technical perspective illustrates a number of key characteristics that enable us to see how and
why subsequent systems developed as they did, as well as understand the evolving relationship
between humans and machines within them.
The Characteristics of the Bombardment System
Complexity
The first notable characteristic of the bombardment system is its sheer complexity,
comprised of an incredible number of moving parts from top to bottom, all synchronized in
pursuit of a common purpose. At the highest level, assembling and employing the multitudes of
bombers that made up each formation was both complicated and deadly. Forming and
maneuvering them required extended orchestration and thinking well beyond the simple act of
turning left or right, and a small misstep in speed, direction, or altitude could have significant
consequences, as losses to collision or enemy action decreased their offensive and defensive
effectiveness. Navigation errors could cause lead bombers, and hence entire formations, to miss
their target or bomb the wrong one. Worse still, sometimes these missteps were beyond human
control, as environmental factors such as poor weather enroute or over the target could further
complicate the process and prevent them from accomplishing the individual or collective tasks
necessary to perform the overall mission.
The machines used in the system were highly complex, as well, and some, like the
Norden bombsight, represented the cutting edge of technical development. Successful operation
required extensive training, and producing bombsights that met the exacting mechanical
specifications necessary for precision bombing from high altitude was a challenge that stretched
the limits of manufacturing capability. Throughout the war, Norden and other bombsight
producers continually struggled with the production process, and even as late as late 1944, the
USAAF was reporting that 75 to 80 percent of the bombsights it received were unsuitable for
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combat use.1 Even simple machines such as the E6-B computer, used by the navigator and
bombardier, stretched the limits of complexity, brought together with maps, charts, and flight
instruments to form a shared calculating capability that extended far beyond their individual
capacities.
The humans in the system were equally complex as individuals and as a group, defined
by the job they performed and the machine that they used to perform it. Some, such as the
navigator and bombardier, performed single, well-defined tasks requiring specific skills that
established their professional identity. Others, like the pilot, performed a similarly well-defined
task, flying, but derived professional identity and position from another, less well-defined but
more powerful task, command. All, however, were incapable of fulfilling their function without
a technological partner that not only enabled them to perform that function, but formed an
integral part of their professional identity, bringing to light perhaps the most important
characteristic of the bombardment system-there is no instance where a human or machine
performed a task as a single entity. Interdependent humans and machines acted as individual
socio-technical elements, each forming an extension of the other, but even those elements existed
as part of greater whole, and we cannot understand the function of any one of them without
considering all of the others.
Additionally, the humans existed in a complex professional and social structure with a
distinct pecking order defined by the doctrine that brought them together as a team, the
organizationally held belief in pilots as leaders, and the superior-subordinate relationships that
were a product of the military rank system. Those structures could conflict with informal
structures, such as the meritocracy produced by the creation of the lead crew positions, which
bestowed control upon those who demonstrated technical excellence regardless of rank, or a
humans' own individual assessment of their value based on the role played on the crew, founded
on the particular skill and machine that defined them, such as with the bombardier. These social
relationships, between the humans and machines and the humans and humans, created a
complicated, messy environment that served only to complicate another key characteristic of the
bombardment system-control.
Stephen L. McFarland, America's Pursuit of Precision Bombing, 1910-1945 (Washington, DC: Smithsonian
Institution Press, 1995), 145.
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Control-Machines and Command
All systems need control. The complexity of the bombardment system drove its design
and evolution as a three-level system to enable control, but two primary factors directly affected
how that control was exercised: machines and command. Machines played a key role in defining
which human in the system had the authority to exert control. The pilot, by virtue of his ability
tofly the aircraft, the lowest level at which all of the pieces of the system came together as a
cohesive element, was the de facto system controller. When the autopilot and bombsight
provided the bombardier the ability to "fly" the aircraft more precisely than the pilot during the
most critical phase of the mission, they directly challenged the pilot's right and ability to control
the system. However, because the autopilot and bombsight provided only a limited ability to
steer the aircraft, not fully control it, the bombardier did not become the overall system
controller. They merely gave the bombardier the ability to perform a part-task better than the
pilot could. In fact, the autopilot, by helping the pilot fly the aircraft during the non-bomb run
portions of the mission, improved the pilot's ability to exert the control that he already
possessed.
The second dominant factor that affected how humans controlled the bombardment
system was the function of command, and it more clearly explains why the bombardier did not
become the system controller. Machines could provide only limited control over specific parts
or functions of the overall system, but all of the system functions needed to be controlled and,
significantly, harmonized. Command, a function doctrinally vested in the pilot, provided the
ability to exert that control. It gave the pilot organizationally derived responsibility that trumped
the simple ability to fly the aircraft as the source of the authority to control the system. He alone
was responsible for its correct operation, and while the pilot shared control to manage system
complexity, he did not share command. The concept of command as a broader force that
supercedes but includes system control is a key consideration as we examine the development of
subsequent aerial combat systems.
Shared and Distributed Cognition
As a complex socio-technical entity that reacted to a dynamic environment to perform a
specific mission, the bombardment system demonstrated another key characteristic-shared
cognition. Every task was dependent upon the sharing of unique cognitive capabilities
distributed throughout the system in both humans and machines. The navigator combined his
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abilities to interpret the physical environment and integrate data with the calculation and
translation capabilities resident in his charts, maps, and E6-B computer to navigate. Likewise,
the bombardier combined his ability to interpret the bomber's physical status and the data in the
bombing tables and translate it for use by the Norden bombsight, which, as an advanced
mechanical calculator, had the ability to compute the solution to the bomb dropping point
problem rapidly in a dynamic environment. In each case, the separate cognitive capabilities of
the humans and machines came together, complementing each other, to enable the solution of
complex problems beyond the capacity of either alone.
While humans and machines shared cognition, so too did the humans on the bomber
crew. The pilot depended upon each specialist crewmember to acquire and maintain the
knowledge and expertise necessary to perform their tasks, and as a whole, they formed a larger,
more capable cognitive element. Similarly, the navigator depended upon the other crewmembers
to provide him usable navigation information that they gathered from sources to which he lacked
access, such as the view of the ground from their crew position. As the set of central beliefs
shared by all of the crewmembers, doctrine played a role in shared cognition, as it provided a
common base of knowledge that shaped their thought processes and perceptions, enabling them
to work together toward a common goal.
While doctrine enabled shared cognition within the individual socio-technical element
and aircraft-levels of the bombardment system, it is interesting to note that it also inhibited that
sharing at the larger, formation level of the system. The USAAF policy of radio silence during
bombing missions prevented navigation and targeting information from being shared between
aircraft, and in several instances this lack of communication led to missed navigation turn points,
2
attacks on the wrong target, or the loss of aircraft and aircrews. This policy clearly inhibited
sharing data or information outside the aircraft, but another area of potential investigation for the
phenomenon is rooted in the bombardment system's the social realm-the influence of the
command structure. With so much doctrinal emphasis placed on the significance of command as
the final arbiter of control in the system, was there an institutional barrier that prevented
subordinate elements from questioning the actions and decisions of the command pilot and lead
2 The question of sharing information between elements in aerial combat systems remains a challenge in the USAF
to this day, and the institutional resistance to the implementation of effective datalink systems is an area
ripe for investigation. For a perspective on the advantages of information sharing in aerial combat, see
Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War, Revised Edition, McNair papers: No. 68
(Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2004).
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crew to the detriment of the overall mission? If so, this merely reinforces the interdependent
nature of the bombardment system, the assertion that doctrine is an integral element, and that
social structures and relations can have system-wide effects.
The Aerial Combat System-The Elements, Their Roles, and "What They Do"
The processes of shared control and shared cognition reveal a pattern in the roles played
by the humans, machines, and doctrine in the bombardment system, with each performing
distinct functions based upon their individual expertise or purpose. While not all are specific,
well-defined singular tasks, these functions capture what each did, providing the foundation for
the examination of the design and use of subsequent aerial combat systems and, most
significantly for the current debate surrounding the roles of humans and automation in remotely
piloted aircraft (RPA), the evolving relationship between these elements within the systems.
Doctrine-Purpose, Design, and Direction
The sharing of control and cognition between the humans and machines in the
bombardment system did not evolve spontaneously. It happened because the system elements
were bound by a common purpose, assembled to enable controlled pursuit of that purpose,
comprised of complementary humans and machines focused on well defined tasks, and operated
in a way that took advantage of the system's designed capabilities. Doctrine's role in the system
was to ensure that all of that occurred by clearly defining the system purpose, defining the
human and machine elements around the functions necessary to achieve it, and defining how
they, as a socio-technical unit, would perform those functions. In this manner, by intentionally
affecting its behavior, the doctrine itself became the key contextual factor and an integral part of
the bombardment system.
Humans-Complex Cognition
The human role in the bombardment system involved employing a unique set of
cognitive skills to perform the complex tasks associated with the inherent complexity and
uncertainty of a dynamic socio-technical system. The bomber crewmembers applied these skills
at every level of the system in an effort to impose control and make it work as unified network
focused on achieving a single objective or purpose. They accomplished this through three
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primary functions: interpreting and translating the environment, integrating disparate sets of data,
and system management and judgment.
Interpreting and Translating the Environment
The bomber crewmembers interpreted the bombardment system environment at the
individual human-machine element level, acting as "sensors" for a particular machine. The pilot
interpreted the aircraft attitude for the autopilot, using his eyes to combine what he could see out
of the cockpit window and on the aircraft instruments to create a single reference that the
autopilot, by design, accepted as truth. Without that level truth, the autopilot could not sense
deviations from it and make corrections. The navigator interpreted the bomber's physical state
through the flight instruments, radio, and visual sources, often having to interpret imprecise
readings or indications to gather useful data. In the process, he often converted analog and
position data to digital data that his calculators and charts could use to compute the aircraft
position.
The bombardier's role as interpreter was perhaps the most instructive regarding the
human role in the bombardment system, as it involved many complex, core functions that are
still performed in current aerial combat systems. The Norden bombsight performed almost all of
the dynamic calculations necessary for precision bombing, but had no capacity to collect the
necessary data. The bombardier provided that data, some of it digital, gathered from flight
instruments and bombing tables, but also critical analog data that involved finding, identifying,
and tracking the target. The bombardier found the target visually and identified it based upon the
information gathered during the extensive pre-mission route study and mission planning process.
When he did this, he transformed a geographic point on the ground into an objective-the
reference point upon which the bombsight based all of its calculations-orienting it in the
physical world and establishing the critical relationship between the bombsight and the target.
When the bombardier pointed the bombsight at the target, he translated its position into
direction data, and then managed the relationship between the target and the bombsight by
continuing to visually track the target and synchronize the bombsight's optical tracking
mechanism. Through this process, he translated the target position data into tracking rate data,
ultimately enabling the bombsight to create the miniature analog of that physical relationship
between the bombsight and the target that analog enabled the it to calculate the bomb release
point. While the bombsight ultimately performed the calculation, it was the bombardier's ability
337
to identify a point on the ground as a target and manage the relationship between it and the
bombsight that enabled the system to work.
Integrating Disparate Sets of Data
The crewmembers also managed complexity in the bombardment system by exercising
the unique cognitive ability to integrate disparate sets of data and transform them into data usable
by the machines in the system. The pilot integrated two very different sets of data-his visual
perception of the aircraft attitude relative to the horizon and the digital and rate information that
obtained from his flight instruments-into a single representation as he defined the level
reference for the autopilot. The navigator managed more complex problems in his "centres of
calculation," integrating visual, analog, textual, and position data and continually translated it
into data usable by his E6-B computer, his Flight Record, or his air plot. The bombardier's
function as an integrator was perhaps the most challenging of all, as he combined digital data
from bomb tables and drift calculations, visual data on his target photos and perspective charts,
and direction and motion data derived from his operation of the bombsight into a coherent whole
that enabled the bombsight to perform its function.
System Management and Judgment
The final human role in the bombardment system, managing the system and exercising
judgment, combined both interpreting the environment and integrating data within the context of
the mission-making sure that the system was doing what it needed to do and operating within
the parameters of the context of the mission itself. The navigator and bombardier operated
primarily at the individual machine level, caring for their machines and ensuring that they were
operable and properly calibrated. They also exercised judgment when using those machines,
often having to interpret imprecise instrument readings from fluctuating gauges or displays to
determine a value for the airspeed, heading, or altitude needed for their calculations. The
navigator served as a "sanity check" on his own work, continually evaluating his calculated
position relative to his pre-mission plan as well as his inflight records, ensuring that his solution
was reasonable and within an acceptable range of error, functioning much like a modern
Kalmann filter. The bombardier was the final decision authority on whether to allow the
bombsight to drop the bombs. Making that decision, either way, required understanding the
mission and its purpose, and integrating its real-time context to evaluate whether anything
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differed enough from what was anticipated to warrant not completing the defining task at the
center of the bombardment system.
The pilot managed the system at both the individual machine and larger system levels.
He managed the autopilot while it was in use, monitoring its performance, adjusting it when
necessary, and ensuring that it kept the aircraft moving in the right direction. Likewise, he
managed the crew to ensure that they were performing their jobs. At the system level, the pilot
ensured that his particular element was performing in compliance with the overall mission plan,
whether as an individual aircraft or a larger portion of the formation, fulfilling its role as defined
by the HADPB doctrine and functioning correctly within the context of the mission overall. This
was perhaps the most complex cognitive function of all, and an inherent responsibility of
command, as it required a complete understanding of the mission, its purpose, and how his
particular element fit into it.
Ultimately, system management and judgment were intertwined as one function, boiling
down to an assessment of whether something was right. Did the navigation calculation place the
aircraft in the right position on the Flight Plan and mission map? Was the building or bridge
under the crosshairs in the bombsight the right target? Was the aircraft or formation going where
it needed to in order to accomplish the mission objective? The answers to these questions could
be difficult and they were always subjective, as they required an interpretation and understanding
of some particular context surrounding the question, whether it was a fluctuating compass or
deciding to continue in the face of deteriorating weather over the target. Only the humans in the
bombardment system possessed the unique cognitive ability to capture the complexity of that
context, integrate with the greater mission and doctrinal context, and play the role of decision
maker to arrive at an answer.
The humans in the bombardment system performed shared cognitive tasks with specific
machines, but their uniquely human cognitive ability to constructively manage the complexity
within the system defined their role. While some of the particular functions, like navigation or
bombing, were strictly defined and even mechanized to an extent, and others, like flying and
command, were much more flexible, each one required interpretation, integration, and
management within some not-easily quantifiable context. The ability to handle this complexity,
however, was not matched by a similar ability to perform some of the specific tasks with the
precision necessary for the bombing mission. That role fell to the machines in the system.
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Machines-Simplification
Just as the processes of shared control and shared cognition reveal a distinct pattern in the
roles played by humans, so too do they for the machines used in the bombardment system.
While the bomber aircraft played a prominent role in the system, the roles played by the
individual machines provide the foundation for understanding the human-machine relationship in
aerial combat systems. Machines performed very specific cognitive tasks, and in the case of the
automated machines physio-cognitive tasks that involved some form of sensing and action or
reaction, that simplified the complex and varied human cognitive tasks necessary to operate the
bombing system. They accomplished this through two principal functions: performing complex
calculations in a dynamic environment and executing precision physical and cognitive tasks.
Calculation, Precision Action, and the Single Task
The machines in the system were designed to support a specific task with a specific
capability. Aerial navigation required a great deal of repeated calculation, and accuracy and
speed were essential for precision. Rapidly solving the complex geometric, vector, and
trigonometric problems necessary to calculate the aircraft position was beyond the unaided
cognitive capacity of most navigators. Specially designed mechanical calculators, flight
planning and recording forms, and navigational charts with embedded cognitive capabilities
enabled the navigator to perform these calculations and navigate effectively. While extremely
powerful, however, these devices were limited in their application, useful only for the specific
function of navigation calculation. The bombardier was also involved in complex calculation,
but he used a machine with much greater precision to simplify the problem of locating the single
point in space from which he could drop his bombs and hit the desired target, the Norden
bombsight.
Arguably the most advanced airborne mechanical calculator of its era, the Norden
bombsight was more powerful than the navigator's computers and solved complex, dynamic
mathematical calculations far more quickly than is conceivable for a human alone. When used
with the other computers and bombing tables, it enabled the level of rapid calculation necessary
for precision bombing. As a calculator, however, the Norden bombsight was even more limited
than the navigator's were, intended for a more narrowly defined task-to locate the precise
position of the bomb dropping point. It could perform no function other than those related to the
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task of bombing. 3 The single task orientation that characterizes the calculating machines is
reflected in the bombardment system's automated machines, as well.
The bombardment system relied on two primary automated machines, the Norden
bombsight and the Minneapolis-Honeywell C-1 Autopilot, both designed to perform the precise,
timely actions necessary for precision bombing. Other than calculation, the bombsight
performed two automatic functions: it gyroscopically kept the optical system oriented to the true
vertical after the bombardier leveled it, and it automatically released the bombs from the aircraft
precisely at the calculated bomb dropping point, both of which increased bombing accuracy.
While separate physical functions, their common purpose was dropping precision bombs. The
autopilot performed one automated function-it automatically maintained the flight attitude
commanded by the system operator, whether the pilot or bombardier. It was very precise, able to
counter the normal oscillations of an aircraft in flight much faster and more accurately than a
human pilot could. While it served to relieve pilot fatigue on long duration flights and provided
the bombardier the ability to precisely control the aircraft flight path, it performed only a single
function-it maintained the flight attitude commanded by the human operator. Nothing more.
The machines in the bombardment system were all single-task focused. They performed
tightly defined, single functions that accomplished very specific cognitive and physio-cognitive
tasks. Where the human role was to manage the complexity in the system, the machine's role
was to simplify specific aspects of that complexity for the human by making certain tasks easier
to accomplish rapidly and more precisely. While they helped the crewmembers perform rapid,
complex calculations in a dynamic environment and execute the precise physical tasks necessary
for precision bombing, none of the machines, even the automated ones with rudimentary
capability to sense their environment and react to it, was able to deal with the uncertainty or
complexity inherent in the bombing mission. They performed their task regardless of the
mission purpose or the context surrounding it, and were likewise unable to adapt their behavior
in response to a change in that context. They executed only that which the human operator
directed. It is this inability to adapt to the context that is the most interesting, and possibly most
important, aspect about the machine's role in the system, and sheds light on how we may
3 As discussed in Chapter 4, the Norden bombsight could compute the aircraft drift for the navigator, much like a
drift meter, but this function was integral to bombing, as well.
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understand if and how automation has changed what the human operator really does in aerial
combat systems.
Automation, Concentration, and Control
One of the principal issues in the debate surrounding the present-day increased use of
RPAs is the effect of the increased use of automation in aerial combat systems. As such, it is
useful to examine the effect of the use of automation in the first aerial combat system-which
predated current RPA systems by over half a century. All of the automated machines in the
bombardment system performed single, well-defined, cognitive tasks that began with human
operator input, remained under operator supervision during operation, and could be terminated
by the operator at any time during execution. They were automated, but not autonomous.
Additionally, while the task that they accomplished could be individually quite complex, within
the larger system, it was cognitively quite simple. At no point were the technologies called upon
to understand why they were performing that task or how it fit into the larger system's operation
and purpose. That role fell to the human operator. They acted independent of any context other
than the tightly defined parameters that controlled their operation. This is the area where we
must look for change in the human-machine relationship. If, as we examine subsequent aerial
combat systems, we see automated machines shouldering more of the complex cognition burden,
we can then look for change in the human operator's actions as they push more tasks to
machines, freeing up cognitive capacity.
While the conclusion that machines accomplished easily-defined tasks and humans more
complex ones is neither new nor surprising, it provides insight into the rationale used to
determine which functions might be chosen for automation in aerial combat systems and why.
Handing off time consuming cognitive tasks to automated machines freed up more of the
human's limited cognitive capacity so that it could be dedicated to the higher-level task of
controlling the system. The greater the number of tasks that can be automated, the greater the
amount of control a single human can exert over the larger system. This concept clearly guided
the use of automation in the system, but its influence is far wider and not limited just to
automation, indicating a more generalized phenomena that we can clearly see through the
development of the bombardment system as just that-a socio-technical system.
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As we examine the bombardment system, we see clear indications of the process of
defining tasks, designing an element to perform that task effectively in a fashion that is
controllable, and suborning it to a controlling authority. Initially, the pilot performed all of the
tasks on an aircraft associated with bombing. However, as the task of dropping bombs became
more complex and beyond the capacity of the single human pilot, the Air Corps developed both a
specialized machine and a specialized human to perform that single task, and likewise with
navigation. These socio-technical elements became controllable entities focused on a single task,
and the pilot evolved to become the controller of those elements. The socio-technical elements
were not automated, but the actions of the humans themselves were mechanized through training
and procedure to try to gain some of the benefits of automation by reducing their complexity,
limiting their role, and making them more predictable. Through this process, the pilot gained
more ability to control the system at the aircraft level.
The process of concentrating tasks at a central location in the system in order to reduce
complexity and exert more control over them extended into the formation level as well, as
observed in with the adoption of the drop-on-leader doctrine and the creation of the lead crew.
Creating a single lead navigator and lead bombardier decreased the number of socio-technical
"cognitive units" in the formation, making control easier for the command pilot, but it had an
added benefit. By limiting the number of participants in the bombing and navigating process,
but increasing their span of control within the system, it made it possible to improve system
performance with a smaller investment in training.4 As demonstrated by the great reduction in
the number of bombardiers and the creation of togglier, only the lead bombardier and his
4
Before the war, the Air Corps had planned to combine bombardier and navigator training and put a single
bombardier-navigator on each crew. Combining the two tasks was viewed as a solution to the pressing
demand for trained personnel in both areas, as well as an opportunity to reduce the number of
crewmembers on bomber aircraft, saving weight and enabling them to carry more bombs. The constant
shortage of qualified personnel and the difficulty of finding recruits capable of being trained in both
specialties prevented the Air Corps from fully implementing the program at the beginning of the war. They
did, however, begin training a significant number of dual-qualified bombardier-navigators on the use of the
less-complex D-8 bombsight and in dead reckoning navigation for use on the smaller crews of medium
bombers, such as the B-25. By late 1943, they had developed several different training programs that
trained bombardiers more thoroughly in some areas of navigation, and trained navigators in the basics of
bombing and how to use the bombsight. The particular program that a recruit completed depended upon
which bomber he would fly in combat. For example, recruits destined for assignment to a B-29 unit were
"completely dually trained" as celestial navigators and bombardiers, whereas those destined for B-17s or B-
24s received only bombardier and dead reckoning training. See Ben R. Baldwin, Individual Training of
Bombardiers, Army Air Forces Historical Study 5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Air Forces Assistant Chief
of Staff, Intelligence Historical Division, May 1944), 58-70.
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deputies needed to know how to operate the Norden bombsight. In that case, a few well trained
individuals were all that was required, greatly reducing the amount of expensive training
necessary to make the bombardment system effective. Of course, once the single task of
bombing was concentrated in a single point, it became a logical candidate for more automation.
In 1944, the USAAF developed and fielded the Radio Bomb Release (RBR) automated
bombing system, codenamed "Crawfish," which used radio signals to trigger the simultaneous
release of all of the bombs in an entire bomber formation. A radio in the lead bomber
transmitted a signal when the lead bombardier's bombsight dropped its bombs, triggering
receivers in the rest of the formation to do the same. Only used in a limited capacity, as the
system was subject to malfunction and jamming, RBR produced very tight bomb patterns when
it worked, further demonstrating how a single control technology could improve system
performance.5 As single tasks, both navigation and bombing were appropriate candidates for
further the further application of technology, automated and otherwise.
World War II saw a great swelling of American technological development, and by the
middle of 1943, a revolutionary new technology was slowly taking its place at the head of the
giant bomber formations flying over Europe-radar.6 Specially trained Pathfinder crews flew
radar-equipped bombers in the lead position, using the new technology to assist with both
navigation and bombing when weather obscured the ground, adding a tremendous new offensive
capability while simultaneously creating a new crew position, the radar operator, which required
an entirely new skill set.7 Interestingly automation brought bombing and flying even closer
together during the war in PROJECT APHRODITE, where worn out B- 17s were converted to
remotely piloted aircraft, loaded with 20,000 pounds of explosives, and then flown remotely into
high-value ground targets.8 The guided missiles and RPAs in use today can count these "Weary
Willie" bombers in their lineage.
Automation technologies played a large role in the bombardment system, as they
performed single, well-defined, time consuming cognitive tasks that required speed and
5 Roger A. Freeman, The Mighty Eighth War Manual (London: Jane's Publishing Company, Ltd, 1984), 46.
6 For an excellent account of the United States' tremendous scientific and technological advances during the war,
see James Phinney Baxter, Scientists Against Time (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968).
7 For a perspective on the use of radar and the role of the Pathfinders in the British effort during the CBO, see
Gordon Musgrove, Pathfinder Force: A History of 8 Group (London: Macdonald and Jane's, 1976).
8 Dik A. Daso, Hap Arnold and the Evolution ofAmerican Airpower (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution
Press, 2000), 186-188.
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precision, freeing up the humans in the system to perform the more complex cognitive tasks
associated with operating the system within the context of the mission. Although automated,
these technologies were not autonomous and required human operators to apply their capabilities
to the particular needs of the mission. The automation of these tasks reflected a larger socio-
technical trend of concentrating human and machine capability in a central location in the
system, enabling greater control over them and over the larger system itself. Technical
development focused on improving performance in these areas, and the bombardment system
began changing as new capabilities were developed and implemented. New technologies
brought new crewmembers and new procedures to operate them, but they were bound together
by the same element of the system that defined the initial components, defined their form, and
guided their operation-doctrine.
All of the elements in the bombing system had distinct roles. The humans performed
complex cognitive tasks that required interpreting and translating the system environment,
integrating disparate sets of data, and exercising judgment, managing the system to ensure that
all of the elements performed within the particular context of the mission. The technologies
aided the humans by performing single tasks that required rapid complex calculation or precision
action that was beyond human capability, freeing up their uniquely human cognitive capacity so
that the system could function at all levels. Doctrine was the key contextual element in the
bombardment system-the "why" that bound together the humans, machines, and ideas. Its role
was to provide the purpose, the design, and the direction for the system's use. In this role, it
affected the makeup of the socio-technical elements, both physically and socially, but was itself
affected by their actions. Acting as the glue that held the system together, it is not possible to
understand how the system's physical and social elements operated, at any level, without
considering it a full and equal part of the system.
Looking Beyond the First Step-The Socio-Technical View of Aerial Combat
Three decades after Riley Scott first demonstrated his bomb dropper, the United States
took the first aerial combat system to war. From August 1942 to the end of December 1943,
USAAF bomber formations visually bombed 2,766 targets out of 2,872 struck, dropping over
345
109,000 short tons of bombs and losing 1,567 aircraft in the process.9 While it was the first use
of a bombardment system on a large scale, that period of the CBO effectively marked the end of
an era. In the years following, inventions such as radar and other automated machines produced
new methods of flying aircraft and dropping bombs, and while large bombers remained a viable
aerial combat alternative, many new systems emerged that employed smaller aircraft with
different capabilities. Rather than viewing that change as a continuing, monochromatic
procession of new aircraft that could drive inaccurate, context independent conclusions about the
roles of humans and machines in these systems, the socio-technical perspective developed in this
study provides an alternative way to interpret aerial combat system development, using doctrinal
change as a common thread that enables us to reveal the evolving human-machine relationship,
particularly with regard to how automated machines affected what the human operators did and
who they were.
The first major, non-nuclear, doctrinal change after World War II occurred in the early
1960s, when improved enemy air defenses and the need to drop bombs at night or in any weather
condition made high-altitude, daylight bombing a poor option for the precision strike mission.
The need for a high speed, low-altitude, all-weather bomber drove the development and fielding
of the General Dynamics F-111. The F-111 was a fighter-bomber aircraft operated by two
crewmembers, a pilot in the left seat and a weapons system officer (WSO) in the right, and
although smaller than the B-17, it carried more bombs and could fly much farther. Highly
complex, it incorporated many automated flying, navigating, and bombing systems, reflecting a
distinct trend toward the increased use of automation in aerial combat.
One of the most significant automated systems was the terrain following radar (TFR), a
forward-looking radar that, when coupled to the aircraft autopilot, provided the capability to fly
at the extremely low altitudes and high speeds necessary to avoid the enemy air defenses without
hitting the ground. The TFR automatically maintained a set altitude, and could fly the aircraft at
altitudes and speeds far beyond the human pilot's capability, particularly at night when he could
not see the ground. In high threat combat areas, it was not uncommon for the pilot to set the
TFR to maintain 200 feet while the aircraft traveled at airspeeds up to 600 miles per hour. With
the system engaged, the pilot did not touch the flight controls, and although he monitored its
9 Data taken from spreadsheet 1942-45.xls in Richard G. Davis, Bombing the European Axis Powers: A Historical
Digest of the Combined Bomber Offensive, 1939-1945 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press,
2006).
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performance, there was little or no time to override an errant flight control input, and he had to
develop a clear trust relationship with the system in order to get comfortable using it. The TFR's
outstanding low-altitude flying capability had an interesting role in the trust relationship between
the crewmembers, as well. On crews where the pilot and WSO were unfamiliar with each other,
the WSO was often more comfortable when the autopilot was flying the aircraft at low altitude
than when the human pilot was flying, as he knew what to expect from the autopilot.' 0
The TFR and autopilot also integrated with the F-III's navigation system, itself a highly
automated inertial navigation system (INS) that kept track of the aircraft position by tracking its
movement with a series of internal gyroscopes. Together, they largely automated the function of
flying to the target, able to fly the aircraft on a preplanned mission flight route, avoiding
obstacles and integrating a great deal of the physical mission context in a way that was not
possible during World War II. Both the TFR and INS also integrated with the aircraft's weapon
system computer and bomb targeting radar, creating a coupled bombing system that was
conceptually a direct descendant of the Norden bombsight. After the WSO "designated" a target
on the radar scope, the weapon system computer flew the aircraft to the correct release point,
from which it could drop the bomb automatically, if desired." This integrated system also gave
the WSO the ability to "fly" the aircraft through the computer and autopilot, as well, by simply
moving his target designator on the radar scope and changing the target location and thus the
steering point for the computer.
The F-Ill used many automated machines to help the aircrew perform its mission, with
the TFR and weapon system computer further refining the ability to perform tasks accomplished
on the B- 17, like flying and bombing, and the INS performing new ones, like navigation. All of
these systems required that the humans, as well, refine some of their existing skills or develop
other new ones to operate them. The pilot had to improve as a system manager, as both the TFR
and the complexity of the entire aircraft system placed new demands on his cognitive skills. The
WSO, who was in fact part navigator and part bombardier, had to improve as a system manager
as well, as he was responsible for several automated navigation and bombing systems, and had to
10 Terrance McCaffrey, "Interview with Terrance McCaffrey, Col, USAF," interview by Raymond P. O'Mara,
August 13, 2010; Raymund E. O'Mara, "Interview with Raymund E. O'Mara, Maj. Gen., USAF (Retired),"
interview by Raymond P. O'Mara, June 13, 2010.
The system had a consent-to-release function operated by the pilot, much like the release lever that the
bombardier used on the Norden bombsight.
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learn how to visually interpret the radar display and determine how to locate and identify his
target on a monochrome green screen, as well. Studying radar "pictures" of targets replaced
studying photographs during mission planning on missions where radar bombing was planned,
and interpreting them evolved into a skill in itself.12 As the navigator, the WSO had to learn how
to manage the computer's internal navigation model, which involved understanding and
monitoring a task-inertial navigation-that he himself could not even perform. The most
important thing that the humans had to develop, however, was the ability to trust their machines
as they took on more and more mission critical functions, the correct performance of which was
essential for the survival of the aircrew itself. This essential trust bound the humans and
machines together more tightly as a socio-technical unit.
While each of the automated machines used on the F-111 still essentially performed a
single task, when integrated as a weapon system they performed much more complex cognitive
tasks than the machines on the B- 17 by concentrating more functions into fewer locations in the
system. This concentration enabled the size of the crew to be reduced, as it gave individual
humans the ability to manage more tasks, but automation's ability to provide system control to
different individuals reinforced some of the machine-induced social phenomena observed in the
B-17. The WSO, who operated the weapons system computer and navigation system, gained
much more physical control of the aircraft, including the mission critical functions of navigating
and bombing, while the pilot surrendered even more of his flying responsibility to the same
computer and the TFR and autopilot. In fact, the job involved enough system control that there
was initial discussion regarding replacing WSOs with inexperienced pilots to provide them the
opportunity to become seasoned before moving to the left seat as the aircraft commander, much
like the copilot in the B- 17.13
The USAF investigated this possibility in 1967 during COMBAT LANCER, the first
combat deployment to Vietnam, when they put pilots in the right seat instead of the navigators
who had trained for the position. The experiment proved fruitless, however, serving only to
annoy both parties, denying the navigators the opportunity to perform their jobs and causing
resentment among the pilots denied the opportunity to fly the aircraft. Ultimately, pilot manning
12 See "COMBAT LANCER Preliminary Report (Secret/NOFORN) (Information extracted declassified 14 July
2010)", December 20, 1968, K168.03-262, IRIS No. 113011, US Air Force Historical Research Agency.
13 See Aircrew Composition Study for F-4 and F-111 Aircraft (Combat Eternal) (United States Air Force, 1968), M-
U 38264-77, Muir S. Fairchild Research and Information Center, Maxwell AFB, AL.
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shortages prevented any further use of pilots in the right seat, and the basic crew functions went
unchanged. The pilot occupied the left seat as the aircraft commander, responsible for the
overall management and successful operation of the system, and the WSO occupied the right
seat, a technical navigation and bombing specialist. The case provides an opportunity to explore
more deeply the phenomena witnessed with the adoption of the C-I autopilot in the B- 17
regarding a machine's ability to grant control in a system where control is defined, at least in
part, by a specific physio-cognitive task that is central to the professional identity of one of the
human operators.1 4
The F-Ill case is an opportunity to see how automated machines can change the human
operators' physical actions in aerial combat systems, but also raises questions that provide
insight into the evolution of human and machine functions in these systems. As automated
machines gained more ability to physically fly the aircraft, how did the pilot's role evolve?
What additional functions and responsibilities did the pilot assume? If giving a machine or
another operator the physical ability to fly did not change the fundamental control structure in
the system, what is the role of flying in system control? Perhaps, what does it really mean to
"fly," and most importantly, what are the key skills necessary to perform that function? The
increased use of automation spurred by doctrinal change prompted these questions, and within
twenty years, another significant doctrinal change produced a new system in which the use of
automation raised even more questions about the pilot's role in manned aerial combat systems.
Where the doctrinal change to low-altitude, all-weather strike brought humans and
machines closer together in the F-111 socio-technical system by further blurring the lines
between human and machine roles, the fielding of the F- 117 Nighthawk stealth fighter in the
1980s did so to an even greater extent. The F- 117 emerged in response to the very poor
performance of US-built aircraft against Soviet-built air defense systems during the 1973 Arab-
Israeli War. Created as a single-seat, medium altitude, night, precision strike platform, the F-117
was a technological marvel, and the unique nature of its design directly influenced the human
pilot's actions while employing it.15
14 See Major Norman L. Rice, Effects of Right Seat Manning and Radar Strike Preparation on the F-1I "Combat
Lancer" Project, Corona Harvest, Project CORONA HARVEST (Maxwell AFB, AL: Aerospace Studies
Institute, Air University, January 1971), K239.032-21, IRIS No. 917632, US Air Force Historical Research
Agency.
15 See Martin L. Van Creveld, Military Lessons of the Yom Kippur War: Historical Perspectives (Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage Publications, 1975). The F-i 17 is actually an interesting case where the doctrine emerged from the
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The need to achieve and maintain stealthy characteristics drove the F- 117's design, and
the unique shape necessary to minimize radar detection produced an aircraft that looked more
like a science fiction-inspired spacecraft than a strike platform. The aggressively swept wings
made the aircraft inherently unstable in pitch, thus uncontrollable by a human pilot without the
use of a digital fly-by-wire flight control system. That flight control system was part of a
complex digital autopilot that could rapidly and accurately sense the aircraft attitude and perform
the complex calculations necessary to keep the aircraft in flight. While the pilot still controlled
the aircraft direction and orientation with a conventional flight control stick, the autopilot
modified his control inputs with its own before moving the flight control surfaces, making flying
the aircraft a true team effort.
The autopilot also played a major role in the aircraft's combat employment. During a
mission, the aircraft had to remain correctly oriented to the known threats to maintain its stealthy
profile. This meant flying precise headings for extended periods based on the threat, turning
only when necessary. Rather than tax the pilot with this task, the autopilot flew the mission
profile, controlled by an electronic flight program created on the ground before the mission,
consisting of a set of executable instructions, much like the flight plan created by the B- 17
navigator in World War II. The autopilot flew the aircraft for the majority of the mission, with
the pilot "hand flying" it only during takeoff, transit periods, aerial refueling, and landing. This
significantly decreased role as a flyer raises some interesting questions when we examine the
system socio-technically, especially when we then examine the human role in RPA systems.
Who, or what, was flying the aircraft? Certainly, the pilot is one answer, as he sat in the
cockpit with direct access to the flight controls, necessary for takeoff and landing, and able to
override the automatic system at any point. The autopilot is another possible answer, as it
maintained direct control over the flight control surfaces, and even integrated the mission context
with its knowledge of the necessary headings and turn points, a function performed only by the
human pilot in the B- 17. But how did it know that contextual information? Actually, it was a set
of specialized mission planners who programmed it before the mission, many of who were not
even pilots. Since the autopilot was executing their instructions, are they not a possible answer
successful development of stealth technology, rather than the technology developing in response to a
doctrinal need. This serves to reinforce the interdependent nature of all of the elements in aerial combat
systems. See Paul G. Kaminski, "Low Observables: the Air Force and Stealth," in Technology and the Air
Force: A Retrospective Assessment, ed. Jacob Neufeld, George M. Watson, Jr., and David Chenoweth
(Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997), 299-309.
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to the question? Of course, there is no single, clear answer. As seen with the F-111, the concept
of flying evolved as the aerial combat systems themselves evolved and incorporated more
automation into every operation.
The autopilot actually controlled the aircraft for the majority of the mission for another
reason, as well. Since the F- 117 was a single-seat aircraft, the pilot was responsible for dropping
the bombs on the target. The aircraft had a very advanced infrared targeting system, and the
pilot spent the majority of the time during the mission using it to find, identify, and track the
intended target. He did this by watching a single, monochromatic screen located in front of his
control stick, controlling where the targeting system looked so that he could visually acquire the
target. Once acquired and identified, he pointed a laser at the target, which the seeker on the
laser-guided bomb (LGB) carried by the aircraft tracked as it fell. During that fall, the seeker
steered to the laser spot, as the pilot essentially remotely flew the bomb to the target through the
bomb's flight control system, attaining a level of precision bombing that was only dreamed of
during the CBO. In a very odd twist to the story of the World War II bombardier using the C-I
Autopilot and Norden bombsight to perform the pilot's job of flying the aircraft, the autopilot in
the F- 117 actually gave the pilot the ability to do the bombardier's job.
Obviously, the pilot's physical role in the F- 117 was different in several ways from the
B- 17 or F-Ill pilot, but they were evolutionary changes largely driven by the use and
dependence upon automated systems. The F- 117 brought system management to a new level, as
the pilot had to monitor the autopilot, the aircraft engine and performance instruments, and the
operation and employment of the targeting system, but he still remained the aircraft commander,
the individual responsible for the entire system. The targeting system introduced the need for the
pilot to develop a new skill, however. Understanding and interpreting the infrared display was
part art, part science, and took much practice to master and it developed into a new measure of
"piloting" ability among F- 117 operators. Rather than the ones who could turn the hardest or
shoot the fastest, excellence in the F- 117 was measured by how well and how fast a pilot could
identify his target on the targeting system display.1 6
As a highly automated system, the F- 117 graphically illustrates the effect of the use of
increased automation on the physical actions of the aircraft operator. As machines took on
16 Mike Merritt, "Interview with Mike Merritt, Lt Col, USAF (Retired)," interview by Raymond P. O'Mara, August
12, 2010.
351
progressively more of the cognitive load associated with individual technical tasks, concentrating
them into fewer and fewer automated systems, it enabled the pilot to perform more of the higher-
level management tasks necessary to keep the entire system operating. From that perspective,
automation changed the pilot's fundamental role in the system very little. That fact alone is the
conceptual bridge that links the human, machine, and doctrinal roles developed in this thesis to
the debate surrounding the effect of the increased use of automation in today's RPA systems. In
the F- 117, a weapon system fielded in the 1980s and already retired from the active flying
inventory, an automated machine accomplished almost all of the mission-related flying
functions. It was far more automated than most of the RPA systems in use today, particularly
those that employ weapons. If we wish to evaluate the effect of the increasing use of automation
in unmanned systems, we need merely to look back at those other manned systems that we have
so recently used, very successfully, in combat.
This brief glance at the F-1Il and the F- 117 within the context of the entire study only
scratches the surface of what we can learn about the human-machine relationship in aerial
combat systems by examining them from a socio-technical perspective, but it shows the value of
that frame of reference for better understanding the social, technological, and doctrinal issues
surrounding the increased use of RPAs in today's militaries. Although remotely piloted, broadly
conceived, the RPAs of the twenty first century are colossal networks of specially trained
humans and purpose built machines and automation technologies, including pilots, sensor
operators, aircraft, satellites, computers, datalink systems, and weapons, guided by a new,
developing set of doctrinal ideas and beliefs, that together bring a new set of airpower
capabilities to the battlefield-essentially grown up versions of the bombardment system that the
United States took to war against Germany in 1942. Understanding them requires the same
holistic approach used in this study, focusing on the central roles played by all of the elements in
the system, rather than focusing on a single human-machine physical relationship. Only then can
we conquer the real challenge of identifying change in the relationship between the elements,
because the change reveals itself in what each element does, which is not necessarily dependent
upon where it is.
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